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The present thesis sets out to provide an understanding of how European integration 
affects NPs in the EU and their relationship to the executive. The main objective of the 
empirical analysis is to investigate how parliamentary control of government serves EU 
scrutiny between 1999 and 2011. The case study, which focuses on the Luxembourgish 
Chamber of Deputies allows for a test of changes in governmental discretion on three 
parliamentary control dimensions in different domestic and European contexts of 
coalition governments and European Treaties.  
The theoretical framework for interpreting the impact of the EU on NPs and executive-
legislative relations is a combination of the larger concept of top-down Europeanisation 
with the principal agent approach. The emphasis is on the EU as an external force being 
central in the adaptation of parliamentary control of government, while taking into 
account the particularity of parliament as a principal. Based on the delegation argument, 
we generate hypotheses about the evolution of parliamentary democracy under the 
condition of a highly decentralised committee system, multiple committee membership, 
high party cohesion and majority government.  
Our empirical findings run counter to the predictions of the deparliamentarisation 
hypothesis. This owes to the fact that we investigate parliamentary control of government 
in a most inclusive perspective. Rather than weakened, this study considers the 
Luxembourgish parliament strengthened not least by the opportunities offered by the 
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INST Committee for institutions and constitutional revision (Commission des Institutions et de 
la Révision constitutionnelle) 
INT1  Internal affairs committee (Commission des Affaires intérieures) 
INT2 Committee for internal affairs and spatial planning  (Commission des Affaires intérieures 
et de l’Aménagement du Territoire) 
INT3 Committee for internal affairs, the Great Region and police (Commission des Affaires 
intérieures, de la Grande Région et de la Police)  
IPEX  Platform for EU Interparliamentary Exchange  
IV   Independent variable 
JURI  Justice committee (Commission juridique) 
LCM   number of legislative committee meetings  
LOG  Housing committee (Commission du Logement)  
LSAP  Luxembourgish Socialist Workers‘ Party (Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Arbechterpartei) 
MEDIA  Media and communications committee (Commission des Media et des Communications) 
MEPs  Members of the European parliament 
MPs  Members of National parliaments 
N  Number  
NPs  National parliaments in the European Union 
PQs  Parliamentary questions  
QMV  Qualified majority voting  
PMP  Party Manifesto Project 
R   Risk for agency loss 
xi 
 
RI  Rational Choice Institutionalism 
RGD  Grand-Ducal regulations (Règlements grand-ducaux)  
RM  Ministerial regulations (Règlements ministériels)  
RoP   Rules of procedures of the Chamber of Deputies (Règlement de la Chambre des Députés) 
SANT Committee for health and social security (Commission de la Santé et de la Sécurité 
sociale) 
SCL  Central service for legislation (Service Central de Législation) 
SEA  Single European Act 
SREL  Luxembourgish Secret Service (Service de Renseignement de l’Etat du Luxembourg) 
SSI  Structural scrutiny intensity  
SSP   Structural scrutiny potential  
TEU  Treaty of the European Union 
TFEU  Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union  
TRANS  Transport committee (Commission des Transports) 
TRAVEMP Work and employment committee (Commission du Travail et de l’Emploi) 
TRAVPUB Public works committee (Commission des Travaux publics) 
TSCG  Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the European Monetary Union  
~U  Share of non-unanimous laws 





Since the “permissive consensus” of the general public has given way to Euro-scepticism, 
negative referenda and extremely low turnout at European elections1, one of the major 
concerns of politicians as well as political scientists has been the double democratic 
deficit and hollowing out of the nation state (Ladrech, 2010, p. 73ff). European 
integration, they claim, leads to the weakening of the dual legitimacy of the European 
Union (EU), consisting in the control the European Parliament (EP) and the national 
parliaments (NPs) exert over their respective executive bodies (Benz, 2004; Neunreither, 
1994). The NPs lose leverage vis-à-vis their executives due to the extension of qualified 
majority voting (QMV) in the Council.  
 
Even worse, the growing powers of the EU are seen to trigger a weakening of NPs, the 
often referred “losers” of political integration (Maurer and Wessels, 2001a). Moreover, 
whereas the national executives take decisions behind closed doors in the Council, NPs 
are considered to lag behind in scrutinising EU lawmaking. The sheer amount of 
legislative acts stemming from the EU makes it an impossible exercise for members of 
NPs (MPs) to effectively control their governments, besides their normal business as 
legislators. Subsequent adaptation and reform of NPs' internal procedures and scrutiny 
mechanisms, as well as EU level efforts are doubted to outweigh the suspected loss in 
power (Maurer and Wessels, 2001a; O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007a; Raunio and Hix, 
2000). 
                                                          
1 On average, the turnout at EP elections further declined by 2.5% to 43% in 2009. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/de/turnout_de.html, last access: 1 




Although plausible, the assumptions and conclusions of a weakening of parliamentary 
government within the EU are contested. Doubts have been cast on whether the 
democratic deficit in the EU as such exists or not. Based on the principal agent 
approach, some authors have argued that the chain of delegation from NPs, to their 
executives and further on to the Council of the EU, already ensures the legitimacy of EU 
policy-making. In this intergovernmentalist view, NPs’ business lies at member state 
level. Legislators still control their respective governments independently of EU decision-
making (Moravcsik, 2008, 2004).  
 
Likewise, evoking again the delegation hypothesis, other scholars have questioned the 
democratic deficit caused by a weakness in parliamentary scrutiny, and have instead 
identified legislators as main players when it comes to transposition. Governments have 
to anticipate what is feasible at the domestic level when they agree to a certain policy in 
the Council of the EU. The lack of visible parliamentary activity should not be confused 
with a lack of influence (Martin, 2000, p. 147ff).   
 
From a supranational perspective, NPs do not seem concerned by European integration. 
As Ladrech states  
“If the traditional functions of parliaments can be listed as representation, 
deliberation, legislation, authorization of expenditure, and scrutiny of the 
executive, the formal increase of the power and influence of the EU does not 
directly impact any of these except scrutiny of executive. […] The EU has no direct 
impact upon the domestic operation of national parliamentary action.” (Ladrech, 
2010, p. 80).  
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In legal terms, no formal pressure of adaptation was introduced on NPs, apart from 
non-binding wish lists and recommendations, starting with the two declarations 
concerning NPs in the Maastricht Treaty in 19922 and continuously resulting from 
interparliamentary meetings, such as the Conference of EU committees (COSAC)3 
(Miklin and Crum, 2011; Miklin, 2010).  
 
On the contrary, with the Lisbon treaty, NPs were granted however modest but direct 
influence in EU politics. Legislatures and the quality of democracy stood in the focus of 
the attention in the Convention on the future of Europe, leading to the Lisbon Treaty. 
Measures, such as the “Early Warning Mechanism” (EWM) and direct sending of 
documents to domestic legislators4 were created to improve the say of NPs in EU 
legislative activities. Politicians and researchers however believe it achieved only modest 
effects (Fraga, 2005).  
 
But again, no obligation for NPs could be drawn from the Treaty. The respective 
protocols on the role of NPs and the application of the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles rather opened opportunities of involvement for those legislatures which wish 
                                                          
2 The Maastricht Treaty includes the following two declarations concerning NPs: Declaration on the role of 
national parliaments in the European Union and Declaration on the Conference of the Parliaments 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0101000034, last access: 29 December 
2013. 
3 COSAC stands for “Conférence des Organes Spécialisés dans les Affaires Communautaires et 
Européennes des Parlements de l’Union européenne”. COSAC conclusions are not binding, Article 10 of 
Protocol 1, TEU  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0148:0150:EN:PDF, last access: 
29 December 2013.  
4 The so-called “Barroso-initiative” of 2005, as expressed in "A Citizens’ Agenda Delivering Results For 
Europe" (COM (2006)211), p. 3. 
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to contribute.5 NPs’ internal operations were not obliged, and neither were MPs. Rather, 
the Treaty provisions showed the concern of elites, within and outside NPs, regarding the 
growing democratic deficit following the deepening of integration (Raunio, 2007, p. 87).  
 
Despite a lack of formal obligation, we observe their institutional adaptation, as a most 
obvious reaction of NPs on EU integration. European Union affairs committees (EACs) 
were created within all EU NPs in order to reinforce the scrutiny of the respective 
ministers of EU affairs. Furthermore, all NPs established permanent administrative 
representation offices at the EU, located within the EP (COSAC Secretariat, 2009, p. 
32).6 They served to first and foremost counterbalance the information asymmetry of 
their respective governments, report formal and informal news and prepare for meeting 
the obligations of the presidency and the COSAC secretariat membership that comes with 
it (COSAC Secretariat, 2009, p. 24; Raunio and Hix, 2000).  
 
Still, a general consensus among scholars of NPs emerged, which consists in the 
conclusion that European integration indeed empowered governments rather than NPs. 
According to these authors, single national executives were certainly not able to totally 
control agenda setting in the Council of the EU (Laver and Shepsle, 1994, p. 294), but 
their inclusion into the decision-making process resulted in an information advantage 
(Holzhacker, 2007a; O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007a), which consequently changed the 
                                                          
5 Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0148:0150:EN:PDF, last access: 29 
December 2013. 
6 An updated list of all NP Representatives may be found on the COSAC-website: 
http://www.cosac.eu/permreps/, last access: 29 December 2013.  
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power balance within the national political arena and caused institutional adaptation 
within legislatures which could not outbalance the loss of control.  
 
Yet, the scope of this EU influence on national politics remains unclear. Whereas 
governments enjoy discretion in the Council negotiations, the other side of the coin 
consists in a growing constraint by EU policy-making, although the Europeanisation of 
national legislation seems to be smaller than expected. Recent findings point to relatively 
modest but growing amounts of laws affected by EU policy-making (Brouard et al., 
2012c). In how far different fora and actors7 within NPs are subsequently influenced by 
European integration, is largely ignored by Europeanisation scholars up to now. No 
conclusive results exist, whether and to what extent the EU matters for national 
legislatures and consequently, in how far democracy is effectively in danger or absent in 
the EU member states.  
 
This discussion inspired the present thesis which is concerned with the Europeanisation 
of the Luxemburgish Chamber of Deputies (ChD) and its relationship to the government, 
between 1999 and 2011. Not much is known about how the Luxembourgish parliament 
has included EU matters in its proceedings so far, and most importantly, during this 
period of deepening and widening of European integration. Luxembourg is an interesting 
case not least because it provides unknown territory for research. We were puzzled by the 
                                                          
7 We differentiate between fora and actors, in order to point to the double function of some parliamentary 
bodies, such as committees and the plenary, but also the Conference of Presidents for instance. With 
parliamentary fora, we mean mainly committees and the plenary, as well as the parliamentary factions 
providing different opportunities and constraints as places of decision-making. Those bodies become 
actors, when they take collective decisions. This is for instance the case, when a committee adopts a report 
or the Conference of Presidents determines a speaking time model. Also, individual MPs, committee chairs, 
party leaders, and the Speaker are parliamentary actors. Those are represented in different fora, where they 
are able to express their standpoint and make use of specific instruments.   
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fact that, on the one hand, the Chamber is said to maintain a high capacity for the control 
of government. Its highly decentralised committee system makes it a “strong legislature” 
for some legislative scholars (see for instance Martin and Vanberg, 2011). On the other 
hand, it is ranked among the weakest legislatures when it comes to EU scrutiny (compare 
with Table 28 in chapter 7). This thesis brings the different notions of parliamentary 
strength together in order to give an overall evaluation of parliamentary control of 
government. While it is based upon the study of one parliament, it consists of an 
investigation of trends over thirteen years. Three different governments were in place 
during the period of investigation, two Treaty revisions have been decided at EU level, 
besides of two major enlargement rounds. We will line out the details of our logics of 
enquiry in section 1.3.  
 
Keeping NPs in the focus of attention within Europeanisation studies is important 
because they are the main producers of democratic legitimacy within the EU multi-level 
polity. They constitute the “institutions closest to the people” (Holzhacker, 2007a, p. 
144). On the one hand, they are often seen as part of the solution to the democratic deficit 
(Haenel, 2006). Aside from legitimising policy-making at national level, creating a 
second chamber at European level consisting of national parliamentarians was an issue 
among policy entrepreneurs and researchers in order to tackle the alleged democratic 
deficit (Fraga, 2005; Kiiver, 2006; Raunio, 2007, 2005a).8 On the other hand, and central 
to the aim of this thesis, studying the impact of the EU on domestic political systems can 
                                                          
8 The Laeken Declaration more precisely put the question of the role of NPs in an eventual second chamber 
explicitly to debate. In the light of discussions on the abolishment of upper chambers all across the EU, 
such as the Austrian Bundesrat, the Slovenian National Council, and most importantly, the Belgian Senate, 
the idea was never taken as a real option. In recent years, and more pronouncedly since the entering into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Council of the EU is said to function just like an upper house.  
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yield valuable insights into the underlying causes of the evolution of parliamentary 
democracy.  
 
In order to evaluate the impact of European integration on the Luxemburgish parliament, 
a holistic view on parliamentary government has to be taken over, and lawmaking as well 
as scrutiny have to be assessed (Strøm 1995, 53). Yet, until recently, studies on the 
Europeanisation of NPs did not go beyond the investigation of EU scrutiny arrangements 
in the narrow sense; thus scholars "…must extend beyond European Affairs Committees" 
(Raunio and Wiberg, 2010, p. 75). The majority of the studies in the field attempted to 
measure the strength, or weakness of legislatures in controlling governments in EU 
affairs (Auel and Benz, 2006; Maurer and Wessels, 2001a).  The impact of the EU on 
domestic lawmaking has attracted much less attention, although  
"There is an urgent need for a method to measure quantitatively the 
Europeanisation of national public policies, meaning the scope and extent to 
which national policies are shaped by European law and policy." (Töller, 2010).  
 
This study is designed to explain the consequences of European integration on the role 
of the Luxembourgish parliament vis-à-vis its government. European integration 
challenges democratic standards and domestic institutions since its beginnings. To be 
sure, national policy-making authority has been shifted to EU level. The idea that 
legislatures have necessarily lost on influence over their governments due to European 
integration is however an unproved assumption of much of the mainstream literature on 
EU scrutiny and the democratic deficit in the EU. Drawing on the traditional role of 
parliament in the political system, executive-legislative relations and legislative 
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organisation, as well as the empirical work in this study, a threefold argument will be 
made.  
 
First, principal agent theory (Bergman and Damgaard, 2000) and evidence (Jančić, 2011, 
2010)9 suggests that parliament could also benefit from European integration. Instead 
of losing hold of government and abdicating room for manoeuvre, some NPs have been 
empowered by aims to tackle unwarranted shifts of sovereignty to the EU. Analyses of 
NPs as “latecomers” or “declining” and rubber stampers of government following its own 
interest in the Council of the EU miss out on many of the more regular instruments of 
parliamentary control and influence.  
 
Second, the consequences of European integration on parliamentary organisation and the 
role of parliament within the political system will be considered. Parliaments are not 
unitary actors and different parliamentary fora witness differentiated EU impact. 
Political factions determine much of the day-to-day work within legislatures and must be 
given due consideration. Most importantly however, parliament is organised in 
committees which enjoy large autonomy and powers in organising their work.  
 
Thirdly, if we look at lawmaking as a process and outcome, the supposed decline of 
parliamentary democracy is put into question. Proposals to minimize legislative 
participation in the interest of efficiency seem to be misguided but remain on the agenda 
of decision-makers. In fact, it is precisely when executives and other actors try to 
                                                          
9 Compare with section 5.2.3 on page 272 on budgetary control and the EU, as well as section 6.1.1 on page 
298 on the direct flow of EU documents initiated by the Barroso-initiative. 
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circumvent legislatures that democracies face their most significant democratic crisis. 
Thus, lawmaking as well as scrutiny have to be considered in order to arrive at an 
adequate evaluation of executive-legislative relations. 
 
Developing these three lines of argumentation – the possible empowerment of 
legislatures by European integration, its differentiated impact on actors within parliament 
and taking into account lawmaking and scrutiny – requires that we understand 
institutionalist models of legislative organisation and legislative-executive organisation. 
The present thesis accounts for those insights into the consequences of European 
integration on executive-legislative relations of both – literature on lawmaking, 
parliamentary control of government, as well as EU scrutiny.  
 
In contrast to former studies, we take into account all parliamentary fora and actors 
concerned with lawmaking and parliamentary control, the instruments they are applying 
as well as formal and informal rules, behaviour and their change. Assessing the overall 
influence of EU policy-making on parliamentary government is essential in order to 
evaluate the quality of democracy in the EU. An empirical analysis of the amount and 
kind of European impulse affecting different areas of parliamentary business helps 
evaluating if NPs are still central players in the multi-level game within the EU. The aim 
is to contribute to our understanding on how Europe “hits” NPs and with it domestic 




The more general aim of this thesis is to answer the question of how EU policy-making 
influences the scrutiny and lawmaking functions of NPs. We seek to understand how 
those two functions linking parliament to government changed over time and in all 
different policy areas due to European integration. The principal objective is to contribute 
to a better understanding of the development of parliamentary democracy in the multi-
level governance within the EU.  
 
This brief outline of the debate on the consequences of European integration for NPs is 
followed by a presentation of the research objectives in the next section. This includes an 
outline of the primary research questions.  
 
Research objectives and primary research questions 
The present thesis aims to provide an understanding of the consequences European 
integration has on the Chamber and on its relationship to the government. The first 
research objective is to further develop the theoretical framework for interpreting 
institutionalisation due to European integration, with particular emphasis on parliament-
government relations. The main objective of the empirical analysis is to investigate how 
different EU impulses become manifest in the Luxembourgish parliamentary proceedings 
of two of its main functions, which relate parliament to government: Lawmaking and 
scrutiny.  
 
The parliamentary context changes over time and similarly, we consider EU impulses not 
as stable characteristics. Instead, we aim to establish the factors that affect EU policy-
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making, in particular EU treaty changes and enlargement. Furthermore, the study wants 
to assign the impact of different types of EU policy-making on the national legislation 
and its handling by the Luxembourgish parliament. We look at the variety of legal 
instruments with the aim of determining their differentiated impact on domestic 
legislation. The comparative perspective of the thesis, which focuses on different policy 
fields and three coalition governments, allows us to test common factors as potential 
determinants of institutionalisation in different contexts of policy-making. Overall, the 
thesis thus focuses on three major research questions:  
 
1. Which actors and fora within the Luxembourgish parliament are affected by 
European integration?  
2. How is the national institutional balance between parliament and government 
affected by European integration?  
3. What are the consequences for parliament as a principal resulting from handling 
these matters?  
 
Our intent is to undertake an institutionalist oriented study of changes in NPs provoked 
by European integration, which differs from the mainstream of research in at least four 
aspects: Firstly, we take into account all legislation adopted in the period of investigation, 
which affords us the opportunity to analyse the general impact of the EU impact on NPs.  
 
Secondly, we draw a complete picture and consider all aspects of parliament-
government relations when it comes to policy formulation, that is lawmaking including 
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transposition as well as scrutiny. European integration concerns parliament as well as 
government and an evaluation of parliamentary strength has to include both parliament’s 
core procedures and the sum of all functions linking parliament and government with 
respect to policy formulation. We shall not exclude the possibility that a weakening of 
parliament might go hand in hand with a weakening of government and the entire 
domestic level. Executive-legislative relations are in the focus of this thesis. Parliament-
citizens relations, on the contrary, are not of central relevance for the research objective 
and are for this reason not dealt with in the following overview on relevant literature on 
the topic.  
 
Thirdly, we develop a concept of Europeanisation applicable to the changes undergone by 
NPs and which distinguishes between formal rules and actual behaviour, not least, in 
order to take account of the fact that besides institutional affiliations, actors within 
government and parliament are linked by party bonds.  
 
Fourthly, we look at EU policy-making as external factor in order to isolate the 
independent variable (IV) with the aim of establishing a causal link to domestic policy-
making and its unequal impact on actors and fora within the NP.  We take account of 
dynamics over time and hence control for differing settings at EU and national level. At 
EU level, treaty revisions have increased the depth and scope of European integration. At 
national level, coalition governments of varying party composition might influence 




Aiming at a complete picture of policy-making and parliament-government relations 
within Europeanisation research so far was eclipsed from the mainstream of theory as 
well as from most applied work on this area. Arguing that a statement on the strength or 
weakness of a NP may for this reason lead to erroneous conclusions, the present thesis 
develops a framework, developing and combining indicators for parliamentary control of 
government, governmental discretion at EU and domestic level, and the risk for 
delegation. We give due consideration to both, fora and functions within a NP, and we 
consider the complete legislative activity covering all policy fields in order to arrive at 
quantitative indicators for Europeanisation processes. Moreover, we take into account the 
decision-making as well as the transposition stage. We also include EU primary, 
secondary and tertiary legislation and their effects on the Luxembourgish Chamber of 
Deputies.   
 
Contents and organisation of this thesis 
The structure of this thesis follows an “opening out model” (Dunleavy, 2003, p. 59f). 
Thus, the sequence of chapters does not show the sequence of investigations. Instead, this 
thesis starts with a short chapter on the theoretical framework and logics of enquiry. It 
then immediately enters the empirical chapters and presents the empirical findings. Those 
main research chapters are followed by a chapter of thorough analysis which connects the 
findings in detail to the findings of other scholars and previous literature. It closes with a 




Thus, this thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter draws an overall picture 
of the theoretical framework and the most important dimensions in the model of enquiry. 
Firstly, it evokes reasons for changes in parliamentary control of government based on 
governmental discretion and party positions. Secondly, the institutional separation of 
government and parliament is put into question, depending on party cohesion and the size 
of parliament. Thirdly, we outline how parliamentary control is facilitated or hindered by 
parliamentary organisation, that is decentralisation in committees. Chapter one further 
outlines the hypotheses and the logics of enquiry. This includes a presentation of the 
reasons of case selection, research design and indicators. 
 
The second chapter investigates the pre-conditions and intervening factors for change at 
domestic level. It starts with an analysis of the discretion of ministers at EU level. Then, 
we analyse the domestic preference constellation. Policy initiation gives insights on 
delegation from parliament to government and the discretion of ministers hold at 
domestic level. Furthermore, drawing on the constitutional setup of parliamentary 
democracy in Luxembourg, and policy positions of parties stemming from the Party 
manifesto project, the perceived risk for agency loss is evaluated from the perspective of 
the Chamber as a principal.  
 
Chapters three to six represent the core empirical chapters of this thesis. The third 
chapter is concerned with the parliamentary organisation, most importantly the scrutiny 
potential and intensity as offered by the parliamentary committees. It presents the 
different types of committees concerned with lawmaking, the practices and rules of 
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committee composition and committee chair allocation, as well as different indicators of 
the activity of committees and its members. 
 
The fourth chapter deals with legislative scrutiny, one of the three main indicators for 
parliamentary control within this thesis. It investigates three variables for the strength of 
legislative scrutiny: Amendments and final votes in the Chamber, as well as the length of 
the legislative process, starting with the deposit and finishing with the adoption of laws. 
The fifth chapter is concerned with specific control instruments of the Chamber. It 
presents the most common instrument, that is parliamentary questions (PQs) as well as 
the most important control, that is budgetary control more in depth in separate sections. 
Other control instruments such as motions and enquiry committees are given 
consideration in the final part of the chapter. The sixth chapter turns then to EU scrutiny 
in the more narrow sense. In particular, it aims to establish the changes introduced 
regarding subsidiarity and proportionality control. It investigates the evolution of formal 
rules and the work of different committees in EU scrutiny.  
 
The seventh chapter serves for the general analysis of the findings in the empirical 
chapters two to six, taking into account the premises outlined in the second chapter with 
regard to EU policy-making, the risk for agency loss and discretion in domestic 
lawmaking. The eighth chapter concludes this thesis with a summary and reflexion on 
the implications of the findings for current debates and future research.  
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Chapter 1. Theoretical framework and logics of enquiry 
This study is theory-driven. Our baseline consists in Europeanisation research, which 
defines the broad direction of the investigation. Europeanisation was initially applied as a 
broad term describing a variety of phenomena occurring in the context of European 
integration.10 Recently, we observe a narrowing and concretion of the concept. The 
multiple uses have given way to mainly two applications in research: The building of the 
European polity is usually referred to in a context of “uploading” preferences. Such 
understanding of Europeanisation deals with the establishment of European integration 
processes. “Downloading”, on the other hand, accounts for the impact of European 
governance on national political systems. This latter research strand is most prominent in 
Europeanisation research, not least, because uploading is difficult to observe due to the 
intransparency and secrecy of Council of the EU meetings. Downloading regards all 
aspects of member states’ political spheres, policies, decision-making processes, and 
most importantly for this thesis, domestic institutions (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005; 
Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Graziano and Vink, 2007; Ladrech, 2010). The 
downloading of institutional change in national parliaments (NPs) is in the focus of this 
thesis. 
 
The application of the principal agent approach more particularly shapes this research. 
In parliamentary democracy, authority is legitimated through representation, delegation 
and accountability. The chain of delegation starts at the voters. It goes to elected 
representatives and via the executive branch, that is the head of government to executive 
                                                          
10 For a discussion of the “many faces of Europeanization” see Olsen (2002). 
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departments and civil servants. Delegation in this case means a transfer of sovereignty 
and authority of decision-making from principals to agents (Bergman and Damgaard, 
2000; Strøm et al., 2003). This thesis more particularly deals with the Chamber as 
principal and its delegation of sovereignty to government as agent.   
 
Theory-driven we aim at fine tuning our theoretical knowledge of the impact of 
European integration on domestic institutions and NPs as a principal. This chapter first 
outlines the theoretical framework of this thesis in section 1.1 which guides the 
establishment of hypotheses in section 1.2. The third part of this chapter (section 1.3) sets 
out the logics of enquiry. It justifies the case selection, indicates the research design and 
gives an overview of the indicators and data used.  
 
1.1. The Europeanisation of NPs as principals 
This first section of chapter one affords to introduce the theoretical framework more 
particularly. The main aim is to integrate the principal agent approach into the 
perspective of Europeanisation research. On the one hand, the concept of 
Europeanisation serves giving this research the main direction. More particularly, we 
focus our attention on “downloading”, that is the impact of European integration on 
domestic legislatures and their relationship to their executive.  
 
The principal agent approach on the other hand permits an insight on how this 
relationship between parliament and government is shaped. It helps explaining why NPs 
would adapt their internal organisation regarding European integration constraints and 
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opportunities using the concepts of discretion and agency loss. Thus, we shortly outline 
Europeanisation as the framework of this study and its shortcomings with regard to the 
Europeanisation of NPs. Then, we introduce the principal agent approach which helps 
filling the gaps by providing a better understanding of parliament as a principal of 
government. 
 
1.1.1. “Downloading” institutional change in NPs 
Much of the findings of Europeanisation research are based upon policy analysis, while 
the influence of European integration on politics and polities is somewhat under-
researched. One of the main concepts in this regards is the idea of a “goodness of fit” 
which determines the strength of adaptation pressures on domestic policies (Börzel and 
Risse, 2007, 2000; Cowles Green et al., 2001). Depending on the misfit between an EU 
policy and the existing domestic regulations, more or less important adaptations need to 
be implemented by national policymakers. A given policy will therefore have a 
differentiated impact on member states. The founding members of the EU should witness 
less misfit than later member states. Having shaped European integration from its 
beginnings and agreeable to the own particular situation, the arrangements made at 
supranational level should be closest to those involved in decision-making. The older 
member states, among them Luxembourg, should therefore find themselves in a “better-
fit” situation than the newer ones.  
 
For where there is misfit, EU policy-making does not directly translate into domestic 
change: Besides the required transposition and implementation of a specific EU 
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legislative act, the national traditions, resources and identities filter the European 
stimulus and lead to particular national adaptation patterns (Héritier, 2001). This 
conclusion drawn from policy analysis on how Europe impacts on the domestic level also 
turns out to apply for institutions and administrations in the EU: A convergence of 
domestic institutions is not very likely although single findings point to effects of 
interparliamentary cooperation and learning (Raunio, 2005b, p. 35). Pressures emanating 
from European integration have shown to be mediated by the domestic contexts, resulting 
in differing institutional adaptation  (Auel, 2005; Harmsen, 1999; Norton, 1996a).  
“The logic of integration, seen in this light, is almost reversed. While usually 
portrayed as a process of national adaptation to European norms (in both the 
legal and the more general senses of the term), the picture which presently 
emerges is rather more one of European norms being adapted to, or at least 
within, national contexts.” (Harmsen, 1999, p. 86) 
Harmsen points out that the assumptions which led to the expectation of convergence in 
public administrations are wrong: Neither the socialization of officials, nor the aspiration 
for the optimization of structures up to the most optimal solution hold true (ibid., p. 84). 
This being said, we should expect to find a specific “modèle luxembourgeois” (Nies-
Berchem, 1996, p. 154) when it comes to institutional adaptation to European integration. 
 
The concept of misfit itself which triggers policy change at domestic level is however 
less appropriate for explaining institutional adaptation, more particularly within NPs 
(Benz, 2005, p. 517; Ladrech, 2010, p. 76). Unlike for certain policy areas, the EU is not 
entitled to directly enforce a change in the national institutional setting, once a state is 
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member.11 It is result-oriented rather than process-oriented. Compliance with the once-
decided EU acts sets the criteria for sanctions. How compliance is reached is of little 
importance. Certainly, permanent non-compliance with EU policy standards may trigger 
institutional adaptation needs. However, such changes are less expected to impact on NPs 
but governments rather. It is their obligation to guarantee the implementation of European 
provisions. In order for NPs and the domestic institutional power balance to change as a 
consequence of European integration, other mechanisms than the “goodness of fit” to 
European policies must be at place and foster counter-reactions in terms of adaptations of 
parliamentary organisation and behaviour. This is where new-institutionalist concepts 
step in. 
 
Within Europeanisation research, new institutionalism ranges most prominently among 
the applied theoretical frameworks in order to explain the mechanisms of how change 
takes place. Some authors point to the parallel evolvement of Europeanisation, new 
institutionalist ideas and their inter-connectedness:  
“One might go even so far as to say that the Europeanisation research agenda as 
such exemplifies the institutionalist turn in the political science of the 1980s” 
(Graziano and Vink, 2007, p. 13).  
Within this thesis, we regard Europeanisation as a process of institutionalisation at 
national level (Ladrech, 2010). Institutionalisation increases specialisation and efficiency 
by sub-divisions of a parliament being able to proceed simultaneously, instead of 
sequentially (Norton, 1996b; Strøm, 1990).  
 
                                                          
11 The EU does however impose institutional reform in the course of accession negotiations. 
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The new institutionalist approach distinguishes three main strands: Historical, rational, 
and sociological institutionalism. They all agree that “institutions matter” in that they 
structure action (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Lowndes, 1996; 
March and Olsen, 1984; Peters and Pierre, 1998; Peters, 1999). Within this thesis, we 
employ a variant of Rational Choice Institutionalism (RI). The application of new 
institutionalist tools and RI more particularly, enables us to evaluate three aspects 
regarding the Europeanisation of domestic executive-legislative relations: Firstly, we deal 
with the EU as the institutional environment for executive-legislative relations. Secondly, 
we evaluate the power balance at the domestic level. Thirdly, besides external factors, 
intra-parliament organisation concerns both links between government and parliament, 
that is lawmaking as well as scrutiny.  
 
As argued by Peters, starting research in political science by looking at institutions is 
essential, as “most political action of real consequences occurs in institutions” (Peters, 
1999, p. 150). We are however aware that applying an institutionalist perspective has to 
be done with caution as “the institutionalism we have considered is neither a theory nor a 
coherent critique of one” (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 747). There are at least three pitfalls 
of institutionalism: Firstly, it mostly overemphasizes structural aspects, although in 
varying degrees. One of the main challenges of the social sciences in general is to 
untangle structure and action. On the one hand, structures pattern behaviour; on the other 
hand, it is social action which creates structure: Structure consists of repeated action. 
Theoretical strands differ regarding the emphasis given to either one (Aspinwall and 




Secondly, and connected to the “hen-and-egg-dilemma” of structure and action, 
Institutionalism lacks a dynamic view and with it comes a weakness in explaining 
institutional formation and evolution. Whereas informal structures enable actors to still 
change settings rather easily, formal structures decrease actors’ influence on “the rules of 
the game”.  Besides, each one of the New Institutionalist approaches has its own flaws: 
RI is considered a simplistic and apolitical view combined with a “thin theory of human 
rationality” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 950ff). Proponents of RI argue that institutions 
lower transaction costs and solve collective action problems. They assume that actors are 
rational and have fixed preferences, which is in real life not always the case.  
 
The shortcomings of New Institutionalism are addressed by a critical application of the 
principal agent approach, a variant of RI (Strøm et al., 2003). The principal agent 
approach helps dealing with issues concerning the relationship between NP and their 
respective governments, which makes it perfectly applicable to this research. Delegation 
theory is best suited to define this relational view. It serves in explaining the mechanisms 
of an established power balance by preference constellations and information asymmetry. 
Regarding dynamics over time, we consider the institutional environment as major cause 
for change. Most importantly within this thesis, European integration is investigated for 
triggering change within parliament and in the principal agent relationship between 




Focusing on bureaucracies and political institutions still justifies staying in the Weberian 
tradition of RI, where structure enables and constrains behaviour but does not determine 
it and leaves some autonomy to actors instead (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000, p. 4). 
Formal rules mainly are considered to shape the behaviour of political actors and 
institutions within this thesis. But we also take account of informal practices in our 
investigation of behavioural patterns.  What is more, this theoretical framework is chosen 
as one way to account for the importance of individuals within political institutions. 
Although individuals accept and follow institutional rules, it is important to acknowledge 
autonomy in decisions at the periphery of institutions where rules lack. Actors still might 
enjoy large autonomy, depending on their position. Formal rules offer a framework for 
action which may or may not be filled in by actual behaviour. The use of formal 
structures may thus be seen as potential.  
 
While some may find the RI concept of rationality too rigid, it does acknowledge 
“bounded” rationality, that is its proponents take into account situations of limited 
information and subjective preferences of actors (Dür, 2012). The principal agent 
framework is based upon the assumption that information is crucial and scarce (Strøm, 
2003, p. 59). Preferences are exogenous to the approach, that is delegation theory does 
not explain their formation. Only if the environment changes, preferences of organisation 
members are about to change. What is more, RI and the principal agent approach assume 
preferences to be stable and fixed towards the maximization of benefits. Incentives and 
rules determine behaviour and strategies for gaining advantages (Aspinwall and 
Schneider, 2000; Strøm, 2003, p. 59). Those assumptions on preference formation have 
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far-reaching consequences when it comes to predicting institutional change. In RI change 
occurs because of a transformed organisational environment, which alters the established 
power equilibrium and with it resource distribution (Shepsle, 2008). This assumption is 
particularly useful, when investigating the impact of European integration on domestic 
institutions. 
 
Alternatively, this thesis could have drawn on Historical Institutionalism which helps to 
cope with path dependent developments and event-triggered outcomes (Aspinwall and 
Schneider, 2000; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999). Within the context of this study, 
such a view is less helpful as our period of investigation includes thirteen years and thus a 
rather limited period of time. Also, we consider parliament not only on its own, but in its 
relationship to government.   
 
Applying a Sociological Institutionalism framework on the other hand would have 
resulted in a totally different work. In this case, socialisation mechanisms, norms and 
values are put forward. It is certainly of great interest to observe socialisation processes in 
political institutions. However, within this thesis, we assume formal rules, guided by 
some informal practices, in highly institutionalised settings to be dominant. The informal 
practices are very often formalised and the Rules of Procedures (RoP) of the 
Luxembourgish Chamber of Deputies are a very good example for such adaptation 




Thus, we acknowledge the importance of history in the long-term perspective as well as 
socialisation supplementing formal and informal structures. However, we focus on other 
than tradition, norms and values as explanations of the developments in a rather short 
period and in a highly formal, structured setting including a relational perspective 
between political institutions. 
 
In the next sections, we outline the basics of the delegation approach, and with regard to 
the Europeanisation of NPs and their relationship to government. Then the hypotheses are 
outlined which are drawn from the theoretical framework and tested within this study.  
 
1.1.2. The principal agent approach: Information asymmetries and agency loss 
An agent enjoys freedom as to how best represent the interests of his/her principal. In 
delegation theory this freedom of choice is usually referred to as discretion of the agent. 
This wording does not automatically imply a purposeful “secrecy” of the agent, although 
of course, this may be the case. While the expression “discretion” leaves some ambiguity 
regarding those two meanings its use is limited to a “latitude of judgement” rather than 
the secrecy of government and ministers.   
 
For instance, the Agriculture minister may decide to follow an aggressive and outspoken 
negotiation strategy in EU Agriculture and Fisheries Council meetings or informally try 
to build coalitions in the forefront of such meetings by diplomatic moves. It is up to 
his/her judgment as an expert of the matter at stake and his/her experience in such 
meetings to decide which strategy is more effective with regard to the interests of the 
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country he/she represents. Suffice it to say at this point that Luxembourgish ministers 
have generally opted for the second strategy, as interviews show (compare with section 
2.1.3 at page 74). 
 
Irrespective of the strategy for the defence of the principal’s interests, agents are 
accountable for their actions. Accountability is thus the agent’s responsibility for his/her 
actions and the right of the principal to take measures of precaution and control. Hence, 
one of the main functions of parliament is to overview the executive. It is not supposed 
to administrate or “legislate in a substantive sense” (Müller et al., 2003, p. 20).  
 
Delegation is not always “for free”. It may bring along agency loss, that is a suboptimal 
representation of the principal’s interests by an agent. In other words, agency loss is the 
cost of delegation. Two mechanisms influence the standing of principals and agents 
respectively and impact on the possible agency loss. Firstly, the so-called “reversion 
point” describes the status quo. Depending on the preferences of principal and agent, the 
distance among them and their respective location seen the status quo, policy change will 
occur. Outside forces, such as the EU may change this reversion point. If it moves away 
from the principal’s ideal point, agency loss increases (Lupia, 2000). Although we may 
not deal with questions of policy change within this thesis, we touch upon the issue of 
diverging preferences between government and parliament as a prerequisite for a 
perceived need for increased control, that is institutional and procedural adaptation of the 




Secondly, a major trouble in delegation is asymmetric information which originates in 
the expertise of ministers and their staff in policy formulation. If a principal has to face 
uncertainty about the possibilities, the agent’s preferences and/or his/her truthfulness, 
he/she risks taking wrong decisions. Ex-ante and ex-post control aims at guaranteeing 
that ministers and their staff still follow the principal’s preferences instead of an own 
agenda. They should prevent from agency loss (Müller et al., 2003, p. 23ff).  
 
Coming back to our example of an Agriculture minister negotiating in the Agriculture 
and Fisheries Council, he/she may be in the situation as to decide whether to support 
subsidies to farmers who leave parts of their territory idle. He/She knows that his/her 
principal, the Chamber, favours such measures. However, he/she knows that a large 
majority of his/her electorate would not support such measures but prefer the cultivation 
of those territories. The minister is now in a dilemma of following his/her own 
preferences (and the one of his/her electorate, the “ultimate principal”), or the 
preferences of parliament, to which he/she is obliged. Every action of the minister which 
does not support parliament’s position falls thus under the cost of delegation, that is 
agency loss.  
 
Parliament may decrease the cost of delegation. However, within this thesis, we do not 
deal with ex-ante selection mechanisms of ministers. Those are mainly put forward by 
political parties and rather than parliament, it is the Grand Duke who nominates and 
organises government (art. 76-77 C). What is more, ministers are recruited from the ranks 
of a newly elected parliament. The electorate exerts a large influence on who enters 
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ministerial status as the system allows for personal votes across lists (referred to as 
“panachage”). Thus, while the parties determine who enters their candidate lists, voters 
decide about the ranking within those lists. Generally speaking, the candidates who have 
obtained the most votes enter government (Reimen and Krecké, 1999, p. 51ff).   
 
Also, we do not deal with one of the most crucial questions of delegation theory which 
there is: To delegate or not to delegate? (Lupia, 2003, 2000) We assume that delegation is 
based on a long established division of labour between parliament and government which 
remains stable over the period of investigation. Instead, we focus on identifying what has 
been delegated and on the ex-post parliamentary control of government. Such ex-post 
control consists on the one hand on monitoring and reporting requirements and 
institutional checks, that is information on the behaviour of the agent via third parties 
(Strøm, 2003, p. 63). 
 
The principal agent approach stems out of a Comparative research agenda (Strøm et al., 
2003) which further suggests that external factors, such as the institutional context and 
political culture determine the power balance between parliaments and governments and 
would not allow parliaments to change in radical manner (Norton, 1996a, p. 200). The 
“viscosity of legislatures”, how Blondel (1970) put it, depends firstly on the role it is 
given in the legislative process by virtue of constitutional rules, which represent a 
necessary condition for explaining parliaments’ powers. Other external political 
variables, such as the political culture, the system of organised interests, and the party 
system, constitute sufficient conditions for explaining the say of the parliament on the 
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legislative outcome (Norton, 1996a, p. 5ff). Within this thesis, we mainly take into 
account constitutional rules on the institutional balance between executive and legislative. 
Political culture is difficult to measure and a far too large enterprise for the scope of this 
thesis. The system of organised interests and the party system on the other hand are taken 
into consideration where necessary.  
 
Most importantly, however, the regime of the EU is an “outside force” to the domestic 
balance of power which affects delegation and accountability within the domestic setting. 
It impacts on the information available to domestic actors and their preferences 
concerning policy change, but “need not weaken domestic accountability” (Lupia, 2000, 
p. 17). Although there certainly is some shift of sovereignty to the EU level, the chain of 
delegation may witness a differentiated impact on the actors involved. Lupia – somewhat 
similar to the propositions of Lisa M. Martin (2000) on how a strong parliament helps 
government in Council of the EU negotiations - suggests, that  
“Outside forces such as the EU and the EEA [European Economic Area; note from 
the author] can give domestic actors bargaining leverage and credibility that they 
would otherwise lack. These forces make it possible for domestic actors to commit 
to new types of agreements and provide new types of collective goods. When these 
forces make government actions more transparent, they shift domestic balances of 
power towards political principals and towards greater accountability.” (Lupia, 
2000, p. 17f).  
Outside forces may help getting improved information either directly, or indirectly, by 
increasing domestic penalties for lying, augmenting the likelihood of information 
verification, and by forcing agents to make “observable and costly efforts” indicating 





Assumption 1: Open-ended consequences of European integration 
European integration may increase or decrease the efficiency of domestic accountability 
mechanisms. The exposure to the risk of agency loss changes with shifts in the 
availability of information for government and parliament. Depending on the differences 




1.1.3. Domestic complicity in EU matters: Party discipline and size 
Parliament and government strength exceed a zero-sum-game, because the strength of the 
parliament is not always the reverse of government strength, as Bergman (1997, p. 381) 
suggests. If a minority government is in place, the opposition in parliament is strong. In 
this case, the initial statement holds: The stronger the parliament, the weaker the 
government. From the perspective of the agent, principal agent theory states that a strong 
parliament does not necessarily lessen governments’ bargaining power in the Council of 
the EU but it might even increase it (Martin, 2000). Parliament may serve as an excuse 
not to be able to accept certain policy proposals, most importantly in situations of 
minority government.  
 
As soon as a majority government is in place, the zero-sum game is however not valid 
anymore. Parliament is not weakened by the fact that a majority of its MPs belongs to 
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government parties. It is the opposition that is weakened and less of its preferences will 
eventually be taken into account. Therefore, the stronger the government is represented in 
parliament, the more credible are its commitments within the EU fora (Martin, 2000).  
 
Conversely to what studies evoke which emphasise information asymmetry between 
government and parliament in EU matters (O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007b; Raunio and 
Hix, 2000; Raunio, 1999), outside forces may provoke solidarity and collaboration rather 
than an increase in parliamentary scrutiny of government. Parliament may use its 
capacities to help form a counterweight to European institutions, where government and 
parliament are accomplices.  
 
Scrutiny is an upstream and downstream process (ex-ante and ex-post). That is, scrutiny 
occurs at the policy formulation and at transposition stage. We thus differentiate between 
three different pillars upon which parliamentary control is based: Legislative scrutiny, 
specific control instruments and EU scrutiny. Due to the increased uncertainty at EU 
level, parliaments have to increase control. The more areas are decided at EU level, the 
more actors are involved, the more uncertainty of the outcome for member states in 
general, for governments as well as for parliaments. The institutional innovation within 
parliaments however helped domestic opposition parties who are the only ones really 
excluded from European level policy-making, and they were certainly keen on gaining 




Some studies point to parties serving as facilitators of such complicity (Norton, 1996a, p. 
192ff). European integration, they argue, does not fundamentally change the existing 
relationship between governments and parliaments because of the cross-cutting 
importance of parties. The established power balance is maintained, mostly because 
parliamentary majority stays the long arm of government. Governmental backbenchers 
supporting the governmental lawmaking agenda while ruling out opposition in 
parliament, is most common when a government has a majority in its command in 
parliament. 
 
 Party discipline and defection is however a crucial variable in determining how well 
government may rely on its parliamentary party support (Norton, 1996a, p. 5ff). Due to 
party links the two institutions – parliament and government - are allies, most notably 
when majority governments are in place (Döring, 1995, p. 28). This is why Jensen (2007, 
p. 225f) concludes that even the Danish EU committee, which is considered to employ 
the strictest EU scrutiny among EACs, lost much of its effectiveness in case the 
traditional minority government had to give place to a majority government. The EU 
committee would then be dominated by the governing majority and not able to block 
ministers anymore. Norton (1996a, p. 192ff) recognizes a striking unwillingness of 
legislatures to employ serious measures against the government. This can be explained by 
the fact that party bonds prevent the two institutions working against each other. 
However, also within a coalition government, control is exerted during the legislative 
process not only by opposition but the coalition parties more importantly, as Martin and 




Small size has an impact on the behaviour in parliament. Smallness may help 
collaboration and shorten the chain of delegation. But it may also have drawbacks. 
Firstly, the smaller the number of backbenchers in a parliament, the higher party 
cohesion turns out, because “the pressure to support the party is even greater and the 
scope for backbench dissent is inevitably limited” (Rush, 2013, p. 184). Related to this is 
the fact that proximity is created when only few human resources are available to cover 
the posts of ministers and MPs. Thus, the exchange of members between government and 
parliament is high (Dumont and Varone, 2006, p. 10). Dumont and Varone (2006) 
furthermore point to smallness making specialisation for individual MPs more difficult. 
Related to this is the fact that small parliaments are often “semi-professional” 
parliaments, meeting “only on a limited number of days per year” with members who are 
“part-time rather than full-time politicians” (Rush, 2013, p. 185).  
 
The freedom of MPs from their party leadership, and thus the independence of parliament 
from government, may however increase, if MPs are able to create expertise. Then they 
are possibly the only expert in the party on a subject matter (Dumont and Varone, 2006, 
p. 9). Thus, informality not only works through the parliamentary body itself. Surely, 
small parliaments allow for a greater intimacy than larger bodies (Rush, 2013, p. 183ff). 
Informality is structured by the channels of (governing) party caucuses and this often 
leads to government by consensus. Not least, smallness may have consequences on 
sanctions: “[…] people in charge of sanctioning are the same as those engaged in daily 
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personal interactions with their agents and thus, may find it more difficult to apply 
sanctions” (Dumont and Varone, 2006, p. 11). Hence, we arrive at Assumption 2:  
 
 
Assumption 2: The EU as common challenge to parliament and government 
Thus, this thesis takes into account the smallness of the country and the parliament more 
particularly. Smallness, and furthermore majority government and high party discipline 
may result in the EU being regarded as common challenge. This provokes domestic 
institutions to ally for a national interest. Parliament thus increases capacities for EU 




1.1.4. Parliamentary organisation and the expertise of MPs  
Taking into consideration only relational factors of parliaments does however not give a 
full account of the question of parliamentary strength. Internal organisation is a second 
dimension which determines the quality of parliamentary control in a broader sense. 
Besides of party cleavages, legislatures are structured mainly by their committee system. 
Institutionalisation (going hand in hand with specialisation) increases the ability of 
parliaments to control governments. The more NPs have advanced their committee 
systems, the better they became apt to control government (Müller et al., 2003; Norton, 




The mirroring of the organisation of ministries by specialized committees improves the 
coverage of ministers. Also the institutionalisation of parties within parliaments as 
factions has triggered changes in the parliamentary working capacities (Norton, 1996a, p. 
26ff). Institutionalisation increases efficiency by subdivisions of a parliament being able 
to proceed simultaneously, instead of sequentially (ibid. 1996a, p. 199). This view is 
confirmed by Martin and Vanberg (2011), who find that parliaments with strong 
committee systems play a major role in policy shaping and the overview of ministers. The 
committee structure offers thus a potential for scrutiny. It facilitates or hinders the 
adaption of parliament to external forces. Assumption 3 reads as follows: 
 
 
Assumption 3: Structures as potential for parliamentary control of government 
NPs have different capacities to cope with environmental change. Where parliament is 
highly specialised, the need for adaptation is lessened as control is already guaranteed. 




1.1.5. Summing up: A theoretic model for the investigation of the Europeanisation 
of NPs   
The theoretical framework leads to a model of enquiry which we subsequently follow up 
within this thesis. The independent variable (IV) is EU policy-making which on the one 
hand, may increase the discretion of government by giving an information advantage. 
Thus, the more EU policy-making, and the more power of the Council the more 
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discretion government enjoys. On the other hand, EU enlargement and qualified majority 
voting (QMV) diminishes the weight of single governments in Council decisions and 
leads to a loss of influence of single member states. The discretion of government at EU 
level is filtered by the domestic preference constellation. The further away government 
finds itself from parliament and the coalition partner, the higher the risk for agency loss. 
Parliamentary organisation determines the potential of MPs to scrutinise government. 
The higher the specialisation of MPs, the more the information asymmetry of government 
is counterbalanced. Finally, regarding parliamentary control, specific EU scrutiny 
measures, but also the traditional control instruments and legislative scrutiny are taken 
into consideration when we evaluate executive-legislative relations in Luxembourg and 








This model of enquiry regarding the EU influence on three pillars of domestic 
parliamentary control of government does not take into account feedbacks of changes. 
For instance, when government draws on the mandate issued by its parliament in order to 
defend a particular argument in the Council of the EU, adaptations in EU scrutiny may 
provoke changes in EU policy-making. Changes in legislative scrutiny may impact on 
parliamentary organisation, if new committees are created in order to deal with specific 
legislative proposals. Control instruments, such as a strengthening of the budgetary 
overview, may diminish governmental discretion at domestic level. Rather than tracing 
the complete process of influence for one matter at stake, and although this means 
ignoring possible feedback dynamics, we opt consciously for a holistic approach 




The review of literature and the theoretical framework lead to four hypotheses formally 
summarized and briefly outlined below. They assign the research agenda for the 
empirical chapters. We investigate hypotheses H0, H1, H2 and H3 on the role of the 
Luxembourgish parliament within the domestic setting.  
 
In H0 we test whether governmental discretion has changed due to European integration 
and within the timeframe of the study, between 1999 and 2011. We consider H0 rejected, 
if we find that the Luxembourgish government has gained or lost discretion at EU level. 
This approach differs from what Bergman and Damgaard (2000) propose for the country 
studies in their edited volume. When looking at “Parliament as Principal and Cabinet as 
Agent”, the co-authors firstly outline the “traditional and general organisation and role 
of the parliament” and secondly the changes triggered by the EU (Bergman, 2000a, p. 
10). This proceeding leaves the exact cause of parliamentary adaptation unobserved 
assuming an increase in the discretion of government and the risk for agency loss. Seen 
that our period of investigation ranges from 1999 to 2011, we rather leave it open 
whether government has gained discretion. The Amsterdam Treaty and the subsequent 
treaty reforms brought along a deepening and widening of the EU and those 
developments may have opposing effects on governmental discretion. Thus, we first test 
for change in Hypothesis H0. 
 
If we find a change in the discretion of government, we test two alternative hypotheses 
regarding the consequences of the changing role of the Chamber for the domestic power 
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balance. The Deparliamentarisation/Abdication-Hypothesis H1 builds on the principal 
agent approach and the question of discretion and trust. European integration, it states, 
leads to information advantages of governments with their inclusion in negotiations of the 
Council of the EU. Domestic legislatures, the governments’ principals, are not able to 
scrutinise ministers’ behaviour at EU level, because of the opacity of proceedings in the 
Council. Parliament responds by adjusting its internal procedures, and reforming 
administrative practices and/or the rules of the game at political level in order to hold 
government accountable. Thus, parliament as a principal is weakened if delegation to 
government has increased and control does not embrace the new tasks. If we lack 
evidence of a weakened parliament due to European integration, we reject Abdication-
hypotheses H1. Alternatively, we suggest testing Adaptation-hypothesis H2. The 
domestic power balance remained as it was, but at a higher level so to say. Parliament in 
this case adapts control over government so that government is not able to enjoy the 
advantage of discretion in EU matters. 
 
Furthermore, we test Complicity-hypothesis H3 suggesting that European integration has 
resulted in an alliance between parliament and government. Parliament reacted in order to 
better play the “European game” and used windows of opportunity to increase 
parliament’s powers in EU policy-making. As such, it collaborates with government in 
the defence of the national interests (Table 1 and Figure 2). 
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Table 1: Main hypotheses - A summary 
Detecting a change in the discretion government enjoys at EU level: 
H0: t0 = t1 = t2 Null-hypothesis  
Governmental discretion in EU matters has not changed in the period between 1999 and 2011.  
 
In case H0 is rejected → test for possible consequences of change. 
 
European integration has made the parliament worse off: 
H1: x0 > x1 > x2 Deparliamentarisation/Abdication-hypothesis 
Governmental discretion in EU matters has increased and parliamentary control has not improved 
adequately.   
 
Parliament has adapted to European integration: 
H2: x0 = x1 = x2 Adaptation-hypothesis 
Parliamentary control of government was adapted according to the level of governmental 
discretion and the risk for agency loss.   
 
European integration is perceived as common challenge at domestic level: 
H3: y0 > y1 > y2 Complicity-hypothesis 
Parliament has increased its EU scrutiny in order to help government defend a national interest 
vis-à-vis the European institutions. 
 
where:  
t: Discretion of government  
x: Parliamentary strength vis-à-vis the government 
y: Parliamentary control of the European institutions 
 
0: Legislature 1 (CSV/DP) (1999-2004) 
1: Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) (2004-9)  
2: Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II) (2009-11) 
 
CSV: Christian Social People’s Party (Chrëschtlech-Sozial Vollekspartei)  
DP: Liberal Party (Demokratesch Partei) 




Figure 2: Relationship between hypotheses 
 
 
With those four hypotheses, we follow at least two purposes: Theory testing and theory 
building. The first aim is to test an often assumed causal relationship (European 
integration leads to deparliamentarisation). However, this research also contributes to the 
question of how European integration impacts on NPs and their role vis-à-vis 
governments. This thesis therefore examines whether a causal mechanism is present in 
the investigated case, but also encompasses explaining the outcome in order to better 
describe how this causal mechanism works. 
 
 
1.3. Logics of enquiry 
What we know about NPs in the EU mostly stems from five types of research: Firstly, 
some studies deal with the general role NPs play within the EU (Katz and Wessels, 
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1999; Kiiver, 2012, 2006). Secondly, comparative research covers the legislatures of all 
member states at a given time (Bergman, 1997; Karlas, 2012, 2011; Raunio, 2009, 1999; 
Winzen, 2013, 2012). Thirdly, and similar to the comparative studies, other most 
inclusive research on NPs in the EU still treats all member states’ parliaments but 
introduces each of them as single cases typically in an edited book or journal issue 
(Maurer and Wessels, 2001a; Rozenberg et al., 2014). This type of study reveals more 
details on single parliaments and gives comparative insights in the conclusion written by 
the editors.  
 
Other studies limit themselves to the examination of a few parliaments, rarely justifying 
the selection (Auel and Benz, 2006; Auel, 2007; Bergman and Damgaard, 2000; Brouard 
et al., 2012c, 2012c; Hamerly, 2007; Holzhacker, 2007b; Norton, 1996a; Smith, 1996). 
Such research has very actively investigated extreme cases, such as the Nordic 
parliaments, where EU scrutiny is considered to be high, as well as parliaments of the 
larger “old” member states (Germany, France and the UK). Finally, we find case studies 
treating one single NP (Börzel and Sprungk, 2007; Carlier, 1995; Demuth, 2009).  
 
Those five types of research reveal what is known from other subject matters: Limits in 
resources and time require researchers generally to take a decision on whether to examine 
many cases on a few variables, or a few cases on many variables. There is thus a trade-
off between depth and breadth, that is the extent to which a case is dealt with in detail 
and the number of cases included in a study (Aarebrot and Baka, 2003; Lijphart, 1975, 




Figure 3: Five types of studies on NP in the EU 
 
 




1.3.1. Case selection 
What becomes obvious from the classification of studies on NP in the EU is that the cases 
which have been investigated most often have shaped our thinking about NPs in the EU. 
We may even go so far to consider a “Nordic bias” in research on NPs in the EU, given 
the gap between the number of studies concerning European integration and the Nordic 
parliaments, most importantly Denmark (Arter, 1995; Damgaard and Jensen, 2006; 
Damgaard and Nørgaard, 2000; Fitzmaurice, 1976; Jensen, 2007; Laursen, 2005), and to 
a lesser extent Finland (Raunio and Wiberg, 2000a) compared to research on other 
parliaments. The particularity of the Nordic parliaments, which has fascinated and 
inspired research, lies upon the fact that EU scrutiny is exerted seriously and rigorously 
via parliamentary mandates which define the negotiation position of government at EU 
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level. This system was made possible by periods of minority government unknown in 
other countries (Strøm, 1990, p. 58). Also when government finds itself temporarily in 
minority position at the crucial point in time when decisions on European integration 
need to be taken, the introduction of a strict mandating system is more probable.12  
 
Furthermore, Nordic case-biased research sometimes covers an inherent judgement which 
says that strong EU scrutiny in form of parliamentary mandates for EU level negotiations 
is most desirable. Parliaments ranging low when it comes to such standards are under-
researched and less known in the English-speaking literature. Among those parliaments 
are not least those of the Southern member states, small parliaments (Benz, 2005, p. 
518), and parliaments which are difficult to study because of the language of 
parliamentary proceedings or both, for instance Cyprus and Luxembourg. The Nordic 
bias is also a bias towards member states of later enlargement rounds. The six “old” 
member states, among them Luxembourg, were able to shape European integration from 
the beginning. Thus, there is an empirical lack of research which limits our ability to 
judge the evolution of parliamentary democracy in the EU. 
 
This thesis follows the fifth design (compare with Figure 3 on page 43) and thus deals 
with one single country study – the Luxembourgish parliament and its relationship to 
government in a most extensive way. We analyse all parliamentary fora and actors 
concerned with lawmaking and parliamentary control, the instruments they are applying 
                                                          
12 A non-Nordic example confirms this thesis. When Austria was to enter the EU, it had to change its 
Constitution in order to comply with the necessities of membership. Constitutional changes require a two-
thirds majority in the Nationalrat. Opposition was in a historic situation to blackmail government to 
commitments. This is how the Austrian scrutiny reserve saw the light of day.  
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as well as formal and informal rules, behaviour and their change. European integration is 
seen as a process and an examination of its consequences for domestic institutions 
requires us to investigate trends over time. Thus, we take into account of scrutiny as well 
as lawmaking, and seek to understand how they have changed due to European 
integration.  
 
Contrary to studies on a large number of cases (large-N studies), where case selection 
should guarantee a representative sample in order to draw general conclusion on the 
population, a selection of cases on the dependent variable (DV) is allowed and even 
required in studies of a limited number of cases (small N-studies) (Ebbinghaus, 2005, p. 
142; Goertz and Hewitt, 2006). Our DV within this study is parliamentary control more 
generally and in EU matters more particularly, consisting of legislative scrutiny, 
traditional parliamentary control instruments and EU scrutiny in the narrow sense. 
However, we know rather little about the population of NPs regarding all those aspects of 
control in EU matters. Choosing the Chamber for our investigation should therefore help 
completing the picture and developing a framework for comparative analysis in all NPs 
of the EU. Taking into account the independent and intervening variables on the other 
hand, Luxembourg is an extreme case of a very small, but specialised parliament in long-
term and hyper-stable majority government.   
  
While the thick description of a case study seems to be incompatible with inferences 
about causal relationships at a first glance, this thesis has the ambition to find causal 
explanations and contribute thus to theory advancement. To be sure, a “single case can 
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constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving an 
established generalization” as Lijphart (1971, p. 691) has put it. King, Keohane and 
Verba even go so far as to discourage from single observation studies “and argue that 
successfully dealing with it is extremely unlikely”  (King et al., 1994, p. 209). However, 
treating only one parliament does not automatically mean that comparison and causal 
inference is totally excluded. Lijphart (1975, p. 160) distinguishes between “entities” and 
“cases”, like George and Bennett (2005, p. 32f) suggest that cases may include many 
observations and thus single case studies are perfectly legitimate. Thus, the investigation 
of several units of observation provides us with several cases within the Luxembourgish 
setting. 
 
The crucial point is the basis of observation. Research on one case, such as one country 
or a NP, may thus be of comparative nature. What is more, comparing observations 
within one entity, helps avoiding the so-called “whole-nation bias”, where sub-units are 
artificially equalised. “Smelser (1967:114-115) argues that ‘Intra-unit comparisons may 
prove more fruitful than inter-unit comparisons’ because their degree of similarity is 
likely to be higher” (as cited in Lijphart, 1975, p. 168).  This is especially so for 
parliamentary procedures such as lawmaking or parliamentary control, where 
comparability is hampered by the complexity of political systems, as the parliamentary 
context, as well as the particularity of proceedings up to the point of non-comparability 
(see Peters, 1998, p. 14 on the overstatement of commonality in comparative studies of 
institutions and legislatures). Some instruments, such as parliamentary questions (PQs) 
for instance, are known under the same name but following very different rules and 
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functions (Rozenberg and Martin, 2011; Russo and Wiberg, 2010). Cross-case 
comparative research would in this case need to pay attention and be sure to compare like 
with like, risking “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970, p. 1034ff).  
 
1.3.2. Research design and causal inference 
More particularly, we follow the congruence method in a “disciplined configurative” 
case study research (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 75 and 181ff). It requires a 
theoretically founded relationship between independent variable (IV) and the dependent 
variable (DV) and is thus theory driven. This includes the determination of the value of 
the IV and then tests whether the expected result is consistent with the prediction. Such 
“case study can contribute to theory testing because it can ‘impugn established theories if 
the theories ought to fit it but do not’, and it can serve heuristic purposes by highlighting 
‘the need for new theory in neglected areas’” (Eckstein (1975, p. 99) as cited in George 
and Bennett (2005, p. 75)). Rather than drawing conclusions on other cases, we thus aim 
at improving our theoretical framework and the way of studying NPs. 
 
To further increase our ability to draw causal inferences, we establish an intra-system 
comparative design (Lijphart, 1971, p. 678ff) and divide the entity of a national 
parliament into sub-units of time that are periods of variance in the IV. This within-case 
analysis may be seen as a quasi-experimental comparative design. A causal relationship 
can be determined because extraneous variables are controlled for and confounding 




On the one hand, cross-time comparisons bear the advantage of a constant contextual 
framework (Peters, 1998, p. 23f). Measuring more than one point in time and tracing 
developments over a longer period further improves internal validity within this thesis. 
We track the evolution of parliamentary control for the context of varying settings and 
during a crucial period of European integration: The permanent transformation of the EU 
polity and its competences ask for further research on the role of NPs in the EU, 
especially in the light of the changes brought along with the entering into force of the 
Nice Treaty in 2003 and the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. Foremost the latter 
introduced new mechanisms for NPs’ involvement in EU decision-making (see the new 
information policy and the so-called yellow and orange-card mechanisms13). This project 
will give an outlook on the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on NPs. What is more, 
enlargement has changed the rules of the game during the period under investigation. In 
2004 and 2007, the accession of 12 Eastern and Southern member states has had a major 
effect on decision-making in the European institutions. Thus, if European integration has 
an impact on parliamentary control of government, this impact is likely to be visible 
during those 13 years under investigation. 
 
At the national level, two different government coalitions in two and a half legislatures 
were in place between 1999 and 2011. The Conservatives (CSV) governed in coalition 
with the Liberals (DP) from 1999 to 2004 (Legislature 1) and in coalition with the 
Socialists (LSAP) from 2004 to 2009 (Legislature 2) and as of 2009 (Legislature 3). The 
change in coalition partners gives opportunity to an investigation on the relationship 
                                                          
13 Protocol (No. 1) on the role of national parliaments in the European Union (Protocol 1) and Protocol (No. 
2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Protocol 2), Lisbon Treaty. 
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between government and parliament and the respective patterns of (voting) behaviour 
within the parliamentary groups. It should however not hide the fact that all three 
governments have been based upon large majorities within parliament. This intra-system 
comparison between different periods aims at fine-tuning theoretical stances in 
Europeanisation research. It enables us to control the influence of EU policy-making (our 





Figure 4: Within-case comparison 
 
T IME→ 
→ 1997 Amsterdam Treaty → → →→ 2003 Nice Treaty → → → → → → → → → →→ → 2009 Lisbon Treaty → → → 
 
Legislature 1 
1999-2004 CSV – DP 
 
Legislature 2 
2004-2009 CSV – LSAP 
 
½ Legislature 3 
2009-2011 CSV – LSAP 
Committee 1 Committee 1 Committee 1 
Committee … Committee … Committee … 
Committee 19 Committee 17* Committee 18 
 
Independent variable: 
► EU policymaking under the Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon  
 
Controlling for: 
► Discretion at EU and domestic level, risk of agency loss 
 
Dependent variable: 
►Role of the Luxembourgish parliament as principal 
 
 
*…17 committees until 2005/6 and 18 as if 2006/7 




1.3.3. Indicators and data  
Recent research has acknowledged the importance of including scrutiny as well as 
lawmaking in the measurement of the Europeanisation of a legislature. Raunio and 
Wiberg (2010) suggest five indices to account for the European impact. The share of EU-
related laws, firstly, concerns lawmaking. Secondly, the share of parliamentary questions 
and confidence votes regarding EU issues measures scrutiny. Third, committee time and 
fourth, plenary time spent on European matters as well as, fifth, party group meeting time 
concern the different fora within the parliament. Taken all together, the five measures 
touch upon all parliamentary fora and their relationships towards government.  
 
This is a good starting point for developing indicators on the Europeanisation of 
delegation and accountability between government and parliament. However, an 
adaptation of these measures is needed with regard to the hypotheses investigated within 
this thesis. The results obtained by qualitative and quantitative indicators are 
substantiated in the empirical chapters two to six.  
 
We measure the discretion of government in EU matters as the amount of legislative 
acts related to EU matters. Three indicators serve determining this quantity: Firstly, the 
amount of different types of EU legislation. Secondly, the translation of those into 
domestic regulation, that is the amount of executive decrees and laws related to EU 
matters. Thirdly, and more closely regarding parliament, we investigate the number of 
laws transposing directives. Furthermore, we add a qualitative measure and investigate 
changes in the EU Treaties and the rules guiding EU matters at domestic level for an 
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increase of governmental discretion. Those four measures together enable us to determine 
if the discretion of government has increased in EU matters and in the period between 
1999 and 2011.  
 
In order to determine the need for an adaptation of parliamentary control of government, 
we have to take into account the risk for agency loss as measured by Party Manifesto 
data. Thus, we obtain the policy positions of all parties represented in parliament at the 
time of the election. The differences in policy positions between government and 
parliament, and between the coalition parties help evaluating, whether parliament is prone 
to strengthen its scrutiny arrangements or not. 
 
We triangulate multiple indicators for each of the following variables and base our 
conclusions on a variety of provenances of empirical information. Our indicators for 
parliamentary control in EU matters concern parliamentary organisation, the 
legislative process, traditional control instruments and EU scrutiny in the narrow sense. 
Regarding parliamentary organisation we especially emphasis changes in the 
organisation of committees, that is the number and competences of committees, types of 
committees and their composition. Within the legislative process, we analyse 
amendments, final votes and the length of the legislative process, besides the rules 
guiding lawmaking. Furthermore, changes in the use of traditional control instruments 
are an important indicator for how the executive-legislative relationship works. The use 
of parliamentary questions (PQs), interpellations, votes of confidence and budgetary 
control in EU matters are among the instruments investigated. Finally, we explore the use 
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of EU scrutiny in the narrow sense which consists of the control of governmental 
behaviour in EU level negotiations and the screening of EU documents. Thus, the number 
of EU documents treated by committee, the reasoned opinions and political opinions 
issued by the Chamber are examined.  
 
The main source of the quantitative investigation is the parliament’s online archive on 
www.chd.lu as well as printed minutes and reports of the Chamber (altogether indicated 
as parliamentary proceedings in Table 2). The coding of laws was mostly retrieved from 
those online minutes of the public sessions of the Chamber, that is the voting results, 
amendments, dates of deposit and vote etc.  
 
The printed minutes of public sessions and annual activity reports of the Chamber contain 
information about the committee composition and meetings, EU scrutiny, as well as the 
different parliamentary control instruments. They were drawn upon if the online archive 
was inconclusive with regard to specific information. For instance, if a voting result could 
not be found via the search for the parliamentary dossier number, indications on the 
public session where it has been voted on have been used to look up the print version of 
minutes. Those are accessible in the National library and the Chamber’s library.  
 
Detailed information about specific aspects of parliamentary control, for instance the 
enquiry committees and PQs, have been found in the respective committee reports which 
again may be found in the online database of the Chamber. The minutes of committee 
meetings were unfortunately not easily accessible. Committee meetings are held in 
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private and only recently, very general minutes of those meetings are publicly accessible. 
In order to trace developments over time, the investigation of agendas was thus limited to 
the European affairs committee of the Chamber (EAC), where we were allowed access 
thanks to the permission of the General Secretary and the committee chair. 
 
The coding of parliamentary proceedings was certainly very time consuming as the 
online database and the printed minutes are not prepared for quantitative legislative 
research. The search options are rather limited and the database at times slow. However, 
this data comes from first hand and a source which is most reliable and exhaustive. The 
retrieved data is complete and represents the whole population of laws, committees and 
control instruments in the period of investigation (1999-2011). 
 
Besides, we draw information on legislative texts from the LegiLux database of 
government (www.legilux.lu) and the reports of the Central service for Legislation 
(SCL).14 Difficulties arose when the information provided by government and parliament 
differed. For instance, we have coded laws which transpose directives from the 
Chamber’s proceedings, however, found diverging numbers of laws per year in LegiLux. 
The choice for one source or the other were indicated where they were used in the 
analysis. Information on the amount of EU regulatory output came from the Eur-Lex 
database (www.eur-lex.eu) and secondary sources. The precise link to those statistics is 
indicated where they have been used.  
 
                                                          
14 Service Central de Législation 
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The investigation of formal rules was based on the Rules of Procedures (RoP, see annex 
1 of this study) provided by the Chamber after request, as not all versions have been 
publicly available. The changes in the constitutional provisions are indicated in the latest 
version of the Constitution which is to be retrieved at LegiLux.15 Secondary literature as 
well as interviews helped the interpretation of formal rules.  
 
Additional support for our interpretations were provided by a total of 28 face-to-face 
interviews and one telephone interview with MPs, members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs), and ministers, staff of the Chamber, ministries, the State Council, the Audit 
Court and professional chambers, held between August 2012 and November 2013. Those 
guided interviews were recorded if the interviewee permitted and transcribed. The 
questions depended on the professional experience of the respondent but all related to 
inter-institutional relations, EU matters and the specific institutional insight gained by the 
interviewee. The interviewees were first chosen by their (previous) function and later 
through the snowball system, that is through recommendation of persons who could 
inform about particular aspects of this thesis. They permit an unbiased view on inter-
institutional relations, as interviewees come out of a plenitude of institutions involved in 
lawmaking and scrutiny. 
 
The total of this data allows thus to draw conclusions on the evolution of formal rules, 
their use, the behaviour of actors at micro-, meso- and macro-level (MPs, committees and 
parliament as a whole), and different institutional perspectives. Formal rules and statistics 
                                                          
15 The Luxembourg Constitution may be found under this link: 
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/textescoordonnes/recueils/Constitution/. last access 31 December 2013. 
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about behavioural patterns were used as the backbone of the empirical part of this study. 




Table 2: Indicators and data sources 
Variable Concept Indicator Source 
Independent Governmental 1 EU competences as fixed by the Treaties Legal texts, secondary literature 
variable discretion 2 Amount of EU legislation by type  Eur-Lex 
 3 Voting power in the Council of the EU secondary literature 
 4 Amount of EU related domestic regulation by type Eur-Lex 
 6 Number of EU related laws  Legilux, parliamentary proceedings 
Intervening Risk of  7 Difference in policy positions of government and parliament  Party Manifesto data 
variable agency loss 8 Difference in policy positions of coalition parties Party Manifesto data 
Intervening Scrutiny  9 Number, types and competencies of committees Parliamentary proceedings
variable potential 10 Committee composition and chairing Parliamentary proceedings 
 11 Number of committee meetings Parliamentary proceedings 
 12 Laws by committee Parliamentary proceedings 
 13 Committee membership Parliamentary proceedings 
Dependent Legislative  14 Number of amended laws Parliamentary proceedings 
variable I scrutiny 15 Final votes Parliamentary proceedings 
 16 Length of the legislative process Parliamentary proceedings 
Dependent Parliamentary  17 Parliamentary questions and interpellations Parliamentary proceedings 
variable II control  18 Motions  Parliamentary proceedings 
instruments 19 Budgetary control Parliamentary proceedings 
 20 Committees of enquiry Parliamentary proceedings 
Dependent EU scrutiny 21 Number of EU documents by committee Parliamentary proceedings 
variable III  22 Reasoned opinions issued Parliamentary proceedings 
 23 Political opinions issued Parliamentary proceedings 








Chapter 2. Governmental discretion and risk for delegation  
Policy initiation is one major step in policy-making which is to a large extent delegated to 
government. It initiates legal acts at domestic and supranational level. One part of the 
argument used by the advocates of the abdication thesis is that EU regulation lies at the 
source of the democratic deficit. EU level negotiations facilitate agency loss because NPs 
are not able to control their governments during their negotiations in the Council. What is 
more, NPs have ignored how more and more competences went to supranational level 
and escape their control (Maurer and Wessels, 2001a, 2001b). Hence, governments gain 
discretion if more domestic regulation is decided in Brussels.  
 
In order to expect a need for the adaptation of parliamentary control of government, 
governmental discretion at EU level must vary. Within this chapter, we investigate in 
how far this basic assumption taken up by Hypothesis H0 holds (Figure 5 compare with 
section 1.2 on page 38).  
 





In what follows, we firstly review the competence mix at EU level and size the amount 
of EU regulation in order to examine whether governments have gained on discretion at 
EU level.  Most importantly, we investigate the different EU policy instruments, their 
development over time and their use. Besides the question of EU regulatory output, this 
study examines the consequences of enlargement by investigating voting weight and 
voting power of the Luxembourgish government in the Council of the EU.  
 
In the second part of this chapter, we control for changes in policy initiation at domestic 
level necessitating adaptations in parliamentary control. The aim of this second part is to 
define the role of the Chamber in the legislative process. We evaluate whether its role has 
changed within the period between 1999 and 2011, and whether the government’s 
standing has improved.  The legislative procedure is examined concerning an eventual 
change in the discretion of government during the period of investigation, that is between 
1999 and 2011. Although lawmaking is not subject to EU regulation as such, indirect 
influences from EU policy-making may be observed, be it in the arrangements regarding 
the transposition of EU law, be it in an anticipation of EU policy-making in domestic 
lawmaking or domestic reforms on the occasion of EU regulation.  
 
Corresponding to the two level polity of Luxembourg, the communal and national level 
legislate (Schroen, 2008, p. 117). Within this thesis, we do however not address 
lawmaking at the communal level. Our focus lies on the Chamber of Deputies. Through 
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the possibility to accumulate the mandate of a MP and the one of a member of the 
communal council, the two levels are however well entangled.16 
 
Furthermore, we investigate the sources of laws and the instruments of transposition. 
European legal acts are only effective, if they are transposed into the national legal order. 
While the majority of transpositions are carried out by executive decree, parliament has 
to be involved when a directive touches upon specific areas fixed by the Constitution (art. 
37 C). 
 
In the third section of this chapter, we calculate the risk parliament takes when delegating 
to government. We measure the policy preferences expressed in the electoral programmes 
of parties represented in parliament using Party Manifesto Project (PMP) data. This is 
one way to deal with the question of “reversion points”, that is the status quo and the 
relative distance of principal and agent to this point (compare with section 1.1.2 on page 
25). The so expressed differences in positions between government and opposition and 
the coalition partners respectively allow us to estimate the importance of ministerial 
discretion and a risk for agency loss.  
 
                                                          
16 Schroen (2008, p. 108) finds 71.5% of MPs holding a communal mandate at the same time. All parties – 
except the Greens – organise their parliamentary works via their geographical belonging. If for instance an 
issue touches upon the matters of a certain community, the MP elected in this community would take over 
to follow it up. The Greens organise regarding policy areas and committee belongings rather. Even if an 
issue concerns the community of a specific MP more particularly, the subject matter decides who of the 




We conclude with an evaluation of ministerial discretion in EU and domestic policy-
making and perceived risk for agency loss for the three governments in place during the 
period between 1999 and 2011.  
 
2.1. Ministerial discretion at EU level: Deepening and widening 
This chapter examines whether governmental discretion has varied regarding EU 
decision-making. It thus concerns the IV of this thesis as outlined in the model of enquiry 
(Figure 6).   
 





The Treaties of Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003) and Lisbon (2009) have deepened 
European integration by increasing the EU’s scope and competences in many policy areas 
(Craig and Búrca, 2011). Enlargement on the other hand has decreased the Union’s 
capacity to act as the accession of new member states has “increased the diversity of 
interests in the Council of Ministers” (König et al., 2012, p. 22). Between 1999 and 2011, 
the EU grew from 15 to 27 member states. Ten Eastern member states joined in 2004 
(including Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) and two in 2007 (Bulgaria and Rumania) (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: Historical development by treaty revisions and enlargement rounds  
 
Enlargement: West `73: accession of Denmark, Ireland and UK; South `81`86: Greece (1981), Portugal & 
Spain (1986); North `95: Austria, Sweden & Finland; East `04, `07: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta & Cyprus (2004), Bulgaria & Romania (2007).  
Deepening/Treaty revisions (year indicates their entry into force): EEC `57: European Economic 
Community; EEA `87: Single European Act 1987; Maas `93: Treaty of Maastricht 1993; Amst `99: Treaty 
of Amsterdam 1999; Nice `03: Treaty of Nice 2003; Lisb `09: Lisbon Treaty 2009.  




The level of EU policy-making is a function of the possibility and the capacity to do 
so, in other words “the extent of material competencies of the EU and the motivation and 
ability of the Commission, the member states and the European Parliament to use them” 
(König et al., 2012, p. 22). The range of formal EU competences alone does not 
determine the EU regulatory output, but also the use of those competences. The empirical 
expression of EU policy-making is thus the result of this function of possible and actual 
use, and illustrates the consequences of the deepening and widening of European 
integration.  
 
In the following sections, we take account of this function and investigate legal 
provisions on the one hand and the EU policy output on the other hand. While it is a 
common knowledge, that the EU has increased its competences, we shall give a coherent 
overview of which competences have been added by the three treaties in force during the 
period of investigation between 1999 and 2011. An outline of the binding EU policy-
making instruments as well as the development of the use of legislative and non-
legislative acts adds to this section. The aim is to give a full account of EU regulatory 
activity in order to arrive at an estimate of governments’ discretion and its development 




2.1.1. Binding EU policy-making instruments 
The EU treaties introduce three forms of legal acts: Regulations, directives and 
decisions (art. 288 TFEU17, ex art. 249 TEU18). They vary in their application, 
bindingness and the choice of instrument. In the Lisbon Treaty the choice of instrument is 
generally specified. If such is not the case, they are selected “on a case-by-case basis, in 
compliance with the applicable procedures and with the principle of proportionality” 
(art. 296 TFEU). Before, the treaties left the choice of instrument open in most of the 
cases (Craig and Búrca, 1998, p. 106).  
 
Between 1999 and 2011, the EU has issued 41,910 binding acts that are on the average 
around 3,224 acts per year. Only 3.8% of those came in form of directives and thus had a 
chance to go through NPs. More than two thirds of all acts were regulations and more 
than one fourth decisions, both bypassing NPs (Figure 8).19  
 
                                                          
17 Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union 
18 Treaty of the European Union 
19  Where not otherwise indicated, the data of this section are retrieved from the Eur-Lex website at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Stats.do?context=legislative, last access: 7 January 2014.  
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Figure 8: Regulations, directives and decisions issued by European institutions, percentages, 1999-2011 
   
 
The total amount of binding EU acts has decreased since 1999 in terms of absolute 
numbers. Thus, although the EU has increased its competencies, its regulatory output 
continues to decrease. This is due to the decrease of issued regulations. The number of 
decisions and directives remain at similar and comparatively low levels. The trend is 
steady except for the year 2009 when the number of regulations increased again from 
around 1,500 to almost 2,000. The run-up to the Treaty of Lisbon seems to have left the 
EU in a stalemate. When it entered into force, many dossiers could be unblocked and 
adopted (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9: EU regulatory output by type of legal act, absolute numbers, 1999-2011 
 
 
König et al. (2012, p. 24) confirm that the amount of decisions rose with the number of 
member states and in the period between 1984 and 2007. In relative terms, this trend 
continues until 2011. The percentage of decisions among all binding acts issued rose 
from around 20% in 1999 to 35% in 2011, to the detriment of regulations. Those are 
however bypassing NPs. Most visible at domestic level and for NPs more particularly are 
however directives. They have to be transposed into the domestic legal order either by 
executive decree or law. The number of directives is supposed to decrease over time due 
to the accomplishment of harmonisation efforts (König et al., 2012, p. 24). However, the 
trend concerning directives is less clear. Their share already was at low levels and varies 




Figure 10: Regulations, directives and decisions (basic and amending acts), percentages, 1999-2011 
 
 
2.1.2. Legislative and non-legislative acts 
As Craig and Búrca (2011, p. 104) note no a priori hierarchy exists among the legislative 
instruments. Regulations, although binding and directly applicable, are not superior to 
directives, for instance. All instruments are applied in all different areas of the Treaties. 
However, depending on the legislative or non-legislative (delegated or implementing) 
character of an instrument, legal hierarchy is established: Legislative acts are superior to 
non-legislative acts. The procedures of making legislative and non-legislative acts differ 
(art. 297 and 288 TFEU).  
 
The acts with binding effect, that is regulations, directives and decisions may express 
legislative or non-legislative character. While the choice of a legal instrument depends 
on its substance, its form is determined by the respective procedure employed. Legal acts 
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are created by ordinary or special legislative procedure (art. 289 TFEU), whereas non-
legislative acts are delegated to the European Commission, excluding the Council of the 
EU as well as the EP from decision-making. Non-legislative or tertiary legislation is of 
technical nature and “requires more expertise than democratic legitimization” (König et 
al., 2012, p. 24). In case a certain provision in the Lisbon Treaty does not specify a 
procedure, only non-legislative acts may be produced, even if the predecessor provision 
in the Treaty of Nice clearly could produce legislative acts (Craig and Búrca, 2011, p. 
113). Tertiary legislation is thus supposed to increase because of unspecified areas of 
application but also in case of an increased level of conflict in the Council of the EU 
which may prevent from overruling tertiary legislation (König et al., 2012, p. 24).  
 
The large number of non-legislative regulations explains that almost 80% of the EU’s 
legislative output is issued by the Commission. Second ranges the Council and third, acts 
adopted by the Council and the EP together. In absolute terms, the Council legislative 
output has remained stable during the period of investigation with peaks in 2004 and 
2011. Council acts including the EP have increased over the time (Figure 11 and Figure 
12). 20   
 
                                                          
20  Where not otherwise indicated, the data of this section are retrieved from the Eur-Lex website at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Stats.do?context=legislative, last access: 7 January 2014.  
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Figure 11: EU policy output by regulator (basic and amending acts), absolute numbers, 1999-2011 
 
Figure 12: Council and EP policy output (basic and amending acts), absolute numbers, 1999-2011 
 
 
In relative terms, the Commission has undoubtedly decreased its regulatory activity. 
Contrary to what some scholars have expected (Costa et al., 2006), the legislative output 
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of the Council (including acts of the Council and the EP) has remained rather stable after 
the enlargement. Decisions on the other hand, including the Council in their making, have 
gained on weight as well as decisions including the EP (Figure 13 and Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 13: EU policy output by regulator (basic and amending acts), percentages, 1999-2011 
 
 






With the Lisbon Treaty, two forms of non-legislative acts were introduced. While they 
differ from legislative acts in the procedure of their adoption, their substance may be of 
legislative nature though. If a legal act delegates the adoption of non-legislative acts to 
the Commission, it is called a delegated act. Such delegated acts are of general 
application and shall “supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the 
legislative act” (art. 290(1) TFEU). The objective, content, scope and duration of the 
delegation must be fixed in the respective legislative act and essential elements are 
reserved to legislative acts. EP and Council may veto a delegated act. 
 
Besides, the Lisbon Treaty foresees implementing acts as second category of non-
legislative instruments. The implementation of binding EU acts is in principle the duty of 
the member states. However, in cases where “uniform conditions” are needed, a 
legislative act may attribute implementation to the Commission or the Council (art. 
291(2) TFEU). The difference between the two instruments gives substance for debate 
among EU scholars and practitioners. Craig and Búrca  (2011, p. 113f) point to the aim to 
divide between secondary acts of legislative nature (delegated acts) and those of non-
legislative nature (implementation acts). However, this division is not clear-cut. 
 
The two non-legislative instruments substitute what has been known as secondary 
measures (art. 202 TEC), which were produced in the Comitology working group 
system of European Commission and member states’ experts. In case the national 
representatives disagreed with a Commission proposal of an executive act, it could be 
vetoed by the Council. The existing measures ranged on a continuum between rule-
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making and implementing. Implementing acts executed a legislative act, without 
amending or supplementing it. Under the Lisbon Treaty, implementing acts are subject to 
the revised version of the Comitology procedure, while delegated acts undergo ex-ante 
and ex-post controls by the Council and the EP.  
 
Comitology pre-Lisbon was seen as a form of control on EU action, but also as form of 
“deliberative supranationalism” evoking concerns of transparency and legitimacy. EP 
and Commission were not satisfied with the veto power of the Council under the 
Comitology regime (Craig and Búrca, 1998, p. 137ff). Until the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Council could confer the right to issue regulations to the Commission via a “parent 
regulation” (art. 202 TEC). Such delegated acts were widely used in the areas of 
agriculture and competition for instance. The committees of member states’ 
representatives served as control to the Commission.  
 
Those qualitative changes bring along quantitative shifts. A major decrease in the number 
of opinions and instruments issued under the Comitology procedure is visible. The 
number of Comitology committees remains stable over time and their meetings only 




Figure 15: Comitology committees, meetings, opinions and instruments absolute numbers, 2000-10 
 
 
Data source: Reports from the Commission on the working of committees 2000-10 
 
With the new delegated acts under the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission has gained 
important stances in regulatory autonomy. While the Council lost its authority it held in 
the review of Comitology decisions, the EP is now increasingly asked to exert scrutiny on 
delegated acts. It may not yet be foreseen, in how far the EP will attend to this duty and 
how the new system will work in practice (Craig and Búrca, 2011, p. 139). 
 
Similarly, difficulties arise when it comes to controlling implementing acts. A revised 
Comitology procedure still exists for implementing acts, including an advisory and an 
examination procedure.21 It is important to acknowledge that the division between 
delegated and implementing acts is crucial for the involvement of the EP and the Council. 
                                                          
21 Regulation 182/2011 of the EP and the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general 




Craig and Búrca (2011, p. 141) note that the Lisbon Treaty has added complexity rather 
than limiting it.   
 
2.1.3. The weight of votes in the Council of the EU 
Apart from the quality and quantity of the EU legislative output, we would assume the 
decision-making style to change with enlargement. Individual member states have less 
say, not least in Council of the EU bargaining and the outcome of decision-making gets 
less predictable with the number of actors involved. In the period between 1999 and 
2011, the EU increased from 15 to 27 member states. Until 2004, Luxembourg held two 
votes in the Council of the EU. With the Act of Accession of 2003, Luxembourg obtained 
four votes (art. 205(2) TEU) which it holds until 31 October 2014, when transitory 
provisions expire (art. 3(3) Protocol No 36 on Transitional provisions, and art. 16(4) 
TEU, art. 238(2) TFEU).  
 
In the literature, Luxembourg is portrayed as winner of enlargement. Compared to the 
size of its population, it is still over-represented in the Council (Felsenthal and Machover, 
2000; Slomczynski and Zyczkowski, 2006). Although its number of votes increased from 
two to four, Luxembourg’s vote share in the Council, that is its voting weight, decreased 
from 2.3% to 1.2%, because of an increase in the total number of votes from 87 to 345.  
 
Voting weight is however not the same as voting power. The latter may be calculated 
using the Normalised Banzhaf index. This index shows the share of changes in 
majorities a voter may cause. In other words, it indicates the probability a voter may 
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produce a “swing” and change a yes-decision to a no (Leech, 2002). The Normalised 
Banzhaf Index for Qualified Majority Votes (QMV) has a value of 2.26 before 
enlargement and 1.25 after the 2004 enlargement for Luxembourg.  
 
In order to better estimate the room for manoeuvre of the Luxembourgish ministers at EU 
level, we calculate an discretion index (DI)  based on the number of acts issued by the 
Council multiplied by Luxembourg’s weight in the Council, that is the Normalised 
Banzhaf index (Equation 1). 
 
Equation 1: Discretion index 
 
DI = Ca * VWL 
DI: Governmental discretion at EU level index 
Ca: Council acts 
VWL: Voting weight of Luxembourg in the Council of the EU (Normalised Banzhaf index) 
 
 The three governments in the period under investigation thus enjoyed varying discretion 
at EU level. The CSV/DP government, in place between 1999 and 2004, had most 
discretion. Its voting power was still at higher level as the ten new member states joined 
in 2004 only. Luxembourg’s voting power subsequently dropped after 2004 and the 
CSV/LSAP I government had to face a situation of less discretion, with an output of 
Council acts which drops in 2005 after its peak of 2004. The CSV/LSAP II government 
of 2009 again sees an increase of its discretion at EU level. Although its voting power 
remains at lower levels, the Council regulatory output increases and thus lifts our 




Table 3:  Luxembourg’s voting weight in the Council of the EU and DI, 1999-2011 
L¹ year votes total QMV weight² Banzhaf³ Council acts DI4 
L 
1 
1999 2 87 62 2.30% 2.26 255 5.8 
2000 2 87 62 2.30% 2.26 232 5.2 
2001 2 87 62 2.30% 2.26 195 4.4 
2002 2 87 62 2.30% 2.26 210 4.7 
2003 2 87 62 2.30% 2.26 215 4.9 
L 
2 
2004 4 321 232 1.25% 1.25 248 3.1 
2005 4 321 232 1.25% 1.25 173 2.2 
2006 4 321 232 1.25% 1.25 198 2.5 
2007 4 345 255 1.16% 1.25 218 2.7 
2008 4 345 255 1.16% 1.25 215 2.7 
L 
3 
2009 4 345 255 1.16% 1.25 236 3.0 
2010 4 345 255 1.16% 1.25 273 3.4 
2011 4 345 255 1.16% 1.25 322 4.0 
 
¹ L: Legislature, L1: Legislature 1 (CSV/DP), L2: Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I), L3: Legislature 3 
(CSV/LSAPII) 
² The voting weight was calculated as the number of votes divided by the number of total votes. 
³ Normalized Banzhaf index for QMV in the Council of the EU, the figures are retrieved from Hosli 
(2008, p. 91, 2000, p. 23).  








Figure 17: Discretion index and Council acts, 1999-2011 
 
 
The advantage of representing an old member state decreases for ministers, as 
interviewees confirm. The establishment of interpersonal relations between the country 
representatives became more difficult as the group expanded. With six or fifteen member 
states, every minister in a Council of the EU formation knew the other one and the 
structure of his/her member state. Particular sensitivities and problems became evident at 
regular visits at informal Council meetings. It was easier to evaluate whether a standpoint 
of a minister was strategy or based on a real problem. With the enlargement, the 
knowledge of the others’ challenges remains basic, not least because visits have to be 
made in 28 countries. But also the meetings of groups of member states with common 
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interests have decreased. All this complicates the representation of a small country like 
Luxembourg.22 
 
At the same time, Luxembourg enjoyed a major advantage given the stability of its 
governments. Often, Luxembourgish ministers were among the most senior politicians in 
the Council. As such, they received more attention than other small countries with more 
frequent government change and more junior ministers did.23 Seniority is an advantage at 
administrative level too, apart from cross-sector knowledge.24  
 
The Council remains however a consensual institution with a large majority of its 
decisions being adopted without dissent between member states (Dehousse and Deloche-
Gaudez, 2006; Hayes-Renshaw et al., 2006; Heisenberg, 2005, p. 73; König and Junge, 
2009). Contrary to the expectations, conflict in Council negotiations did not increase, as 
first evidence on the consequences of the “Big Bang” enlargement round of 2004 
suggests (Van Aken, 2012). Luxembourg did and still does belong to a non-contesting 
group (Heisenberg, 2005; Hosli et al., 2011) of a “silent majority” (Van Aken, 2012). The 
new member states have adapted and mostly joined this non-contesting group of member 
states. Van Aken concludes that “[…] the growing diversity of Member States’ 
preferences has been absorbed by existing coalition patterns in the Council rather than 
by the creation of entirely new ones” (Van Aken, 2012, p. 62). 
 
                                                          
22 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
23 Former Member of the Chamber of Deputies and former Minister, face-to-face interview, 29 October 
2013. 
24 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
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2.1.4. Summary and conclusions: Ministerial discretion at EU level 
There are opposing tendencies which need to be taken into account when it comes to 
estimate the development of the discretion of member states’ governments in EU policy-
making. On the one hand, we observe an increase in the importance of the Council when 
it comes to decision-making at European level. The amount of acts issued by the Council 
alone remained stable between 1999 and 2011 while the total EU policy-making activity 
has decreased over this period. The Commission is the main regulator in purely 
quantitative terms, but it may issue only technical tertiary acts, and those have scaled 
between 1999 and 2011. It limited the issuing of tertiary regulations and this mainly 
accounts for the decrease in EU regulatory output, although the number of acts issued by 
EP and Council together has fallen as well (but at lower levels). We thus conclude that 
the Council has kept its importance in EU decision-making between 1999 and 2011.  
 
The more recent developments since the introduction of the Lisbon treaty however point 
to the fact that governments have lost in influence in EU decision-making. The number of 
Comitology acts, which are under the control of Council working groups, has dropped 
and the say of the EP on delegated acts increased. QMV has been extended. What is 
more, enlargement speaks for a decrease of individual governments’ importance in EU 
decision-making, most importantly in 2004, when 10 new member states entered the EU. 
 
The Normalized Banzhaf index suggests that Luxembourg’s voting power in the Council 
indeed decreased due to enlargement, as it should be the case for all founding members of 
the EU. We propose to calculate a discretion index (DI), based on the quantity of 
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legislative output and the voting power of a member state in the Council of the EU. 
Among the three governments under investigation, the CSV/LSAP I coalition suffers of a 
decrease in the DI at EU level, compared to its predecessor, the CSV/DP government. 
Since 2009, the DI increased again, due to the increase of legislative output of the 
Council. 
 
Thus, taking into account ministerial discretion only, parliament should increase its 
control of the CSV/DP coalition, followed by the CSV/LSAP II government. The 
CSV/LSAP I government on the other hand should face less parliamentary control, as the 
DI is lower compared to the other two coalitions. However, preferences too play a role 
when it comes to the risk for agency loss. In the next section, we evaluate this risk for 
delegation of the three governments.  
 
2.2. Ministerial discretion at domestic level: Lawmaking 1999-2011 
This section aims at an evaluation whether the discretion of ministers at domestic level 
has changed during the period of investigation. Ministers have discretion in EU 
negotiations and EU policy initiation. At national level too, policy initiation is 
government business and this makes ministers and their staff experts in their fields. While 
laws may origin in the respective agenda of a government, it enjoys no total freedom in 
policy initiation. Not least, EU directives have to be transposed into the domestic legal 
order. Government may largely decide on instrument and timing for doing so. In our 
model of enquiry, this completes the examination of governmental discretion, our first 




Figure 18: The model of enquiry: Governmental discretion at domestic level 
 
 
2.2.1. Law initiation: Main steps, actors and behaviour 
The initiative to a law comes either from the executive (the government) or from the 
legislative (the Chamber of Deputies) (art. 47 and 48 C (2012)). An initiative of the 
executive is called a law project (“projet de loi”), an initiative coming from parliament a 
law proposal (“proposition de loi”). The respective ordinary legislative procedure 
depends on the initiator of a bill.25  
 
                                                          
25 Subsequently, we use the terms “bill” and “draft law” interchangeable. for both, parliament and 
government law initiatives. 
82 
 
The Grand Duke’s role is limited to the start and end phase of the legislative process. In 
the start phase, he may ask the government to take a certain initiative to a law. 
Practically, he does not use this right, but only formally charges a minister to hand in a 
bill proposal in his name. The government is the main initiator of draft laws. The 
ministerial responsibility outweighs the Grand Dukes irresponsibility. Every decision 
taken by the executive is signed by both, a member of government and the Grand Duke. 
However, only the minister is accountable for his actions (ibid. p. 6).  
 
The assent of the Chamber is required for all laws (art. 46 C (2012)). The executive, 
formally again the Grand Duke, does however have the right to undertake technical 
measures, such as regulations and decrees, which are necessary for the execution of laws 
(art. 36 C (2012)). The Grand Duke agrees on international treaties, but they may only 
enter into effect after they have been approved and underwent the ordinary legislative 
procedure (art. 37 C (2012)).  
 
The whole government works together in the creation of a law project. Once the text is 
agreed by the ministerial college, the responsible minister prepares a Grand Ducal 
direction. Signed by the Grand Duke, the direction is constitutional condition for the 
deposal of the draft law at the parliament. It comes with comments on articles and a 
synopsis of motives. At the same time, the draft law is sent to the State Council and, 
depending on the topic, to the respective professional chamber(s) (Schroen, 2008, p. 
119f).  The respective letter indicates the date of approbation by the ministerial college, 
as well as information on the concerned professional chambers and other consultative 
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bodies. It also indicates an eventual urgency of a draft law and if it transposes EU 
directives. Attached to the letter is the text body of the draft law and respective 
documents (Service Central de Législation, 2010, p. 10). The Central Service for 
Legislation (SCL) acts as intermediary administration between government and 
parliament, government and State Council, as well as parliament and State Council which 
it addresses with a demand for examination of the law initiative. 
 
Article 54 of the Chamber’s Rules of Procedures (RoP) (1999) pointed to an urgency 
procedure. This provision was based on the organic law of the State Council, where in 
case of urgency the government would transfer a draft law to parliament and State 
Council at the same time, instead of sending it to the State Council first and then submit 
all documents to parliament.26 Article 54 RoP was abolished in 2000. Rather than being 
an exception, the government used the urgency procedure in most of its initiatives, not 
least, because a presentation at parliament generally allows government to inform the 
press and present the project to the greater public. The minister thus wins public laurels 
and all necessary changes on the demand of the State Council most importantly fall into 
the period of examination within parliament.27  
 
Parliament took account for this practice and lifted the urgency procedure to the standard 
procedure. In any case, it is practice that the committees take up discussions in most of 
                                                          
26 Loi du 12 juillet 1996 portant réforme du Conseil d’Etat, Mémorial A n° 45, p 1319, doc. parl. 3940. 
27 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 24 July 2013 and Official of the State Council, 
face-to-face interview, 18 September 2013. 
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the cases only with the reception of the opinion issued by the State Council.28 This is due 
to the fact that at some instances, when the Chamber sets out to its work on a draft law 
too early, it had to start afresh after the delivery of the State Council opinion.29 Even 
though the urgency procedure became the ordinary procedure, they still wait for the State 
Council opinion before taking up works. 
 
Legislative initiatives from within the parliament, so called law propositions, stem from 
at least one (or several individual) MPs (art. 55 RoP (1999-2004), art. 56 RoP (2007-11)). 
Similar to the procedure guiding law projects, the author comments the articles of the law 
proposal and adds a synopsis of motives to the text. While government initiatives do not 
undergo an a priori selection procedure in parliament, initiatives of MPs have to pass the 
Conference of Presidents, where their proposals are scrutinized for their value of taking 
further pursuit.  
 
The Conference of Presidents is the parliamentary steering organ including the Speaker, 
the Secretary General and the leaders of all parliamentary factions (art. 28 RoP 2007-11, 
art. 26 RoP 1999-2004).30 It is responsible for the organisation of works in the Chamber.  
Firstly, at the very beginning the law proposal is brought for the attention of the 
Conference of Presidents (art. 58 RoP (2007-11), art. 57(1) RoP (2000-4), the former 
                                                          
28 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012, and Clerk of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 June 2013. 
29 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 3 May 2013. 
30 The formation of a parliamentary faction requires at least five MPs. The Chamber distinguishes between 
political factions comprised by MPs of the same party affiliation and technical factions, which consist of 
MPs of affiliations which are too small to create a political faction on their own (art. 13-15 RoP 1999-2004, 
art. 14-16 RoP 2007-11). 
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Commission de Travail (art. 57(1) RoP (1999)) which decides upon its permissibility and 
the responsible committee.  
 
The votes of representatives of factions are weighted by their number of seats. Thus, 
majority rules in the Conference of Presidents too, however, consensus seeking is 
prevailing. Yet, the opposition factions dispose over a veto when it comes to the selection 
of the speaking time model in public session, a decision taken at the Conference of 
Presidents. The opposition is always granted a general longer speaking time, in case it 
requests so. Generally speaking, only on rare occasions, requests are refused by the 
Conference of Presidents. Rather, proposals for changes are made.31  
 
Until 2009, the conditions of permissibility were specified in the RoP. Article 58(1) RoP 
(2007) (art. 57(1) RoP (1999-2004)) stated that a law proposal would always be 
permitted, unless it violated public order or etiquette. Today the measure for 
permissibility is not stated, the Chamber decides following a proposal of the Conference 
of Presidents.  
 
Recently, the RoP introduced more specific rules in case a law proposition was turned 
down and not followed up. If for whatever reason a law proposition was not successful 
and stopped during the legislative procedure, MPs may not introduce the same 
proposition in the same session (art. 62 RoP (2011)). However, authors of law bills may 
withdraw their proposition (art. 64(1) RoP (2011)) and factions (or the Conference of 
                                                          
31 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013, and Member of the Chamber of 
Deputies, face-to-face interview, 2 October 2013. 
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Presidents) may do the same, if the author of a proposition leaves parliament (art. 64 (2) 
and art. 65 RoP (2011)). Reports on law propositions with budgetary consequences have 
to indicate how to cover additional costs before they may be adopted (art. 63 RoP 
(2011)). After the first vote in plenary, a bill proposition may not be withdrawn anymore 
(art. 66 RoP (2011)).  
 
Then, the State Council may be consulted in the run-up to a draft law with regard to the 
principles of a planned reform. This however happens quite rarely.32 More commonly 
however, it reviews all law initiatives – that is law projects and propositions - and their 
amendments. In its opinions on legislative acts, it may issue a formal opposition towards 
the content of a law or an amendment, based upon the compliance of constitutional, 
fundamental, international or European principles of law. It has no legislative function 
but may rather be characterized as “competent under constitutional law, extra-
parliamentary legislative committee” (Service Central de Législation, 2010, p. 10)  
compensating for the lack of resources of parliament and government (compare with 
section 4.3.1 on page 223).  The legislative process differs thus only marginally between 
government initiatives and parliament initiatives. (Figure 19).  
                                                          
32 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interviews, 18 September 2013, and Official of the State 
Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
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In order to evaluate the discretion of government in law initiation at domestic level, we 
investigate a sample of years and all laws adopted in 2001, 2006 and 2011. Laws based 
on parliament law initiatives remain marginal. Furthermore, a few bills are introduced by 
MPs and then taken up by government (two laws in the three sampled years). Those are 
indicated as initiatives stemming from government and parliament. Not surprisingly, 
most laws are penned by government, that is on the average 97.6% over the three years 
(Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20: Initiators of draft laws, absolute numbers & percentages, 2001-2006-2011 
 
 
Data source: Parliamentary proceedings 
 
Parliament clearly regards law initiation as government business. Government is 
considered to be in charge of the resources needed in terms of expertise. But even if MPs 
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have a large expertise, it is difficult to find the necessary majority in the Chamber and 
meet the requirements of the State Council regarding the legal standards.33 
 
2.2.2. Sources of law and transposition 
After its revision in 1956 the Luxembourgish Constitution specified that the Grand Duke 
may create regulations and decrees which serve the execution of laws introducing 
international treaties (art. 37 C). Most importantly however, article 49bis34 was 
established enabling the ratification of the Treaty on the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and the Treaty on the European Defence Community (EDC). It 
rendered the devolution of executive, legislative and judiciary powers to international 
institutions possible. More particularly, it affords parliament to ratify international 
treaties, which result in a shift of sovereignty to a supranational organisation (Bicheler et 
al., 2006, p. 192ff; Pescatore, 2009; Schroen, 1999). Indirectly, this article is still today 
the basis for the transposition of directives. 
 
Between 1986 and 2006, the largest share of the domestic regulatory output consisted in 
executive decrees. Only 9% of those acts were laws and thus involved parliament as a 
legislator. Around 4% of all regulatory acts transposed directives and 1% of it consisted 
                                                          
33 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
34 Article 49bis: “L’exercice d’attributions réservées par la Constitution aux   pouvoirs législatif, exécutif et 
judiciaire peut être temporairement dévolu par traité à des institutions de droit international.” 
Jurisprudence: Article 49bis: “En cas de conflit entre une norme de droit interne et une norme de droit 
international ayant des effets directs dans l’ordre juridique interne, la règle établie par le Traité doit 
prévaloir. Cette règle s’impose plus particulièrement lorsque le conflit existe entre une norme de droit 
interne et une norme communautaire puisque les traités qui ont créé le droit communautaire ont institué un 
nouvel ordre juridique au profit duquel les Etats membres ont limité l’exercice de leurs pouvoirs souverains 
dans les domaines que ces traités déterminent.” (Conseil d’Etat, 21 novembre 1984, Pas. 26, p. 174). 
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in laws transposing directives.35 Although we do not dispose over exact figures for the 
period between 1999 and 2011, we have no reason to believe that those percentages have 
shifted for our period under investigation. Similarly, parliament was not concerned with 
most of the EU regulatory acts. At least 96% of the binding EU policy output issued 
between 1999 and 2011 has bypassed the Luxembourgish parliament. This is the case for 
regulations and decisions, which are directly applicable at domestic level and do not 
require transposition (compare with section 2.1.1 and Figure 8 on page 65 more 
particularly).  
 
Most of the transposition of directives again does not imply the Chamber. It is done by 
government and executive decrees or by administrative measures. In case no legal base 
exists already or if a directive is supposed to evoke political controversies, government 
should introduce a bill. On the average, 82% of all directives transposed in the period 
under investigation were taken up in executive decrees that are Grand-Ducal regulations 
(RGD)36 and ministerial regulations (RM)37. This percentage decreased until 2008 and 
augments since (Figure 21).  
 
                                                          
35 These figures are based on the domestic policy output between 1986 and 2006. Data source : SCL 
36 Règlements grand-ducaux 
37 Règlements ministériels 
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Figure 21: Transposition directives, absolute numbers and percentages, 1999-2011 
 
Data source: Parliamentary proceedings and Rapports d’activités, SCL 
 
On the average, 21% of all directives are transposed by law, while 77% of them are 
transposed by RGD and almost 3% of them transposed by RM. We may speak of a major 
increase of parliament involvement in transposition until 2008. In recent years, this 




Figure 22: Transposition instruments, percentages, 1999-2011 
 
 
Data source: Rapports d’activité, SCL 
 
One legal act may transpose more than one directive and vice-versa one directive may be 
transposed by more than one act. During the period of investigation, the number of laws 
transposing one or more European directives has doubled. More volatility is displayed in 
the number of executive decrees used for the transposition of at least one directive. The 




Figure 23: Laws and executive decrees transposing directives, absolute numbers, 1999-2011 
 
Data source: Parliamentary proceedings and Rapports d’activité, SCL 
 
However, the interviewees we spoke to also mentioned that government has no infinite 
capacities and that functionaries work on many dossiers at the same time. In complex 
matters, this results in a relatively late introduction of law initiatives in the Chamber. 
When it comes to the transposition of directives, the respective draft laws sometimes 
enter parliament when the transposition deadline has already passed. Parliament is then 
urged by the responsible minister to speedily deal with the matter, hoping for sloppy 
scrutiny.38  
 
                                                          
38 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 December 2012, Clerk of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 12 December 2012, and Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face 
interview, 13 December 2012. 
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Government has large discretion as to the timing of transpositions. Occasionally, the 
deadline has already passed when a transposition bill enters the Chamber. Interviewees 
indicate that strategy may sometimes be behind such decision. Government introduces 
some transposition laws very late in order to urge the Chamber to proceed very quickly 
and avoid a closer investigation. Others believe the scarce administrative resources, the 
complexity of matters or interest groups to be responsible for such late law initiatives 
(compare with section 4.3.2 at page 229).39 Be that as it may, in parliament, law projects 
carrying the transposition of a directive are treated the same way like other law projects 
in the legislative procedure. However, they are often given priority, as parliament is 
aware of the obligation of timely transposition (compare with section 4.3.1 at page 
223).40 
  
In 1971, a law was adopted to facilitate transposition of potentially controversial issues.41 
It enables the government in economic, technical, agricultural, forestal, social and 
transport matters with the advice of the State Council and the agreement of the 
Conference of Presidents to circumvent the ordinary legislative procedure (Dumont and 
Spreitzer, 2012, p. 225; Service Central de Législation, 2010, p. 11). However, this did 
                                                          
39 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 12 December 2012, Member of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, and Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face 
interview, 13 December 2012. 
40 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 30 November 2012, Member of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 December 2012, Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face 
interview, 14 January 2013 and Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 3 May 2013. 
41 Mémorial A n° 59 du 06.09.1971: Loi du 9 août 1971 concernant l'exécution et la sanction des décisions 
et des directives ainsi que la sanction des règlements des Communautés européennes en matière 
économique, technique, agricole, forestière, sociale et en matière de transports and  
Mémorial A n° 82 du 19.12.1980: Loi du 8 décembre 1980 complétant l'art. 1er (al. 2) de la loi du 9 août 
1971 concernant l'exécution et la sanction des décisions et des directives ainsi que la sanction des 
règlements des Communautés européennes en matière économique, technique, agricole, forestière, sociale 
et en matière de transports.  
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not lead to the desired outcome. Article 1 of the 1971 law excludes all matters, reserved 
to law by the Constitution and this leaves the situation basically unchanged.42  
 
The State Council in its opinions of 6 June 2012, 16 March 2004 and 19 February 2002 
repeatedly considers such facilitated procedure necessary in order to guarantee a quick 
and correct transposition. It recommends changing article 37 of the Constitution and 
adding a paragraph allowing parliament to decide case-by-case whether it delegates 
transposition to the executive. The government expressed its favour of such a change in 
its position of 22 June 2011. The debate is still on-going in the Chamber at the time of 
submission of this thesis in January 2014. 
 
2.2.3. Summary and Conclusion: Ministerial discretion at national level 
This section served controlling for governmental discretion at domestic level in order to 
draw conclusions about the consequences of change of governmental discretion at EU 
level. Government discretion at domestic level may be measured by the number of 
laws it initiates and the number of directives it introduces as executive decree rather than 
as a law. The rules on the initiation of laws do not change during the period under 
investigation. The general amount of laws has however increased between 1999 and 
2011. Around 98% of them are initiated by government and all three coalitions have held 
this practice the same way.  
 
                                                          
42 Art. 1, loi du 9 août 1971: “Seront toutefois exceptées de cette réglementation, qui peut déroger aux lois 
existantes, les matières réservées à la loi par la Constitution.“ Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-
face interview, 3 May 2013. 
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For MPs, law initiatives require resources and competencies often not at their hands. Law 
propositions thus have a signalling rather than a policing function. Similar is known for 
Italy and Belgium, and more generally in Western Europe. Mattson claims that they are 
often introduced by small opposition parties at the most visible stage of the legislative 
procedure indicating “concurrence of government, parliament and opposition in the law-
making process” (Mattson, 1995, p. 481). Initiatives may be seen as resources of 
individual MPs employed to influence and negotiate decisions (Di Palma 1977, 59 as 
cited in Mattson 1995, 482).  
 
The State Council influences the destiny of initiatives. It must confirm every initiative 
not to break constitutional law, conventions, treaties and general principles of law. It may 
not be seen as apolitical although its role became more of an advisory body in recent 
years. 
 
In any case, the initiator of a bill does not necessarily tell about the author (Mattson, 
1995, p. 454). Initiators of an initiative may also act on behalf of the party, an interest 
group or the public. The actual origin of law initiatives is difficult to determine. What we 
were able to demonstrate, however, is that government disposes over a rather large 
discretion at domestic level and this situation has not changed during the period of 
investigation. 
 
This is however not the full story. Government has to face some external constraints. It is 
not totally free when it comes to law initiation. The transposition of EU directives into 
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the national legal order requires respective action. The government has to consider the 
instrument to be used for the transposition. If a basic law exists the transposition may be 
done by executive decree. Otherwise, a law needs to be initiated or an existing law 
changed. 
 
Generally speaking, at least 96% of all binding EU regulatory output bypassed NPs 
between 1999 and 2011. With regard to directives, we note an increase of transposition 
including parliament. The amount of laws compared to the amount of executive decrees 
transposing a directive has increased during our period of investigation. While their 
number is very small, the share of transpositions by law increased between 1999 and 
2008, just to fall back to prior-2004 levels in 2010. The number of directives transposed 
by executive decree remains nonetheless overwhelming, ambiguous concerning the 
choice of legal instrument and uncontrolled. It is entirely up to government to decide 
upon the measure it uses for transposition. 
 
 
2.3. Risk for ministerial drift: Governmental preferences and  parliament 
Depending on the domestic context, government is “perceived” within a NP. Not only the 
discretion of ministers may provoke NP to better scrutinise government. Also differences 
between the preferences of principals and agents increase the need for tougher control. 
Depending on the position of government vis-à-vis parliament (Lupia, 2000) and the 
coalition partners respectively (Martin and Vanberg, 2011) parliamentary control is 
considered more or less necessary. The further away the positions of ministers from 
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parliament and the coalition partner, the more probable we would consider a 
strengthening of parliamentary control. In our model of enquiry, the domestic preference 
constellation thus influences the need for adapting parliamentary control (Figure 24). 
 
Figure 24: The model of enquiry - Domestic preference constellation 
 
 
Before investigating party positions in more detail, we outline the constitutional setting of 
parliamentary democracy in Luxembourg with a focus on the executive-legislative 
relationship. We point to changes in the constitutional rules with possible impact for the 




2.3.1. The Luxembourgish political landscape: The constitutional set-up of 
parliamentary democracy and coalition government 
The Luxembourgish Constitution defines the political system of the country as a 
parliamentary democracy (art. 51 C) in form of a constitutional monarchy. The Chamber 
was designed a unicameral parliament, which with its 60 members43 is among the 
smallest NPs in the EU. Many aspects of state organisation follow the Belgian model 
(Beissel, 2006). The country was however considered too small for a bi-cameral 
parliament. The State Council “somewhat compensates for the lack of a second 
chamber” (Dumont and Spreitzer, 2012, p. 217). Political elites considered that the 
country was too small for a  bicameral system (Dumont and Spreitzer, 2012, p. 217; 
Schmit, 2009, p. 60).  
 
However, as Schroen (2008, p. 115) points out, the State Council is a non-elected body 
and its tasks are other than that of a Senate.44 It had to face limitations of its competences. 
Until the constitutional reform of 1996, it also fulfiled judiciary functions in 
administrative matters. After a judgment by the European Court for Human Rights,45 an 
Administrative Court was created. At the same time to this limitation of powers, the State 
Council was reinforced in its advisory role. A Constitutional Court was created in 1996 in 
order to check the constitutionality of laws a posteriori (Schroen, 2008). Since, the main 
                                                          
43 Before 1988, the number of MPs varied as it was dependent on the size of population. 
44 Although its aims might go into this direction: We may read in its activity reports that State Council 
representatives take part of meetings of European Senates. See for instance “Activités pour l’année 2010-
2011”, where it mentions its observer status in the Association of European Senates. http://www.conseil-
etat.public.lu/fr/actualites/2012/03/Rapdact__10_11/Rapport_d_activit___2010-2011.pdf, last access: 
29.12.2013.  
45 Procola v. Luxembourg, European Court of Human Rights, 28 September 1995. 
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task of the State Council is to a priori check the constitutionality of laws and their 
accordance to superior law, that is international agreements and general legal principles.46   
 
The Grand Duke and government together form the executive. The Grand Duke may 
dissolve the Chamber (art. 74 C). He is symbol of national unity and politically 
irresponsible (art. 33 C). His signatures have to be counter-signed by a member of 
government (art. 45 C). Thus, the Constitution guarantees that the Grand Duke stays out 
of the political debates and even more so since the constitutional crisis of 2008 and its 
subsequent revision of March 2009. Then he was withdrawn his duty to sanction laws 
after parliamentary adoption. This purely formal obligation was interpreted by the Grand 
Duke as agreement to the content of laws, similar to parliamentary approval.  
 
Before parliament adopted the law on euthanasia47 the Grand Duke thus threatened to 
refuse sanction.48 In the case of such a refusal, government had to resign. As a 
consequence, the government initiated a law revising Article 34 of the Constitution49 in 
order to further clarify his political irresponsibility by withdrawing his right for sanction. 
This should ensure the role of the Grand Duke as guarantor of national unity.  
 
                                                          
46 "S’il estime un projet ou une proposition de loi contraire à la Constitution, aux conventions et traités 
internationaux, ainsi qu’aux principes généraux du droit, le Conseil d’Etat en fait mention dans son avis. Il 
en fait de même, s’il estime un projet de règlement contraire à une norme de droit supérieure.“ art. 2(2), Loi 
du 12 juillet 1996 portant réforme du Conseil d’Etat.  
47 Loi du 16 mars 2009 sur l’euthanasie et l’assistance au suicide. Mémorial A n°46 du 16.03.2009. 
48 Interestingly, similar happened in Belgium 19 years before the Luxembourg incident. In 1990, the 
Belgian King Baudouin refused to sanction the law which partially exempted abortion from punishment. 
The solution they found to let the law enter into force was however not applicable in the Luxembourg case 
(Bicheler et al., 2006, p. 151). 
49 Loi du 12 mars 2009 portant révision de l’article 34 de la Constitution. Mémorial A n° 43 du 12.03.2009. 
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What is more, the constitutional revision has clearly disposed the Grand Duke of an 
unclear set of responsibilities which blur the separation of executive and legislative 
powers. Since the 2008 constitutional reform, a law is established by its adoption in 
parliament. Today, parliament alone holds the legislative power. The Grand Duke is 
limited to sign laws at least three months after their adoption in parliament. The crisis has 
triggered a more profound reform process of the Constitution, most importantly with 
regards of the monarchy. Parliament is set to benefit from the revision which is not yet 
concluded at the time this study has been accomplished.50 
 
The Grand Duke remains head of government which is composed of at least three 
members (art. 76 C). The constitutional revision of November 2004 enables him to 
charge members of government with executive measures foreseen in Articles 36 and 37 
C, and even deviating existing law in case of an international crisis (art. 32 C). The 
irresponsibility of the Grand Duke is compensated by the responsibility of the members 
of government (art. 78 C). They may enter the Chamber and the Chamber may ask their 
presence (art. 80 C). It is also foreseen in the Constitution, that the Chamber may accuse 
government members while details are supposed to be ruled out by law (art. 82 C). As no 
such law has been put into place, a transitory provision still applies (art. 116 C) which 
gives the Chamber discretionary power to exert this “right of accusation”. 
 
Luxembourg’s governments are characterized by their durability and were always 
composed of two parties, apart from the Dupong all-party-government installed after the 
                                                          
50 6030 - Proposition de révision portant modification et nouvel ordonnancement de la Constitution, 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/RoleEtendu?action=doDocpaDetails&backto=/wps/portal/public&id=
6030, last access: 6.1.2014.    
102 
 
end of World War II. In all but one cases51, the Christian Social People’s party (CSV) 
was senior partner of the coalition and set the Prime Minister. In 2011, Prime Minister 
Jean-Claude Juncker was in office since sixteen years, when his predecessor Jacques 
Santer took over the post of the European Commission president in 1995. Since 1945, 
there were two anticipate elections due to government crisis in 1959 and 1968 and two 
coalition breakdowns which did not lead to anticipated elections but resulted in a change 
of government.  
 
Between 1999 and 2011, three coalition governments were in place. From 1999 to 2004, 
the Liberals joined the CSV as a junior partner. Lydie Polfer became Vice-Prime Minister 
and Minister for Foreign affairs and External commerce, Minister for the Public service 
and Administrative reform. Out of the fourteen ministers, the Liberals held seven, among 
them two Secretaries of State (Table 4).52 Those were installed in portfolios of ministers 
of the same party (public service and administrative reform as well as environment). 
However, the CSV and Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker more particularly, denied the 
two State secretaries the right to vote in the Council of government. Thus, they were not 
delegated competences but signature only.53   
 
                                                          
51 The exception was the Thorn/Vouel/Berg government of Liberals and Socialists between 1974 and 1979. 
52 Member of the European Parliament, telephone interview, 26 March 2013. 
53 This was not compliant to the executive decree of 1857 on the organisation of government. Arrêté royal 
grand-ducal du 09 juillet 1857 portant organisation du Gouvernement grand-ducal. Mémorial n°25 du 16 
juillet 1857, p.285. Official of the State Council, written statement, 22 November 2013. 
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Table 4: Portfolio allocation in the Juncker/Polfer government (CSV/DP), 1999-2004  
Name Portfolio 
1 Jean-Claude Juncker (CSV) 1 Prime minister 
2 Minister of State 
3 Finance Minister 
2 Fernand Boden (CSV) 4 Minister for agriculture, viticulture and rural development 
5 Minister for the medium-sized businesses, tourism and housing 
3 Marie-Josée Jacobs (CSV) 6 Minister for family, social solidarity and youth 
7 Minister for the promotion of women 
4 Erna Hennicot-Schoepges 
(CSV) 
8 Minister for culture, higher education and research 
9 Minister for public works 
5 Michel Wolter (CSV) 10 Internal affairs minister 
6 Luc Frieden (CSV) 11 Treasury and budget minister 
12 Justice minister 
7 François Biltgen (CSV) 13 Minister for work and employment 
14 Minister for the cults 
15 Minister for the relations with parliament 
16 Deputy minister for communication 
1 Lydie Polfer (DP) 1 Vice prime minister 
2 Minister for foreign affairs and external commerce 
3 Minister for the public service and administrative reform  
2 Joseph Schaack (DP) (3) Secretary of State for the public service and administrative reform 
3 Anne Brasseur (DP) 4 Minister for national education, vocational training and sport 
4 Henri Grethen (DP) 5 Minister for economy 
6 Transport minister 
5 Charles Goerens (DP) 7 Minister for cooperation, humanitarian aid and defence 
8 Environment minister 
6 Eugène Berger (DP) (8) Secretary of State for environment 
7 Carlo Wagner (DP) 9 Minister for health and social security 
Source: Thewes (2011, p. 233) 
 
Between 2004 and 2009, the CSV went back to its former coalition partner, the LSAP. 
The Juncker/Asselborn I government installed fifteen ministers. With the exception of 
the change of the defence portfolio from Frieden to Schiltz, the structure of the 
government remained the same over the whole period. The Socialists could secure only 
six out of the fifteen ministers, and eight out of 27 portfolios. Three portfolios were 
attributed “helpers”. Nicolas Schmit became Deputy Minister for Asselborn’s external 
affairs and immigration ministry. Octavie Modert held even three State secretary 
portfolios, one for the relations with the parliament for which she was responsible alone. 
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She supported Fernand Boden in the area of agriculture, viticulture and rural development 
and François Biltgen with culture, higher education and research (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Portfolio allocation in the Juncker/Asselborn I government (CSV/LSAP I), 2004-9  
Name Portfolio 
1 Jean-Claude Juncker (CSV) 1 Prime minister 
2 Minister of State 
3 Finance Minister 
2 Fernand Boden (CSV) 4 Minister for agriculture, viticulture and rural development 
5 Minister for the medium-sized businesses, tourism and housing 
3 Marie-Josée Jacobs (CSV) 6 Minister for family and integration 
7 Minister for equal opportunities 
4 Luc Frieden (CSV) 8 Treasury and budget minister 
9 Justice Minister 
10 Defence minister 
5 François Biltgen (CSV) 11 Minister for work and employment 
12 Minister for culture, higher education and research 
13 Minister for the cults 
6 Jean-Marie Halsdorf (CSV) 14 Minister for internal affairs and spatial planning 
7 Claude Wiseler (CSV) 15 Minister for the public service and administrative reform 
16 Minister for public works  
8 Jean-Louis Schiltz (CSV) 17 Minister for cooperation and humanitarian aid 
18 Deputy minister for communication 
9 Octavie Modert (CSV) 19 State secretary for the relations with parliament 
(4) State secretary for agriculture, viticulture and  rural development 
(12) State secretary for culture, higher education and research 
1 Jean Asselborn (LSAP) 1 Vice prime minister 
2 Minister for foreign affairs and immigration  
2 Nicolas Schmit (LSAP) 3 Deputy minister for foreign affairs and immigration 
3 Mady Delvaux-Stehres (LSAP) 4 Minister for national education and vocational training 
4 Jeannot Krecké (LSAP) 5 Minister for the economy and external commerce 
6 Sports minister 
5 Mars Di Bartolomeo (LSAP) 7 Minister for health and social security 
6 Lucien Lux (LSAP) 8 Environment minister 
9 Transport minister 
Source: Thewes (2011, p. 233) 
 
After the legislative elections in 2009, the coalition government of Juncker and 
Asselborn found a remake. Again, the LSAP held six out of fifteen ministers. 22 
portfolios went to the CSV, nine to the Socialists. The CSV attributed two deputy 
ministers, one for public service and administrative reform (Octavie Modert) and one for 
sustainable development and infrastructure (Marco Schank). Romain Schneider of the 
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Socialists became Deputy Minister for a solidary economy. He held this portfolio 
however by his own (Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Portfolio allocation in the Juncker/Asselborn II government (CSV/LSAP II), 2009-13  
Name Portfolio 
1 Jean-Claude Juncker (CSV) 1 Prime minister 
2 Minister of State 
3 Treasury Minister 
2 Marie-Josée Jacobs (CSV) 4 Minister for family and integration 
5 Minister for cooperation and humanitarian action 
3 Luc Frieden (CSV) 6 Finance minister 
4 François Biltgen (CSV) 7 Justice minister 
8 Minister for the public service and administrative reform 
9 Minister for higher education and research 
10 Minister for communication and the media 
11 Minister for the cults 
5 Jean-Marie Halsdorf (CSV) 12 Minister for the Grand region 
13 Defence minister 
6 Claude Wiseler (CSV) 14 Minister for sustainable development and infrastructure 
7 Octavie Modert (CSV) 15 Culture minister 
16 Minister for the relations with parliament 
17 Minister for administrative simplification alongside the 
Prime minister 
(8) Deputy minister for the public service and administrative 
reform 
8 Marco Schank (CSV) 18 Minister for housing 
(14) Deputy minister for sustainable development and 
infrastructure 
9 Françoise Hetto-Gaasch (CSV) 19 Minister for small and medium enterprises and tourism 
20 Minister for equal opportunities 
1 Jean Asselborn (LSAP) 1 Vice prime minister 
2 Minister for foreign affairs  
2 Mady Delvaux-Stehres (LSAP) 3 Minister for national education and vocational training 
3 Jeannot Krecké (LSAP) 4 Minister for the economy and external commerce 
4 Mars Di Bartolomeo (LSAP) 5 Minister for health and social security 
5 Nicolas Schmit (LSAP) 6 Minister for employment, work and immigration 
6 Romain Schneider (LSAP) 7 Minister for agriculture, viticulture and rural development 
8 Sports minister 
(9) Deputy minister for a solidary economy 
Source: Thewes (2011, p. 233) 
 
 
Thus, State Secretaries and Deputy ministers were not installed to work as watchdogs of 
the coalition partner, but to support the own minister. In their place, a high functionary 
may fulfil the same obligations.  
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The three coalition governments at place within the period between 1999 and 2011 
certainly resembled each other in their structure although the junior partners of the CSV 
changed from the DP to the LSAP. The Juncker/ Polfer as well as the Juncker/Asselborn I 
governments granted their junior partners five ministers (excluding State secretaries of 
supportive function), while the CSV held seven ministers in the first and eight in the 
second legislature (respectively nine including State Secretary Modert with a proper 
portfolio). Within the most recent coalition, the LSAP had a slightly better stance with six 
ministers out of fifteen.  
 
The total number of ministers remained relatively stable, but we may observe an increase 
in the number of separate ministerial portfolios from 25 during the Juncker/Polfer 
government to 27 during the Juncker/Asselborn I and 29 during the Juncker/Asselborn II 
governments. The CSV held sixteen, nineteen and twenty portfolios respectively. Thus, 
out of the three, the Polfer DP was slightly better off, with around 36% of portfolios 
belonging to the Liberals, while Asselborn could only secure 30% and 31% of the 
portfolios for the Socialists. 
 
Those figures point to a slight weakening of the respective junior coalition partner of the 
CSV although the electoral results were comparable (in 1999 the DP won 22.35% and 
fifteen seats, and the LSAP 23,37% or 14 seats in 2004 and 21,56% or 13 seats in 2009). 
In terms of the domestic political constellation, we may thus conclude that conflicts 
within government have increased due to the weakening of the junior partner, who must 
be unsatisfied with the situation. In total however, the majority of government in the 
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Chamber increased from 34 seats to 38 in 2004 and 39 in 2009. As such, the mostrecent 
coalition government only missed one vote in the full assembly in case a two-third-
majority is required, that is for constitutional revisions (art. 114 C).  
 
Luxembourgish governments dispose over large resources when it comes to expertise. 
They alone may charge the Economic and Social Council (CES)54 and the Social security 
administration (IGSS)55 with the examination of particular problems. Similarly, 
government may get the Tripartite involved, which was introduced to bypasses the CES. 
The Tripartite more particularly puts the Chamber under pressure with ready-made 
package deals.56 Notably, to change an agreement between the trade unions, employers’ 
representatives and the government is very delicate, as this risks the failure of the bargain 
in case the negotiation result becomes unbalanced.  
 
Finally, it should not be forgotten within this context that government largely consists of 
the most popular figures of governing parties (Reimen and Krecké, 1999, p. 51ff). This 
gives ministers additional legitimacy for their action. The popularity of ministers, 
together with the increase of majority seats in parliament and the disposal over external 
expertise make up for the strength of government. At the same time, this ensures trust and 
support of parliament. 
 
                                                          
54 Conseil Economique et Social 
55 Inspection générale de la sécurité sociale 
56 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 3 October 2013. 
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2.3.2. Party positions and expected agency loss 
Party programmes offer one way to measure the positions of parties represented in 
parliaments. To this end, we analyse data stemming from the Party Manifesto Project 
(PMP)57 which published data for the Luxembourgish parties represented in the Chamber 
and from 1945 up to the latest elections. Although it was contested (see for instance 
Dinas and Gemenis, 2010; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Pelizzo, 2010), the advantage of 
using this data is its availability, completeness for all parties represented in parliament 
and comparability for an extended period in time.  
 
In order to arrive at an evaluation of the differences in preferences between government 
and parliament, and the coalition partners respectively, we use the indices contained in 
this data concerning the position of parties on six dimensions: Left-right, planned 
economy, market economy, welfare, international peace and European integration. We 
compare those measures in the electoral programmes issued for three elections leading to 
the installation of the three different coalition governments in place between 1999 and 
2011: the June 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. In sum, our calculations are thus based on 
16 party programmes, with five parties represented in the Chamber after the 1999 and 
2004 elections, and six after the 2009 elections.  
 
The first analysis we perform concerns the preference differential between the 
coalition partners. Following Martin and Vanberg (2011), parliamentary control 
increases if the coalition partner expects agency drift. When it comes to the three 
governments under investigation in this study, the Juncker/Asselborn II government 
                                                          
57 https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/, last access: 31 December 2013.  
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shows the largest difference taken together all six indices. This difference is due to 
preferences concerning the left-right dimension. Interestingly, this did not show for the 
Juncker/Asselborn I government, although the same parties were in government. Instead, 
the differences in the preferences regarding European integration ranked high. The 
position of the Juncker/Polfer government, bringing together the Christian democrats and 
the Liberals, is situated between the Juncker/Asselborn governments when it comes to the 
total differential of preferences. Similar to the 2009 government, left-right divides this 
government most, followed by welfare policy and European integration (Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25: Absolute differences between preferences of coalition partners, 1999-2004-2009 
 




It is trickier to calculate the differences in preferences between opposition and 
government, not least, as the expected agency loss depends on the party providing a 
minister. In order to avoid an underestimation of a preference differential, but taking into 
account collegial decision-making in the Council of government, we propose using the 
sum of the absolute difference of an opposition party to each of the government parties on 
each of the indices.  
 
It shows that the LSAP was the opposition party holding the greatest distance to 
government in 1999. In 2004, the Democratic Reform Party (ADR)58 took over this 
position, while the Greens and the Liberals are closer to government. This picture 
changes again in 2009, when all the three opposition parties keep similar distances to the 
governing coalition. If they are represented in parliament, the Left (déi Lénk) take over 
the most extreme position on all dimensions. Taken across all parties, the differences in 
the positions of opposition and government remain at similar levels for the Juncker/Polfer 
and Juncker/Asselborn I governments. They increase with the last government, not least, 
because of the presence of the Left in parliament (Figure 26).  
 
Opposition parties do not enjoy the high importance this first figure would suggest. In a 
second step, we weight each party position by the relative weight a faction enjoys in 
parliament. This gives justice especially to the last legislature, when déi Lénk entered 
parliament with one MP. While the Juncker/Asselborn II government saw an increase in 
opposition in parliament compared to its starts in 2004, it did not reach exceptionally high 
                                                          
58 Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei 
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levels. Compared to the Juncker/Polfer government, it rather faces less opposition. The 
LSAP was dominantly defending its position in the 1999-2004 legislature (Figure 27).  
 
Figure 26: Sum of absolute differences of opposition parties to each of the government parties on six 
dimensions, 1999-2004-2009 
 




Figure 27: Weighted sum of absolute differences of opposition parties to each of the government parties on 
six dimensions, 1999-2004-2009 
 
Data source: Party Manifesto Project 
 
Finally, we calculate the overall risk for discretion as the sum of the policy positions 
between the coalition partners and between parliament and government parties. While the 
within coalition risk and the within parliament risk diminish for about the same amount 
between Legislature 1 (CSV/DP) and 2 (CSV/LSAP I), the within coalition risk 
disproportionally increases in Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II). Thus, a U-shaped pattern 
appears with Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) facing least the risk and Legislature 3 
(CSV/LSAP II) the most. The higher the risk, the more should parliament increase its 
overview of government. Due to the assumption of a positive relationship between risk 
and parliamentary control, we expect parliamentary control to be the highest in 
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Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II), followed by Legislature 1 (CSV/DP) and the smallest for 
Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) (Figure 28).59  
 
Figure 28: Risk of delegation in Legislatures 1 to 3 
 
 
2.3.3. Summary and conclusions: An evaluation of the risk for ministerial drift 
The constitutional revision of 2008 has improved the separation of executive and 
legislative powers. Today, laws are established by its adoption in parliament which alone 
holds the legislative power. The Grand Duke on the contrary was limited to sign laws at 
least three months after their adoption in parliament. The deletion of the Grand Ducal 
sanctioning right has formally improved the standing of parliament. 
 
                                                          
59 The within coalition risk is in principle smaller than the risk within parliament, that is the differences 
between all parties in parliament to the parties in government. However, as we have weighted the within 
parliament risk by the share of seats of parties, it displays smaller in Figure 28. This does however not 
disturb the evidence, not least, because each one of the coalition parties may quit government. The share of 
seats of governing parties in parliament is thus not important with this respect. 
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The size of governing parties in parliament has increased with every election between 
1999 and 2011. In addition, government disposes over a large pool of resources which 
improves their expertise through external consultative bodies, such as the Economic and 
Social Council (CES)60 and the Social security administration (IGSS)61 for instance. 
Furthermore, it consists of the most popular figures of the governing parties (Reimen and 
Krecké, 1999, p. 51ff).   
 
Those advantages government has vis-à-vis parliament have been limited by the fact that 
the coalition partners of the Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) have become worse 
off over time. An investigation of the domestic political constellation, in terms of 
portfolio allocation, revealed that conflicts within government have increased due to the 
weakening of the junior partner of the three coalition governments in place during the 
period under investigation.  
 
The aim of the analysis on party positions was to better estimate the risk of agency loss 
in case of weak parliamentary control. We thus take account of Lupia’s “reversion 
points” which represent the status quo of a policy and the preferences of principals to 
delegate and agents to moral hazard. Although data on policy preferences of ministers, 
governments and MPs on policies is generally missing, we delineate policy preferences 
from the electoral programmes of parties represented in government. Differences in the 
so expressed positions between government and opposition and the coalition partners 
                                                          
60 Conseil Economique et Social 
61 Inspection générale de la sécurité sociale 
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respectively allow us to estimate the importance of ministerial discretion and a risk of 
ministerial drift. 
 
While the Constitution has limited the powers of the Grand Duke in 2008 as one part of 
the legislative in favour of parliament, this is only an adjustment of old rules to modern 
democracy and the practice of lawmaking. The Luxembourgish governments as main part 
of the executive are however characterised by their long duration and stability which is 
one sign of governmental strength (Lijphart, 1999, p. 129). What is more, during the 
whole period of investigation (and before) the CSV was always senior coalition partner 
holding a large majority of portfolios. Thus, while the junior coalition partner changed, 
the possibilities to control the senior coalition partner did not change, not least, because 
the electoral gains of the Liberals and the Socialists were comparable and junior and 
senior minister keep the same party affiliation. As Martin and Vanberg (2011) propose, 
coalition partners may instead scrutinise each other during the legislative process.  
 
In order to calculate policy preferences of the Luxembourgish parties, we use the data 
from the Party Manifesto project (PMP). We are aware of the limits of this data in terms 
of its invariance between elections but may unfortunately not draw on other sources, such 
as the Policy agenda datasets established in other countries.  
 
Comparing the policy positions of coalition partners, we find the largest differences for 
the Juncker/Asselborn II coalition and the smallest one for Juncker/Asselborn I. Those 
differences are due to changes on the left-right dimension and indicate that the level of 
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conflict within government increased. As policy preferences differ more, control is more 
necessary. Thus, we may expect an increase in parliamentary control after 2009.  
 
The opposition on the other hand has increased during the last legislature when déi Lénk 
entered parliament. In terms of policy preferences, the range of positions thus increased. 
However, weighted by their relative importance in parliament and thus taking account of 
the practical influence of opposition parties, the differences in policy preferences 
increased in 2009 compared to 2004, and went back to the level of 1999. Altogether, we 
may thus expect the highest legislative scrutiny in the most recent legislature, that is 
between 2009 and 2011 (Legislature 3), followed by the period between 1999 and 2004 
(Legislature 1). The least risk of agency loss is visible in the period between 2004 and 
2009 (Legislature 2).  
 
2.4. Summary and conclusions: Governmental discretion and risk for 
delegation 
This chapter has been concerned with the possibility of governmental discretion and 
consequently the necessity seen by parliament to reinforce scrutiny. The aim was to 
examine whether the developments between 1999 and 2011 suggest an increase need for 
parliamentary control, considering policy initiation in EU and domestic matters, voting 
weights in the Council of the EU and the perceived risk by parliament of agency loss. In 
this way, we purpose evaluating the foundations of the arguments drawn on by the 
supporters of the abdication thesis. On the one hand, we considered those aspects of 
policy initiation which are likely to affect the influence of ministers on policy-making at 
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European level as well as domestic level. On the other hand, we dealt with the 
characteristics of parliament that are argued to shape the perception of government and 
the coalition partner. This distinction is adopted to take account of both factors guiding 
agency loss: Information asymmetry and reversion points. Information asymmetry is 
gained by agents involved in specialised and secretive negotiations about policy 
initiatives. Reversion points, representing the status quo of a given policy serve as 
reference points for principals when deciding to delegate or not policy initiation.  
 
First, we considered the deepening and widening of European integration which is 
suggested to increase the discretion of ministers. To begin with, we found that at least 
96% of the binding EU regulation bypassed the Chamber in the period under 
investigation. In the more recent years, and since 2006 more particularly, the annual EU 
regulatory output decreased. Opposing trends are guiding the power of the Council and 
individual ministers at EU policy initiation. For the Council as an institution, we find an 
increase of its relative importance expressed by a stable amount of acts it issued between 
1999 and 2011. The Commission remains the main regulator in purely quantitative terms, 
but it may adopt only technical tertiary acts, and those have diminished in the period 
under investigation. The decrease of tertiary regulations mainly accounts for the decrease 
in EU regulatory output. In relative terms, this resulted thus in a rise of the relative 
importance of the Council. 
  
Individual governments on the other hand have lost importance. With the introduction of 
the Lisbon treaty the number of Comitology acts, which are under the control of Council 
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working groups, has dropped and the say of the EP on delegated acts increased. QMV in 
the Council has been extended to further policy areas and already with the Treaty of Nice 
in 2003. Enlargement furthermore has decreased individual governments’ influence in the 
Council, most importantly in 2004, when 10 new member states entered the EU. We 
conclude that the developments at EU level may seem to increase ministerial discretion 
for external observers taking into account only policy output, but result in a de-facto loss 
of power of governments. Ministers are less able to follow a particular agenda as the 
outcome decision-making has become more unsecure. An index of discretion of ministers 
at EU level supports this argument: Based on the number of Council acts and weighted by 
the voting power of Luxembourg in the Council, the discretion index falls at lower level 
in 2005.  
  
Then we examined the sources of laws at domestic level. Policy initiation is one main 
task delegated to government at domestic level. The discretion of ministers depends 
firstly on the number of laws initiated. In terms of the constitutional and legal rules on the 
initiation of laws, we observe no major change during the period under investigation 
which could account for a change in delegation or ministerial discretion. Around 98% of 
all laws are constantly initiated by government. The low resources at hands of MPs 
attribute them a minor role in law initiation.  
 
Given constraints in time and capacity, domestic law initiation is limited by laws 
originating in the supranational context, but require transposition in the domestic legal 
order, eventually threatening financial and other sanctions. Still, government has some 
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discretion in the choice of instruments and the timing of such transposition acts. Thus, the 
number of directives it introduces as executive decree rather than as a law is another 
measure for governmental discretion. Although at low levels, parliament is increasingly 
included in the transposition procedure and may thus better check on government.  
 
The Luxembourgish governments are characterised by their long duration and stability 
which is one sign of governmental strength (Lijphart, 1999, p. 129). The government 
disposes over a large pool of resources which improves their expertise. It furthermore 
consists of the most popular figures of the governing parties. Those factors account for 
the strength of government. Conflicts within government have however increased due to 
the weakening of the junior partner of the three coalition governments in place during the 
period under investigation.  
 
A closer investigation of policy preferences has confirmed this evaluation. Although data 
on policy preferences of ministers, governments and MPs is not available for 
Luxembourg, we estimate the risk of delegation for parliament as a principal. To this 
end, we examine the policy preferences expressed in the electoral programmes of parties 
represented in parliament and for the legislative elections in 1999, 2004 and 2009. The 
Party Manifesto Project (PMP) data serves as the best proximate to account for the 
stances of parliamentary factions. The so expressed differences in positions between 
government and opposition and the coalition partners respectively allow us to estimate 




The within-coalition differential of policy preferences is the highest for the 
Juncker/Asselborn II coalition, governing as of 2009 (Legislature 3). The greatest 
harmony regarding the positions expressed in electoral manifestos was witnessed by the 
Juncker/Asselborn I (Legislature 2) government. It seems paradoxical that governments 
of the same party political composition differ that much between two subsequent 
elections. The Juncker/Polfer government (Legislature 1) ranges still between the two. At 
a closer look, those differences are due to changes on the left-right dimension. In times of 
crisis, the Socialists have shifted more to the left and thus signal a change in attitude. 
Hence, the level of conflict within government has increased. As policy preferences differ 
more, control is more necessary. Thus, we may expect an increase in legislative scrutiny 
by the coalition partner since 2009.  
 
The range of positions expressed within parliament has increased due the Left (déi Lénk) 
entering the Chamber in 2009 as sixth party. Taking account of the practical influence of 
opposition parties by weighting policy preferences by the share of seats of a faction 
shows that the risk for agency loss went up in 2009 and arrived at a level comparable to 
1999. Taken together, we thus expect the highest legislative scrutiny in Legislature 3 
(CSV/LSAP II), followed by Legislature 1 (CSV/DP). The least risk of agency loss is 
visible in Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I), that is in the period between 2004 and 2009.  
 
The policy output has increased between 1999 and 2011. Many of the interviewees 
explain this increase with the increase of EU policy output which needs transposition. 
This interpretation reveals erroneous, seen that already since 2006 transposition 
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obligations have diminished in absolute terms. The inclusion of parliament in the 
transposition of EU directives has however increased and reached its peak in 2008. The 
number of directives dealt with in parliament per year remains however small and may 
not account for the overall increase in policy output. It reaches an average of 16 laws per 




Chapter 3. Scrutiny potential through parliamentary 
committees 
Parliaments’ capacities vary when it comes to cope with environmental change, such as 
the deepening and widening of European integration. The internal organisation of 
parliament is one necessary condition determining the quality of parliamentary control 
more generally. In our model of enquiry, it represents an intervening variable, which 
influences how European integration pressures are dealt with (Figure 29). The tighter 
parliament is institutionalized, the larger its ability to control government. 
Institutionalisation is specialisation and increases expertise and the efficiency of 
parliamentary work. The committee system is the main structural feature of NP in the 
EU, besides party factions. However, specialisation and expertise are created in the 
committees mainly. Hence, committees hold a crucial role in the parliamentary scrutiny 




Figure 29: The model of enquiry - Parliamentary organisation 
 
 
The main intent of this chapter is to perform an exploratory analysis of the value of the 
Luxembourgish parliament’s committee system for scrutiny. Drawing on the formal 
parliamentary rules of committee organisation and their empirical expression in terms of 
committee work and committee composition, we identify changes in the committee 
system between 1999 and 2011, and for the three legislatures at place during this period. 
Hence, we firstly determine the different forms of committees established in the Chamber 
concerning their functions and compositions. The objective is to localise whether and 
where expertise establishes, which is crucial for legislative scrutiny particularly and 




Then, we investigate rules and practices of committee composition and membership. 
The allocation of committee chairs is of utmost importance in this respect as he/she 
controls the committee’s agenda and decision-making style. We argue that the 
independence of a committee from its corresponding minister is strongly related to the 
effectiveness of its scrutiny. The greater the expertise and self-confidence of committee 
work the better government may be held accountable.  
 
In the third and final section, we take a closer look on the legislative work of permanent 
committees, the main scrutinizer of governmental bills. Their frequency of meetings and 
the number of laws treated by committee serve as indicators for their importance and role 
in the Chamber. We conclude with the elaboration of four measures for the analysis of 
parliamentary scrutiny and an evaluation of the framework for parliamentary scrutiny in 
the Chamber, and the opportunities and constraints MPs are given to investigate on 
ministerial discretion.  
 
The data we investigated were collected from three sources: Firstly, we use official 
publications of the Chamber, most importantly its annual report. As committee meetings 
are held in private this leaves us with only limited insight on how committees work. 
Thanks to the permission of the committee chairs, we could attend meetings of the 
European affairs committee (EAC) and the Justice committee (JURI) as an observer and 
witness how MPs scrutinize laws, the general atmosphere in committees and their way to 
bargain. To complete the picture, we held interviews with six (former) committee chairs, 
other MPs, as well as three committee secretaries, and other staff of the Chamber where 
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we asked about their role in lawmaking and scrutiny. The insight we could gain allows 
for an evaluation of the legislative work of committees.  
 
3.1. The organisation of the Chamber in committees 
Not all committees work after the same provisions. The Rules of Procedures (RoP) 
distinguish between permanent committees (art. 17 RoP 2007-2011, art. 16 RoP 1999-
2004) and special committees (art. 18 RoP 2007-2011, art. 17 RoP 1999-2004) in first 
place. Articles 19-27 (RoP 2007-2011, art. 18-26 RoP 1999-2004) fix rules concerning 
both types of committees. The Chamber knows furthermore sub-committees of 
permanent committees, as well as regulatory committees, one informal type defined by its 
subject matter and subsequent organisation of work. Committees of enquiry as important 
instruments of parliamentary control are concerned with specific complaints about the 
dysfunction of administration or government. They are dealt with in more depth in 
chapter five on specific parliamentary control instruments (compare with section 5.3.2).  
 
3.1.1. Permanent committees 
The number and organisation of permanent committees are constituted after each election 
and the Chamber decides on their composition. Traditionally, they mirror the ministerial 
jurisdictions. However, there are exceptions to this rule (compare with section 3.2). 
They consist of five to 13 members (art. 17(2) RoP 2007-11, art. 16 (2) RoP 1999-2004). 
The work on draft laws is given priority (art. 21 (2) RoP 2007-11, art. 20 (2) RoP 1999-
2004) to other activities a committee may exert, that is the work on motions, the 
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preparation of debates, the organisation of public and non-public hearings, and visits. 
They may also give an opinion on draft executive decrees, if the Conference of 
Presidents, whose assent is necessary for their evacuation, wishes so (art. 22 (1) RoP 
2007-11, art. 21 (1) RoP 1999-2004).  
 
In the beginning of every meeting, committee chairs check the presence of members (art. 
23(1, 4) RoP 2007-11, art. 22(1, 4) RoP 1999-2004). At least an absolute majority of 
committee members have to be present in order for the committee to be able to take 
decisions (art. 23(2) RoP 2007-11 art. 22(2) RoP 1999-2004). Those are often taken by 
consensus and formal voting is done where formally required, that is if reports have to be 
adopted for instance.62 On such occasions, MPs rather abstain instead of voting against. 
The voting result including the names of MPs voting against or abstaining is included in 
the minutes of the committee meeting. Depending on the committee composition, one or 
two of the opposition factions are prone to abstain in many of the decisions.63 The 
consensual decision-making in committee, with incidental abstentions of opposition 
factions, reflects the later voting behaviour in public session except for controversial 
issues and budget laws (compare with section 4.2 and section 5.2.2). 
 
 Committees may invite members of government to give explanations on subjects at stake 
(art. 20(4) RoP 2007-11, art. 19(3) RoP 1999-2004). In case a committee is concerned by 
a bill, an absolute majority of a committee nominates one of its members a rapporteur 
(art. 22(3) RoP 2007-11, art. 21(3) RoP 1999-2004). A respective final report should 
                                                          
62 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 2 October 2013. 
63 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 
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contain an analysis of the deliberations of the committee, its conclusions and the text the 
committee proposes (art. 22(4) RoP 2007-11, art. 21(4) RoP 1999-2004). The committee 
adopts the report and distributes it to all members of parliament at least three days before 
debates start in the plenary (art. 22(5) RoP 2007-11, art. 21(5) RoP 1999-2004). All 
committee documents are distributed automatically to the political factions (art. 22(6) 
RoP 2007-11, art. 21(6) RoP 1999-2004).  
 
The deadline for the submission of a report is fixed by the Speaker, after the Conference 
of Presidents has given its opinion. If the rapporteur does not respect this deadline, the 
Speaker may propose to install another rapporteur to the committee. Similarly, the 
committee may decide so (art. 24 RoP 2007-11, art. 23 RoP 1999-2004). The main author 
of a report has the right to take part and advice in committee meetings which deal with 
his/her report (art. 25(1) RoP 2007-11, art. 24(1) RoP 1999-2004) and so has the author 
of an amendment (art. 25(2) RoP 2007-11, art. 24(2) RoP 1999-2004).  
 
If a bill project, EU documents (since 2003) or reports are examined, the committee may 
invite extra-parliamentary bodies, and since 2003, MEPs (art. 26(1, 2) RoP 2007-11, art. 
25(1, 2) RoP 1999-2004) to take part in the meetings. Other committees may be asked for 
advice too (art. 26(3) RoP 2007-2011, art. 25(3) RoP 1999-2004), or may give their 
opinion , without being asked to (art. 26(5) RoP 2007-11, art. 25(5) RoP 1999-2004). The 
Speaker, upon the advice of the Conference of Presidents, holds the final decision about 




Committee meetings are non-public. The Chamber became however more transparent in 
the more recent years. In 2010, the RoP gave the possibility to committees to ask 
authorization at the Conference of Presidents to hold public hearings or to transmit one of 
its meetings via the parliaments television channel “Chamber TV” (art. 22(7) RoP 2007-
11, art. 21(7) RoP 1999-2004). In the same year, the minutes of committee meetings were 
declared public and since are to be found on the website of the Chamber. The minutes of 
meetings from the steering organs of the Chamber, that is the Bureau,64 the Conference of 
Presidents, and minutes of international delegation meetings are still classified 
confidential and not accessible (art. 22(8) RoP 2007-11, art. 21(8) RoP 1999-2004), 
except the respective organ would decide otherwise. A committee may decide to hold its 
deliberations in secrecy and no minutes are published in this case (art. 22(9) RoP 2007-
11, art. 21(9) RoP 1999-2004).  
 
While there is no mention of regulatory committees (“commissions réglementaires”) in 
the RoP, they are considered a different category. In the period between 1999 and 2011, 
four regulatory committees are known. Such is the Committee on the Rules of Procedures 
of the Chamber, including its sub-committee on the statute of the MPs. It is an important 
committee as the RoP have been and still are an important tool for MPs to introduce 
obligations for government.65 Other regulatory committees are the Petitions committee 
and the Accounts committee66, which oversees the spending of the Chamber. Between 
                                                          
64 The Bureau consisted of the Speaker, three vice-presidents one of the three largest parties each, seven 
MPs – three from the CSV, two from the LSAP, and one from the Liberals and the Greens each and the 
General Secretary, who has no voting right. 
65 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 2 October 2013. 
66 Commission des comptes 
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2004 and 2006, the latter was also in charge of budgetary control. Before and after this 
period, budgetary control was exerted by an ordinary permanent committee.  
 
The Parliamentary control committee of the national Secret Service (SREL 
committee) (art. 27 and Annex 1 RoP 2007-2011)67 also ranges among the regulatory 
committees. A former special committee and working after its own, particular provisions, 
the Chamber deemed the installation of this committee necessary, after the law of 2004 
re-organised the national Secret Service. It is composed of the leaders of political groups, 
and as such works after the principle of the Conference of Presidents: Every vote is 
weighted by the number of MPs a political group holds in the Chamber. Once a year, it 
submits report on its activities to the Chamber. For the rest, it examines specific dossiers 
of the Secret Service with the help of its agents. All its deliberations are ex officio 
confidential and not open to the public. 
 
Common to all regulatory committees is that they are not concerned with lawmaking as 
the other permanent committees. Instead, they deal with parliament internal affairs, 
secretive and sensitive issues. No ministry corresponds to their jurisdiction. Thus, the 
principle of correspondence between permanent committees and ministries does not hold 
for regulatory committees.  
 
                                                          
67 Commission de Contrôle parlementaire du Service de Renseignement de l’Etat, as foreseen by chapter 
five on the parliamentary control of the Secret Service (Loi du 15 juin 2004 portant organisation du Service 
de Renseignement de l’Etat, Mémorial A n° 113 du 12 juillet 2004).  
 http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2004/0113/a113.pdf, last access: 11.2.2013. 
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The number of permanent committees remains at 22 for the whole period under 
investigation, except for the sessions 2004/5 and 2005/6 and due to changes in the 
regulatory committees. Then, the aim was to decrease the number of committees and 20 
permanent committees were thus installed in the beginning of the legislature. However, in 
2006/7, the SREL committee was set up. At this occasion the Budgetary control 
committee was separated from the Accounts committee, as it was before 2004/5. The 
merge had apparently not worked out in a satisfying manner.  
 
The organisation of the Chamber is subject to discussions within the factions. Some 
propose that permanent committees should become even more non-volatile.  Rather than 
depending on the organisation of government, the Chamber should create fewer and 
larger, but truly permanent committees. In their view, ministers do not require “their” 
committee in the Chamber but may deliver in several committees, depending on the 
matter at stake. It is argued that this would give the committees more visibility and 
independence.68 This on-going debate shows that the correspondence of ministerial and 
committee jurisdictions is a double-edged sword. It serves improving scrutiny, as the 
literature suggests (Norton, 1998; Strøm, 1990), but bears the danger of ministerial 
dominance or sectoral thinking based on the expertise established in committees.  
 
3.1.2. Sub-committees and special committees 
Permanent committees could always constitute sub-committees, however, practice 
shows that they rarely did so and even less so in the recent years. The mother committee 
                                                          
68 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
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may decide upon the composition and competences of sub-committees which report back 
to it (art. 22(2) RoP 2007-11, art. 21(2) RoP 1999-2004). Generally, sub-committees 
consist of a subset of members of the mother committee, mostly of one member by 
faction. No vice-chairs are nominated. They examine specific aspects within the 
competences of the mother committee.  
 
Three sub-committees have been established in the period under investigation and two of 
them still exist at the end of the most recent legislature, in September 2013. The JURI 
established a first sub-committee on divorce in session 2007/8. It ended in the same 
session and was chaired by the CSV MP Christine Doerner. During its existence, the sub-
committee examined five bills related to divorce matters.69 The installation of the sub-
committee was justified by the sheer number of law initiatives related with divorce and 
the complexity of the matter at stake. 
 
The second sub-committee of the JURI was on the creation of a European contract law 
for consumers and enterprises.70 It is the most recent one, established in session 
2010/1. Again the chair went to a CSV deputy, Léon Gloden. Apart from its chair it has 
three members, one each from the Socialists, Liberals and Greens. Most interestingly, the 
Green paper from the European Commission on the same topic71 is on the origin of the 
sub-committee. The JURI esteemed a sub-committee would be appropriate due to the 
                                                          
69 5867 Projet de loi relatif à la responsabilité parentale, 5285 - Proposition de loi relative à l'exercice 
conjoint de l'autorité parentale, 5304 - Proposition de loi portant réforme de l'autorité parentale et instaurant 
la permanence du couple parental, 5553 - Proposition de loi portant réforme du droit de la filiation et 
instituant l'exercice conjoint de l'autorité parentale, 5155- Projet de loi portant réforme du divorce. 
70 Sous-commission Création d’un droit européen des contrats pour les consommateurs et les entreprises 
71 Green paper from the Commission on policy options for progress towards a European Contract Law for 
consumers and business. COM(2010)348 final, Brussels, 1.7.2010. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0348:FIN:en:PDF last access: 12.02.2013. 
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specificity of the topic and the more efficient work style.72 As a result, the JURI adopted 
the report of the sub-committee as a political opinion and transferred it in the framework 
of the political dialogue to the European Commission.73 The mandate of the sub-
committee was extended to further follow the subject. 
The third sub-committee of period 1999-2011 is the one on the statute of MPs.74 It was 
created in session 2009/10 by the regulatory Committee on the Rules of Procedures and 
chaired by Lucien Weiler (CSV). The sub-committee has seven members. All political 
factions in the Chamber hold one seat, except the CSV, which holds two (including the 
chair of the committee).  
 
Special committees on the other hand are not created by a mother committee, but by 
parliament as a whole. Similar to sub-committees, they deal with a precise problem or 
topic. All general provisions in Articles 19-27 RoP 2007-2012 (ex. art. 18-26 RoP 1999-
2004) apply to permanent and special committees in the same manner. However, while 
permanent committees are established for the whole legislative period, special 
committees are dealing with a particular piece of legislation and end after accomplishing 
legislative scrutiny (art. 18 RoP 2007-2011, art. 17 RoP 1999-2004).  
 
In the period between 1999 and 2011, 12 special committees were active and the topics 
covered reached from ethics, non-discrimination, immigration and the economic and 
financial crisis (Table 7). Their missions varied: While some of them dealt with special 
                                                          
72 Chambre des Députés: Rapport d’activité de la session parlementaire 2010-2011, p. 21. 
73 6267 - LIVRE VERT DE LA COMMISSION relatif aux actions envisageables en vue de la création d'un 
droit européen des contrats pour les consommateurs et les entreprises (document COM (2010) 348 final du 
1er juillet 2010).  
74 Sous-commission Statut du député 
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societal problems, others were installed to treat European matters. The Chamber 
established a special committee in order to deal with the European Commission’s 
National action plan for employment which transposed one directive during its 
existence.75 Other special committees were institutionalised at a permanent basis: Such 
was the case for the Equality between women and men committee, and more recently the 
Immigration committee, and the Committee for the Parliamentary control of the Secret 
Service (SREL) for instance.  
 
                                                          
75 Loi du 12 février 1999 concernant la mise en œuvre du plan d’action national en faveur de l’emploi 1998, 
Mémorial A n°13 du 23.02.1999; doc. parl. N° 4459.  
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Table 7: Special committees active between 1999 and 2011 
 Title Period  Chairs 
1 Genetics (Génétique) 1994/5-1998/9 Marcelle Lentz-Cornette (CSV) 
3 Ethics (Ethique) 1996/7-1998/9 Marcelle Lentz-Cornette (CSV) 
4 Equality between women and men (Egalité entre femmes et hommes) 1996/7-1998/9 Ferny Nicklaus-Faber (CSV) 
2 Drug abuse (Stupéfiants) 1994/5-2003/4 Willy Bourg (CSV) 1994/5-1998/9 
Niki Bettendorf (DP)1999/2000-2003/4 
5 National action plan for employment (Plan d'action national en faveur de l'emploi) ˡ 1997/8-2003/4 Marcel Glesener (CSV) 
6 Youth and poverty (Jeunesse et détresse) 1999/2000-2003/4 Lucien Weiler (CSV) 
7 Immigration 2000/1-2003/4 Marcel Glesener (CSV) 
8 International road transport (Transports routiers internationaux) ² 26.2.2002-3.6.2002ˡ Lucien Weiler (CSV) 
9 Parliamentary control of the Secret Service   
(Contrôle parlementaire du Service de Renseignement) ³ 
2004-2005/6² Henri Grethen (DP) 
10 Territorial reform (Réorganisation territoriale) 2004/5-2007/8 Michel Wolter (CSV) 
11 Tripartite 2006/7 Michel Wolter (CSV) 
12 Economic and financial crisis (Crise économique et financière) 2008/9 Lucien Thiel (CSV) 
ˡ The Special committee on international road transport was transformed into a committee of enquiry thereafter. 
² The Special committee on the parliamentary control of the Secret Service was established after the adoption of the law re-organising the Secret Service76 and 
transformed into a regulatory committee in 2005. 
 
 
                                                          
76 Loi du 15 juin 2004 portant organisation du Service de Renseignement de l’Etat (SRE). 
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Although they embrace an important role as “cradle” for permanent committees and 
flexible instruments to cope with specific problems of general interest, a clear trend away 
from special committees may be observed since 2009. Not a single one of them was 
active in Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II), that is between 2009 and 2011. What is more, the 
four special committees created during Legislature 2 (CSV-LSAP I) were on average of a 
shorter duration (1.5 years) than the three special committees working during Legislature 
1 (CSV/DP) (2.5 years). Also, the Socialists did not chair any of the special committees. 
11 out of 12 were chaired by CSV members, two of them were taken over by the Liberals 
(the Committee on drug abuse was chaired by both, the CSV before and the DP after 
1999). The LSAP seems to oppose the creation of special committees rather, as it had 
attempted to limit the number of permanent committees in the beginning of the 2004/5 
legislature. This fits to recent statements of Socialist party leader Alex Bodry, that the 
structure of the Chamber should be reformed and the number of committees limited.77 
 
3.1.3. Number of committees and correspondence to ministries 
The number of (legislative) committees often serves as indicator in comparative politics 
in order to determine the scrutiny strength of a legislature (Martin and Vanberg, 2011; 
Norton, 1998; Strøm, 1998). The Luxembourgish parliament gains a high score in those 
studies, as it is highly decentralised. Between 1999 and 2011, 81 committees were 
created, among them 55 permanent committees, 11 regulatory committees, 3 sub-
committees, and 12 special committees. Altogether, 848 committee seats were to be filled 
in the period of investigation. 
                                                          




While the number of permanent committees follows a rather stable pattern during the 
whole period, there is a trend away in the use of special committees particularly since 
Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II). Not least the Socialist faction is promoting a limitation of 
committees and thus does not support the creation of special committees. Still, this more 
flexible instrument exists and has in the past often transformed into permanent 
committees (and enquiry committees).  Instead, sub-committees became more prominent 
since 2006/7 but did not outweigh special committees in their numbers. Sub-committee 
establishment lies in the hands of a committee and its chair and may serve as a resort, if 
special committees are not well-regarded by the coalition partner.  
 
Although no high scale changes have been made, a trend towards slightly less committees 
is visible, from the peak of 29 committees installed in 2001/2 to 22 committees in 2004/5. 
Subsequently, their numbers increased again to 26 for the rest of Legislature 2 
(CSV/LSAP I). In 2009/10 again, the overall number sank to 23 in order to increase 
slightly afterwards. This pattern is due to the life-cycle of legislatures on the one hand, 
with the more flexible committees that are special and sub-committees established in the 
second half rather. On average, this resulted in 297 committee seats per parliamentary 
year in Legislature 1 (CSV/DP), 261 in Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) and 266 in 




Figure 30: Number of committees, absolute figures, 1999/2000-2011/2 
 
Data source: Parliamentary proceedings  
 
The number of permanent committees mirrored the number of established ministries. 
They did however not exactly equal neither the number of ministers nor the number of 
portfolios in the period of investigation. During Legislature 1 (CSV/DP) for instance, 19 
permanent committees were in place, while the government comprised 14 ministers 
holding 25 portfolios. In Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I), 18 committees corresponded to 15 
ministers and 28 portfolios. And the 18 committees of Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II) 
matched 15 ministers with 28 portfolios. Taking into account the size of parliament, one 
portfolio was thus covered by around 2 MPs (60 divided by 25 is 2.4 and by 28 is 2.1). 
 
The correspondence between committees and ministries was imperfect in all possible 
directions: Firstly, some ministers did not “dispose” about a proper committee, this is the 
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case for instance for the Minister for Cults. Secondly, other ministers held more than one 
portfolio exclusively related to respective committees. For example, Fernand Boden 
(CSV) was Minister for agriculture, viticulture and rural development, as well as Minister 
for the medium-sized businesses, tourism and housing in Legislatures 1 (CSV/DP) and 2 
(CSV/LSAP II), where respective committees were installed in parliament. Thirdly, 
Justice Ministers Luc Frieden (CSV) and François Biltgen (CSV) went into meetings 
with two committees, the Justice committee, as well as the Committee for institutions and 
constitutional revision. Finally,  some committees covered two or more ministries, most 
notably the Committee for foreign and European affairs, cooperation, defence and 
immigration (EAC) had to deal with four different ministers in Legislatures 2 and 3 
(CSV/LSAP I and II) and two in Legislature 1 (CSV/DP).  
 
In total, there is a trend away from the ideal one-to-one correspondence between 
committees and ministries. More and more committees are responsible for more than one 
ministry. In Legislature 1 (CSV/DP), five committees dealt with more than one ministry. 
Only the EAC effectively did so, if State Secretaries and Deputy Ministers backing up 
portfolios were excluded. The CODEXBU covered the Minister for public works together 
with the TRAVPUB. Similarly, we may disregard the separation between the Ministry of 
economy and the Transport ministry, seen that one minister (Henry Grethen of the 
Liberals) was responsible for both portfolios. Thus, the one-to-one correspondence 




In Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I), seven committees had to face more than one ministry. 
Again, the CODEXBU covered the Minister for public works with the TRAVPUB. 
Furthermore, subtracting those held by junior ministers and covering for a purely 
administrative separation of departments under the head of one minister, again only the 
EAC was left. Finally, in Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II) five out of eight committees 
actually covered more than one ministry (EAC, CODEXBU, FAM, FONCPUB3 and 
EDUSP), after disregarding junior ministers and administrative divisions. The 
CODEXBU covered the Minister for sustainable development together with the 
DEVDUR. Similarly, the EAC backed up the TRAVEMP when it came to immigration 
issues. The situation thus got more complicated over time and committees followed 
ministerial jurisdictions to a lesser extent in the more recent years (Table 8). 
 
Parliamentary control of government is supposed to be less effective when one committee 
is responsible for more than one ministerial portfolio, than two committees responsible 
for one ministry. However, oversight also depends on the workload and the motivation of 
the committee (chair) to effectively organise the incurring tasks. For the EAC, there is 
some evidence, that scrutiny was not hindered by the fact that it had an overarching 
jurisdiction.78 Others esteem the European dimension not enough considered by the 
EAC.79 This increasing inflexibility of some committees when it comes to adapt to 
ministerial jurisdictions may also be seen as growing independence of parliament vis-à-
vis government. The stability of jurisdictions of committees over longer periods may 
foster a more constant creation of expertise and committee identity. 
                                                          
78 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 20 June 2013, and Member of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 2 October 2013. 




Discussions are on-going concerning a reform of the committee system in the next 
legislature (compare with section 3.1.2). The proposals are manifold: The installation of a 
centralised EU committee and larger but “truly” permanent committees (not dependent on 
the formation of ministries) are among the possibilities to come (Bodry, 2012) (Table 
8).80  
 
                                                          
80 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013 and Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 23 September 2013. 
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Table 8: Correspondence between committees and ministries 
Legislature 1 (CSV/DP)
Minister Portfolio Commitee
1 1 Jean‐Claude Juncker (CSV) 1 Prime minister x
2 2 Minister of State x
3 3 Finance Minister 1 FIBU
4 2 Fernand Boden (CSV) 4 Minister for agriculture, viticulture and rural development 2 AGRI
5 5 Minister for the medium‐sized businesses, tourism and housing 3 CMTOUR
6 3 Marie‐Josée Jacobs (CSV) 6 Minister for family, social solidarity and youth 4 FAM 
7 7 Minister for the promotion of women 5 EGAL
8 4 Erna Hennicot‐Schoepges 8 Minister for culture, higher education and research 6 ENSSUP1
9 (CSV) 9 Minister for public works 7 TRAVPUB 9 CODEXBU
10 5 Michel Wolter (CSV) 10 Internal affairs minister 8 INT1
11 6 Luc Frieden (CSV) 11 Treasury and budget minister 9 CODEXBU
12 12 Justice minister 10 JURI 19 INST
13 7 François Biltgen (CSV) 13 Minister for work and employment 11 TRAVEMP
14 14 Minister for the cults x
15 15 Minister for the relations with parliament x
16 16 Deputy minister for communication 12 MEDIA
17 1 Lydie Polfer (DP) 1 Vice prime minister x
18 2 Minister for foreign affairs and external commerce 13 EAC
19 3 Minister for the public service and administrative reform  14 FONCPUB1
19 2 Joseph Schaack (DP) (3) Secretary of State for the public service and administrative reform 14 FONCPUB1
20 3 Anne Brasseur (DP) 4 Minister for national education, vocational training and sport 15 EDUSP
21 4 Henri Grethen (DP) 5 Minister for economy 16 ECON, TRAN
22 6 Transport minister 16 ECON, TRAN
23 5 Charles Goerens (DP) 7 Minister for cooperation, humanitarian aid and defence 13 EAC
24 8 Environment minister 17 ENVI 
24 6 Eugène Berger (DP) (8) Secretary of State for environment 17 ENVI 
25 7 Carlo Wagner (DP) 9 Minister for health and social security 18 SANT  
Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I)
Minister Portfolio Committee
1 1 Jean‐Claude Juncker (CSV) 1 Prime minister x
2 2 Minister of State x
3 3 Finance Minister 1 FIBU
4 2 Fernand Boden (CSV) 4 Minister for agriculture, viticulture, and rural development 2 AGRI 
5 5 Minister for the medium‐sized businesses, tourism and housing 3 CMTOUR
6 3 Marie‐Josée Jacobs (CSV) 6 Minister for family and integration 4 FAM 
7 7 Minister for equal opportunities 4 FAM 
8 4 Luc Frieden (CSV) 8 Treasury and budget minister 5 CODEXBU
9 9 Justice Minister 6 JURI 18 INST
10 10 Defence minister 12 EAC
11 5 François Biltgen (CSV) 11 Minister for work and employment 7 TRAVEMP
12 12 Minister for culture, higher education and research 8 ENSSUP1
13 13 Minister for the cults x
14 6 Jean‐Marie Halsdorf (CSV) 14 Minister for internal affairs and spatial planning 9 INT2
15 7 Claude Wiseler (CSV) 15 Minister for the public service and administrative reform 10 FONCPUB2
16 16 Minister for public works  11 TRAVPUB 5 CODEXBU
17 8 Jean‐Louis Schiltz (CSV) 17 Minister for cooperation and humanitarian aid 12 EAC
18 18 Deputy minister for communication 10 FONCPUB2
19 9 Octavie Modert (CSV) 19 State secretary for the relations with parliament x
4 (4) State secretary for agriculture, viticulture and rural development 2 AGRI 
12 (12) State secretary for culture, higher education and research 8 ENSSUP1
20 1 Jean Asselborn (LSAP) 1 Vice prime minister x
21 2 Minister for foreign affairs and immigration  12 EAC
22 2 Nicolas Schmit (LSAP) 3 Deputy minister for foreign affairs and immigration 12 EAC
23 3 Mady Delvaux‐Stehres (LSAP) 4 Minister for national education and vocational training 13 EDU
24 4 Jeannot Krecké (LSAP) 5 Minister for the economy and external commerce 14 ECON, SP
25 6 Sports minster 14 ECON, SP
26 5 Mars Di Bartolomeo (LSAP) 7 Minister for health and social security 15 SANT
27 6 Lucien Lux (LSAP) 8 Environment minister 16 ENVI 





1 1 Jean‐Claude Juncker (CSV) 1 Prime minister 1 FONCPUB3
2 2 Minister of State x
3 3 Treasury Minister 2 CODEXBU
4 2 Marie‐Josée Jacobs (CSV) 4 Minister for family and integration 3 FAM 
5 5 Minister for cooperation and humanitarian action 4 EAC
6 3 Luc Frieden (CSV) 6 Finance minister 5 FIBU
7 4 François Biltgen (CSV) 7 Justice minister 6 JURI 18 INST
8 8 Minister for the public service and administrative reform 1 FONCPUB3
9 9 Minister for higher education and research 7 ENSSUP2
10 10 Minister for communication and the media 7 ENSSUP2
11 11 Minister for the cults x
12 5 Jean‐Marie Halsdorf (CSV) 12 Minister for internal affairs and the Greater region 8 INT3
13 13 Defence minister 4 EAC
14 6 Claude Wiseler (CSV) 14 Minister for sustainable development and infrastructure 9 DEVDUR 2 CODEXBU
15 7 Octavie Modert (CSV) 15 Culture minister 10 CULT
16 16 Minister for the relations with parliament x
17 17 Minister for administrative simplification alongside the Prime minister 1 FONCPUB3
8 8 Deputy minister for the public service and administrative reform 1 FONCPUB3
18 8 Marco Schank (CSV) 18 Minister for housing 11 LOG
14 14 Deputy minister for sustainable development and infrastructure 9 DEVDUR
19 9 Françoise Hetto‐Gaasch (CSV) 19 Minister for small and medium enterprises and tourism 12 CMTOUR
20 20 Minister for equal opportunities 3 FAM 
21 1 Jean Asselborn (LSAP) 1 Vice prime minister x
22 2 Minister for foreign affairs  4 EAC
23 2 Mady Delvaux‐Stehres (LSAP) 3 Minister for national education and vocational training 13 EDUSP
24 3 Jeannot Krecké (LSAP) 4 Minister for the economy and external commerce 14 ECCEES
25 4 Mars Di Bartolomeo (LSAP) 5 Minister for health and social security 15 SANT
26 5 Nicolas Schmit (LSAP) 6 Minister for employment, work and immigration 16 TRAVEMP 4 EAC
27 6 Romain Schneider (LSAP) 7 Minister for agriculture, viticulture and rural development 17 AGRI
28 8 Sports minister 13 EDUSP
24 9 Deputy minister for a solidary economy 14 ECCEES  
Source: Thewes (2011, p. 233) and parliamentary proceedings 
Compare with committee key in Annex 0 on page 173 
 
3.1.4. Summary and conclusions: The organisation of the Chamber in committees 
The Chamber is well equipped with committees in terms of their number as well as their 
function. The types and number of committees hint to a stable decentralisation of scrutiny 
and specialisation in the Chamber. Their main purpose is lawmaking, and internal as well 
as governmental control. Committee meetings are not public and grant MPs and their 
invitees’ discretion for discussions related to the matter rather than party political 
calculations. 
 
Within the Chamber three formal types of legislative committees exist. Permanent 
committees are the main locus of legislative scrutiny. The Luxembourgish parliament is 
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characterized by a rather high and stable number of those permanent committees. The 
installation of sub-committees is dependent on the permanent mother committee. Two 
out of the three sub-committees established during the period under investigation 
belonged to the JURI. Seen in a longer perspective, it is mother of five out of six sub-
committees between 1980 and 2011. Special committees are similar to sub-committees 
concerned with a particular legislation or clearly defined subject matter and erase after 
the accomplishment of a defined mission. 12 special committees were active and the 
topics covered reached from ethics, non-discrimination, immigration and the economic 
and financial crisis. Interestingly, EU matters were taken as occasion to create both, sub- 
and special committees. This hints to the reactivity of the Chamber and the flexibility of 
the committee structure.  
 
Informally, yet another division of committees, that is regulatory committees, exists 
which is not incorporated in the RoP of the Chamber. Some of the permanent committees 
are concerned with parliament internal affairs and secretive and sensitive issues such as 
the control of the secret service. Four regulatory committees came into being since 2006 
and, in contrast to other permanent committees, they had not ministry which applied to 
their jurisdiction.  
 
During the period of investigation, the number of legislative committees remained mostly 
stable. However, some trend towards fewer committees becomes apparent. Their 
number peaked in 2001/2 when 29 committees installed. In 2004/5 only 22 committees 
remained in place. Subsequently, their number increased again to 26 for the rest of 
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Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I). In 2009/10 again, the overall number sank to 23 in order to 
increase slightly afterwards. This pattern is due to the life-cycle of legislatures on the one 
hand, with the more flexible committees that are special and sub-committees established 
in the second half rather. On average, this resulted in 297 committee seats in Legislature 
1 (CSV/DP), 261 in Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) and 266 in Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP 
II). 
 
Although permanent committees largely follow the ministerial jurisdictions, they do not 
correspond one-to-one to ministries. Their jurisdictions slightly shifted over time and 
largely correspond to ministerial departments, although this principle was loosened in 
Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II). Thus, in a few but increasing number of cases, one 
committee correlates to more than one ministry. Depending on the workload and the 
organisation of the committee, such imperfect correspondence may be overcome. This 
growing independence of committees from ministry jurisdictions may thus point to an 
increasing independence of parliament vis-à-vis government. However, the use of those 
structures depends on the MPs at place. In a next section, we therefore investigate the 
committee’s composition and committee chair allocation. 
 
3.2. Committee composition  
This section examines the formal rules and practices of committee composition, 
membership and chair allocation.  The committee chair is of particular importance for the 
organisation of works in committees which determines the establishment of expertise of 
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MPs. His/Her leadership style, as well as the composition of committees and committee 
memberships influence the effectiveness of parliamentary control of government.  
 
3.2.1. Committee composition and membership 
The first step to determine the composition of committees is done by the Conference of 
Presidents who suggests a number of seats for each committee, by faction and after 
proportional representation (art. 19 ex. 18 RoP). The attribution of MPs to committees is 
decided in the political factions and guided by MPs interest, field of expertise and former 
occupation. For the smaller factions of the ADR and the Greens, this means that they are 
represented with one MP in every committee even when they hold the committee chair.  
 
Although committee work requires and brings along specialisation, factions usually work 
following an electoral logics rather than a logics of expertise. The Green faction makes 
the exception and sticks to committee assignments when it comes to other parliamentary 
work too. For instance, if parliamentary questions (PQs) are asked, a faction would assign 
the MP as its author whose electorate is concerned by the topic, that is by geographical 
area. Authorship of PQs in among the Greens on the other hand sticks to the respective 
field of expertise of an MP and this is normally related to his/her committee assignment.81  
 
As we outline in section 3.2.2, committees are not equally attractive to chairs. Neither are 
they to MPs with the committees on the Committee for institutions and constitutional 
                                                          
81 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 December 2012. 
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revision (INST), JURI and the EAC (AEE/AEEDCI) being said the most popular ones.82 
The EAC for instance is chosen by senior MPs with prior experience in the issue areas. 
Such experience may consist in a former government responsibility or activity in 
international parliamentary assemblies.83  
 
The JURI is cast with mainly lawyers by training. What is more, it is a politically and 
financially rewarding committee, where important matters are decided, such as legal 
provisions on divorce, the requirements for the obtainment of the Luxembourgish 
nationality or criminal matters. Similarly, the INST treats matters of high public 
relevance when it proposes changes to the Constitution. This ranking might be partly 
related to the fact that the JURI as well as the EAC are very active committees. Also the 
INST holds regular meetings although those come up to a lower number (not least, 
because it does not deal with government law initiatives). The more meetings a MP 
attends, the more allowances he/she is granted (compare with section 3.3.1). Finally, 
committee membership is more or less attractive, depending on the party affiliation as the 
factions have different priorities in policy matters. 
 
In many committees, MPs exercise partial memberships. No formal rules exist 
regarding this costume. Rather, the political factions staff committees as they see fit, once 
the number of seats by party affiliation is fixed (following proportional representation). 
Such partial membership is more common in committees of large jurisdiction and among 
larger factions. Not least, the EAC features partial members for all its components, be it 
                                                          
82 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 24 July 2013. 
83 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
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foreign and European affairs, defence, cooperation or immigration. It enables a larger 
number of MPs to take part in committee meetings as they would not necessarily leave, 
when a subject does not fall under their responsibility. Also, MPs may substitute each 
other. The committee chairs try to regroup items on the agenda so that they cover similar 
policy areas, not least, when ministers and their staff are invited to take part in the 
meetings.84  
 
Despite the fact that MPs dispose over prior knowledge in a domain, specialisation is 
complicated by the small number of MPs and their multiple committee memberships. 
While committees serve as opportunity structure to gain policy expertise and exert 
parliamentary scrutiny, the practical possibility to use this opportunity is dependent on 
the size of parliament. Multiplying the number of committees with the number of seats by 
committee gives us the number of committee seats for a parliamentary year. The 
analysis shows that Legislature 1 (CSV/SP) between 1999/2000 and 2003/4 offered the 
most committee seats to MPs (on the average 304 per session). In Legislature 3 
(CSV/LSAP II) there were on the average 266 and Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) 261 seats 
waiting to be filled by MPs.  
 
Divided by the total number of MPs in the Chamber, that is 60, we arrive at the average 
number of committee memberships of an individual MP. This calculation assumes a 
perfect application of the proportional representation principle in committees. Reality is 
not that ideal but this gives us an insight on the average number of committee seats a MP 
holds. The average number of committee seats by MP may be calculated as number of 
                                                          
84 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 
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committee seats-number of MPs-ratio. It indicates, in how far an individual MP is able to 
develop expertise (Harfst and Schnapp, 2003, p. 18ff). Notwithstanding all policy areas 
have to be covered by a small parliament too. A low number of MPs forces thus a higher 
number of committee memberships, given a constant number of committees. The fewer 
committee memberships one individual MP holds the more expertise he/she may develop.  
 
For the Legislature 1 (CSV/DP), the average number of committee membership is the 
highest (5.06 over the 5 sessions between 1999/2000 and 2003/4), followed by 
Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II) (4.43 over 3 sessions between 2009/10 and 2011/2). MPs 
held the least committee seats in Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) (Figure 31).   
 






3.2.2. Rules and practice of committee chair allocation  
The committee chair is of major importance for the organisation of committee work. In 
the beginning of each session, all committees attribute with an absolute majority one 
chair and two vice-chairs (art. 19(1) RoP 2000-2011, art. 16(3) and art. 17(2) RoP 1999). 
The committee chair, one of the two vice-chairs or the Speaker convokes meetings at 
least three days in advance unless the Speaker decides otherwise (art. 20(1) RoP 2007-
2011, art. 19(2) RoP 2000-2004, art. 19(1) RoP 1999). As of 2003, the oldest committee 
member chairs the committee in case its chair and vice-chairs are prevented for any 
reason (art. 20(5) 2007-2011, art. 19(5) RoP 2003-4). The chair fixes the agenda and 
his/her voice is decisive in case the committee fails to agree (art. 21(1) RoP 2007-2011, 
art. 20(1) RoP 1999-2004). Since 2010, summaries of meetings are published on the 
Chamber’s website and it is the committee chair who signs those summaries as well as 
the committee secretary (art. 22(8) RoP 2010-2011). In the beginning of each meeting, 
the chair checks the presence of members and subsequently opens or adjourns a meeting 
(art. 23(1) 2007-2011, art. 22(1) RoP 1999-2004).  
 
The value of a party holding the committee chair is contested. The congruence of party 
affiliation between committee chair and minister is generally considered an advantage for 
the establishment of a good working atmosphere and does not seem to be a contested 
principle. However, the actual power of chairs and subsequently, legislative scrutiny 
depends on how skilful the position is used. Some interviewees pointed to the relative 
importance of committee chairs, not least in the case of conflict to moderate and reach 
consensus. It is in their hands to guide the meetings to success. Fearful and tender 
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characters, as well as “party slaves” are considered less apt for such position. On the one 
hand, a committee chair has to sometimes take decisions which are not in everyone’s 
favour and possibly a respective minister needs to be put in his/her place. On the other 
hand, he/she should establish consensus where possible and this requires flexibility and 
pragmatism.85 If the committee is not able to arrive at a consensus, the dispute enters 
plenary and thus gains public attention. The aim is to bring everybody in to avoid 
publicity for deviating views.86  
 
What is more, a good preparation of meetings is naturally appreciated, with the chair 
being obliged to be the most active among committee members. One good indicator of 
his/her expertise is that committee chairs usually take over the tasks of rapporteurs, 
although committee members may specialise in different sub-areas. Depending on his/her 
skills to draft such reports, they deserve their committee chairmanship, and for long-
standing chairs this is mostly the case. Administration and faction staff is left out if the 
rapporteur holds enough expertise to draft a report herself. No MP chairs two committees 
and a skilled committee chair may thus gain large authority within parliament and can 
often be considered the best expert of the committee. Such expertise is of great value for 
a party, and outdoes the electoral logics: Even if a committee chair is not the best friend 
of the common people, he/she will normally enter parliament again. At the same time, 
chairs of different committees are informally not equal. A snobbish “Committee-
consciousness” is fostered, not least among the chairs themselves. The unofficial Queen 
                                                          
85 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 24 July 2013, and Clerk of the Chamber of 
Deputies, face-to-face interview, 12 December 2012. 
86 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 20 June 2013. 
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of committees is said to be the Institutional affairs and constitutional revision (INST) one, 
followed by the JURI and the EAC.87   
 
Since the 1980s, the practice of establishing committees as well as committee chair 
attribution has changed. In the beginning of the 1980s, the Chamber established 
committees which were chaired by more than one person, depending how delicate the 
matter at stake was. The two co-chairs were affiliated to different parties, namely the 
coalition partners. Today, such twinned chairs are not used anymore.  
 
The parliamentary committees in the Chamber largely mirror ministries, as we have seen 
in section 3.1.3, including the party affiliation of minister and committee chair. The 
Chamber’s European affairs committee (EAC) made an exception. Its jurisdiction has 
twice increased over the period of investigation, from foreign and European affairs, to 
defence in 2000 and cooperation and immigration in 2004. In 2000 still, minister and 
committee chair were of the same party affiliation (Liberal), although two ministers were 
responsible for foreign and European affairs (Lydie Polfer) and defence (Charles 
Goerens).88 As of 2004, a Socialist MP took over and since, it was responsible for matters 
covered by four ministers: Foreign affairs and immigration matters were held by Socialist 
ministers, while Christian Social ministers were responsible for cooperation and defence. 
                                                          
87 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 24 July 2013. 
88 Lydie Polfer was Vice-Prime minister, Minister for foreign affairs a.nd external commerce as well as 
Minister for the public service and administrative reform. Charles Goerens was Minister for cooperation, 
humanitarian aid and defence, as well as Environment minister. 
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Some of the Christian Social People’s party (CSV) were sceptical in the beginning, 
working relations proved no difficulty.89  
 
Another sort of exception was made for the regulatory committees. Those committees 
are normally chaired by opposition MPs. The attribution of regulatory committee chairs 
to opposition members was invented in the legislature 1999/2000. Only the Petitions 
committee’s tradition of opposition chairs goes back even longer. Liberal deputy Anne 
Brasseur chaired the Petitions committee as of 1984, although the DP was in opposition. 
She held this position during the whole period of CSV/LSAP coalition during almost two 
decades and was the only opposition MP chairing a committee before 1999. When the DP 
entered government in 1999, its chair was handed over to the Socialist Lydie Err. When 
Err’s party joined government again in 2004, the chair fell to the Green Camille Gira.  
Gira already chaired a committee as of 1999, when he took over the Account committee. 
The chair went to DP’s Henri Grethen in 2004 and back to Gira in 2006. In 2004, another 
committee chair came into the hands of opposition. For the first time since its entry into 
parliament, the ADR could nominate a chair. Thus, Gast Gibéryen came to be the chair of 
the parliamentary Rules of procedures committee.  
 
Since 2004, the Control committee for budgetary execution (CODEXBU) is the only 
permanent committee90 in the hands of the opposition. In 1999, when the CODEXBU 
was created, its makers found that the committee would have more credibility when it 
                                                          
89 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
90 It was a joint regulatory committee with the Chamber’s Accounts committee from 2004/5 to 2005/6 but 
split again in 2007/8. The Accounts committee remained a regulatory committee and the CODEXBU 
became a permanent committee. 
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was chaired by an opposition MP. During the CSV/DP legislature, the LSAP held the 
chairmanship which went over to the DP in 2004. Although a permanent committee, it is 
no common legislative but a scrutinising committee (compare with section 5.2.2 on the 
practice of budgetary control).91  
 
To be sure, chairing the special and sub-committees was always majority business and 
the opposition never held any of their chairs. 
 
3.2.3. The party political distribution of committee chairs 
Split up by party affiliation, it shows that the CSV always held more than 50% of all 
committee chairs between 1999/2000 and 2011/2. The Socialists lost most of their chairs 
in 1999, when they had to give over their government participation to the Liberals. The 
DP is seen as the third force in the party landscape of the country, and entered 
government several times since 1945. As such, it held chairs during its government 
participation, but also when it had opposition status. It traditionally held at least one 
committee chair then. The Greens were attributed their first committee chair in 1999. 
Like the ADR, they held 5 seats in the Chamber. But in terms of the electoral result, the 
Greens were stronger gaining 303,991 votes, compared to 244,045 votes of the ADR, 
thus 9.9% respectively 9.0% of the votes and both resulted in 5 seats in the Chamber. 
This should have served them as argument during the “committee allocation carrousel” 
(Figure 32).  
 
                                                          
91 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 June 2013. 
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Figure 32: Committee chairs of permanent committees by party affiliation, percentages, 1999/2000-2011/2 
 
 
Over the years, opposition factions’ chairs remained rare but could increase their 
presence in the Conference of committee chairs.92 While they maintained only one chair 
before the 1999 elections, their numbers increased to four until 2005/6, when they firstly 
obtained five chairs. They still hold five chairs in 2011/2. The total number of permanent 
committees stayed at similar levels. Only in the period between 2004/5 and 2005/6, their 
number fell to twenty (Figure 33). Relative to all committee chair posts, opposition held 
between around 14% to almost 23% of permanent committee chairs and in more recent 
years, came close to 23% (Figure 34).  
 
                                                          
92 The “Conférence des Présidents des Commissions permanentes“ is an informal body which reunites at 
irregular intervals all permanent committee chairs. 
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As such, opposition is underrepresented among committee chairs. However, the gap 
between the percentage of seats in the Chamber and the percentage of committee chairs 
decreased since 1999. Opposition lost stands in the last two legislatures, which is 
observable in the percentage of opposition seats in the Chamber. Still, their numbers 
among committee chairs rose and this is why the gap decreased from 30 to almost 10 
percentage points difference (Figure 35).  
 
Figure 35: Opposition seats in parliament, opposition chairs and their difference in permanent committees, 
percentages, 1999/2000-2011/2  
 
 
3.2.4. Summary and conclusions: Committee composition 
Within this chapter we dealt with committee composition, committee membership and 
committee chair allocation as important factors influencing the capacity of parliament to 
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hold government accountable. All three factors may facilitate or hinder effective 
parliamentary scrutiny.  
 
Regarding their composition, committees follow proportional representation. The 
Luxembourgish parliament is highly decentralised according to the rather high number of 
permanent committees (20-22 in the period under investigation). This is in principle a 
good starting point for parliamentary control of government. The opportunity structure is 
however not sufficient for an evaluation of effective scrutiny.  
 
The capacity of MPs to use their opportunities depends on their possibility to specialise in 
an issue area. The small size of the Luxembourgish parliament forces multiple 
committee memberships which hamper the possibilities of MPs to specialize in a certain 
matter at stake. Between 242 and 319 committee seats on average 278 seats were 
available per parliamentary year during the period of investigation. Legislature 1 
(CSV/DP) between 1999/2000 and 2003/4 offered the most committee seats to MPs (on 
average 304 seats by parliamentary year), followed by Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II) (266 
seats) and Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) (261 seats). Divided by the total number of MPs, 
it shows that an individual Luxembourgish MP is on the average member of four to five 
committees, which is amongst the highest numbers compared to other NPs (Harfst and 
Schnapp, 2003, p. 19). 
 
When it comes to the allocation of committee chairmanship, committee chair allocation 
follows proportional representation, but largely excludes opposition. All committees 
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concerned with lawmaking, that is most permanent, and all sub- and special committees 
are headed by a MP of the governing coalition. The governing factions justify their 
accumulation of committee chairs by the possibility to better coordinate with a minister.93 
The need to oversee government seems to be less of an argument.  
 
Committee chairs may be characterized as mediators between parliament and 
government, and between government and opposition. Chairing a committee is the art of 
creating consensus. At the same time, the chairs are able to facilitate parliamentary 
control of government. Especially in small parliaments, which do not dispose over large 
resources, a potential for better scrutiny lies in the attribution of committee chairs to the 
opposition. In the Luxembourgish case, this potential is not used when it comes to the 
permanent committees, which are mainly concerned with lawmaking. 
 
While neglected the possibility of chairing a permanent committee, opposition MPs are 
not totally excluded from committee chairmanship. The attribution of certain committees 
concerned with scrutiny (that is the regulatory committees and the CODEXBU) to 
opposition as of 1999/2000 has to be seen as a major change in paradigm and 
parliamentary culture. In this case the credibility of control justified the decision. 
However, in the overall ranking of committees by prestige and importance, regulatory 
committees are to be found at the lower end of the scale rather, not least, because they 
offer less possibilities of public exposure. 
  
                                                          
93 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 December 2012, Clerk of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 12 December 2012, and Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face 
interview, 24 July 2013. 
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Summing up, due to the high number of committees, we consider the Luxembourgish 
parliament highly decentralised.  This suggests a big potential to control government as 
committee work creates a division of labour and this makes MPs experts. However, seen 
the low total number of MPs, they have to take over a large number of multiple 
committee memberships. Specialisation is thus not entirely possible and scrutiny remains 
suboptimal.  
 
3.3. Scrutiny in committee 
Committees are the main feature determining the opportunities for parliamentary control. 
In this section, we focus on the scrutiny exerted by committees. Hence, we concentrate on 
the permanent committees as the main locus where lawmaking takes place in the 
Chamber but exclude regulatory committees. Also, we do not consider special and sub-
committees in this analysis for reasons of comparability. Although the latter deal with 
legislation, they are generally concerned with only one law initiative. Many of them only 
work during a limited period of time. In this section, we firstly investigate committee 
meetings and secondly the number of laws by committee in order to arrive at the 
calculation of two indices: The Structural scrutiny potential (SSP) and Structural scrutiny 
intensity (SSI) of the Chamber. 
 
3.3.1. Committee meetings and laws by committee 
Committee chairs dispose over a large discretion when it comes to the initiation of 
meetings. They may convoke meetings at least three days in advance, unless the Speaker 
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of parliament agrees on an exception (art. 20(2, 3) RoP 2007-2012, art. 19(2, 3) RoP 
2000-2003, art. 19(1,2) RoP 1999). Committee meetings may be initiated by other MPs 
too, if at least three of them or one political faction or technical group asks for it (art. 
20(3) RoP 2007-2012, art. 19(3) RoP 2000-2003, art. 19(2) RoP 1999).  The number and 
character of government bills impacts on the number of required committee meetings, 
however, committee chairs do not underlie any formal restriction with regard to the 
frequency they convoke the members.  
 
Interestingly, since 1999, we observe an increase from below 400 to over 600 in the total 
number of committee and working group meetings (including meetings of the Bureau94 
and the Conference of Presidents95). Their numbers peak in 2001/2 and 2007/8 and stay at 
high levels as of 2009/10. The number of public sessions on the other hand decreased 
slightly over the years. More significantly, we observe an important diminution of hours 
spent in public session, from around 250 between 2000/1 and 2003/4, to around 150 
between 2004/5 to 2011/2 (Figure 36).  
 
 
                                                          
94 The Bureau consisted of the Speaker, three vice-presidents one of the three largest parties each, seven 
MPs – three from the CSV, two from the LSAP, and one from the Liberals and the Greens each and the 
General Secretary, who has no voting right. 
95 The Conference of Presidents is the parliamentary steering organ including the Speaker, the Secretary 
General and the leaders of all parliamentary factions (art. 26 RoP 1999-2004, art. 28 RoP 2007-11). It is 
responsible for the organisation of works in the Chamber. 
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Note: The number of committee and working group meetings includes the meetings of the Bureau and the 
Conference of Presidents.  
 
 
The fall of hours spent in public session is a consequence of the reform of speaking time. 
Most importantly, government has been limited in its freedom to take as much time as it 
wanted.  
 
Split up for different committees, we find that the average number of meetings almost 
doubled from around 15 in 2000/1 to around 27 in 2010/1.  This increase is due to mainly 
the EAC, which holds a slightly above average amount of meetings until 2003/4, to 
suddenly more than quadruple its frequency of meetings in 2004/5 to 66 per session. It 
stayed at around this amount of meetings ever since. This increase of meetings is less 
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pronounced but remains considerable, adding all committee meeting on immigration to 
the EAC before it has incorporated the subject. The extension of the EAC’s scope to 
immigration in 2004/5 is consequently not the reason for this increase.   
 
The EAC holds the most meetings per session since 2003/4, but it was overtaken once by 
the Finance and Budget committee (FIBU) in 2005/6 which has witnessed a slightly 
lower increase of meetings within this period. Just recently, in the 2011/2 session, the 
Committee for sustainable development (DEVDUR) has bypassed the EAC. This 
successor committee of the Environment committee has extended its scope and now 
includes transport which necessitated an increase frequency of meetings since 2009/10.  
The Justice committee (JURI) ranks third in the total amount of meetings held between 
2000/1 and 2011/2. This committee was however always at above average level, with a 




Table 9: Number of meetings by committee, 2000/1-2011/2 
L¹ 
committee 2000/1 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/1 2011/2 Total
AEEDCI (EAC) 24 18 26 15 66 51 64 74 46 65 72 57 578
FIBU 22 32 25 23 33 54 40 53 45 49 47 46 469
JURI 31 48 32 21 25 36 41 46 35 44 48 49 456
ENVI/DEVDUR 11 26 20 20 26 25 30 27 19 40 56 62 362
EDU 14 24 18 17 23 13 27 47 29 29 37 33 311
ECON 16 20 17 21 27 21 40 34 22 31 32 24 305
INT 9 22 29 22 13 17 11 38 28 35 31 24 279
SANT 19 25 21 13 19 18 27 27 16 27 29 28 269
ENSSUP 20 11 30 10 18 14 22 21 11 34 37 40 268
CODEXBU 20 23 23 15 20 25 5 22 20 29 32 29 263
INST 18 19 30 22 21 20 25 31 14 20 12 26 258
FAM 7 12 12 9 21 19 24 32 18 28 25 26 233
TRAVEMP 12 19 7 12 14 29 28 38 16 13 10 19 217
AGRI 17 8 6 11 8 19 30 29 9 15 22 16 190
TRAVPUB 22 30 17 16 12 10 18 17 18 160
FONCPUB 5 14 13 4 17 12 23 9 11 8 7 10 133
CMTOUR 5 22 19 11 10 5 15 14 3 4 17 7 132
MEDIA 11 36 15 13 75
TRANS² 12 14 16 12 10 64
EGAL 15 16 14 15 60
CULT 18 7 9 34
LOG 12 10 8 30
Total 298 425 374 290 385 402 486 571 370 501 531 513 5146




¹ L: Legislature, L1: Legislature 1 (CSV/DP), L2: Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I), L3: Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAPII)  
² incorporated in the DEVDUR as of 2009/10  





Figure 37: Number of meetings by committee, 2000/01-2011/12 
 
 
¹ incorporated in the DEVDUR as of 2009/10 
Compare with committee key in Annex 0 on page 173 
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Figure 38: Committees contributing to the increase of average committee meetings, 2000/1-2011/2 
 
 
Compare with committee key in Annex 0 on page 173
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Several interviewees have pointed to the fact that a change in the electoral law reforming 
the remuneration of MPs should be responsible for this development.96 The new rules 
foresee a part of MPs income to depend on their presence in committee meetings and the 
number of votes they attend in public sessions.97 Since, the “invisible” work in the 
committees is more appreciated, at least in financial terms. Besides the increase in the 
number of committee meetings, attendance has risen. Since MPs are present, they may as 
well get into the subject matter and take part in the discussions.98 Regular committee 
meetings therefore foster the establishment of expertise among MPs. Taking more often 
part in committee meetings, MPs get informed and become experts in policy areas. They 
increase their independence from the party leadership, not least, in case a MP is the single 
representative of a faction in a committee. 
 
Thus, although we have concluded in section 3.2 that MPs remain generalists due to their 
multiple committee memberships and the difficulty to specialise under this circumstance, 
the increase of committee meetings during the period of investigation improves the 
situation. MPs are more inclined to work alongside the sectoral divisions. This exposure 
to specialised content may reinforce their expertise.  
 
Besides, the number of adopted laws has slightly increased according to the Chamber’s 
records. Summing up the respective laws adopted during the first three years after an 
election, 226 laws have been adopted until 2001/2, 287 until 2006/7 and 291 until 
                                                          
96 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 June 2013,  Clerk of the Chamber of 
Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 June 2013,  Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 
24 July 2013, and Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
97 art. 126 de la loi électorale du 18 février 2003, Mémorial A – n° 30 du 21 février 2003, p. 446; doc. parl. 
4885. 
98 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
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2011/12. More committee meetings are thus necessary for legislative scrutiny (Figure 
39).  
 




The quality of the introduced bill influences the number of necessary committee 
meetings. The parliamentary proceedings have become faster because the urgency 
procedure became the regular legislative procedure and parliament thus receives draft 
laws at the same time as the State Council. Parliamentary committees may immediately 
start working on the legislative texts. However, those texts may be less developed 
because of the missing opinion of the State Council. Formerly, in case of non-urgency, 
the requested changes have been incorporated before the bill entered parliament (compare 
with the discussion of the length of the legislative procedure in section 4.3).  But even if a 
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committee is not concerned with a large quantity of law initiatives, it may work on the 
preparation of debates with ministers in plenary sessions (Hours of actuality for instance, 
compare with section 5.1.1). 99 
 
The number of committee meetings alone does not tell about the quality of the meetings 
or the hours spent. Effectively, the number of hours in committee meetings could have 
stayed the same or dropped. However, no figures are available to examine this possibility. 
Some interviewees have pointed to an amelioration of the quality of committee meetings, 
not least, because of the improved presence of MPs.100  
 
Furthermore, we have to take into account that more delegation visits take place today 
and that those visits are counted in the committee meeting time. Bilateral relations have 
been booming over the last ten years. Especially the contacts in Brussels have grown. 
However, the domestic business is given priority and may prevent from taking part in all 
interparliamentary meetings.101  
 
                                                          
99 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
100 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 2 October 2013. 
101 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
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The number of meetings is one measure for the activity of committees. Depending on the 
initiative of government, committees face a varying burden of lawmaking. Which 
committees are concerned more by lawmaking and thus by the transposition of 
directives? An examination of the data we have collected on the adopted laws between 
1999 and 2011 sheds light on the question. We use a sample of laws for which we have 
coded the committees involved in their elaboration. The sample contains all laws adopted 
in every third year after an election, that is 2001, 2006 and 2011. A total of 285 laws 
make part of this selection.  
 
Over all the three years in the sample, it is the FIBU which has been busy the most with 
lawmaking, followed by the JURI, the Committee for environment, which became the 
Committee for sustainable development (ENVI, DEVDUR) and the Committee for 
foreign and European affairs, defence, cooperation and immigration (AEE, AEEDCI), the 
Chamber’s EAC. These four committees were included in half of the laws (142 out of 
285) adopted during those years. Another third of the laws in the sample passed six 
further committees, and the remaining 20% were dealt with in 11 committees. 
 
Transposition is not every committee’s business. Among the four most active committees 
in lawmaking, only two were concerned with transposition in a larger scale. Out of the 48 
laws which went through the FIBU, almost 38% (that is 18 laws) were transposing 
directives.  In the ENVI (and later DEVDUR) around 19% out of the 31 laws under 
examination transposed directives. The share of transposition laws remains below 10% 
for the JURI and the AEE/AEEDCI (Table 10). 
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Table 10: Adopted laws transposing a directive and not transposing a directive by committee, absolute numbers, sample of laws 2001-2006-2011 
year year year Total
committee no t* t* Total committee no t* t* Total committee no t* t* Total no t* t* Total
1 FIBU  13 6 19 FIBU  11 9 20 FIBU  6 3 9 30 18 48
2 JURI 11 0 11 JURI 10 0 10 JURI 11 3 14 32 3 35
3 ENVI 3 0 3 ENVI 3 3 6 DEVDUR 19 3 22 25 6 31
4 AEE (EAC) 8 0 8 AEEDCI 13 2 15 AEEDCI 5 0 5 26 2 28
5 ECON, TRAN 2 1 3 ECONSP 5 2 7 ECCEES 9 0 9 16 3 19
6 INT 4 0 4 INT2 5 0 5 INT3 8 0 8 17 0 17
7 SANT 4 2 6 SANT 4 1 5 SANT 4 0 4 12 3 15
8 ENSSUP1 2 0 2 ENSSUP1 7 0 7 ENSSUP2 5 0 5 14 0 14
9 TRAVEMP 3 0 3 TRAVEMP 3 4 7 TRAVEMP 1 2 3 7 6 13
10 TRAVPUB 9 0 9 TRAVPUB 2 0 2 x 11 0 11
11 FAM 4 0 4 FAM, EGAL 2 0 2 FAM, EGAL 3 0 3 9 0 9
12 EDUSP 2 0 2 EDU 2 0 2 EDUSP 4 0 4 8 0 8
13 FONCPUB1 0 0 0 FONCPUB2 5 1 6 FONCPUB3 1 0 1 6 1 7
14 INST 0 0 0 INST 3 1 4 INST 2 0 2 5 1 6
15 CMTOUR, LOG 1 0 1 CMTOUR, LOG 2 0 2 CMTOUR 2 0 2 5 0 5
16 CODEXBU 2 0 2 CODEXBU 2 0 2 CODEXBU 1 0 1 5 0 5
17 x TRANS 4 0 4 x 4 0 4
18 EGAL 2 1 3 x x 2 1 3
19 AGRI 1 0 1 AGRI 1 0 1 AGRI 1 0 1 2 0 2
20 MEDIA 1 1 2 x x 1 1 2
21 x x CULT 2 0 2 2 0 2
22 x x LOG 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 72 11 83 Total 84 23 107 Total 84 11 95 240 45 285
2001 2006 2011
 
Note: no t*: law not transposing a directive, t*: law transposing a directive 
Compare with the committee key in Annex 0 on page 173 
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Even though the increase in the number of committee meetings could lead to the 
impression of more specialisation and a better scrutiny the higher number of adopted bills 
has to be taken into account. This increase simply requires MPs to spend more time in 
committee. Therefore, the time spent on one bill does not necessarily increase and lead to 
an improved scrutiny. However, for three out of the four most active committees, this is 





Table 11: Laws and meetings by committee, absolute numbers, sample of laws 2001-2006-2011 
2001 2006 2011 Total
committee laws meetings ratio committee laws meetings ratio committee laws meetings ratio laws meetings ratio
1 FIBU  19 22 0.9 FIBU  20 54 0.4 FIBU  9 47 0.2 48 123 0.4
2 JURI 11 31 0.4 JURI 10 36 0.3 JURI 14 48 0.3 35 115 0.3
3 ENVI 3 11 0.3 ENVI 6 25 0.2 DEVDUR 22 56 0.4 31 92 0.3
4 AEE (EAC) 8 24 0.3 AEEDCI (EAC) 15 51 0.3 AEEDCI (EAC) 5 72 0.1 28 147 0.2
5 ECON, TRAN 3 16 0.2 ECONSP 7 21 0.3 ECCEES 9 32 0.3 19 69 0.3
6 INT 4 9 0.4 INT2 5 17 0.3 INT3 8 31 0.3 17 57 0.3
7 SANT 6 19 0.3 SANT 5 18 0.3 SANT 4 29 0.1 15 66 0.2
8 ENSSUP1 2 20 0.1 ENSSUP1 7 14 0.5 ENSSUP2 5 37 0.1 14 71 0.2
9 TRAVEMP 3 20 0.2 TRAVEMP 7 29 0.2 TRAVEMP 3 10 0.3 13 59 0.2
10 TRAVPUB 9 22 0.4 TRAVPUB 2 10 0.2 x 11 32 0.3
11 FAM 4 7 0.6 FAM, EGAL 2 19 0.1 FAM, EGAL 3 25 0.1 9 51 0.2
12 EDUSP 2 14 0.1 EDU 2 13 0.2 EDUSP 4 37 0.1 8 64 0.1
13 FONCPUB1 0 5 0.0 FONCPUB2 6 12 0.5 FONCPUB3 1 7 0.1 7 24 0.3
14 INST 0 18 0.0 INST 4 20 0.2 INST 2 12 0.2 6 50 0.1
15 CMTOUR, LOG 1 5 0.2 CMTOUR, LOG 2 5 0.4 CMTOUR 2 17 0.1 5 27 0.2
16 CODEXBU 2 20 0.1 CODEXBU 2 25 0.1 CODEXBU 1 32 0.0 5 77 0.1
17 x TRANS 4 14 0.3 x 4 14 0.3
18 EGAL 3 15 0.2 x x 3 15 0.2
19 AGRI 1 17 0.1 AGRI 1 19 0.1 AGRI 1 22 0.0 2 58 0.0
20 MEDIA 2 11 0.2 x x 2 11 0.2
21 x x CULT 2 7 0.3 2 7 0.3
22 x x LOG 0 10 0.0 0 10 0.0
Total 83 306 0.3 Total 107 402 0.3 Total 95 531 0.2 285 1239 0.2  
 




3.3.2. Structural scrutiny potential and intensity 
In this section we propose two indices which help examining the evolution of structural 
scrutiny over time. What is more, they open up possibilities for comparison between 
legislatures in future research. The first measure we introduce is a Structural scrutiny 
potential (SSP). It is based on the average number of legislative committee memberships 
by MP (LM) as outlined in section 3.2.1 and the number of legislative committees (LC) 
installed in a parliament. 
 
For Luxembourg, we are able to calculate the SSP over time and with accuracy 
concerning the actual number of established committees and their size of membership 
(Equation 2). The SSP indicates whether MPs are potentially able to invest time in the 
scrutiny of legislative proposals. The number of legislative committees is however not 
independent from the average committee membership by MP. If the number of legislative 
committees increases, the average legislative committee membership by MP goes up too, 
given a stable assembly size. Thus, this measure is especially useful for comparative 
research between parliaments, as their number of MPs in most cases does not vary. 
 
 
Equation 2: Structural scrutiny potential index (SSP) 
 
 
LC: Number of legislative committees 
LM: Average legislative committee membership by MP 
 
Not surprisingly, the SSP only slightly changes in the period under investigation and with 
regard to the Luxembourgish parliament. The number of MPs remains constant and 
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structures too are rather stable between 2000/1 and 2010/1. The development indicates 
that the SSP was the highest for Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) between 2004/5 and 2008/9. 
This is due to the fact that the number of seats in committees has decreased in this 
legislative period and thus the number of committee memberships by individual MP 
decreased (Figure 40 and Table 13 at the end of this section).  
 
Thus, while committees serve as opportunity structure to gain policy expertise and exert 
parliamentary scrutiny, the practical possibility to use this opportunity is dependent on 
the average number of committee memberships by MP/size of parliament-ratio. A 
low number of MPs demands a higher number of committee memberships, given that the 
number of committees is constant. Given time constraints, the less committee 
memberships the more expertise develops.  
 
The Chamber ranges among the assemblies which require MPs to sit in a rather large 
amount of committees. Compared to other European countries, only the Netherlands 
range higher, where one MP is member of around 4.1 committees. Luxembourg is ranked 
second, with 4.0 committee memberships per MP, just before Austria, where MPs attend 
2.8 committees. In some NPs the ratio is 1:1, which seems to be the ideal: An MP may 
thus focus on his/her area of specialisation. This is the case for Finland and Norway, for 
instance. The strength of legislative scrutiny should thus take into account the opportunity 
structure, that is the number of committees and the capacity of MPs to become expert and 
use the possibilities. For a measure of legislative scrutiny potential we thus weight the 
opportunity structure by the potential to make use of it. A ranking of European NPs on 
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the so-developed Structural scrutiny potential (SSP) reveals that the Chamber may be 
seen as the weakest scrutinizer, although it finds itself among the highest de-centralised 
NPs (Table 12).  
 








seats LM SSP 
Germany 21 622 28 588 0.9 22.2 
Sweden 16 349 17 272 0.8 20.5 
Italy 16 630 43 688 1.1 14.7 
Norway 12 169 14 168 1.0 12.1 
Finland 12 200 17 204 1.0 11.8 
Denmark 23 179 17 391 2.2 10.5 
Portugal 12 230 24 288 1.3 9.6 
Austria 24 183 21 504 2.8 8.7 
Spain 19 350 41 779 2.2 8.5 
Greece 10 300 40 400 1.3 7.5 
Netherlands 28 150 22 616 4.1 6.8 
Belgium 10 150 22 220 1.5 6.8 
France 6 577 97 582 1.0 5.9 
Luxembourg 22 60 11 242 4.0² 5.5 
Ireland 0 166 166 0 0.0  
UK 0 650 650 0 0.0  
 
¹ Source: Martin and Vanberg (2011, p. 44), all other data: own research and calculations 
² Taking into account the exact number of committee seats available for the period between 1999/2000 and 
2011/2, this value averages 3.4 permanent committee memberships by MP.  
 
LC: Number of legislative committees 
LM: Average legislative committee membership by MP 
SSP: Structural scrutiny potential 
 
Including the frequency of committee meetings by law within the SSP affords us a 
measure of Structural scrutiny intensity (SSI). We thus divide the number of 
committee meetings (LM) by the total number of laws (L). The SSI of the Chamber is 








LCM: Number of legislative committee meetings 
L: Total number of laws 
SSP: Structural scrutiny potential 
 
If the SSP is high, the number of meetings necessary to scrutinize a legislative proposal 
should be lower, given a stable number of laws. For instance, if we have 100 laws in a 
parliamentary year and a constant SSP of 10, the SSI varies depending on the number of 
legislative committee meetings (LCM). The increase of LCM we have witnessed over our 
period under investigation thus intensifies the scrutiny of laws. However, no clear trend 
reveals regarding the SSI and thus the establishment of expertise among MPs (Figure 40 






Figure 40: Indices of structural scrutiny potential and intensity, 2000/1-2010/1 
 
 
SSP and SSI could still be refined regarding the actual memberships of MPs in 
committees (contrary to the average committee membership by MP). What is more, the 
number of laws is not uniformly distributed over committees, as we have seen in section 




Table 13: Structural scrutiny potentials and strength, 2000/1-2010/1 
 Legislature 1 Legislature 2 Legislature 3 
 2000/1 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/1 
LC 22 22 22 22 20 20 22 22 22 22 22 
LM 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.6 
SSP 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.1 6.1 
LCM 209 209 209 209 187 187 198 198 198 216 216 
L 79 79 125 126 101 88 101 129 89 95 101 
SSI 16.7 16.7 10.6 10.5 11.9 13.6 13.1 10.2 14.8 13.9 13.1 
 
 
LC: Number of legislative committees 
LM: Average legislative committee membership by MP 
SSP: Structural scrutiny potential 
LCM: Number of permanent committee meetings 
L: Number of laws 





3.3.3. Summary and conclusions: Scrutiny in committee 
Committee work creates experts and control. We have focussed on legislative committees 
in this chapter, that is the permanent committees. Curiously, there is a clear trend towards 
more committee meetings in the Chamber, to the detriment of hours spent in public 
sessions. Responsible for this trend are three permanent committees mainly: The 
Committee for foreign and European affairs, defence, cooperation and immigration 
(AEEDCI), the Finance and Budget committee (FIBU), and the Committee for 
sustainable development (DEVDUR). The Justice committee (JURI) also increased its 
number of meetings immensely during the last two legislatures. However, it was already 
at high levels in Legislature 1 (CSV/DP). Changes in the incentive structure 
(remuneration of presence in committee), and an increase of incoming government bills 
make this trend further comprehensible. It fits in this regards that FIBU, JURI, DEVDUR 
and AEEDCI have been the locus of the highest number of bills over three sample years 
(2001-2006-2011).  
 
In order to arrive at a measure for the Structural scrutiny potential of a legislature 
(SSP) we propose not only to take into account the overall number of committees but also 
the MPs capacity to specialise (average number of committee memberships by MP), 
which is especially difficult for small legislatures. In comparative perspective, it shows 
that Luxembourg drops from the top of the ranking to the bottom: While the number of 
committees is high in the Chamber, its size prevents MPs from becoming expert, taking 
into account their high number of committee memberships. Over the period of 
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investigation, this rather low scrutiny potential only increases in the second half of 
Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I), that is between 2006/7 and 2008/9.  
 
In a further step, we calculate a legislature’s Structural scrutiny intensity (SSI) by 
taking into account this scrutiny potential and the number of committee meetings by law. 
This index of scrutiny intensity varies during the period under investigation, depending 
partly on electoral cycles. Comparative data is lacking in order to better estimate the 
Chamber’s performance regarding this second index. Most importantly, we do not 
dispose about data on the number of committee meetings in other legislatures. Data 
collection for comparative purposes exceeds the purpose of this thesis and remains up to 
future research. 
 
3.4. Summary and conclusions: Scrutiny potential through parliamentary 
committees 
The chapter was concerned with the investigation of the internal organisation of the 
Luxembourgish Chamber of Deputies (ChD) as opportunity structure for exercising 
parliamentary control more generally and legislative scrutiny more particularly. The 
investigation of parliamentary structures focussed on the most important organisational 
feature of parliament: The committee system. The decentralisation of parliament by 
committees is said to increase parliamentary control (Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Norton, 




Within the first section, we explored the different types of committees and their 
functions. On the one hand it maintains a stable and high number of permanent 
committees for legislative scrutiny, which mirror ministerial jurisdictions. One group of 
those permanent committees is however concerned with regulatory functions. Those 
committees overview parliament internal matters (the parliament’s Account committee, 
and the Committee for the rules of procedures), exert control on the Secret Service and 
regard petitions. No ministry directly corresponds to them but they are permanent.  
 
On the other hand more flexible forms of committees exist which are employed for 
special missions. The special committees are one example which is however not often 
used in the Chamber and their number has still declined in recent years. Sub-committees 
of permanent committees have been established more often instead. However, they do not 
dispose about the same amount of human resources (that is MPs) as their mother 
committees. The Chamber is thus well equipped with committees in terms of their 
numbers and their diversity in function, but their total number decreases slightly over the 
years. This is a good starting point for parliamentary control, but not the end of the story 
as some may think. Such more flexible committee types were used in order to deal with 
EU matters. This may be seen as evidence for the reactivity of the Chamber when it 
comes to European matters and the flexibility of the committee structure.  
 
A second important feature of committees is their composition. In the Chamber, they are 
“staffed” by proportional party representation and hold between 5 and 13 members. The 
bargain over who enters which committees is done in the party factions. We devoted 
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much attention to investigate committee chair allocation in this section. The extent of a 
serious legislative scrutiny lies much in the hands of the chairs and requires party-
independent mind. They may be seen as the best of the experts in the committee as he/she 
takes over many of the legislative reports necessary for the adoption of a law. A skilful 
handling of diverging opinions within the committee and of opposing stances to the 
minister, the largest possible inclusion of opposition views and a well-prepared 
organisation of committee matters increase a chair’s reputation and may give him or her a 
large authority in a policy field.  
 
All but one permanent committee chairs are filled with MPs of the governing factions, 
corresponding to the party affiliation of the minister in place. The Control committee for 
budgetary execution (CODEXBU) is the exception and is no lawmaking committee in the 
strict sense. It has an important function in overviewing government spending and was 
thus considered more credible when chaired by an opposition MP. The opposition chairs 
the regulatory committees since 1999/2000 and we may speak of a major shift in 
paradigm in committee chair allocation since then. However, regulatory committees are 
not among the most contested ones if a MP wishes to gain public attention.  
 
In the third section of this chapter, we have investigated committee behaviour more 
closely. Committee work has become more important in the period under investigation as 
the increase in the number of meetings shows. Lawmaking is an important trigger for this 
increase, with the main legislative committees facing the largest increase in the number 
of meetings: The Committee for foreign and European affairs, defence, cooperation and 
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immigration (AEEDCI, EAC), the Finance and Budget committee (FIBU), and the 
Committee for sustainable development (DEVDUR), besides the Justice committee 
(JURI) which has always been among the main legislative committees.  
 
In the final part of this section, we develop the following argument: Structural factors 
alone only demonstrate a certain potential for scrutiny. Whether this potential is exploited 
depends on the capacity of MPs to become expert in a field. MPs who are member of 
numerous committees may specialise less easily than members of one or few committees. 
While the potential for scrutiny is high in the Chamber thanks to its decentralised 
committee structure, the small size of parliament hampers the development of expertise 
and thus effective scrutiny. Although the total number of committee seats decreased in 
the Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP 1) and remained stable in Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II), it 
stays at high levels. The 60 MPs of the Chamber hold on the average 4.6 committee seats, 
a number which decreases in Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) and subsequently remains 
stable. Compared to other European assemblies, scrutiny capacity in Luxembourg is very 
low. It importantly decreases the Structural scrutiny potential (SSP) by simple time 
constraints.  
 
For calculating the Structural Scrutiny Intensity (SSI), we take into account not only the 
SSP but also the number of committee meetings by law. This measure of scrutiny 
intensity varies during the period under investigation, depending partly on electoral 




Although the high number of committees and the decentralisation of the Chamber suggest 
a great scrutiny capacity, rather than specialists, Luxembourgish MPs remain generalists 
if we take into account the size of parliament. However, the increase in committee 
meetings should have a positive effect on the expertise of MPs, even if the quality of laws 
and the deletion of the urgency procedure fostered their increase, as well as the slight 
increase in the number of laws. Furthermore, meetings also serve to prepare debates and 
delegation visits and are thus not used for scrutiny. However, three of the most active 
committees, that is the FIBU, the JURI, and the EAC, use more meetings per law in 2011 
than in 2001. This could point to an increase in legislative scrutiny. Still, if the number as 
well as the presence of MPs in committee meetings increases, expertise is fostered. 
Consequently, the independence of committees from ministers is facilitated, depending 
on the ability of the committee chair.  
 
Summing up, the parliament has all cards in hands as its internal organisation permits 
scrutiny. This potential could however be better used. To improve the situation, 
parliament would have to increase its resources and support for MPs. Allowing for more 




Chapter 4. Legislative scrutiny 
This chapter is concerned with the first pillar of parliamentary control: Legislative 
scrutiny and the question of control and influence on governmental bills of domestic and 
European origin. More particularly, we compare ordinary laws with laws transposing a 
directive on three indicators for legislative scrutiny strength, that is amendments, final 
votes and the length of the legislative process. The aim is to arrive at a general evaluation 
of the legislative scrutiny of the Chamber (ChD) within the period of investigation, that is 
between 1999 and 2011 (Figure 41).  
 





The first section of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of amendments. This includes 
an outline on the formal rules on amendments as well as the practice of how they are 
handled within the Chamber. The distinction between amended laws of domestic and 
European origin adds another level to this analysis and allows us to evaluate whether 
legislative scrutiny differs between transposition and ordinary laws. What is more, we 
attempt an estimation of the influence of parliament on laws by comparing draft laws at 
their deposition in parliament and final bills. 
 
We consecrate a second section of this chapter to the analysis of final votes in the 
Chamber. Again, formal rules on the adoption of laws are examined first, and in a second 
step the patterns of parliamentary behaviour. We account for the adaptation of control in 
EU matters and distinguish between voting patterns on transposition laws and other laws.  
In the last section, we investigate the length of the legislative process as third indicator 
for legislative scrutiny. We identify the factors which may influence the pace of 
legislative process in formal terms, most importantly the actors involved in lawmaking 
and the characteristics of a bill. Then we check in the data, how the duration of a bill in 
parliament has changed within the period under investigation and for which reasons. This 




Amendments are one expression of parliamentary influence on laws and one of the most 
important tasks of parliament and legislative committees more particularly. The right to 
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amend and divide articles as well as proposed amendments is enshrined in the 
Constitution (art. 66 C). The examination of the formal rules on amendments, the number 
of amended domestic and Europeanised laws and the influence of amendments on the 
content of laws will give a first insight on the general impact of the Chamber on laws. 
Based on the findings of Dumont and Spreitzer (2012), we investigate whether 




4.1.1. Formal rules on amendments and practice of amending legislation 
The formal rules on amendments have changed in the Chamber. Until 2003, the Rules of 
Procedure (RoP) foresaw that an amendment had to be supported by a minimum of five 
MPs in order to be considered in committee (art. 67(2) RoP (1999-2000)). This rule was 
however never practised in the strict sense and therefore abolished. Amendments in 
committee occur mostly during the discussion and are not introduced in written form.102 
In plenary session, this limitation still holds – an amendment is only put on the agenda if 
five MPs support it (art. 68(1) RoP (1999-2003) and art. 72(1) RoP (2007-2012)). To this 
end, the vote on the bill as a whole is substituted by a vote by article (art. 65 C). In case 
these amendments would need further study the report is sent back to the committee.  
 
All amendments – introduced by the government or MPs – have in principle to be 
approved by the State Council (art. 83bis. C). If the State Council fails to bring in its 
opinion before the draft law is voted as a whole, the Chamber may still proceed to vote 
                                                          
102 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 
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each of its articles. This does not dispense the final vote, but serves as the starting point 
of a period of three months within which the State Council gets a last chance to provide 
its opinion. If the vote by article dates back to more than three months and the State 
Council has not responded the Chamber may hold the final vote on the whole text of the 
law and thus adopt the law (art. 70(1) resp. 66(1) RoP (2000-2012) and art. 66(1) RoP 
(1999-1999)). The State Council as such holds a suspensive veto of three months with 
regard to (plenary) amendments too (compare with Figure 19 at page 37).103  
 
Within parliament, amendment activity takes place in committees. Only in exceptional 
cases, amendments initiated in public session are supported by a sufficient majority of 
MPs. Although amendments are either attributed to government, parliament or both, 
interviews reveal similar to what Mattson (1995) states: The origin of an amendment is 
difficult to evaluate. While its title attributes it as either “amendement gouvernemental” 
or “amendement parlementaire”, this does not necessarily mean that government or 
parliament stands behind the changes. Especially in committee, those attributes become 
superfluous. As the Chamber does not dispose of experts in all sub-fields of legislation, 
government serves as agent when it comes to drafting amendments.104 What is more, 
government accommodates MPs, of the majority factions and of opposition parties, as 
much as possible.105 If an amendment is very technical the committee asks the 
government representative during their meetings to draft amendments for them and even 
                                                          
103 No deadline applies a priori for amendments introduced in committee. Parliament could however 
advance to a vote article by article without the opinion of the State Council. In this case, parliament forces 
the State Council to submit its evaluation within a period of three months. This is however never done in 
practice and the State Council enjoys large discretion in the time it takes to deliver its opinion.  
104 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 December 2012, Clerk of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 12 December 2012, and Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face 
interview, 13 December 2012. 
105 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
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so when the idea and proposal to the amendment came from members of the committee. 
This does however not mean that the amendment would be labelled “government 
amendment”, quite the contrary. 
 
 Government on the other hand, often asks in the committee to attribute an amendment 
parliamentary (committee) status. The advantage is that the amendment may be decided 
quicker as it bypasses the ministerial college and directly goes to the State Council for 
approval. Formally, a law project is a common enterprise of the ministerial college. All 
ministers collectively have to approve a text before parliament is engaged. If the text is 
amended by a ministry during the legislative process, the college has again to formally 
agree to the amendment. Those have to be sent to the ministerial college at the latest one 
week before the meeting. Depending on the agenda of ministerial college, this requires 
some time not least, because amendments may not range among the top priorities of the 
ministerial college. Then they enter parliament and discussions only start. Thus, at least 
two weeks are consumed with such proceeding which may be a long time in some 
cases.106 
 
Mostly, this practice of introducing amendments via the parliamentary committees is due 
to technical reasons.107 However, a political dimension may not be totally excluded, as 
evidence suggests. Some ministers have benefited from the possibility to circumvent the 
ministerial college by pushing through amendments in parliament although they knew 
                                                          
106 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, Member of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013, and Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 10 
October 2013. 
107 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, and Ministry official, 
face-to-face interview, 10 October 2013. 
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that the other members of government would not approve them. One of the most 
conflictual topics in the ministerial college is the question of staffing. Every minister 
would like to increase his/her personnel. However, strict priority lists exist concerning the 
staffing policy of government, the so-called “Numerus Clausus”. Ministers have 
attempted to increase the number of posts attributed to their ministry by law via the way 
of amendment. In such cases, an experienced committee may prevent such circumvention 
of the ministerial college if it does not agree to give the amendment the label of 
parliament initiative.108  
 
Cooperation between government and parliament could go even so far, that after 
government representatives have asked MPs to “take over” their amendments, the 
committee asks government representatives to draft those.109 This practice is considered 
legitimate as it speeds up a rather lengthy legislative procedure.110 In case amendments 
are refused or in case no amendment is brought in, the report is directly voted on.  
 
The Chamber alters a large share of draft laws during the legislative process. Almost all 
amendments are adopted at committee stage (Dumont and Spreitzer, 2012). Adopting an 
amendment in public session would delay the final adoption of a law significantly, as in 
this case the State Council needs to be involved again. If amendments are decided in 
committee negotiations, they are altogether handed in to the State Council and when the 
committee report is voted on, it normally has delivered its opinion on those amendments. 
                                                          
108 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
109 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 December 2012. 
110 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, and Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
191 
 
The adoption of an amendment in public session requires that the same procedure needs 
to be undergone again. The State Council has to review the amendment and thus 
increases the length of the legislative procedure. Committees serve to avoid further delay. 
They smoothen the procedure by striving for consensus and including a maximum of 
opinions.111 
 
An investigation of all laws adopted between 1999 and 2011 was conducted with the 
purpose of shedding light on whether amendments occurred during the legislative 
process.112 An amendment was registered, if such was mentioned in the summary of 
proceedings found in the online archive of the Chamber. During the whole period, 478 
out of 1,294 laws (37%) were amended. Taking into account the total law production, the 
relative number of amended laws shifted to a higher level in 2008. Between 1999 and 
2007, amended laws made up below 40% of all laws. As of 2008, over 40% of laws were 
amended (Figure 42).113  
 
 
                                                          
111 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
112 We investigate all adopted laws within this article rather than the laws in force, as in Dumont and 
Spreitzer (2012). 
113 Where not otherwise indicated, the data of this section are encoded and calculated by the author who 
retrieved the required information from parliamentary proceedings, that is the website of the Chamber at 
www.chd.lu or printed minutes of public sessions. 
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Figure 42: Amended laws over time, absolute numbers and percentages, 1999-2011 
 
 
One explanation for this upward trend may lie in the more stringent review of bills by the 
State Council. It not only indicates erroneous or misfit content, but proposes an 
alternative text for passages it considers not to comply with the superior principles of law. 
While we do not possess exact figures about the amounts of proposals for alternative 
texts, interviewees indicate that those are frequent. The State Council’s work has become 
more systematic and its review has to take into account an ever increasing amount of 
international and European norms as well as Court judgements. Also, it corrects more 
often for formal errors in the texts of bills (compare with section 4.3.1 on the quality of 
draft laws).114 While alternative texts penned by the State Council and entering draft laws 
do not count as an amendment per se, any change on those substitute texts taken over in a 
bill does. 
 
                                                          
114 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 3 October 2013, and Official of the State Council, 
face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
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A second explanation may be provided by the fact that parliament as well as its factions 
dispose over a larger pool of staff as well as technical means. In the 1980s still, MPs 
wrote most texts themselves, be it a law proposition, a report, a parliamentary question or 
a speech. Today, those editorial tasks are mostly done by faction personnel and the 
quality of texts, such as committee reports, has clearly improved since (however, at the 
expense of the spiritedness of speeches, as some claim).115 
 
Given that most bills are written by government, the share of laws amended by 
government (around 44% of all amended laws) seems to be very high. We may qualify 
this observation by the fact that the initiator of an amendment does not tell about its 
origin. It gives however a good impression about how closely parliament and government 
work together. Taking into account that parliament’s resources are limited, most of its 
amendments must be drafted by government in any case. Especially in the recent years, 
labelled parliamentary amendments have increased considerably at the detriment of 
governmental amendments. In 2003 and 2004 still, only 9% and 2% of amended laws 
respectively were declared amended by parliament. In 2005, this percentage climbed up 
to 23%. The share of amended laws by parliament further increased to more than 60% as 
of 2006 and 83% in 2011 out of all amended laws (Figure 43).  
 
                                                          
115 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, and Clerk of the 
Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 24 July 2013. 
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Those figures point to a major change in coalition government and executive-legislative 
relations as of Legislatures 2 (CSV/LSAP I) , that is during the two Juncker/Asselborn 
governments. While during Legislature 1 (CSV/DP) most amendments went through the 
ministerial college, the majority of amendments were decided by the committee together 
with the respective minister since 2006. Hence, the consensus reached by committee 
work also included the minister, but not necessarily the rest of the government. Rather 
than the division between parliament and government, sectoral divisions seem to have 
become more important in the more recent Legislatures. Committee work creates 
expertise and brings MPs close together with the ministers and staff in the corresponding 
ministries. Interviews point to a literal strategy of ministers to circumvent the college of 
ministers, when the latter does not agree on a specific measure.116 Such strategic 
                                                          
116 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
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behaviours of ministers seem to have increased with the help of the Chamber and could 
point to a higher level of conflict between the parties in government. 
 
4.1.2. Amendment of transposition bills 
Law projects carrying the transposition of a directive are formally treated the same way 
as other law projects in the legislative procedure. However, in practice, they are by far 
more often amended than laws of domestic origin. This confirms an observation made by 
Dumont and Spreitzer (2012) on laws adopted in the period between 1986 and 2006. 
Among the 1,294 laws adopted in the period between 1999 and 2011, around 61% of 
laws transposing an EU directive were amended compared to 33% of other national laws 
(Table 14). The share of amended transpositions exceeds the share of amended domestic 
laws in most of the years, except in 2000 and 2007 (Figure 44).117 
 
Table 14: Percentages of amended laws by source of law, 1999-2011 
 not amended amended Total 
national law 67% 33% 100% N=1121 
transposition laws 39% 61% 100% N=173 




                                                          
117 Where not otherwise indicated, the data of this section are encoded and calculated by the author who 
retrieved all required information from parliamentary proceedings, that is the website of the Chamber at 
www.chd.lu or printed minutes of public sessions. 
118 Phi stands for the Contingency coefficient which measures the association between two binary variables. 
It may take over maximum values from -1 to +1 and signify perfect correlations.  
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So far, we were dealing with laws that received amendments stemming from parliament 
and/or government. This first binary variable only tells whether a law witnessed at least 
one amendment of whatever sort. In how far those amendments had an impact on the bill 
is however not contained in this measure. Thus, we do not know whether one word was 
amended because of technical or legal requirements, or whether profound changes were 
introduced.  
 
Hence, a second approximation for an evaluation of the impact of amendments on bills is 
provided in order to get more insight on the changes laws undergo in parliament. This 
measure is based on the length of bills and final laws as measured by the number of 
                                                          
119 Phi stands for the Contingency coefficient which measures the association between two binary variables. 
It may take over maximum values from -1 to +1 and signify perfect correlations.  
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words of a bill and the difference in words of bills and adopted laws. We assume that 
draft laws that face a major change in the number of words are more thoroughly 
scrutinised by parliament, than laws that do not see such changes. The length of a bill 
helps to shed a closer look on the impact of amendments on laws.  
 
We are aware that this measure ignores possible changes which may be introduced by 
substitution of parts of the text. Amendments surely bring along still other changes to 
bills, which do not show in the number of words. Such even more in-depth measure 
requires a content analysis of bills and laws. Because of time constraints and the rather 
large period of 13 years under investigation, this examination was not possible within the 
framework of this thesis. Future research should take up such enterprise. 
 
In order to gain more insight into amendments of transposition laws, we take a closer 
look on the changes laws underwent in parliament. We investigate a sample of 110 laws 
more closely, that is to say all amended laws adopted in three years 2001, 2006 and 2011. 
Only 93 were investigated further, as we have excluded budgetary laws, laws introducing 
international agreements and conventions and laws where parts of parliamentary 
proceedings were missing. Budgetary laws are treated more closely in chapter five of this 
thesis. Laws stemming out of international bargaining may not undergo profound changes 
in parliament anymore. The amendments on them are thus minor and do not reflect the 
Chamber’s possibilities of influence in other areas. 28 of those amended laws out of 93 




The examination of the sample of 93 laws from the years 2001, 2006 and 2011 contains 
bills including between 88 and 21,725 words. Compared to the 65 amended laws of 
domestic origin we find that amended transposition laws are on average slightly longer 
(5,332 in transposition laws compared to 4,405 words in domestic laws) (Table 15). Split 
into the three years of adoption, it shows that transpositions are more than double the 
length of domestic laws in 2001. This difference disappears in the subsequent years 
(Figure 45).  
 
Table 15: Amended transposition and domestic laws, average length in words and average change and 
range in percentages, 2001-2006-2011 (N=93) 
 length % change % range N 
transposition law 5,332 5.1% 68.1% 28 
domestic law 4,405 24.9% 181.5% 65 
total 4,687 18.8% 124.8% 93 
 
 






We assume that a small amount of changed words points to technical adaptations while 
large changes hint to profound interventions. Compared to amended bills of domestic 
origin, the changes introduced by amendments in transpositions are minor. They amount 
to around 5%, that is draft laws transposing a directive are on the average 5% longer or 
shorter than the respective final law. If domestic draft laws are amended, their text body 
faces a 25% change on average in parliament. Few domestic law projects see changes 
below 10% alteration of the original text (Figure 46).  
  
Figure 46: Average change bills undergo in parliament, percentages of words, 2001-2006-2011 (N=93) 
 
 
Interviews confirm that the increased probability of amendments in transposition laws is 
caused by formal, technical requirements.120 Apparently, transposition laws are often very 
poorly drafted (compare with section 4.3.1).121 Hence, it is up to the Chamber and the 
State Council to correct for wrongly transposed provisions but also language mistakes. 
Some ministry officials write transposition bills in a rather mechanical way. For instance, 
                                                          
120 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
121 Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 18 October 2013. 
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it occurred that only words were substituted in the original text of a directive, so that “the 
member states should…” became “the minister should…”. In the Luxembourigsh context, 
it however may not be up to the minister but the Grand Duke to act. Such technical 
substitution of terms is thus error-prone. A rather strict check at draft law stage helps 
avoiding difficulties at a later stage, as the European Commission checks the accurate 
transposition of directives. Referring to the directive in a law does not transpose the 
directive. We may thus conclude that the increased amendment of transposition bills does 
not originate in the aim of MPs to scrutinize government in EU matters.122  
 
Also, interviews point to the decreasing freedom directives leave for the domestic 
lawmaker over the years.123 This observation even more confirms the fact that parliament 
may not give an extensive input in transposition bills. If changes are made, the risk rises 
that a directive is not correctly transposed. Thus, it rather not touches upon the essence of 
such bills.124 This observation may however be policy related, as other respondents have 
witnessed an increase in the freedom left by directives to the domestic lawmaker.125  
 
4.1.3. Summary and conclusions: Amendments 
One measure of legislative scrutiny is the activity of parliament in amending draft laws. It 
is one of the main tasks of MPs to control the law initiatives introduced by government.  
                                                          
122 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
123 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012, Official of the State 
Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013, and Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 28 October 
2013. 
124 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 




The discussion of draft laws and their amendment is primarily done in the legislative 
committees, not least, because individual MPs may introduce them. In plenary they 
require the support of at least five MPs. In principle, the State Council has to approve 
every amendment.  
 
The labelled initiator of an amendment is in many cases not the source of an amendment. 
The Chamber’s capacity to draft amendments is very limited and thus government is 
often delegated this tasks. In return, government regularly asks the committee to 
introduce its amendments if it wants to circumvent the procedure of approval for 
governmental amendments, which have to pass through the ministerial college. Some 
ministers may want to push through amendments via the committee, if they know that 
government does not agree.  
 
On the average around 37% of all laws adopted between 1999 and 2011 are amended. 
The trend goes towards more amended laws over time (from 35% in 1999 to 45% in 
2011). What is more, the declared parliamentary amendments have increased 
significantly in Legislatures 2 (CSV/LSAP I) and 3 (CSV/LSAP II). The committees 
arrive at reaching a consensus not only between their members, but among the committee 
and the minister. This finding hints to an increased importance of sectoral thinking within 
policy areas, possibly to the detriment of government unity. More generally, this further 





Concerning legislative EU scrutiny serious doubts may be cast on whether the increased 
amendment activity on transposition bills is of substance. While the share of amended 
transposition laws almost doubles the share of amended domestic laws, the actual amount 
of change introduced by parliament points to the technical nature of amendments. 
Transposition bills are changed to 5% only, compared to domestic bills, which face 
almost 25% of change counted in the number of words. This implies that legislative 
scrutiny is stronger and more profound with regard to bills of domestic origin. 
 
4.2. Final votes and party cohesion 
Our second measure for legislative scrutiny is final votes on bills in the plenary sessions 
of the Chamber. While committee meetings take place behind closed doors, the whole 
assembly has to publicly approve a law. Thus, while bargaining in committee remains in 
the mist of secrecy, plenary proceedings may shed a light on conflictual issues which 
have not been resolved in committee. Only in combination with an examination of the 
work of committees we should thus strive to answer the question whether voting patterns 
allude to a change in legislative scrutiny. However, the higher the support bills receive in 
the final vote, the less critical potential tends to exist and this may result in a low level of 
legislative scrutiny. We thus complete the picture of legislative scrutiny in committees. 
So far, we have concentrated on the investigation of amendments with important insights 
on plenary proceedings.  
 
During the following pages, we firstly point to the formal rules on the adoption of bills 
and their change in the period of investigation. Secondly, we add the results of actual 
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voting behaviour and inquire differences between transposition laws and other laws. Two 
indicators serve our evaluation of legislative scrutiny in public session: On the one hand, 
the share of unanimous votes gives an insight on conflict and consensus in the Chamber 
(Spreitzer and Timmermans, 2014).  On the other hand, party cohesion is investigated in 
order to estimate government support and opposition behaviour (compare with to 
Assumption 2 in section 1.1.3). 
 
4.2.1. Final votes in the Chamber 
It is the Speaker of parliament who is responsible to set draft laws on the agenda of the 
plenary session (art. 73(3) resp. art. 69(3) RoP (1999-2012). If a draft law is not 
considered to evoke any debate in plenary, a committee may ask the Conference of 
Presidents to schedule a vote without debate. The Conference of Presidents must agree 
unanimously on this demand and no opposition may be expressed by one or more MPs on 
skipping the debate before the plenary session starts (art. 73(4-7) resp. art. 69(4-7) RoP 
(1999-2012)).  
 
Until June 2004, a vote on each article of a law was obligatory in public session, before a 
law could be adopted as a whole. Since the constitutional reform of the same year, this 
obligation is abolished and legislative initiatives are voted on as a whole. A vote on each 
article may be still demanded by five members of parliament (art. 65 C).126  
 
                                                          
126 Constitution luxembourgeoise, art. 65 (Révision du 26 mai 2004): «La Chambre vote sur l'ensemble de 
la loi. Ce vote intervient toujours par appel nominal. A la demande de cinq députés au moins, le vote sur 
l'ensemble de la loi peut être précédé par un vote portant sur un ou plusieurs articles de la loi. Le vote par 
procuration est admis. Nul ne peut toutefois recevoir plus d'une procuration.». 
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The Luxemburgish Constitution foresees two readings in the legislative process and after 
an interval of three months (compare with Figure 19 on page 87). The text may not be 
changed anymore after the first constitutional vote was held. At least one day has to pass 
after the last changes were adopted and before a second regular vote may be held, unless 
the Chamber (in agreement with Government until 2000) decides otherwise (art. 74(1-3) 
resp. art. 70(1-3) RoP (1999-2012)). However, the plenary may decide to dispense the 
second vote (art. 59 C). The State Council has to agree to this dispense. If it refuses 
dispense of the second reading, a second constitutional vote is held (art. 75-78 resp. art. 
71-74 RoP (1999-2012)). Once the law is adopted by the Chamber, the government as 
well as the Grand Duke have to sign it. Three days after the publication in the Official 
journal (Mémorial A) the law enters into force, unless other is foreseen in the law.  
 
The average number of votes approving a bill has jumped to a higher level in 2004. This 
is due to the fact that the coalition partners have gained on seats in the Chamber. While 
government was based on 34 seats in Legislature 1 (CSV/DP), it could count on the 
support of 38 respectively 39 votes in Legislatures 2 and 3 (CSV/LSAP I and II). The 
average number of votes for a bill is however much higher than the seats occupied by the 
governing majority. Between 2000 and 2004, adopted bills were supported by below 54 
votes on the average. Between 2005 and 2007, more than 56 MPs supported a bill on the 
annual average. This average decreased again slightly after 2008 to around 55 votes 
(Figure 47 and Table 16). 127  
  
                                                          
127 Where not otherwise indicated, the data of this section are encoded and calculated by the author who 
retrieved all required information from parliamentary proceedings, that is the website of the Chamber at 
www.chd.lu or printed minutes of public sessions. 
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Figure 47: Average number of votes for, votes against and abstentions, 1999-2011 
 
 
Table 16: Average number of votes for, votes against and abstentions, 1999-2011 
L¹ year votes for votes against abstentions 
L 
1 
1999 54.51 1.26 1.26
2000 53.03 2.60 1.21
2001 52.65 2.74 2.39
2002 51.95 3.27 2.64
2003 53.10 1.84 2.65
L 
2 
2004 51.81 2.35 2.94
2005 56.88 .79 1.07
2006 56.43 1.32 1.41
2007 56.05 1.17 1.54
2008 55.83 1.61 .99
L 
3 
2009 55.62 1.40 1.38
2010 54.86 2.55 1.51
2011 55.71 1.15 1.78
 Total 54.51 1.81 1.78
 






Also, over the years, the amount of laws which pass plenary with unanimous vote 
increased (Figure 48). This trend fits the observation that Luxembourgish politics became 
more consensual, most importantly since the adoption of the new media law in the 
beginning of the 1990s. It allowed a more independent coverage of political events. 
While newspapers in Luxembourg followed the government line in order not to lose 
financing, they became more critical since and reported about opposition initiatives too. 
The media became an important tool in the daily work of opposition parties. Even if 
committee work runs behind closed doors, opposition may always threaten majority 
parties to bring issues for the attention of media and what is more, to the public.128 
Another reason for this increase in unanimity might lie in the change of rules on the final 
adoption of bills. The vote by article, substituted by the vote on the whole bill in 2004, 
may have made MPs aware of disturbing issues in bills and thus may have provoked 
more opposition. 
 
                                                          
128 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 December 2012. 
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Figure 48: Unanimous votes, absolute numbers and percentages, 1999-2011 
 
 
The increase in unanimous votes after 2004 to a level well above 70% and after 2009 
above 60% is in contrast to the voting behaviour in Legislature 1 (CSV/DP). During 
Legislature 1 (CSV/DP), only around 50% of all bills were adopted without opposition. 
This development continues a trend since 1990s (Spreitzer and Timmermans, 2014). 
Interviewees find this trend not surprising when it comes to laws transposing a directive. 
They point to a large support in European matters, which, in their opinion, is responsible 
for an uncontested vote.129  
 
But also domestic bill projects are mostly little exploitable for the purpose of making 
political capital because of either their rather technical nature or their benefit for the 
general public. For instance, the start of buildings of a public school normally does not 
provoke opposition. The right to adopt for homosexual couples on the contrary will not 
                                                          
129 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, and Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
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pass unchallenged. Parties have largely moved to the centre in order to capture a 
maximum of votes. The convergence of party programmes is visible in most subject 
matters, according to interviewees. Only few points remain which truly distinguish 
parties.130 
 
Still other reasons may contribute to this increase in unanimity. One of those may be that 
party cohesion has increased. Section 4.2.2 examines this possibility and opposition 
behaviour more generally and its impact on final votes more particularly. Furthermore, 
committees might perform better and arrive at building consensus well before public 
session. If minority positions are included at committee level, opposition may be inclined 
to vote in favour of a bill. Clearly, committee chairs work to build and find consensus and 
cover a largest possible spectrum of opinions in laws.131 Especially in European matters 
and foreign affairs, for instance when it comes to the decision to support an EU peace 
mission, government is very interested in finding a broadest possible consensus and bring 
in opposition views.132  
 
A closer examination of voting patterns in the Chamber’s proceedings does however not 
confirm this argument. If committees were able to increase consensus on bills, this would 
show in a high correlation between amendments and unanimity. Amended bills should be 
more prone to be adopted by unanimous vote. The data does however not give indications 
that the argument holds. It seems that the increase in unanimous votes is not due to more 
                                                          
130 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, and Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
131 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, and Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
132 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
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successful bargaining at committee level. Quite the contrary, unanimously adopted bills 
are less often amended at committee level (Table 17).  
 
Table 17: Unanimous votes by amended bills, 1999-2011 
 not amended amended total 
not unanimously adopted 50.9% 49.1% 100% N=499 
unanimously adopted 70.7% 29.3% 100% N=795 
total 63.1% 36.9% 100% N=1,294 
Phi133= -0.20 
 
The pattern over time does not change the picture. We observe an increase in amended 
unanimous bills in 2001 and 2002, followed by a period of low amendment activity on 
unanimously adopted bills. Since 2006, the share of amended bills among the 
unanimously adopted ones increased again and remained at the higher level since. Thus, 
except for the last few years, no clear indications for improved committee bargaining 
may be observed (Figure 49). 
 
 
                                                          
133 Phi stands for the Contingency coefficient which measures the association between two binary variables. 
It may take over maximum values from -1 to +1 and signify perfect correlations.  
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Differences exist between laws transposing a directive and other laws. In section 4.1.2 we 
could confirm that transposition laws are still clearly more often amended. In accordance 
to the findings within the present section, the examination of transposition laws shows 
that they are less often adopted by unanimous vote. The difference in the final adoption 




Table 18). Over the years, transposition laws reach lower shares of unanimous votes 













no transposition 37.2% 62.8% 100% N=1,121 
transposition 47.4% 52.6% 100% N=173 








A logistic regression on unanimous votes confirms again that amendments are decreasing 
the likelihood of unanimity. Amendments are thus an indicator of conflict. Transposition 
laws are however not significantly changing the probability for unanimity (Table 19). 
                                                          
134 Phi stands for the Contingency coefficient which measures the association between two binary variables. 





Table 19: Logistic Regression on unanimous votes, 1999-2011 (N=1,294) 
Variables in the equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a amended -.835 .121 47.589 1 .000 .434 
transposition -.225 .171 1.734 1 .188 .799 
constant .842 .078 117.903 1 .000 2.322 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: amendment, transposition. 
 
 
Finally, a general work for the interest of the country was mentioned by interviewees to 
be responsible for the increase in uncontested votes. Internal conflicts are suppressed for 
the sake of a unified voice at the international scene. This might spill over to domestic 
issues and a general trust into compatriots.135 
 
4.2.2. Party cohesion  
On the one hand, the increase in unanimous bills may not be attributed to a more 
successful bargaining at committee level, as unanimous bills are less often amended than 
other bills. On the other hand, the increase in unanimous votes does not directly translate 
into a decrease of legislative scrutiny. Instead, the general number of non-conflictual bills 
could have increased, if the criticism of opposition has not weakened. Alternatively, an 
increase in party cohesion may explain the increase in unanimous votes. While we may 
not measure the amount of non-conflictual bills introduced other than by the final votes, 
we are able to investigate opposition behaviour and party cohesion. 
 
                                                          
135 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
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An investigation in the voting behaviour of parties sheds light on those possible 
explanations of increased unanimity. Firstly, we record whether party factions in the 
Chamber have voted coherently or if one or more of their MPs have not followed the 
party line. Among all final votes on laws adopted between 1999 and 2011, 79 were 
recorded as divided votes. Thus, only 6.1% of all votes divided one or more factions in 
the Chamber. Most of those divided votes were adopted between 1999 and 2004, that is 
during Legislature 1 (CSV/DP). In 2002 and 2004, the amount of divided votes 
concerned around 10 laws and decreased to not more than 3 per year after 2005 (Figure 
51).136  
 
Figure 51: Coherent, divided and unanimous votes, absolute numbers, 1999-2011 
 
                                                          
136 Where not otherwise indicated, the data of this section are encoded and calculated by the author who 
retrieved all required information from parliamentary proceedings, that is the website of the Chamber at 




Hence, by the absolute numbers, we may conclude that party cohesion, already at high 
levels, has increased in the two more recent legislatures. In terms of percentages, the very 
low number of divided votes and the increase in party cohesion is even better visible. 
Between 2000 and 2003, divided votes make up more than 11% of all adopted bills. They 
decrease to around 7% in 2004 and further to 3% in 2005. As of 2006, divided bills sum 
up to around 2% of all bills, and 1% in 2011 (Figure 52). 
 
Figure 52: Coherent, divided and unanimous votes, percentages, 1999-2011 
 
The factions in the Chamber are slightly less divided when it comes to transposition laws. 
If they are divided in 6.2% of the domestic laws, they are divided in 5.8% of the 




Table 20: Divided votes on transposition laws, 1999-2011 
 coherent vote divided vote total 
no transposition 93.8% 6.2% 100% N=1,121
transposition 94.2% 5.8% 100% N=173
total 93.3% 6.1% 100% N=1,294
Phi137= -0.005 
 
Hence, we may speak of a major increase of party coherence in Legislatures 2 
(CSV/LSAP I) and 3 (CSV/LSAP II). But which parties account for this increase? We 
have taken a closer look on the divided votes to answer this question. It reveals that 
almost half of the divided votes concerned only one party and, that is the ADR. When 
Aly Jaerling left the faction and became an independent MP in 2006, party cohesion in 
the Chamber jumps at a higher level. The Socialists (LSAP) rank second when it comes 
to party dividedness in votes. 26% of all divided votes were due to the LSAP. The Greens 
(déi gréng) are the most coherent party over the period under investigation, followed by 
the Liberals (DP) and the Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) (Figure 53).  
 
                                                          
137 Phi stands for the Contingency coefficient which measures the association between two binary variables. 
It may take over maximum values from -1 to +1 and signify perfect correlations.  
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Figure 53: Divided votes by party, percentages, 1999-2011, N=81 
 
Split up per year, party cohesion goes thus up for the ADR and the LSAP. Interestingly, 
also the CSV is slightly more coherent in Legislatures 2 (CSV/LSAP I) and 3 
(CSV/LSAP II). The DP on the other hand became more often divided. The junior 
coalition partners, that is the Liberals in Legislature 1 (CSV/DP) and the Socialists in 
Legislatures 2 (CSV/LSAP I) and 3 (CSV/LSAP II), show a higher party cohesion when 




Figure 54: Divided votes by party, absolute numbers, 1999-2011 
 
 
In absolute numbers, factions are somewhat more divided concerning domestic laws than 
with regard to transposition laws. The Liberals and the Greens were never divided on a 
transposition law in the period of investigation. When taken the share of transposition 
laws, the Socialists and the CSV reveal to be more divided on transpositions than on 
other law. The inverse is true for the ADR: That is, the ADR is more divided regarding 
domestic law than with regard to transpositions (Figure 55 and Figure 56). 
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Figure 55: Divided votes on transpositions and other laws by faction, absolute numbers, 1999-2011 
  
Figure 56: Divided votes on transpositions and other laws by faction, percentages, 1999-2011 
 
In a second step, we examine opposition behaviour. A decrease of critical potential from 
opposition factions could add to increase the amount of unanimously adopted bills in the 
Chamber. To this end, we count the number of laws a party has not supported, that is the 
bills a faction has voted against or to which it has abstained. The Greens reveal as the 
most critical opposition party followed by the ADR. In terms of expressed opposition, the 
219 
 
Greens and the ADR are overtaken by déi Lénk when they are represented in the 
Chamber which was not the case during Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I).  
 
When the Socialists are not in government that is in Legislature 1 (CSV/DP), they 
express their opposition status much more pronouncedly than the Liberals (in 
Legislatures 2 and 3), although the latter have increased their non-support during the 
more recent years (Figure 57 and Figure 58). Taken together, the minority factions have 
thus increased their support of bills or in other words: Opposition has become less 
critical. This decline in opposition may also be owed to the fact that party programmes 
have approached each other, as some observers suggest.138 Especially during Legislature 
2 (CSV/LSAP I), the non-support of opposition is at low levels but increases again in 
Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II) (Figure 59).  
 
 
                                                          
138 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, and Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
220 
 
Figure 57: Non-support of bills in final votes by faction, absolute numbers, 1999/2000-2011/2 
 




Figure 59: Non-support of majority and opposition factions, absolute numbers, 1999/2000-2011/2 
 
 
4.2.3. Summary and conclusions: Final votes and party cohesion 
To briefly summarize our findings on voting patterns, we investigated the rules on the 
adoption of bills and actual final votes in the period between 1999 and 2011. Regarding 
the rules, final votes are facilitated since 2004 when the vote on the whole bill was 
introduced to substitute the vote by article. A vote by article may still be demanded by a 
minimum of five MPs, but occurs only at very rare occasions. The analysis of voting 
behaviour in the Chamber reveals interesting patterns. Firstly, the support for bills 
increased over time. Thus, more votes are cast in favour of bills, and more bills are 
adopted by unanimous vote. The qualitative and quantitative jump towards more 
consensus was made in 2004 and could be partly due to the changed voting rules. If each 
article is voted separately, MPs may pay more attention on the details of laws and thus 
vote against or abstain in the vote on the whole bill. More successful bargaining at 
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committee level may be excluded as explanation for this increase. It shows that 
unanimous bills are overall less conflictual and provoke fewer amendments in 
committees.  
 
Another reason for this increase in support for bills at the final vote is the increase in 
party cohesion, again since the beginning of Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) in 2004. 
Overall, the ADR is by far the least cohesive party up until 2006 when Aly Jaerling 
decided to leave and become an independent MP. Second ranges the LSAP and third the 
CSV, while the Greens are the most cohesive party in the Chamber. What is more, we 
observed a decline of opposition in the Chamber and most importantly in Legislature 2 
(CSV/LSAP I). Firstly, the Left (déi Lénk) could not gain a seat in the Chamber in the 
2004 elections. Secondly, the Socialists have expressed more opposition than the Liberals 
(DP), when in opposition.  
 
Transposition laws face slightly more opposition in final votes. This pattern is however 
not as pronounced as the increased number of amendments issued on transposition laws. 
Also, transpositions provoke slightly less divided votes than other laws. The pattern 
differs depending on the party. It reveals that the CSV and the LSAP both are relatively 
more often divided on transpositions than on other laws. 
 
Altogether, those three reasons – the change of voting rules, the increase of party 
cohesion and the decline of opposition – are responsible for the increase of support for 
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bills in the Chamber. Resulting from this increase in unanimity, we observe a decrease in 
legislative scrutiny with regard to the adoption of bills.  
 
4.3. Length of the legislative process 
The length of the period a law passes in parliament is another way to measure legislative 
scrutiny (Martin and Vanberg, 2011). While it does not tell a priori about the depth of 
scrutiny, we assume that a more in-depth scrutiny prolongs the legislative process. In a 
first step, we thus investigate the reasons for a possible prolongation of the legislative 
process. Two factors may influence the pace of legislative scrutiny: The involvement of 
parliament external actors during the process and the characteristics of a matter at stake, 
that is its urgency and complexity basically. In a second step, we examine the behavioural 
trends over time. 
  
4.3.1. Factors influencing the pace of legislative scrutiny - I: The involved actors  
The duration of the legislative process may be prolonged by the number of involved 
actors. The political institutions concerned with lawmaking indeed blame each other to 
be responsible for delays in the adoption of bills, which is rather lengthy as some 
comparative scholars suggest (Becker and Saalfeld, 2004, p. 58). Apart from the 
accusations that government strategically delayed the introduction of bills (compare with 
section 4.3.2), the Chamber is charged of sedate proceedings, especially so when 
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sensitive societal matters with high conflict potential are at stake,139 and not least when it 
comes to transposition.  
 
The State Council has repeatedly proposed in its opinions of 19 February 2002, 16 March 
2004 and 6 June 2012 to limit the involvement of parliament in the transposition of 
directives. However, such provision should not apply generally. The Chamber should 
keep its authority of delegation on a case by case basis. From the State Council’s 
perspective, most directives do not leave any political options open or keep this freedom 
for adaptation very small. The decision to issue a directive or a regulation at EU level is 
not always a lucky choice. The trend goes to directives that give less and less choice, it is 
argued.140 Interestingly, the Chamber’s position is not totally opposed to this idea of self-
exclusion in transposition. Based on the perception that directives do not give much 
opportunity for political debate, the Committee on institutions and constitutional revision 
(INST) has agreed to such provision to be introduced in the Constitution and specified by 
law, the condition being that the Chamber has the last word in the decision.141 The 
objective is to contribute to a speedy transposition of directives, although the 
transposition deficit has already decreased because of governmental reorganisation (Jann, 
2012; Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 2012, p. 37ff). 
 
                                                          
139 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 18 September 2013, and Member of the State 
Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
140 Others find on the contrary, to be given more freedom in the adaptation of directives to domestic matters 
(compare with section 4.1.2). 
141 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
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The Chamber and the government on the other hand see the State Council to be the most 
important barrier for a quick adoption of a law142 although its organisation has been better 
“channelled” with the result, that is proceedings were speeded up.143 Some MPs still aim 
for an “institutional solution” in form of a formal obligation for the State Council to 
deliver its opinion within a certain period of time.144 In principle, the State Council has to 
check every draft law and every amendment on their constitutionality and their 
accordance to superior law, that is international agreements and general legal principles. 
Thus, by nature, the State Council indeed increases the length of the procedure. 
 
Since 2000, the government officially sends draft laws to the State Council and the 
Chamber at the same time. This former urgency procedure which did not require an 
opinion of the State Council before parliament could become active officially became the 
normal procedure (compare with section 2.2.1). On the one hand, this may be seen as 
“democratising” lawmaking as it enables the press to earlier inform and civil society to 
mobilize.145 On the other hand, this may have a negative impact on parliamentary control. 
The Chamber and the consultative bodies may be pushed to rush in their proceedings. 
Chamber clerks and MPs perceive the legislative process to be faster today than it used to 
                                                          
142 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, Clerk of the Chamber of 
Deputies, face-to-face interview, 3 May 2013, and Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 3 
October 2013. 
143 The State Council has reduced its Committees to six which regularly meet. Every State Councillor is 
member of two committees. The agendas are fixed in terms of priorities and planned in advance which 
gives a good overview of how to proceed. The draft laws are treated in the order of their receipt. Official of 
the State Council, face-to-face interview, 18 September 2013, Official of the State Council, face-to-face 
interview, 3 October 2013, and Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
144 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
145 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 3 October 2013. 
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be. They attribute a great deal of this trend to the change in media landscape and working 
style of ministers as well as MPs.146  
 
Although the urgency procedure became the ordinary procedure, in most cases committee 
deliberations still do not start before the opinion of the State Council has been obtained. 
Hence, to some extent, the slow-down of the legislative procedure attributed to the State 
Council is home-made by parliament.147 Only in case of conflictual and socio-
politically important bills, a committee takes up its work immediately after reception of a 
draft law.148  However, this shows how important the opinion of the State Council is as a 
resource for committee work. 149 
 
Although non-elected, the State Council may however not be considered apolitical. It 
introduces its particular institutional perspective into its opinions on laws and oversteps 
the limits of a purely judicial analysis for the benefit of its institutional interest.150 Such 
opinion normally consists of an evaluation of the compliance of a draft law to 
constitutional, fundamental, international and European law provisions, but may have an 
additional part where the “political opportunity” of such draft law is assessed. The State 
Council signals its opposition on a bill with a “formal opposition” in the text of an 
opinion. Such formal opposition requires the Chamber to either review and change the 
respective provisions or face a three-month delay in the legislative procedure as the State 
                                                          
146 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 24 July 2013, and Clerk of the Chamber of 
Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 June 2013. 
147 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
148 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
149 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012, and Clerk of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 June 2013. 
150 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 12 December 2012, and Clerk of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 
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Council would refuse the dispense of the second vote on a bill (compare with Figure 19 
on page 87). A formal opposition should generally not be introduced on issues of pure 
political opportunity.151 Instead, the State Council aims to provide opinions of the quality 
of Court judgements, giving a clear line of argument and predictable reasoning following 
objective criteria, not least to avoid lengthy lawsuits if a law does not comply with 
general legal principles.152  
 
Thus, the State Council may be regarded as competence centre for legal standards and 
principles, and its opinions provide the base ground for the parliamentary work.153 
However, in case a deadline applies for a draft law, its power exceeds the one of a pure 
advisory body. Most importantly, this is the case in budgetary matters, transpositions and 
at the end of a parliamentary term. Observers in the Chamber suppose strategy behind the 
issuing of formal oppositions at such occasions. Under time pressure, they suggest, the 
State Council expects its amendments and proposals for changes to be taken over without 
major opposition.154 If the State Council totally fails to send its opinion, the Chamber 
may decide to vote the law article by article and in a next step adopt a law in second 
reading (compare with section 4.2.1 and Figure 19 on page 87 particularly). In practice, 
this provision was not yet been drawn upon as the State Council aims to deliver its 
opinions within six months after the reception of a draft law at the latest.155 A respective 
gentlemen’s agreement between the Chamber and the State Council, in presence of the 
                                                          
151 Member of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
152 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
153 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012, Official of the State 
Council, face-to-face interview, 3 October 2013, and Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 
October 2013. 
154 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 12 December 2012. 
155 Member of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013, and Official of the State Council, 
face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
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government, has obliged the State Council to work more speedily and not least on urgent 
matters.156 
 
While it usually dispenses a second reading, as asked by the Chamber after a final vote on 
a bill, it does withhold the evacuation of a law in case it does not agree on its content or 
form. In this case, the Chamber has to vote a second time on the law with a delay of three 
months, as required by art. 59 C. 
 
Furthermore, professional chambers157 have to give an opinion on matters which are 
within their responsibility. They are however only consultative bodies and a failure of 
delivery of an opinion before the adoption of a bill does not render the law invalid. Still 
the Chamber normally waits for their opinion before it adopts a bill (Dumont and 
Spreitzer, 2012, p. 218), although they are judged not having a great impact on 
parliament’s work.158 Also, they may enter the opinion of the State Council already, 
which waits for their reception before it issues its opinion, not least, in case sensitive 
political matters are at stake.159  
 
                                                          
156 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 18 September 2013, and Official of the State 
Council, face-to-face interview, 3 October 2013. 
157 The initial law of April 4th, 1924 institutionalised the following six professional chambers: The 
Agriculture Chamber (Chambre d’Agriculture), the Chamber of Commerce (Chambre de Commerce), the 
Chamber of private employees (Chambre des Employés Privés), the Camber of functionaries and public 
employees (Chambre des Fonctionnaires et Employés Publics), the Chamber of professions (Chambre des 
Métiers), the Work Chamber (Chambre de Travail). Loi du 4 avril 1924 portant création de chambres 
professionnelles à base élective. Mémorial A n°21, 4.4.1924. In 2008, the Chamber of private employees 
and the Work Chamber were replaced by the Chamber of employees (Chambre des salariés). Loi du 13 mai 
2008 portant introduction d'un statut unique. Mémorial A n°60, 15.5.2008. 
158 Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 18 October 2013. 
159 Member of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
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Amendments should cause a longer duration of the legislative process and represent an 
outcome of legislative scrutiny. Again, it is up to the State Council to check all 
introduced amendments for the same legal principles as bills: Their compliance with 
constitutional, fundamental, international and European provisions. The professional 
chambers on the other hand are not asked to give advice on amendments, 160 although 
they usually do so. Given the increase in amended laws over time, we would expect an 
increase in the time consumed by the legislative process.   
 
4.3.2. Factors influencing the pace of legislative scrutiny - II: Characteristics of a 
bill 
Apart from the actors involved in lawmaking, the characteristics of a bill may influence 
the length of legislative scrutiny. All those characteristics concern domestic as well as 
transposition bills. However, we give special emphasis on transposition bills within this 
section in order to evaluate if differences point to increased legislative scrutiny of 
transposition bills or not. 
 
Already at their introduction, bills may be prone to a speedy passage in parliament. 
Government normally signals urgency in its letter accompanying a law project, most 
importantly so, if a directive needs to be transposed and the deadline for doing so is close. 
At occasions, government introduces bills transposing a directive when the deadline for 
transposition has already passed. Some observers in parliament suggest that this was done 
                                                          
160 Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 18 October 2013. 
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on purpose in order to exert pressure on the Chamber and to escape scrutiny.161 Other 
interviewees assume no strategy behind but a signal to the concerned economic groups 
for instance to protect them as long as possible from “harmful” EU regulation. Such 
proceedings are however not judged appropriate, not least, because EU regulation is not 
given due respect. What is more, other texts may be hindered from being adopted if they 
refer to a piece of legislation which has not been transposed.162  
 
Another interpretation of the late timing of transposition bills concerns administrative 
capacity. Those ministerial officials who take part in the negotiations at EU level should 
immediately after draft the law project. They are prevented from doing so because they 
are overcharged with responsibility. A small administration has to transpose the same 
quantity of EU law like a large one, although its staff numbers are much smaller 
(compare with Assumption 2 in section 1.1.3 and section 2.2.2).163 Besides, some 
transposition laws require the coordination of several ministries in order to fully comply 
with the EU provisions and still fit into the domestic legislative framework.164  
 
The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty are responsible for a tighter discipline of all 
concerned actors in the transposition of directives. Since Article 260(3) TEU introduces 
the possibility for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to issue financial sanctions in 
case of a failure to comply with EU law, government watches deadlines more closely. It 
is difficult to justify such payments to the electorate. Until 2011 at least, Parliament could 
                                                          
161 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 12 December 2012. 
162 Member of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
163 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013.  
164 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 
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so far prevent from such sanctions and at occasions with a just-in-time passage of a 
transposition.165 
 
 Finally, also the permanent debate not least within parliament about the transposition 
deficit has brought the matter to an increased attention. Once a year, government issues a 
report on the transposition of directives. This report is public and reviewed by the press 
as well as discussed in the Chamber (art. IV.1-3 Annex 2 RoP 2009-11, compare with 
section 6.1.1) and the EAC more particularly.166 Thus, government was set under 
pressure and has at several occasions improved its internal organisation and overview of 
transposition (Jann, 2012).167 
 
Also, the elaborateness of the matter at stake, not least of transposition laws which are 
supposedly technical and complex, may furthermore prolong legislative scrutiny. The 
complexity of the matter may, among other factors, have an impact on the quality of a 
bill. Many of our interview partners have pointed to a decrease in the overall quality of 
government initiatives, in terms of language and precision for which to find the cause 
exceeds the framework of this thesis.168  Differences appear between ministries, but the 
trend seems to be a more general one. This may also explain the increase in the number 
of amendments on draft laws (compare with section 4.1).  
 
                                                          
165 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012, and Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
166 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
167 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
168 Some have held the education system responsible, others mentioned recruiting procedures and salary 
levels of the public sector, which would attract only second best lawyers for instance. Official of the State 
Council, face-to-face interview, 18 September 2013, Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 18 October 
2013, and Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 10 October 2013.  
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Furthermore, differences occur depending on whether a draft law modifies an existing 
law or whether it pioneers a policy area. For instance, when the scope of EU competences 
is extended, new directives may be issued in new subject matters where perhaps no 
domestic law existed. In such cases, it is more difficult to transpose a directive than in 
cases where a directive modifies already existing law. All institutions involved in 
lawmaking benefit from an already established experience in a policy domain. This is 
generally the case in areas such as agricultural or transport policy, while the euro-crisis 
has provoked new rule-making in areas which have not yet been touched upon by the 
EU.169  
 
But not only have the characteristics of the text of a bill an impact on the length of the 
legislative process. Also the quality of preparatory works facilitates or hinders a speedy 
adoption. While no differences are generally made between laws and transpositions of 
EU directives in the Chamber and the State Council (except that they may be given 
priority if delays are close),170 government foresees a slightly other treatment in the 
preparation of its law projects.   
 
Firstly, a working group on the elaboration of a possibly complex new law of domestic 
origin is installed. This working group may invite experts if it deems it necessary. What is 
more, if a law is of highest priority and political sensitivity, such as housing regulations, 
no functionary but the majority parties is charged with its elaboration. In the case of 
                                                          
169 Member of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
170 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 30 November 2012, Member of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 December 2012, Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face 
interview, 12 December 2012, and Member of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
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transpositions, it is basically one functionary, who is often at the beginning of his/her 
career who writes the transposition. Working groups are not established on such 
occasions.171 This implies that such transposition law project has a higher risk to be 
immature.  
 
Secondly, if a bill is to transpose a directive, the guidelines set by the State Ministry 
require a law project to be guided by a table of correspondence. This table spells out the 
articles in the draft law which transpose the provisions set in the directive.  It facilitates 
the reading and comparison between the two texts and points out whether the 
transposition is complete. If this table is missing or not correctly filled out, the State 
Council takes over this task. The time it takes to do so, however, counts in the period a 
law spends in the Chamber. The same holds for bills of domestic origin. The more 
orderly a dossier enters the Chamber and the State Council, the more its adoption is 
facilitated. 
 
4.3.3. The evolution of legislative scrutiny length 1999-2011 
In the investigation of the average length of the legislative process, we find that laws are 
on the average adopted 371 days after deposit in parliament, that is more than one year 
later. They are published and enter into force on the average 399 days after their 
introduction. Contrary to our expectations when taking into account the increase of 
amended laws, the trend goes towards a shortening of legislative scrutiny. The period a 
law is treated in parliament has declined between 1999 and 2003, risen again until 2006 
                                                          
171 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 3 October 2013. 
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and mostly declined ever since. The general tendency over the whole period is thus 
declining. Also, the standard deviation to the mean has followed a similar pattern. The 
peak in the length of the legislative process in 2006 seems to be due to outliers, as 
signalled by the high standard deviation in this respective year (Figure 60, Table 21). 172  
 
Figure 60: Average number of days between deposit and vote of a law, 1999-2011 
 
 
Table 21: Average period between deposit and vote/publication of a law, means, absolute numbers, 
standard deviations, 1999-2011 
 deposit → publication deposit → vote 
Mean 399.14 371.40
N 1,289 1,289
Standard deviation 465.09 464.90
 
                                                          
172 Where not otherwise indicated, the data of this section are encoded and calculated by the author who 
retrieved all required information from parliamentary proceedings, that is the website of the Chamber at 
www.chd.lu or printed minutes of public sessions. 
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Laws transposing a directive do not significantly differ from other laws regarding the 
length of the legislative procedure, as a linear regression on the length of the legislative 
process suggests. The main factor responsible for the extension in the duration of the 
legislative process is the introduction of amendments. Transpositions take only slightly 
less time than other laws. Also, the absence of conflict as measured by the number of 
unanimously adopted laws does not speed up the duration a law passes in parliament 
(Table 22).  
 
Table 22: Linear regression on the length of the legislative process, number of days between deposit and 











Sig. B Standard error Beta 
 (Constant) 284.486 24.144 11.783 .000
amended  273.531 26.774   .284 10.216 .000
transposition -70.402 37.245 -.052 -1.890 .059
unanimous adoption    -7.200 26.117 -.008 -.276 .783
Dependent Variable: Legislative period in days between introduction and final vote of a bill 
 
 
4.3.4. Summary and conclusions: Length of the legislative process 
Multiple reasons may be found which may impact on the duration a law spends in 
parliament. Among them are the urgency of a law as signalled by government, the 
number of actors involved in its making, the number of amendments introduced and the 
complexity of the matter. Within this section, we investigated the trend over time and 
discovered that the length of the legislative procedure has decreased between 1999 and 
2011 despite the fact that more laws were amended. Parliament, besides the State 
Council, seems to have improved its working procedures and works more efficiently. If 
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parliament or the State Council finally account for the trend is difficult to evaluate from 
the data available. Transposition does not change the length of the legislative process, 
compared to domestic laws. Used as an indicator for legislative scrutiny, the increased 
pace of the legislative procedure does however point to a decrease in legislative scrutiny.  
 
4.4. Summary and conclusions: Legislative scrutiny 
This chapter was devoted to the examination of our first pillar of parliamentary control of 
government. Legislative scrutiny is the procedures a draft law is subject to after it was 
deposited in parliament. The indicators for the strength of legislative scrutiny were the 
amount of amended laws, opposition in the final votes and the length of the legislative 
procedure. All of the indicators underwent an in-depth examination regarding changes in 
the formal and informal procedures and parliamentary behaviour. The range of data 
sources consisted of legal provisions, quantitative statistics on all adopted laws between 
1999 and 2011, and face-to-face interviews with politicians and administrators. The 
challenge was to streamline this plenitude of evidence and come to a clear evaluation of 
the evolution of legislative scrutiny in the Chamber, the difficulty being to counterweight 
statistical evidence with partly diverging oral evidence from the interviewed insiders. 
 
Our first indicator for the strength of legislative scrutiny consisted in the amendment 
activity of the Chamber. At first glance, the purely quantitative increase of amended 
laws could lead to the conclusion that the Luxembourgish MPs have made a major step 
towards a more severe screening of legislative proposals made by government. Especially 
in EU matters, the share of amended transposition laws almost doubled the share of other 
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amended laws. However, much of the qualitative evidence hints to the fact that this first 
impression after this quantitative examination needs to be qualified. 
Firstly, the initiator of an amendment does not tell about the source of the content. 
Parliament did not hold the necessary resources to actually draft all labelled 
“parliamentary amendments”. The ministerial staff mostly did so and still, amendments 
were declared of parliamentary origin. As parliamentary amendments circumvented the 
ministerial college, the minister could benefit and attempt to introduce his/her own 
changes. Such course of action speeded up the procedure and in some cases, we found 
evidence that the minister indeed used the opportunity to introduce changes which 
initially have not received the blessing of the governmental college. Almost all 
amendments were introduced in committee and thus behind closed doors. The reasons for 
their form and introduction remained therefore disguised. From what we have learnt, we 
may however conclude that committee and ministers seem to form an alliance in their 
field of expertise rather than following their institutional, opposing role, most importantly 
in Legislatures 2 and 3 (CSV/LSAP I and II). The increase of parliamentary amendments 
may be interpreted as an increase in the importance of committee work and sectoral 
thinking, helping the independence of ministers from the rest of government. But MPs 
too gain independence from their faction leaders (compare with section 3.3.1).  
 
Secondly, with regard to the amendment of transposition laws, the interview partners 
underlined that no particular effort was made by MPs to distinguish between laws 
transposing a directive and other laws. The legislative procedure in parliament was the 
same for both. Transposition laws did not necessitate particular attention, except if 
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government signalled urgency regarding the deadline set by the European institutions. In 
this case the Chamber would proceed quickest possible, and thus do the contrary as what 
would indicate a thorough scrutiny of government bills. A closer investigation in the 
length of laws after amendment confirmed this picture. It shows that transposition laws 
underwent only slight change, compared to other laws. The modifications introduced by 
those amendments may qualify technical rather than of substance. We may thus conclude 
that the increased amendment of transposition bills does not originate in the aim of MPs 
to scrutinise government in EU matters. 
 
Thirdly, it is important to take into account that the quality of bills has apparently 
decreased. Several of our interview partners have pointed to a decrease in the overall 
quality of government initiatives, in terms of language and precision for which to find the 
cause exceeds the framework of this thesis.173  Differences appear between ministries, but 
the trend seems to be a more general one. This may also explain the increase in the 
number of amendments on draft laws. 
 
However, the characteristics of the text of a bill have not only an impact on the necessity 
of amendments, but also on the length of the legislative process. Similarly, the quality of 
preparatory works makes amendments necessary and facilitates or hinders a speedy 
adoption. While no differences are generally made between domestic laws and 
transpositions of EU directives in the Chamber and the State Council (except that they 
                                                          
173 Some have held the education system responsible, others mentioned recruiting procedures and salary 
levels of the public sector, which would attract only second best lawyers for instance. Official of the State 
Council, face-to-face interview, 18 September 2013, Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 18 October 
2013, and Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 10 October 2013.  
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may be given priority if delays are close),174 government foresees a slightly other 
treatment in the preparation of its law projects with domestic bills receiving more 
attention than transposition laws. 
 
Furthermore, the elaborateness of the matter at stake, not least of transposition laws 
which are supposedly technical and complex, may furthermore prolong legislative 
scrutiny and cause amendments. Amendments are necessary to correct for language and 
formal mistakes, most importantly, when it comes to transpositions. However, we found 
that amendments introduce larger changes in the text of domestic bills. Seen the 
differences in the number of words, this influence has increased (compare with Figure 
46). Based on those findings regarding amendments, one could conclude that the 
Chamber has increased its scrutiny and more particularly in domestic policies. 
 
On the contrary, the increase in unanimity, our second indicator, may be interpreted as a 
weakening of legislative scrutiny. However, changes in the adoption rules may have 
fostered unanimity to some extent. Since 2004, parliament adopts bills by votes on the 
whole text, instead of votes by article. More votes are cast in favour of bills, and votes 
against as well as abstentions have decreased. This development may not be justified by 
improved committee work which would eliminate conflictual items by amendment. On 
the contrary, unanimously adopted bills seem to be less conflictual more generally, as 
they have been less often amended than other laws.  
 
                                                          
174 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 30 November 2012, Member of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 December 2012, Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face 
interview, 12 December 2012, and Member of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
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The increase in unanimous votes after 2004 to a level well above 70% and after 2009 
above 60% is in contrast to the voting behaviour in Legislature 1 (CSV/DP). During 
Legislature 1 (CSV/DP), only around 50% of all bills were adopted without opposition. 
This development continues a trend since 1990s (Spreitzer and Timmermans, 2014). 
Interviewees make the large consensus in European matters responsible for the 
uncontested vote which has always characterised Luxembourgish politics. 
 
Already at high levels, party cohesion increased over time, and especially so since 2004, 
another factor which may be seen as hampering legislative scrutiny. This goes hand in 
hand with a decline of opposition. The proximity of parties when it comes to party 
programmes makes the opposition vote more often in favour of government bills. 
Transposition bills are only slightly less concerned by this decrease of opposition. Not the 
nature of law initiatives has transformed to more technical and uncontroversial, but the 
parties have closed ranks, it appears. 
 
Finally, the duration a law spends in parliament decreased between 1999 and 2011 
despite the fact that more laws are amended. The legislative procedure has to 
accommodate the consultation of the State Council on each bill and every amendment. 
Whether parliament or the State Council have shortened this length is difficult to 
evaluate. However, whether the bill transposes a directive or not does not change the 




Further research will be needed to shed more light on a final explanation of those partly 
contradicting trends. So far, we may conclude that the increase in unanimity, the further 
increase of party cohesion and the shortening of the legislative procedure amount to a 
decrease of legislative scrutiny in parliament, while the increase of amendments on 






Chapter 5. Specific control instruments  
Parliaments possess a number of important instruments to control and sanction 
government. The purpose of this chapter is to take a closer look on the instruments 
available to the Chamber and how these have been used during the period under 
investigation, that is between 1999 and 2011. While research on EU scrutiny often 
neglects a broader concept of parliamentary control, this chapter explicitly takes into 
account the more traditional control mechanisms and their value for the control of EU 
matters. To this end, we investigate the Rules of Procedures of the Chamber (RoP) 
concerning parliamentary control instruments and the Constitution, as well as their use in 
day-to-day business. This second pillar of parliamentary control thus adds to legislative 
scrutiny and offers a broad range of activities for every individual MP and in all policy 




Figure 61: The model of enquiry - Specific control instruments 
 
 
Instruments of parliamentary oversight are parliamentary questions (PQs), interpellations, 
budgetary control, motions and enquiry committees. Common to those instruments is that 
all of them go beyond the ordinary work of committees. PQs, interpellations and motions 
on the one hand are tools for individual or relatively small groups of MPs, which may be 
introduced in public session. Budgetary oversight on the other hand is taken over by two 
committees, that is the Finances and Budget committee (FIBU) and the Committee for 
the execution of budgetary control (CODEXB U) and based upon three debates in plenary 
and on the aid of extra-parliamentary actors, that is the Audit Court. Enquiry committees 
hold judicial competences and are established for the examination of accusations against 
government and its administration. All of those instruments may concern EU matters, as 
any other policy area.  
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In the following sections, we analyse the evolution of formal rules for each of those 
instruments if and how MPs have made use of them. What is more, we investigate their 
value for the control of EU matters. The aim is to arrive at an evaluation of changes in the 
use of those instruments during the period of investigation and with regard to EU matters. 
 
5.1. Parliamentary questioning 
Parliament may ask ministers to respond to specific investigations by means of questions 
and interpellations. “All democratic parliaments have some procedures to allow 
representatives to put questions to ministers.” (Russo and Wiberg, 2010, p. 215) and so 
does the Chamber of Deputies. Apart from interpellations, five different forms of 
questioning exist in the Chamber: Written questions, Urgent questions, Extended 
questions, Questioning hours and Hours of actuality. In terms of their quantity, PQs are 
the most frequent among all the control tools at hands of MPs. When it comes to their 
influence on ministerial behaviour, their value has to be reassessed. Not least, some of 
those PQs are more immediate than others and give ministers a varying amount of time 
for preparation. Their format differs when it comes to the time given for a public 
elaboration of the matters at stake. In our analysis, we point to the change of formal rules 
during the period under investigation and the patterns of their use also in EU matters in 
order to arrive at an accurate evaluation of developments. Rules alone do not tell about 





5.1.1. Formal rules on parliamentary questions and interpellations 
The RoP start with general provisions on PQs (art. 75 RoP 1999-2004, art. 79 RoP 
2007-2011). For all PQs it holds that every individual MP has a right to question 
government. Questions are thus a typical opposition instrument, but also a way for 
majority MPs to profile themselves. In terms of their content, all PQs should be 
formulated in a short and neutral way. The admissibility of PQs is outlined as a function 
of their interest for the general public, their importance and actuality. It is upon the 
Speaker of parliament to decide whether a PQ meets those criteria. In case he/she has 
doubts, he/she consults the Conference of Presidents, that is the parliamentary steering 
organ including the leaders of all parliamentary factions and technical groups. The final 
decision on the admissibility of a PQ lies however in the hands of the Speaker, without 
possibility for objection. If a minister has responded to a PQ, the same question may not 
be issued again during the same session.  
 
The rules for Written PQs are outlined in the subsequent Article 80 (RoP 2007-2011, ex 
art. 76 RoP 1999-2004). A MP who wishes to question a minister in written form has to 
hand in the text of the PQ to the Speaker first. If the PQ is admitted, the Speaker sends it 
to the respective minister and informs the Chamber on its deposit in the subsequent 
public session. The minister sends a written response to the PQ within one month back to 
the Speaker who forwards it to the MP and informs the whole Chamber about the 
response in the next public session. If the minister fails to respond within the period of 
one month, he/she informs the Speaker giving the reasons for the delay and the probable 
date when the response will be delivered. As of 2003, the RoP give the Speaker the 
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formal authority to accord the minister an additional time span to answer the PQ. Both, 
PQ and its response are subsequently published in the minutes of the Chamber. If the 
minister has failed to answer the PQ within one month, the MP has the right to question 
the minister orally in public session. 
 
Urgent questions are a regular form of oral PQs (art. 77 RoP 1999-2004, art. 81 RoP 
2007-2011). Again it is the Speaker who decides about admissibility and whether the 
urgency is justified. Interestingly, until 1999 it was the minister, not the Speaker, who 
could decide about the urgency status of a PQ following Article 77(2). This change is 
symbolic. If urgency is accorded, the MP has five minutes to outline the question. The 
minister is given ten minutes to respond. An urgent question may still be handed in 
during a public session. In this case, the minister answers the question as next point on 
the agenda.175 If no public session is foreseen, the minister gives a written response 
within one week. 
 
A third form of PQs after Written and Urgent questions are Questions with debate (art. 
78 RoP 1999-2004), that is the later Extended questions (art. 82 RoP 2007-2011). The 
former title was regarded as misleading for ministers and MPs, who expected a real 
debate following such PQs.176 This was however not the case. Surely, a certain amount of 
time in public session is devoted to a limited number of Extended questions. Every 
political faction (and political affiliation without the status of a faction) may introduce a 
number of Extended questions by public session, which corresponds to the double of the 
                                                          
175 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 25 September 2013. 
176 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 June 2013. 
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number of their seats. For instance, the Left is represented with one MP in Legislature 3 
(CSV/LSAP II) and may thus introduce two Extended questions in each public session.  
 
Two weeks before the public session takes place, the Speaker communicates the 
respective PQs to government. The PQ is “extended” or “with debate”, because after the 
presentation of the PQ by the MP and the response by the minister, the MP may add a 
brief complementary oral question which the minister may again briefly answer. 
However, the time given by PQ does not exceed the time of Urgent questions and 
amounts to five minutes for the MP and ten minutes for the minister, including the 
complementary PQ. 
 
Fourthly, the Chamber knows so-called Questioning hours (art. 78-1 RoP 1999-2004, 
art. 83 RoP 2007-2011), which, since 2000, take place every Tuesday in the beginning of 
a session. In terms of their content, MPs may orally question government on matters of 
actuality, except technical issues. They were more limited regarding the content of 
Questioning hours until 1999, when MPs could only introduce matters included in the 
declarations on the government programme, on the State of the nation and on foreign 
policy (art. 78(2) RoP 1999). Also until 1999, the number of PQs which could be 
introduced by majority and minority MPs was limited to three each. After 2000, their 
number could be decided by the Speaker, who overviews the balance between questions 





PQs for Questioning hours have to be handed in to the Speaker at least three hours before 
the start of the public session and in written form. The amount of time given for each of 
the PQs is lower than for urgent and extended PQs. A MP may outline its content within 
two minutes, a minister may respond within four minutes (and eight minutes until 2000). 
Opposition and governing factions pose their PQs in turns. As of 2003, it was introduced 
that PQs which could not be considered during such Questioning hours would be 
considered withdrawn but may be re-introduced in a subsequent public session. 
 
Finally, since 2000 the Chamber gives MPs the possibility to orally question government 
in Hours of actuality (art. 78-2 RoP 2000-2003, art. 84 RoP 2007-2011). Those take 
usually place right after the Questioning hours, every Tuesday in a public session and if a 
political faction or affiliation has demanded so. In contrast to Questioning hours, MPs are 
given more time to outline their questions. If a faction has demanded such an hour of 
actuality, it is given ten minutes; all other factions may speak during five minutes, and 
political affiliations remain two minutes. Government may respond within fifteen 
minutes. The RoP specify as of 2003 that Hours of actuality that were asked to take place 
but did not fit into the agenda would be considered null three weeks after their demand.  
 
Interpellations are a separate form of interrogate government (art. 82-3 RoP 1999-2004, 
art. 88-9 RoP 2007-2011). Every MP has the right to introduce an interpellation of 
government. It is specified that only individual MP may do so, that is not a group of MPs 
or a faction. The MP sends a respective written declaration to the Speaker, including an 
outline of contents of the interpellation. The Chamber fixes a date for the interpellation, 
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until 2000 in accordance with government (art. 82(4) RoP 1999). After 2000 the 
Conference of Presidents fixes the date (art. 82(4) RoP 2000-3, art. 88(4) RoP 2007-11 
RoP), in accordance with a government representative (that is an official of the Central 
Service of Legislation or the minister). The interpellation has to take place within six 
months after its introduction, except the respective MP agrees to a later date (art. 82(5) 
RoP 2000-3, art. 88(5) RoP 2007-11).  
 
Like PQs, an interpellation should contain issues of general public interest. Interpellations 
have to be finished during one public session unless the Chamber decides otherwise. The 
MP who has introduced the interpellation is the only MP who may speak and takes the 
word in the beginning. The minister speaks last (art. 82(9) RoP 2000). If an interpellation 
is not admitted, the Conference of Presidents may decide that an interpellation is 
transformed into a PQ (art. 83 RoP 1999), a so-called “debate for orientation”177 (art. 83 
RoP 2000), or an Hour of actuality (art. 83 RoP 2003). 
 
Thus, the different forms of questions give ministers varying amount of time for 
preparation. Oral questions are more immediate than written questions. The most direct 
form of questions is Urgent questions and questions posed during Questioning hours and 
Hours of actuality. Three hours before they start, the MP may still hand in new questions. 
Even Urgent questions give ministers more time, in case no public session is scheduled 
(in case a PQ is posed at the end of a parliamentary year, just before the summer break 
                                                          
177 A “débat d’orientation” may be initiated by the Chamber (since 2000 on the request of at least five 
MPs) on a topic of general interest. A committee may be charged to prepare a report on the subject matter 
which is then discussed in public session and in presence of the government which is heard last (art. 91 RoP 
2007-2011, art. 85 RoP 1999-2004). 
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for instance). Extended questions are sent to the minister two weeks before they are 
answered in public session. Written questions leave the minister with up to one month to 
respond. Finally, interpellations are the least immediate form of questioning. They may 
give the minister up to six months of preparation (Figure 62). 
 
Figure 62: Immediateness of questions and interpellations 
 
 
The different forms of oral questions allow for varying amounts of time for the outline of 
the question and its response. PQs asked during Questioning hours take with eight 
minutes the least time, urgent and Extended questions require 15 minutes and Hours of 
actuality amount to around half an hour, depending on the number of factions represented 
in the Chamber. Interpellations are the most extensive form of questioning. They may 
consume one entire public session. The members of government are given twice the time 
to respond than the outline of a question may take by a MP. Only during Hours of 
actuality, they have to limit themselves to fifteen minutes, that is around half the time the 
factions have to express their different perspectives. The time given to the MP at the 
source of an interpellation and the time for the minister to respond is not fixed (Table 23).  
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Table 23: Time consumption of different question forms, minutes 
 MP minister total 
Urgent questions 5 10 15 
Extended questions 5 10 15 
Questioning hours 2 4 (8 until 2000) 6 (10 until 2000) 
Interpellations not stated not stated one public session 
Hours of actuality 10 (5, 2)¹ 15 32, 30 (30), 29 ² 
 
¹ 10 minutes are given to the introducing faction, 5 to the other factions and 2 to the political affiliations not 
making part of factions. 
² 32 minutes in Legislatures 1 and 3 (with five factions in place and one political affiliation), 30 
respectively 24 in Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) (5 factions in place and no political affiliation until 2006, 
and 3 factions and two political affiliations when Aly Jaerling left the ADR, which subsequently held only 
four seats) 
 
This outline of the six different questioning tools at the hands of MPs in the Chamber, 
including their immediateness and time consumption, affords us to examine in a second 
step their actual use. 
 
5.1.2. Parliamentary questions and interpellations in practice 
The use of PQs in the Chamber increased almost exponentially since 1945. While the first 
(1945-54) to fifth legislature (1969-74) after World War II witnessed only a slight 
increase from 289 to 350 PQs, the rise in their numbers did not stop until the ninth 
legislature (1989-94), when the amount of PQs peaked at 2,659 within five years. 
Subsequently, their use remained stable until MPs introduced a new record of 3,242 PQs 
between 2004 and 2009 (twelfth legislature). This means that more than ten times more 
PQs are issued today than it was still in the beginning of the 1970s. According to MPs 
and parliamentary staff, this increase is mainly due to the increase of MPs’ resources. 
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While members of parliament had basically no support in the 1990s still, they now rely 
on a decent staff of advisors and specialists, who are able to draft laws as well as PQs.178  
 
Compared to PQs, interpellations remained at low levels over the whole period. Only in 
the first legislature 1945-54, their number came up to 144. Up to legislature 1979-84, 
between thirty and fifty interpellations were issued per legislature. Their use declined to 
around twenty until legislature 1994-9. In legislature 1999-2004, MPs increased their 
activity again to almost 50 interpellations in the five parliamentary years, but their use 
fell down to only six in legislature 2004-9. Lately, in legislature 2009-13, they became 
more popular again, when 26 interpellations were evacuated (Figure 63).179  
 
                                                          
178 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 June 2013, Clerk of the Chamber of 
Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 June 2013, and Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face 
interview, 14 January 2013. 
179 Where not otherwise indicated, the data of this section are encoded and calculated by the author who 
retrieved all required information from parliamentary proceedings, that is the website of the Chamber at 
www.chd.lu, printed minutes of public sessions and activity reports. 
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Figure 63: Questions and interpellations, absolute numbers, 1945-2009 
 
 
Written questions represent the largest part of questions to government. Between 
1999/2000 and 2010/1, they always made up more than 80% of all questions and at times 
more than 90%, that is in the parliamentary years 1999/2000 and 2010/1 (Figure 64 and 
Figure 65). On the average, around 87% of all questions required thus a written response 





Figure 64: Written and oral questions, absolute numbers, 1999/2000-2011/2 
 
 





Among the oral questions, the questions posed during Questioning hours are the most 
frequent ones. In comparison, Extended questions, Hours of actuality and Urgent 
questions stay at rather low numbers. Urgent questions have however increased to more 
than twenty per session in the recent years (Figure 66).  
 
Figure 66: Oral questions by type, absolute numbers, 1999-2011 
 
 
Interviews with parliamentary and ministerial administrators confirm that PQs certainly 
serve controlling government.180 At the same time, posing many PQs is good for the 
image of a MP and serves to make the general public aware of a topic. Nonetheless, only 
few PQs are interesting and suggest themselves. PQs mostly deal with local problems and 
conflicts and issues of interest for the general public. EU issues are not a dominant topic. 
                                                          
180 Clerks of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 June 2013, and Official of the Ministry 
for Relations with Parliament, face-to-face interview, 25 May 2013. 
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If they are subject to PQs, they concern specific topics, such as the abolition of pesticides 
to protect the bees for instance. What is more, PQs are not always taken very seriously. 
For instance, a CSV MP recently introduced a question about the train he sat in the same 
morning, which was five minutes behind schedule. This caused great laughter, also from 
the side of the press and adds to the picture of a provincial parliament, which leaves aside 
the real, big problems. The Speaker could have prevented such question, as he/she 
decides about its “admissibility”. Only very few PQs are rejected by the Speaker. The 
reasons are mostly that PQs were already posed before, or treated “too local issues”. If 
the Speaker indicates that he/she has a problem with the admission of a question, the 
parliamentary administration in this case contacts the MP who normally rewrites the 
question. 181 
 
Simultaneously to the introduction of a PQ in parliament, the MP sends it to the press. 
Sometimes, the administration only receives information after the press. But also the 
administration automatically sends information about PQs to the press, which are anyway 
available on the internet site of the Chamber. Some opposition MPs make a real 
difference in the introduction of PQs and issue around 200 PQs per year. Depending on 
the committees the MP is sitting in and thus her specialisation, this directly impacts on 
the respective ministry which might become very busy with PQs. For the opposition, 
posing PQs is important in order to get involved in the public debate. Some PQs seem to 
go back to citizens and interest groups. But ministers too ask MPs to table PQs in order to 
clarify issues in public. Although ministers are obliged to respond to PQs within one 
                                                          
181 Clerks of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 June 2013, and Official of the Ministry 
for Relations with Parliament, face-to-face interview, 25 May 2013. 
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month, and despite repeated reminders of the government service concerned with PQs 
(the “Central Service of Legislation” (SCL)) and the parliament administration, many 
PQs exceed the deadline. Many of them are answered within the month following the 
deadline. Ministers may ask for a prolongation of the deadline.  
 
What is more, MPs often do not follow up their response. They could put a written 
question on the agenda of a plenary session if the ministry does not stick to the one-
month-delay and does not ask for a prolongation of the deadline. Not many of the MPs do 
so and if so, they announce it in advance. Then the minister has to respond. Still, around 
60 to 70 PQs remain without answer, one of them dating back to 2006. That is, 5 to 6 PQs 
per parliamentary year. The Central Service of Legislation suggested setting back PQs of 
the last legislature in 2009. However, this proposal was rejected by the Conference of 
Presidents. Generally, there is a possibility to introduce unanswered written PQs in a 
questioning hour before the summer and winter leave. Some MPs refuse to do so as oral 
answers are less detailed and extensive. Understandably, opposition MPs are more active 
in the follow-up of their PQs than MPs of the majority. 
 
5.1.3. Parliamentary questions as tools for EU scrutiny 
Within this section, three different EU links are examined in PQs. Those three measures 
illustrate a trade-off between breadth and depth. While none of the three measures alone 
shows a representative picture of the use of PQs for EU scrutiny, the three together give a 




The most in-depth measure is the investigation of the content of PQs. Such investigation 
reveals rather time consuming and we thus had to limit it to all written PQs posed to the 
government in the first half of 2010 only (N=823). It reveals that around 11% of them are 
related to European integration.  
 
A second way to measure the EU relatedness of PQs is by an investigation of their titles. 
This enquiry of all titles of PQs enables us to observe the appearance of EU matters in 
PQs over a 10-year time span, that is between the parliamentary years 2001/2 and 2011/2.  
 
Not surprisingly, the percentage of PQs containing an EU link in the title is much smaller 
than the one found in the whole text bodies. On average, 3.8% of the analysed PQs issued 
between 2000/1 and 2011/2 contain an EU link in their title. This percentage varies 
between 2.3% in 2009/10 and 7.1% in 2005/6. Figure 67 shows the development for the 
whole period. No clear increase in the Europeanisation of PQs may be observed in 
Luxembourg over time. Their percentage and absolute number peaks in 2005/6, just after 
Luxembourg’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2005 and the 
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in June 2005. At the same time, parliament 




Figure 67: EU link in title of PQs, absolute numbers and percentages, 2000/1-2011/2 (N=7,717) 
 
A third measure we introduce here to better evaluate the Europeanisation of PQs is by 
considering the addressee. The addressed ministry indicates the policy area a PQ belongs 
to. European affairs are dealt with in the Foreign affairs ministry in Luxembourg. We 
have summarized ministries which were split or transformed during some years within 
the period under investigation. Health and social security, Sustainable development, 
infrastructure and environment as well as Interior and spatial planning issues range 
among the topics most often addressed by MPs. Foreign affairs rank 8th among 24 issue 
areas. This confirms an observation made by some of our interviewees: PQs are most 
often used in order to signal activity in local issues and issues of interest for the 
electorate. The Ministry for the relations with parliament has thus received the least PQs, 
followed by the Ministry for Cults, Equal opportunities, Cooperation and humanitarian 




Figure 68: PQs by ministry, average number by year and absolute numbers, 2001/2-2011/2 (N=7,717) 
 
The patterns over time are difficult to represent in a figure, but it is visible that the 
Foreign affairs ministry has lost on importance as an addressee for MPs’ PQs within the 




Figure 69: Questions by ministry, percentages, 2001/02-2011/2 (N=7,717) 
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The number of PQs addressed to the Foreign affairs ministry, compared to the average 
number posed to the other ministries also fell within recent years (Figure 70).  As of the 
period of presidency and referendum, between 2004/5 and up to 2008/9, Foreign affairs 
were questioned more often than other areas. Not surprisingly, the percentage of PQs 
containing an EU link within their title is the highest for the Foreign affairs ministry, 
followed by the Prime minister’s office, Cooperation and humanitarian aid and 
Communications (Figure 71). 
 







Figure 71: PQs dealing with EU affairs (in title) by ministry, percentages, 2001/2-2011/2 (N=7,717) 
 
 
5.1.4. Summary and conclusion: Parliamentary questioning 
Altogether, the MPs in the Chamber possess a good repertoire of questioning tools. It 
allows them to exert pressure on a member of government with varying immediateness 
required in their response. Since 1999, the existing formal rules on PQs have not much 
changed, but the spectrum of PQs has been increased. A new form of oral PQs was 
introduced in 2000: The Hours of actuality give MPs the opportunity to outline their 
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question more extensively than during Questioning hours. In the same year, the latter 
were rendered more flexible in terms of their content. The decision on the urgency of PQs 
was given into the hands of the Speaker instead of the concerned minister. Also Written 
PQs seem to be a usable tool for putting pressure on ministers, not least because they 
offer the possibility to question ministers orally if they fail to respond in time. 
 
However, parliamentary practice puts this stable pattern of questioning tools in another 
light. The use of written questions has increased exponentially since 1945. Interviews 
point to it as an effect of increased staff of parliament and factions. Regarding the period 
since 1999, written questions account for an average 85% of all questions posed to 
government. Among the oral questions, questions posed during Questioning hours are the 
most frequent form. This comes as no surprise, as those are also the shortest form of 
questioning, giving two minutes to the MP and four minutes to the minister. The trends 
over time indicate that PQs remain very popular among MPs. Especially Legislature 2 
(CSV/LSAP I) as well as the more recent years witness another increase in written 
questions. The number of oral question remained stable until 2009 but declined in 
Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II). Thus, MPs seem to prefer written and detailed responses 
from ministers rather than catchpenny but superficial responses in public session. Written 
PQs are rarely followed up when a minister fails to deliver a response, although the 
question might be posed orally. It is in the responsibility of a MP to insist on obtaining an 
answer. Such unanswered PQs may be seen having only signaling function and serve the 




PQs are covering all sorts of topics and among them most prominently range local 
problems and conflicts and issues of interest for the general public. EU matters are less of 
a concern in PQs. An examination of the content of written PQs issued during the first 
semester of 2010 shows that 11% of them contained a reference to European integration 
in their text body. They do however not specifically recur to PQs to outbalance 
information asymmetry in EU matters. While MPs address negotiations at EU level from 
time to time, they are not systematically using PQs to require information. Rather, they 
pose questions which recur to matters of actuality and public interest.  
 
This pattern shows in the investigation of the evolution of PQs on EU matters over time. 
Their share is particularly high during the period around the Luxembourgish referendum 
on the Constitutional Treaty and its Council of the EU presidency. Especially in 2005/6, 
PQs on European integration jump to their highest level within the period under 
investigation. Almost 7% of all written PQs indicate a link to EU matters in their title and 
in this respective parliamentary year, compared to an average of 3.8% over the whole 
period. MPs use PQs in EU matters as in any other policy area. Their number decreased 
again after those events have lost actuality. 
 
5.2. Budgetary control 
Budgetary control is one of the most important control functions of parliament. Ministers 
are accountable to parliament with regard to past spending, and parliament checks and 
authorises future expenses. This section sets out to determine the main developments in 
the area of budgetary control between 1999 and 2011 and includes an outline of changes 
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in the formal rules of budgetary control within parliament. What is more, the practice of 
budgetary control is investigated and the links between the domestic budget, European 
integration and budgetary control examined. 
 
5.2.1. Formal rules on the budget 
The Luxembourgish Constitution (C) gives the general framework for the budgetary 
procedure in Chapter VIII (Des Finances, art. 99-106 C). The Chamber is determined to 
have the final say in all budgetary matters: No tax may be introduced and no public 
spending of whatever sort may be made unless the Chamber decides so in a special law. 
A general law of 1999182 gives the thresholds below which no such law is necessary (art. 
99 C). It furthermore stipulates that budgetary laws are limited in their validity and expire 
after one year, unless they are renewed (art. 100 C). Thus, the Chamber has to vote 
annually on the budget where all public revenue and spending have to enter (art. 104 C).  
 
In tax matters, no privilege may be given. Exceptions and mitigations of taxes are illegal, 
except the Chamber decides so (art. 101 C). Inversely, no contribution to the state budget 
may be demanded from citizens or public establishments (art. 102 C), and no payments to 
life beneficiaries may be made in whatever form (art. 103 C), unless a law decides so.  
While all the above mentioned provisions were not changed during the period of 
investigation, Article 105 was adapted in 1999. It defines the role of the newly created 
Audit Court to control public finances and assist the Chamber in its budgetary control 
function (art. 105 C).  
                                                          
182 The following law fixes those thresholds: Loi du 8 juin 1999 sur le budget, la comptabilité et la 
trésorerie de l’Etat, art. 80 (Mém. A – n° 68 du 11 juin 1999, p. 1448 ; doc. parl. 4100). 
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Apart from the constitutional provisions, Title IV of the RoP more closely defines the 
procedures regarding budgetary control in the Chamber. In recent years, those rules 
remained largely the same, but they were subject to change in the beginning of the period 
under investigation, in 2000 and 2003. The Chamber obliges itself to examine and discuss 
the political and financial possibilities of the government in the framework of its 
budgetary procedure (art. 87 RoP 1999-2004, art. 92. RoP 2007-2011).  
 
The RoP foresee that a debate on financial and budgetary matters is taken up on three 
occasions: Firstly, during the examination of the law on the state expenses, secondly, 
during the examination of the preliminary budget (that is in a debate on the financial and 
budgetary policy) and thirdly, when the government, that is the Prime minister outlines 
his/her speech on the state of the nation.  
 
The provisions in the RoP concerning the approval of state expenses of the preceding 
financial year are held rather brief. Government is obliged to deposit a respective law 
project until 31 May at the latest. On 30 September at the latest, the Audit Court 
communicates its observations to the Chamber (art. 115 RoP 2000-2003, art. 113 RoP 
2007-2011). Before 2000, the exact dates were not fixed (art. 115 RoP 1999). The change 
in the choice of words gives an indication of an increased self-conscience of the Chamber 
when Article 113 RoP (2007-2011) states “the law on the state spending is deposed at the 
Chamber by the government” instead of “the government is invited to deposit” (art. 115 




More extensive are the rules on the adoption of a law on the preliminary budget and its 
debate. New provisions on infrastructural projects were introduced in 2007 (art. 99-102 
RoP 2007-2011). They state that the government has to deliver a list of priorities 
concerning ongoing infrastructural projects which costs exceed the limit foreseen in 
Article 99 of the Constitution on 30 June at the latest. Subsequently, the concerned 
committees examine the list and their respective reports are discussed in a public session 
taking place every year at the latest in the second week of October. Those infrastructural 
projects, which the Chamber accords the excess of expenditure, are approved in motions. 
The changes in spending have to be included in the preliminary budget law so that 
government may induce payment or public tenders.  
 
While the minister responsible for the budget could initiate a preliminary budget law 
until the third week of September at the latest (art. 99 RoP 1999-2004), he/she was given 
an additional month as of 2007 and may now deliver such bill project until the third week 
of October at the latest (art. 103 RoP 2007-2011). The State Council and the professional 
chambers, as well as the Audit Court after its creation in 2000, should deliver their 
opinions during the six weeks that follow the deposit of the preliminary budget law until 
2007 (art. 100 RoP 1999-2004) and until November 15 thereafter (art. 104 RoP 2007-11). 
Interestingly, since the procedures for the preliminary budget have been shifted to the end 
of the year, amendments do not occur anymore.183 This suggests that government remains 
flexible to anticipate and adapt next year’s spending.  
 
                                                          
183 Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 3 October 2013. 
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The finance and budget committee (FIBU) of the Chamber examines the bill project on 
the budget. More detailed rules on the proceeding in the FIBU have been deleted in 2000 
and 2003, but the RoP still state today that the report of the FIBU has to be approved at 
the end of the third week of November the latest (art. 101 RoP 1999-2004, art. 105 RoP 
2007-11). It is furthermore explicitly mentioned that the FIBU may invite members of 
government and that other parliamentary committees may consult their corresponding 
ministries with regards to the budget. What is more, those committees may draft a report 
for the attention of the FIBU, which is subsequently published together with the FIBU 
report. Inversely, the FIBU may also ask respective parliamentary committees to deliver 
opinions on specific matters (art. 102-3 RoP 1999-2004, art. 106-7 RoP 2007-11).  
 
Every individual MP, all committees, political factions and affiliations may send 
questions on the preliminary budget bill for the attention of the FIBU, which decides 
about their admissibility and forwards them to the respective members of government. 
They have to respond within ten days after reception. Both, questions and answers are 
published in the annex of the FIBU report (art. 104 RoP 1999-2004, art. 108 RoP 2007-
11).  
 
The report is then presented in public session, on the first Tuesday which follows the 
adoption of the report in the committee and at the latest on 30 November (art. 109 RoP 
2007-11).  Before 2007, this was done on the first Tuesday of December (art. 105 RoP 
1999-2004). The next day, government presents the report in the Chamber and the debate 
starts on Tuesday of the following week. It is limited to one week in total and exclusively 
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devoted to financial and budgetary matters (art. 105-6 RoP 1999-2004, art. 109-10 RoP 
2007-2011). Time limits on governmental amendments were deleted in 2007 (art. 107 
RoP 1999-2004). Furthermore, the RoP state the distribution of time in the debate (art. 
108-10 RoP 1999-2000, art. 111 RoP 2003-11) and the date of vote on the law (at the 
latest on Thursday of the third week of December) (art. 114 RoP 1999-2004, art. 112 RoP 
2007-11). Special provisions on parliamentary amendments and motions on preliminary 
budget laws have been deleted in 2000 (art. 111-3 RoP 1999) and the general provisions 
apply since. 
 
Apart from the preliminary budget and the control of state expenses, the declaration on 
the state of the nation which is held in the first semester of each year is followed by a 
general debate during one week which touches upon the question of state spending (art. 
88-9 RoP 1999-2004, art. 93-4 RoP 2007-11). Interestingly, the actuality debate with a 
minister which ranged among those provisions (as outlined in art. 93-96 RoP 1999) has 
been deleted in 2000, but an Hour of actuality occurs since in the provisions on PQs (art. 
78-2 RoP 2000-3, art. 84 RoP 2007-11). As of 2003, the FIBU is consulted by the 
government, after it has drafted its principal budgetary orientations for the next year (art. 
96 RoP 2003, art. 97 RoP 2007-11). Before 1 Mars all ministries have to submit to the 
Chamber activity reports on the past year and budget orientations for the next year (art. 
97-8 RoP 1999-2000, art. 97 RoP 2003, art. 98 RoP 2007-11).  
 
Those changes in the formal rules of the budgetary procedure represented a strengthening 
of the financial oversight of the Chamber, not least on infrastructure projects. The shift of 
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deadlines to even closer to the end of the year aimed at improving the predictability of 
future state expenses.184 An overview of deadlines and formal steps clearly shows that 
financial oversight is mostly concentrated in the fourth quarter of the year (Figure 72).  
                                                          
184 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 2 October 2013. 
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¹ No delay applies on the vote on the law on past state expenses. In recent years, it has been held in the same week as the vote on the budget law which takes 
place in mid-September (compare with Table 24 and Table 25). 
 
grey: actions related to the discussion of financial orientations and the declaration on the state of the nation by the Prime Minister 
black: steps of the approval of state expenses 
black/white: deadlines concerning the excess of costs of infrastructure projects 
black/grey: steps of the preliminary budget procedure 
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5.2.2. Budgetary control in practice  
As foreseen by the RoP, the FIBU coordinated all budgetary reviews and established 
reports on each of the thirteen budget laws during the period of investigation. Budgetary 
laws require absolute majorities, just like ordinary laws. Every preliminary budgetary law 
since 1999 has been approved by the government majority, with all opposition parties 
voting against.185  Only back in 1992, a CSV deputy abstained in the vote. The reason for 
this abstention was an internal conflict concerning the allocation of posts (Table 24).186   
 
                                                          
185 Where not otherwise indicated, the data of this section are encoded and calculated by the author who 
retrieved all required information from parliamentary proceedings, that is the website of the Chamber at 
www.chd.lu, printed minutes of public sessions. 
186 Fernand Rau was apparently hoping to become European Commissioner, but the CSV did not grant the 
post to him. Consequently, the deputy renounced from his party in 1993 and became member of the ADR. 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fernand_Rau, last access: 14 October 2013. 
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Table 24: Voting results on laws of budgets, 1999-2011 
year 
dossier 
title + - ~ 
2011 
6350 
Loi du 16 décembre 2011 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2012 
39 21 0 
2010 
6200 
Loi du 17 décembre 2010 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2011 
39 21 0 
2009 
6100 
Loi du 18 décembre 2009 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2010 
39 21 0 
2008 
5900 
Loi du 19 décembre 2008 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2009. 
38 22 0 
2007 
5800 
Loi du 21 décembre 2007 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2008 
38 22 0 
2006 
5600 
Loi du 22 décembre 2006 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2007 
38 22 0 
2005 
5500 
Loi du 23 décembre 2005 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2006 
38 22 0 
2004 
5353 
Loi du 21 décembre 2004 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2005 
38 22 0 
2003 
5200 
Loi du 19 décembre 2003 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2004 
34 24 0 
2002 
5000 
Loi du 20 décembre 2002 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2003 
34 26 0 
2001 
4848 
Loi du 21 décembre 2001 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2002 
34 26 0 
2000 
4700 
Loi du 22 décembre 2000 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2001 
34 26 0 
1999 
4590 
Loi du 24 décembre 1999 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 2000 
34 26 0 
1998 
4450 
Loi du 21 décembre 1998 concernant le budget des recettes et des 
dépenses de l'Etat pour l'exercice 1999 
38 22 0 
 
The committee concerned with the a posteriori control of state spending is the Control 
committee for the budgetary execution (CODEXBU).187 Until 1998, the overview of 
state spending was still in the jurisdiction of the Finance and Budget committee. The 
creation of the CODEXBU in 1999 signified a will to overview state spending more 
thoroughly. Also, an Audit Court, independent from the executive, was introduced and 
replaced the former Chamber of Audit. It serves the parliament as technical expert in 
controlling government spending (Cour des Comptes, 2010, p. 3 and 5f). Both, the 
CODEXBU and the Audit Court increased the expertise of parliament in the field.  
                                                          




The CODEXBU analyses the government expenses with the help of the reports and 
communications of the Audit Court on the financial management of the state. Also, the 
Committee may ask the Audit Court to examine a certain issue and organize exchanges 
with members of government on the observations of the Audit Court. Unusual for a 
permanent committee, it is chaired by a member of the opposition (compare with 
section 3.2.2. on the practice of committee chair allocation in the Chamber). Exceptional 
too is that a majority of the reports the CODEXBU produced during Legislatures 1 to 3 
were under the auspices of an opposition rapporteur (13 out of 22 reports). This exception 
is even more pronounced since the committee split from the parliaments’ Accounts 
committee and obtained the status of a permanent committee (not a regulatory permanent 
committee) in 2004.188 This conduct of committee chair allocation was chosen in order to 
give the financial oversight of government more credibility.189 
 
The CODEXBU works mainly with the Finance minister as it checks the state budget.  It 
is also responsible for public construction projects and the railways which underlie the 
Ministry for public works until 2004 and the Ministry for sustainable development since, 
all held by CSV ministers. Formerly an area of vast intransparency and inaccuracy, 
parliamentary control in this area became systematic and public spending traceable and 
comprehensible. If public building project cost 105% of the sum initially indicated, 
government had to bring in a new bill. All construction projects are examined by the 
                                                          
188 It was a joint regulatory committee with the Chamber’s Accounts committee from 2004/5 to 2005/6 but 
split again in 2007/8. The Accounts committee remained a regulatory committee and the CODEXBU 
became a permanent committee. 
189 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 June 2013. 
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CODEXBU as from their beginning. Formerly it often took 10 years until the Chamber 
received the final bill of a construction, too late to reproduce and control as the political 
decision-makers were not in place anymore. In this and all other areas, the CODEXBU is 
supplied by the Audit Court and may consult with all other ministers.190  
 
Not only in the infrastructural projects, but also for the rest of the budget, parliamentary 
oversight was formerly not immediate. Laws approving state expenses did not always 
pass in the immediate year following a budget but often enough a couple of years later. 
The delay between budgetary execution and a posteriori control decreased since the 
beginning of the 1990s. In recent years, budgetary control was concluded the year after 
spending. This trend points to the reform in the budgetary procedure and the adaptation of 
control mechanisms, that is the installation of the CODEXBU and the Audit Court. 
Already the date of deposit of a budgetary control law by government has shifted as of 
the 2001 expenses, from 2 years after the spending to 1 year since. This is a direct effect 
of the reform of Article 115 RoP in 2000, where government is obliged to introduce the 
draft law of state expenses until 31 May so that the Audit Court could deliver its opinion 
until 30 September (compare with section 5.2.1, page 266ff on the formal rules of the 
budgetary procedure).  
 
Hence, the voting patterns of laws controlling budgetary expenses reflect a more 
complex picture than the votes on the preliminary budget. The reason for this is the 
delayed moment of adoption. When money was spent under a former government, the 
law approving those spending would be voted for this former coalition parties. For 
                                                          
190 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 June 2013. 
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instance, the expenses of 2002 were only approved in 2005. While a CSV/DP 
(Juncker/Polfer) government of 1999-2004 spent the money, parliament had to approve it 
under a CSV/LSAP (Legislature 2) majority. The exercise was easily feasible, as the 
former coalition partners CSV and DP still maintained a majority of seats in the 
Chamber. The Greens also voted in favour of the law, LSAP and ADR abstained. 
Similarly, the law of 2002 approving 1997s expenses put the CSV/DP (Juncker/Polfer) 
governing majority of 1999-2004 in the situation to vote on the CSV/LSAP 
(Juncker/Poos II) 1995-9 government’s spending. Other budgetary control laws passed 
years after the spending under the same coalition government – CSV-LSAP. Such is the 




Table 25: Votes, timing of adoption and majorities on budgetary control laws, 1999-2011 
year 







Loi du 21 décembre 2012 portant règlement du compte général de 
l’exercice 2011 45 14 0 1  
2010 
6293 
Loi du 16 décembre 2011 portant règlement du compte général de 
l'exercice 2010 59 1 0 1  
2009 
6153 
Loi du 16 décembre 2010 portant règlement du compte général de 
l'exercice 2009 55 0 1 1  
2008 
6058 
Loi du 18 décembre 2009 portant règlement du compte général de 
l'exercice 2008 39 0 21 1  
2007 
5891 
Loi du 18 décembre 2009 portant règlement du compte général de 
l'exercice 2007 39 0 21 2  
2006 
5740 
Loi du 18 décembre 2009 portant règlement du compte général de 
l'exercice 2006 39 0 21 3  
2005 
5591 
Loi du 18 décembre 2009 portant règlement du compte général de 
l'exercice 2005 39 0 21 4  
2004 
5488 
Loi du 18 décembre 2006 portant règlement du compte général de 
l'exercice 2004 53 0 4 2  
2003 
5350 
Loi du 23 décembre 2005 portant règlement du compte général de 
l'exercice 2003 42 0 18 2 x 
2002 
5171 
Loi du 25 avril 2005 portant règlement du compte général de 
l'exercice 2002 41 0 19 3 x 
2001 
4965 
Loi du 21 décembre 2004 portant règlement du compte général de 
l'exercice 2001 41 0 19 3 x 
2000 
4938 
Loi du 21 décembre 2004 portant règlement du compte général de 
l'exercice 2000 34 0 25 4 x 
1999 
4857 
Loi du 16 avril 2003 portant règlement des comptes généraux de 
l'exercice 1999 45 0 12 4 x 
¹ Delay between state spending and parliamentary approval of spending in years 
² x = Governing coalition responsible for spending differs from governing coalition approving the spending 
 
5.2.3. Budgetary control and the EU 
Developments at supranational level have motivated structural adaptation at domestic 
level and in the area of budgetary control. The best example is the creation of an Audit 
Court.  As of 2000, the Chamber could rely on the expertise of this newly created 
institution, which hence replaced the Chamber of Auditors. This institutional renewal 
came into being to comply with the demands at European level and the Council of 
Europe’s recommendations more particularly. Most “European higher institutions of 
control” (Cour des Comptes, 2010, p. 3)  had undergone profound changes regarding 
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their functioning and attributions. A modern and independent Audit Court was thus seen 
to be necessary. 
 
In procedural terms, the Luxembourgish state budget has witnessed influence from EU 
level. It respects the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA95) which 
guarantees the comparability of budgetary figures in order to evaluate convergence in the 
EU (Carneiro, 2012, p. 31f). The Maastricht Treaty (art. 104 TEC), which has introduced 
limits on national budget deficits with an excessive deficit procedure, necessitated a 
standardisation of formerly difficult to compare state budgets. The ESA95 entered into 
force in February 2000 and is legally binding (European Communities, 2002, p. 3). Part 
of the standardisation is the annual budget procedure, however, the Chamber already 
followed a yearly budgetary rhythm at that time (art. 100 and 104 C, compare with 
section 5.2.1.). Parliament decides on a yearly basis on the budget and checks if the 
government has accurately spent it.  
 
EU membership has direct and indirect financial consequences. In the budgetary law, 
such expenses may be found by the codes 35.030 and 35.041, which signify contributions 
to international cooperation. However, expenses related to European integration are not 
clearly attributed.191 Alternatively, the European Commission publishes figures on 
member states’ contributions and the EU’s paybacks. Direct payments concern 
membership fees for instance. Every country contributes 1% of its GDP to the EU 
budget. In 2011, Luxembourg paid 293 million euro, around 100 million euro more than 
                                                          
191 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 
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in 2000.192 But it also gains from the EU. In 2011, Luxembourg retrieved 1,548 million 
euro from the EU.193  
 
The amount the EU dispenses in Luxembourg increased by around 663 million euro since 
2000. On average, it spends around 1,204 million euro per year. Almost 87% of this EU 
spending concern administrative costs in Luxembourg. Only the remaining 13% of 
spending, that is around 160 million euro per year, are related to specific policies, for 
instance sustainable growth, cohesion policy, agriculture and rural development. 
Excluding EU spending regarding the seat of the EU institutions (the administrative 
expenses of the EU), Luxembourg is a net-payer to the EU budget. Thus, taken the EU 
spending on policies in Luxembourg, and deducting the country’s payment to the EU, 
Luxembourg pays more than it gets out. Taking into account payments from and to the 
EU, Luxembourg pays per head a net amount of 147 euro per year into the EU budget. It 
contributes the second highest amount per head, just after Denmark (European 
Commission, 2011). The operating budgetary balance of Luxembourg in the EU is thus 
negative and always was so since 2011 (Figure 73). 
 
                                                          
192 The figures are retrieved from the website of the European Commission, under “revenues”: 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm, last access: 23.11.2012.  
193 The figures are retrieved from the website of the European Commission, under “expenditures”: 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm, last access: 23.11.2012.  
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Figure 73: EU expenditure in and revenue from Luxembourg, million euro, 2000-11 
 
 
Data source: European Commission 
 
Indirect payments are related to the consequences of EU membership. Those include for 
instance costs for delegation journeys and the participation in (military) missions, the 
organisation of conferences, translation, etc. Luxembourg has for instance volunteered to 
send troops for several EU humanitarian aid and peace missions.194 Those indirect costs 
are difficult to quantify and require a more in-depth analysis than it is possible within the 
framework of this thesis. 
 
                                                          
194 Compare with the website of the Luxembourgish army: http://www.armee.lu/mission_OMP/, last 
access: 30 December 2013 
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5.2.4. Summary and conclusion: Budgetary control 
Budgetary control in Luxembourg is formally based on constitutional and legal 
provisions. The Chamber is determined to have the final say with regards all public 
spending. Within parliament, the general principles of budgetary control (based on three 
grand debates on the state of the nation, during the examination of the law on state 
expenses and on the law to the preliminary budget) have been maintained during the 
period of investigation. The Luxembourgish state spending, including its overview, 
follows today an annual rhythm. Up to 2007, state expenses have been approved by the 
Chamber between two to four years after they have been executed. It thus happened that a 
new legislature was in place and asked to confirm past government’s spending. The 
increased pace of budgetary control is a real improvement for budgetary oversight.  
 
More particularly, budgetary overview in the Chamber has been reinforced with respect 
to two issues: Expertise has increased and infrastructure projects are more closely 
followed up by parliament. Firstly, parliament’s expertise in budgetary matters has 
increased because a separate Committee on budgetary control (CODEXBU) came to 
existence in 1999. Its tasks of an a posteriori control of state expenses were formerly 
conducted by the Finance and Budget committee (FIBU). Such separation of functions 
increases budgetary oversight because more MPs devote more time on the subject matter. 
Furthermore, the CODEXBU is chaired by an opposition MP and a majority of its reports 
were carried out in opposition responsibility too. Thus, parliament-internal expertise has 
increased. However, also parliament-external expertise in budget matters has improved. 
Since 2000, parliament may draw on the know-how of an Audit Court. Most 
283 
 
interestingly, its creation was justified with the need to better live up to Europe-wide 
standards of oversight.  
 
Secondly, since 2008, particular provisions on infrastructure projects were included in 
the Rules of Procedures of the Chamber (RoP). Hence, the responsible minister has to 
inform the Chamber, in case public works take more resources than expected. It is 
important to acknowledge that the new rules had real consequences on the transparency 
and accountability of construction projects, which are often related to high public 
spending. 
 
As already mentioned, the supranational provisions had an influence on the creation of 
the Audit Court. European standards also exist with regard to budgetary procedures (the 
legally binding ESA95) and budget deficits (since the Maastricht Treaty). Budgetary 
standards and procedures are thus Europeanised and this has strengthened financial 
overview of public expenses.  
 
Apart from those formal influences on structures and procedures at domestic level, the 
EU certainly impacts financially on the member states’ budgets. While Luxembourg is a 
net-payer to the EU and thus contributes more money than it retrieves in terms of 
subsidies, it strongly benefits from the EU’s spending on its seat in Luxembourg. The 
European Commission is more transparent regarding who pays what in the EU than the 
Luxembourgish budget. Adding the complexity of the budget, we may conclude that it is 
rather difficult to overview government’s spending in EU matters.  
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5.3. Rare and severe forms of parliamentary control instruments 
To conclude this chapter on specific parliamentary control, two parliamentary control 
instruments remain to be discussed: Besides parliamentary questions (PQs) and budgetary 
control, motions (of censure) and enquiry committees are still other means for MPs to 
hold government accountable. Those control instruments are used more rarely and their 
consequences may be severe as they could afford government to resign. We outline the 
formal rules guiding each of those instruments in the following sections and outline the 
changes they have undergone during the period of investigation, that is between 1999 and 
2011. For each of them, their actual use is examined, not least with regard to EU affairs.  
 
5.3.1. Motions of censure and other motions 
The most severe instrument at hands of MPs is a motion of censure which brings 
government or one of its members to fall. However, no such instrument is foreseen by the 
Constitution. The annual budget may however be considered as an annual vote of 
confidence (Dumont and Varone, 2006, p. 13f). Ordinary motions may fulfil the function 
of a motion of censure, similar to negative responses to calls for votes of confidence by 
government (Reimen and Krecké, 1999, p. 80ff). Since 1945, four government crises are 
known (for a detailed description of those dramatic incidences see Reimen and Krecké 
1999, p. 82ff). None of them was however related to European integration matters. 





Similarly, parliament has no formal right to confirm a new government. It is the Grand 
Duke who installs and organises government (art. 76-77 C). However, in practice, a 
“support motion” (“motion de soutien”) has established since 1974 (Reimen and Krecké, 
1999, p. 49). When the Grand Duke convokes the Chamber for its first (extraordinary) 
session after an election (art. 72 C), the Prime Minister informs the Chamber about the 
government programme. The subsequent debate closes with a formal vote on a motion 
which declares the approval of the Chamber, its confidence in the newly formed 
government and this announces the start of works. 
 
While no trace may be found on motions of censure or to confirm government in the RoP, 
only few formal provisions exist concerning the introduction of ordinary motions too. 
They are yet another minority instrument and may be initiated by an individual MP. If 
four further MPs support the motion it is considered in the Chamber. They may take up 
general and specific issues in public session or regard a particular bill proposal and help 
factions to gain additional speaking time (art. 79 RoP 1999-2004, art. 85 RoP 2007-11). 
Again, just like for PQs, it is the Speaker of the Chamber who decides about their 
admissibility and in case he/she has doubts consults the Conference of Presidents.  
 
Subsequently, they are sent for the attention of government, a committee or put on the 
agenda of a public session (art. 80 RoP 1999-2004, art. 86 RoP 2007-11). In case more 
than one motion is introduced on the same topic, the Chamber (until 2000 the Speaker if 
the Chamber as a whole failed to do so) decides preliminary which version to take into 
account. The alternative motions become void (art. 81 RoP 1999-2004, art. 87 RoP 2007-
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11). Thus those provisions did not change profoundly over the years and during the 
period under investigation.  
 
While such ordinary motions are popular instruments introduced in public session, they 
find only seldom the support of a majority in the Chamber. Only up to eight motions were 
adopted in the parliamentary years between 1999/2000 and 2011/2 (Figure 74). None of 
them was concerned with EU matters. Apart from such stand-alone motions, the practice 
of the Chamber knows another type of motions related to a specific draft law. This 
division between the two types of motions does not exist in the formal rules. Motions on 
draft laws outnumber stand-alone motions three to four times. Again, only a very minor 
share of them is adopted. However, their introduction is a sign for conflict and not 
surprisingly they are more often introduced in laws that were amended (Phi195=0.178) 
and laws that provoke opposition in the final vote (Phi=0.281). No difference exists 
between laws transposing a directive and other laws when it comes to the introduction of 
motions (Phi=0.022). 
 
                                                          
195 Phi stands for the Contingency coefficient which measures the association between two binary variables. 
It may take over maximum values from -1 to +1 and signify perfect correlations.  
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Figure 74: Adopted motions, absolute numbers, 1999/2000-2011/2 
 
Data source: Parliamentary proceedings 
 
5.3.2. Enquiry committees 
The installation of an enquiry committee is another rather exceptional parliamentary 
control tool in Luxembourg which is used only in the most extreme cases. Between 1881 
and 2002, 16 committees of this type were created. In the period between 1999 and 2011 
one enquiry committee was established.196 The right to enquire is guaranteed by Article 
64 of the Constitution. Inspired by the Belgian model, its details were settled in the law of 
18 April 1911, and the same provisions make part of the Chamber’s Rules of Procedures 
(RoP 1999-2010) (Bicheler et al., 2006, p. 241). Chapter 14 of the RoP outlines all 
provisions regarding enquiry committees. Their competencies (as well as of the Chamber 
as a whole) are specified as inquisitor rights (art. 179 RoP 2007-10, art. 168 RoP 1999-
2004).  
 
                                                          
196 N° 5170 Rapport de la commission d’enquête “transports routiers internationaux”, 11 July 2003, p. 12. 
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The meetings of enquiry committees are public, unless otherwise is decided (art. 180 RoP 
2007-10, art. 169 RoP 1999-2004). The Chamber pays all necessary expenses for the 
enquiry from its budget (art. 189 RoP 2007-10, art. 178 RoP 1999-2004). An enquiry 
committee ends in case the Chamber is dissolved and in the end of a parliamentary year, 
unless the Chamber decides otherwise (art. 190 RoP 2007-10, art. 179 RoP 1999-2004). 
 
The committee (or the Chamber as a whole) holds the same powers as a judge in criminal 
matters and those powers may not be delegated if not to an advisor of the High Court. A 
special law has to allow for house searches, the confiscation of documents and 
correspondences (art. 181 RoP 2007-10, art. 170 RoP 1999-2004). The convocations to 
the hearings of the committee have to be delivered at least two days in advance of a 
hearing, unless urgency is upon (art. 182 RoP 2007-10, art. 171 RoP 1999-2004).  All 
witnesses, observers and experts to those hearings underlie the same obligations as in 
front of an inquisitor and in case of refusal or disregard to comply and cooperate, they 
underlie the same penalty (art. 185 RoP 2007-10, art. 174 RoP 1999-2004) and sanctions 
regarding false testimony (art. 186 RoP 2007-10, art. 175 RoP 1999-2004). All minutes 
stating legal infractions are transferred to the advocate general and punished according to 
civil law (art. 187-8 RoP 2007-10, art. 176-7 RoP 1999-2004).  
 
The separation of legislative and judiciary powers was always of major concern in the 
discussions on the installation of enquiry committees. This argument of blurring state 
powers was often used by decision-makers not to install such. A good example of the 
reluctance is the “Kralowetz affair”. A Special committee on international road 
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transport was founded on 26 February 2002 and chaired by the Lucien Weiler (CSV, 
chair), Jean-Paul Rippinger (DP, vice-chair) and François Bausch (déi gréng, vice-chair). 
The “counter” resolution of Robert Mehlen (ADR) for the introduction of an enquiry 
committee was at that time rejected by a large majority of 50 against 7 with one 
abstention.  
 
The aim of this special committee was to examine the rules and practices of the 
attribution system of transport licenses and the criteria for authorizations since the 1980s. 
Its rapporteur Gusty Graas (DP) was supposed to deliver a report to the Chamber “at the 
earliest possible date”.197 The special committee was considered necessary after the 
“Kralowetz affair” came to light. The Kralowetz enterprise had among others a seat in 
Luxembourg. Its owner was condemned to prison because he did not respect legal 
provisions on European social and working standards for his mostly Eastern European 
lorry drivers.198 Instead of an hourly remuneration, his drivers were paid by driven 
kilometre. Thus, as mentioned in chapter three on the establishment of committees, EU 
matters had an impact on the committee system of the Chamber. 
 
The special committee met ten times from the end of February to the beginning of June 
2002. Before the creation of the special committee, the Committee of economy, energy, 
                                                          
197 N° 5170 Rapport de la commission d’enquête “transports routiers internationaux”, July 11 2003, p. 10. 
198 The applicable rules are stated in Loi du 30 juillet 2002 concernant l’établissement de transporteur de 
voyageurs et de transporteur de marchandises par route et portant transposition de la directive 98/76/CE du 
Conseil du 1er octobre 1998 which transposes Council directive 96/26/CE of 29 April 29 1996 on admission 
to the occupation of road haulage operator and road passenger transport operator and mutual recognition of 
diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications intended to facilitate for these operators 
the right to freedom of establishment in national and international transport operations http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1996L0026:20070101:EN:PDF, last access : 30 
December 2013.  
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postal services and transport devoted four meetings in February 2002 to the matter at 
stake and after the Greens had invoked urgency.  While the European Council guaranteed 
the distribution of transport licenses out of the international contingent199 and according 
to domestic criteria, the special committee concluded that there were actually no national 
criteria at place. One single high functionary of the Luxembourgish administration was in 
the position to decide if such authorisation was granted or not. But no concrete criteria 
were discovered by the special committee, and it concluded that there were signs of 
malfunction in the Transport Ministry. 
 
The special committee also realised that its competences did not suffice to review certain 
documents from the Transport Ministry, not least, because justice authorities started to 
investigate the former high functionary of the administration. The respective functionary 
and other witnesses refused to give testimony in the special committee. This is why the 
committee members all signed the resolution of 16 May 2002, to finally establish the 
enquiry committee. The special committee was dissolved on 4 June 2002, when a 
resolution on its initiative was adopted.  
 
All working material was transferred to the enquiry committee on international road 
transport. It held 23 meetings presided by Lucien Weiler (CSV, chair), Jean-Paul 
Rippinger (DP, vice-chair) and François Bausch (déi gréng, vice-chair). Gusty Graas 
(DP) again was designated rapporteur. The objective of the committee was to analyse the 
                                                          
199 "Conférence Européenne des Ministres des Transports" (CEMT) today’s International Transport Forum 
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/, last access: 21 September 2013.  
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practices in connection to the irregularities the special committee found in the area of 
international road transport.  
 
The report was discussed in plenary on 15 July 2003. The conclusions of the enquiry 
were that no clear guidelines existed for the administration to attribute licenses. Thus, the 
head of the department exerted a large power of discretion. The abuse of this power was 
sanctioned in a court judgment of 10 March 2003. Judiciary found the head of the 
transport department guilty of “passive corruption” as he had accepted money from 
enterprises which asked for authorization of their road transports.200  
 
Not for the first time, the Chamber had to draw the conclusion that high administrators 
were difficult to control by the political responsible. Already the special committee on 
health of 1998 came to the same result. A minister defines administrative procedures and 
an intervention in individual administrative cases may risk raising suspicion of 
favouritism. But under the given situation, the responsible minister could have 
established instructions in form of a ministerial decree for instance.201 Those conclusions 
were followed by two motions brought in by the Greens, aiming at preventing future 
cases of corruption of high functionaries. Both of those motions could not gain a 
sufficient number of supporters and were rejected. 
 
As a consequence of the enquiry committee on international road transport, a law 
proposal was initiated by Alex Bodry (LSAP) in 2004. A revision of the provisions on 
                                                          




enquiry committees in the RoP of the Chamber (based on the law of 1911) was 
considered necessary and, not least, because the Belgian model law was already reformed 
in 1996.202 Although the initial law proposal suggested the initiation of such enquiry 
committee by a one-third minority, the final law did not allow such minority right. A 
resolution installing an enquiry committee still needs to be supported by a majority of 
MPs.  
 
Most importantly however, the changes in the RoP tackled the question of interference 
between judiciary and legislative powers, a reform judged necessary by constitutional 
experts at several occasions (Bicheler et al., 2006, p. 242). The enquiry committee may 
thus not investigate criminal prosecutions, most importantly, if such proceedings are still 
on-going. An enquiry committee comes to an end if criminal prosecutions are opened on 
the same matter. In case an enquiry committee only touches upon aspects of criminal 
prosecutions, the responsible district attorney informs the committee. The committee may 
continue its work on aspects which are not directly related to the judicial investigations. 
The judiciary should cooperate and provide useful documents to the enquiry (art. 181 
RoP 2011). In return, the minutes of committee meetings which may be of interest to the 
judiciary should be delivered to the district attorney (art. 189 RoP 2011). 
 
Still, enquiry committees probably stay a “sword of Damokles”203 rather than making 
common appearance. The main problem is that MPs are neither trained nor experienced 
in taking over judiciary functions. In the Luxembourgish case, their work led to take up 
                                                          
202 N° 5170 Rapport de la commission d’enquête “transports routiers internationaux”, 11 July 2003, p. 27. 
203 Member of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
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criminal proceedings and only in very rare cases the result of their work was judged 
satisfactory, as an interviewee suggests.204  
  
5.3.3. Summary and conclusion: Rare and severe forms of parliamentary control 
instruments     
This section was concerned with rare and severe forms of parliamentary control. More 
particularly, the focus in this section was upon motions and enquiry committees. In the 
first part, different forms of motions were examined. It revealed that motions of censure 
have never been applied in Luxembourg. What is more, the respective law which should 
give details on the procedure is not in place and transitory provisions apply. More legal 
rules exist concerning other motions. Those divide in motions linked to a parliamentary 
dossier (motions on draft laws) and stand-alone motions. The latter do not exceed eight 
by parliamentary year during the period of investigation. None of those took up EU 
matters. Motions linked to a dossier on the other hand are somewhat more often 
introduced which points to an increased level of conflict. Such motions also concern laws 
transposing a directive but not more so than other laws.  
 
The second part of this section investigated rules and practice concerning Enquiry 
committees. Those are one means to more closely investigate accusations on government 
and, what is more, check whether government follows its duty to monitor administration 
in a sufficient way. The Luxembourgish MPs are rather reluctant to install such enquiry 
committees, not least, because they are supposed to blur the separation of the judiciary 
                                                          
204 Member of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013. 
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and legislative state powers. Special committees, which have shown to be cradles for 
permanent committees in section 3.1.2., may represent a first step towards enquiry 
committees too.  
 
The corruption of the administration and the failure of government to prevent such were 
in the focus of the one enquiry committee established in the period under investigation. 
The enquiry committee on international road transport examined the “Kralowetz affair” 
which was at the heart of a domestic affair. However, it touched upon European matters, 
because of infractions of European social and work provisions.  The committee 
concluded that the transport minister did neither give enough instructions to the 
functionary nor was able to control the service in a sufficient manner. The respective 
service was subsequently abolished and its responsibilities were taken up by the customs 
services.205 
 
It is interesting in the framework of this thesis that the “Kralowetz affair” provoked a 
reform of the formal rules on enquiry committees, not least, to meet fears of blurring 
legislative and judicial competences. Based on a law of 1911, a law proposition was 
introduced in 2004 which led to the adoption of a change in the RoP of the Chamber in 
the same year.  It aimed at clarifying the separation of judicial and legislative powers, 
their cooperation and the possibilities and duties of enquiry committees.  
 
 
                                                          
205 N° 5170 Rapport de la commission d’enquête “transports routiers internationaux”, 11 July 2003, p. 25. 
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5.4. Summary and conclusions: Specific control instruments 
This chapter was devoted to the investigation of specific parliamentary control 
instruments as second pillar of parliamentary control of government and their use during 
the period of investigation, that is between 1999 and 2011. The objective was to add a 
second dimension of control to the one outlined in chapter four on legislative scrutiny and 
to investigate the use of parliamentary questions (PQs), budgetary control, enquiry 
committees and motions for EU scrutiny. This chapter makes an important contribution to 
enlarge our view on the parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs through parliamentary 
control instruments, which remain mostly neglected in the mainstream literature.  
 
To get straight to the point: The Chamber provides a variety of control instruments for 
MPs to profile themselves in areas of their choice, although the political parties certainly 
filter those activities. The respective instruments are used for subjects related to European 
matters too, but are not used to systematically overview government in this area. The 
great potential of control instruments is thus not strategically used for EU scrutiny. 
However, a general trend to a better oversight of government is especially visible in this 
chapter and has partly been provoked by European standards, most notably in the area of 
budgetary control. 
 
The chapter has started with an evaluation of parliamentary questioning tools. Those 
are a very popular form of control instruments. Their use has much increased over time 
and they remain at high levels during the period under investigation, not least because of 
a better staffing of parliament and factions. Five different forms of parliamentary 
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questions (PQs) exist in the Chamber, one of them are written questions and four types of 
oral PQs (Urgent questions, Questioning hours, Hours of actuality, and Extended 
questions), apart from interpellations. The formal rules on PQs and interpellations 
remained largely the same over the years, except for the introduction of Hours of 
actuality in 2000. Questioning hours were given more flexibility in terms of their content 
in the same year. At the same time, the urgency of PQs became a decision of the Speaker 
of the House, instead of the respective minister.  
 
Most of the PQs introduced are written questions and those cover all sorts of subject 
matters and most prominently local issues. Three measures of EU relatedness were 
introduced in the analysis allowing for different breadth and depth of the investigation. 
The most in-depth measure reveals that around 11% of written questions in 2011 relate to 
EU matters, while the most superficial measure gives occasion to explore trends over 
time. Hence, it shows that especially in 2005/6, PQs on European issues were most 
prominent. At that time, the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Luxembourgish Council presidency showed effect also in the PQs. The EU link of PQs 
subsequently dropped again and European integration remains a topic among many others 
for MPs. Although the available tools would allow for it, PQs are not particularly used to 
outbalance information asymmetry in European matters. 
 
The second part of this chapter was concerned with the investigation of budgetary 
control which is based on constitutional and legal provisions in Luxembourg. The 
Chamber is the most important instance when it comes to public spending and it 
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improved its capacity as well as its practice during the period of investigation. The main 
principles of budgetary control remained in place, based on three annual debates. The 
pace of control has however increased and today public spending is approved by the 
Chamber the year following their execution. This is due to the reinforcement of 
parliament-internal and -external expertise in budgetary matters. The establishment of a 
Committee on budgetary control (CODEXBU) in 1999 and the introduction of an Audit 
Court in 2000 were at the source of this expertise building. The latter has been 
established to better comply with European standards. Supranational standards may thus 
improve the scrutiny of domestic issues. This increase in expertise together with the 
important 2007 reform of the Rules of Procedures of the Chamber (RoP) which afforded 
a better follow-up of infrastructural spending has made the budgetary procedure a major 
locus of parliamentary control of government.  
 
The EU has not only had an impact in structural terms, but also with regard to budgetary 
procedures, including the introduction of legally binding standards (the ESA95) and 
limits for budget deficits introduced with the Maastricht Treaty. Altogether, these 
structural and procedural EU influences have contributed to the better overview of 
government spending. At the same time, the control of EU matters via the overview of 
spending remains difficult. Direct and indirect expenses for European integration are not 
very well visible in the budget. Such expenses relate to membership fees (direct) and 
delegation journeys (indirect) for instance. Those are not summed up under a specific 
heading, but divided over several budgetary posts. At the same time, Luxembourg 
benefits financially from the spending of the EU on its institutions located in the country, 
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that is the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Parliament (EP), the European 
Commission and some Council of the EU meetings.   
 
Finally, in the third section of this chapter five, two more instruments of parliamentary 
control have been investigated: Motions and enquiry committees. Both are rather rare in 
their application but may have severe consequences for government. Firstly, the two 
different forms of motions (motions on bills and stand-alone motions) showed to be 
adopted only occasionally. Motions related to specific draft laws are more commonly 
introduced, but again do not often find a sufficient support in the Chamber. They may 
concern laws transposing a directive but not more so than laws of other origin. Stand-
alone motions never touched upon EU matters. 
 
Secondly, enquiry committees are similarly rare in the Luxembourgish political 
landscape. During the period under investigation, one such committee was established in 
2002. At the core, it dealt with the control of administrative staff by the respective 
minister. In the broader sense, the enquiry committee was related to the failure to comply 
with a European directive on social and work standards. The enquiry committee provoked 
a reform of the legal provisions guiding such committees. Whereas the Luxembourgish 
MPs were formerly reluctant to install enquiry committees because of the danger to blur 
the separation of judicial and legislative powers, this should be ruled out today. The law 
took seven years to come into existence, however, since 2011 the duties and rights of 
enquiry committees vis-à-vis judicial instances have been specified. Hence, it seems that 
nothing should stand in the way of a more frequent use of enquiry committees anymore.  
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Chapter 6. EU scrutiny 
This chapter is concerned with EU scrutiny in the narrow sense. It adds a third dimension 
of parliamentary control to legislative scrutiny, examined in chapter four and specific 
parliamentary control instruments in chapter five. While those two other control 
dimensions may be used for all different policy areas, NPs have given themselves special 
instruments for the overview of EU matters. EU scrutiny more particularly concerns EU 
decision-making. It is exerted a priori, that is before a respective EU legislative act is 
adopted and may be combined with an a posteriori control measure. Hence, NPs target 
the executive at EU and domestic level. On the one hand, government may be controlled 
for its behaviour during negotiations at EU level. Thus, government is asked to inform 
parliament and eventually receives guidelines on the positions it should take up during 
EU negotiations (so called “mandates”). On the other hand, parliaments review the 
European institutions’ policy proposals. In this case EU scrutiny consists in subsidiarity 




Figure 75: The model of enquiry - EU scrutiny 
 
 
Within the following pages, we analyse whether and how EU scrutiny in the Chamber has 
changed between 1999 and 2011. The aim is to complete the picture of parliamentary 
control of government in EU matters. In the first section, the evolution of the formal rules 
of EU scrutiny is discussed. This includes an outline of the procedures introduced to 
comply with the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM). It demonstrates the reactivity of the 
Chamber when it comes to EU matters.  In the second section, we examine the use of 
those possibilities given by the Rules of Procedures of the Chamber (RoP). The Chamber 
faces different challenges in order to meet the requirements of a thorough parliamentary 
control in EU matters. The third section more particularly focuses on subsidiarity and 
proportionality control and the input-side of the procedure. It shows how the 
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parliamentary committees more particularly deal with the burden of inflowing EU 
documents.  
 
6.1. Formal rules on EU scrutiny 
In Luxembourg, the parliamentary control of EU affairs is based upon the Rules of 
Procedures of the Chamber (RoP). The Constitution is silent when it comes to EU 
scrutiny in the narrow sense. Every change in the RoP is autonomously decided by the 
Chamber, that is no external institutions, such as the State Council or the government, are 
consulted. Between 1999 and 2011, the RoP were revised nine times. European matters 
were concerned in 2003, 2009 and 2010. As a consequence, the coverage of European 
matters in the RoP jumped from less than 1% to over 7% in 2010. In absolute terms, this 
means an increase from 40 words in 1999 to more than 1500 words on European matters 




Figure 76: Relative and absolute number of words related to EU scrutiny in the RoP, 1999-2011 
 
 
The formalisation of European matters started in 2003, when a Chapter 10 on European 
affairs entered the RoP. Before, procedures were kept informal and we may speak of 
major reforms institutionalising European matters in the Luxembourgish parliament in 
the run-up to the Lisbon Treaty and beyond. In 2009, the Chamber was able to formalise 
an agreement with government on European affairs.206 Those provisions were extended in 
2010 to enshrine rules on subsidiarity control, which were enabled by the Lisbon Treaty 
(art. 168 (2, 4-7) RoP 2010-2).  
 
In how far EU scrutiny in the Chamber targets government and the European institutions 
is outlined in the following two sections. We conclude with a short evaluation of the EU 
scrutiny model employed by the Chamber. 
 
                                                          
206 Annex 2 RoP «Aide-Mémoire sur la coopération entre la Chambre des Députés et le Gouvernement du 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg en matière de politique européenne». 
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6.1.1. Formal rules on the EU scrutiny of government 
As already mentioned, government may be the target of parliamentary EU scrutiny, apart 
from the European institutions. All related formal rules may be found in Annex 2, that is 
the agreement between parliament and government.207 In the first place, the Chamber as a 
principal tries to assure sufficient reporting of its principal the government. It introduced 
an information obligation of government which is asked to keep the Chamber updated 
about developments at European level (art. I.2 Annex 2 RoP 2009-12). More particularly, 
the Chamber obliges government in its RoP to early inform about EU matters of special 
importance to the country so that the Chamber would be able to develop and formulate its 
position on the matter at stake (art. I.3 Annex 2 RoP 2009-12).  
 
The government, disposing over a principal’s expertise, may be demanded to assist the 
Chamber in the establishment of an evaluation of a European dossier with regard to the 
compliance in subsidiarity and proportionality matters. The committees may thus ask 
government to explain issues they judge particularly important. Members of government 
assure an adequate presence in committees (art. I.4 Annex 2 RoP 2009-12).  
 
The Chamber or one of its committees may demand government members taking part in 
Council of the EU meetings to outline their position regarding specific policies and 
documents. After those meetings, the government reports back to the committee on its 
demand (art. I.5 Annex 2 RoP 2009-2012). Furthermore, the government is obliged to 
forward documents mentioned on the agenda of Council of the EU meetings to the 
Chamber, if they were not sent by the European institutions directly. This is to be done as 




early and directly as possible and for the attention of the international relations 
department of the Chamber (art. I.6 Annex 2 RoP 2009-12). The provisions go even so 
far to ask government to facilitate and encourage contacts between European institutions 
and committees of the Chamber (art. I.7 Annex 2 RoP 2009-12).  
 
Similarly, the Chamber requests to be informed about all developments with regard to 
enlargement and EU Treaty revisions. Government has to report, in case an 
intergovernmental conference aiming at EU Treaty revisions or enlargement is convoked. 
It keeps up its reporting during those negotiations (art. V.1 Annex 2 RoP 2009-12).  
 
In a second part of this Annex 2 to the RoP, the position taking of the Chamber is 
briefly laid out. Government engages to consult the Chamber early enough for it to 
establish its position (art. II.2 Annex 2 RoP 2009-12). Inversely, the Chamber informs 
government in early manner about its eventual conclusions and position (art. II.2 Annex 2 
RoP 2009-12).  
 
Part three of Annex 2 RoP is devoted to the cooperation of parliament and government in 
subsidiarity and proportionality matters. The Chamber informs government of its 
activities on this matter (art. III.2 Annex 2 RoP 2009-12). At request, the government 
assists the Chamber in the establishment of its position (art. III.3 Annex 2 RoP 2009-12). 
 
While the annual debate on foreign policy which was foreseen in Chapter 6 of the RoP 
(art. 86 RoP 1999-2000) was deleted in 2003, part IV of the Annex 2 RoP re-introduces 
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reporting on European matters in 2009. Annually, the government thus presents one 
report on the transposition of European directives and the application of Community law 
(in the first half of the year) and a second report on European politics (in the second half 
of the year) (art. IV.1-2 Annex 2 RoP 2009-12).  The Chamber decides about the exact 
timing of those reports (art. IV.3 Annex 2 RoP 2009-12). It obliges itself to respect 
confidential matters which may be communicated by government (art. VI.1 Annex 2 RoP 
2009-12). 
 
Before Annex 2 entered the RoP in 2009, parliament made a rather fruitless attempt to 
oblige government to send EU documents. In 2003, at the introduction of Chapter 10 
on European affairs, government should forward all EU documents to the Chamber (art. 
156(1) RoP 2003-2007). This never really happened and only since the Barroso-initiative 
of 2005, the Chamber receives EU documents from the European Commission. 
Government was either not apt or not willing to provide the requested information. It 
should not be forgotten within this context that government largely consists of the most 
popular figures of governing parties (compare with section 2.3.1). Thus it is still 
ambitious for parliament – although principal – to unilaterally decide on an obligation for 
government. This has however worked out in other areas, for instance when it comes to 
improve the oversight of infrastructure spending (compare with section 5.2.1). We must 
therefore conclude that the political will in the Chamber was not strong enough to insist 
on the compliance with those provisions. Owing to the European institutions and the 
Barroso-initiative more particularly, the Chamber is well informed about policy 
initiatives at EU level. This again shows that European integration may improve domestic 
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scrutiny. Especially, small administrations benefit from the effort made by the European 
Commission most importantly.  
 
To be sure, although the RoP were largely extended with respect to the control of 
government in EU matters, and particularly information obligations, the Chamber does 
not define the position of ministers in the Council. No mandating system was introduced. 
Ministers should not be too restricted regarding their possibilities in EU level 
negotiations. The Danish parliament’s case is well known and purposefully it was not 
chosen as model. The Folketinget serves as warning example for how parliamentary 
control could limit the discretion of ministers in the Council to negotiate for the best 
possible outcome of the country. Interviewees who have experienced Council of the EU 
meetings have examples at the ready which justify why parliamentary mandating 
represents a disadvantage during the bargain.208 So far, those voices have been 
convincing parliamentary leaders. Despite the fact that parliament should control 
government the emphasis is placed on collaboration and the defence of important national 
interests.  
 
Through those formal provisions the Chamber has ensured to be informed if it desires so. 
However, automatisms are held rather vague, except for the two annual reports on 
transposition and European politics. No regularity was introduced to make ministers 
appear in committees. Thus, it is largely upon committee chairs to ensure their presence 
                                                          
208 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013, and former Minister, 
face-to-face interview, 29 October 2013. 
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in case ministers do not request to keep MPs updated. The potential to be informed is 
available and may be used if necessary. 
 
6.1.2. Formal rules on subsidiarity and proportionality control  
The NPs in the EU may target the European institutions, besides their governments, and 
intervene at EU level still before the adoption of an EU act. Their engagement in EU 
decision-making may follow two formulas: Firstly, NPs may get involved in the scrutiny 
of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced 
a special review of its draft legislative acts with the EWM. In case of a critical number of 
NPs opposing a draft legislative act, a yellow or orange card is issued. The institution 
initiating a draft legislative text has to review the proposal and may thereafter decide to 
maintain, amend or withdraw it.209  
 
 Secondly, NPs are invited to join a “political dialogue” with the European Commission, 
which includes a broader spectrum of acts issued by the European institutions. In case 
they find that the EU oversteps the competencies conferred to it by the Treaties, they may 
directly address the European Commission and intervene in the decision-making process. 
Whereas the political dialogue is based on the Barroso-initiative of 2005, it is not 
formalised in the Treaties. It has benefitted the Chamber as it has allowed NPs to access 
EU documents and inform the European Commission about their opinion, independently 
of government.210 
 
                                                          
209 Art. 6 and 7 Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
210 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 3 May 2013. 
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The Luxembourgish parliament’s provisions on EU scrutiny were extended to enable the 
application of rules on the EWM in 2010 (art. 168 (2, 4-7) RoP 2010-1), including the 
submission of political opinions and the possibility of impeachment at the ECJ on 
grounds of subsidiarity and proportionality. The new provisions were unanimously 
adopted.211 Remarkably, even the radical Left recognized that “The Treaty of Lisbon also 
has good points. One of them is the upgrading of national parliaments”.212  
 
The process is the same for EU documents subject to the subsidiarity and proportionality 
clauses (legislative documents) and documents which fall under the political dialogue 
with the European Commission (both, legislative and non-legislative documents) except 
that the delays do not apply in the political dialogue (art. 169(7) RoP 2012, art. 168(7) 
RoP 2010-1). They originated in the Chamber’s “Europe strategy”213  which was 
initiated in March 2004 and decided by the end of 2005.214 This strategy was elaborated 
by the Bureau, which consists of the Speaker, Secretary General and representatives of 
the three main parties.215 The Europe strategy of the Chamber was twofold. First, the 
Chamber made efforts to better communicate Europe to its citizens via its TV channel 
and website, among others.216 Second and more important for this study, it included a 
                                                          
211 Discussion and vote on bill proposal 6143, Compte rendu de la séance 44, 14.7.2010. 
212 Own translation of the Luxembourg original: “Am Vertrag vu Lissabon, do gëtt et jo tatsächlech och 
positiv Punkten. Ee vun deenen ass déi gewëssen Opwäertung vun den nationale Parlamenter.” André 
Hoffmann, Compte rendu de la séance 44, 14.7.2010. 
213 “La stratégie européenne de la Chambre des Députés”, Chambre des Députés, 2006. 
214 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
215 The Christian Conservative People’s party (CSV), the Socialists (LSAP) and the Liberals (DP) 
(Schroen’s “trigonal coalition cartel” (1986, 61)). 
216 The initiative also improved transparency in parliament, although committees still meet behind closed 
doors. Since 2010, summaries of those meetings are however published on the website of parliament. 
Plenary meetings are broadcast on TV and web streamed. All documents related to bills can be found in the 
online database of the Chamber. 
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reform of the EU scrutiny procedure and an active engagement in the screening of EU 
documents. 
 
Thus, the Chamber’s Europe unit (“Cellule Européenne”) of the “International relations 
and Protocol” department bases its evaluation of legislative and non-legislative EU 
documents on the texts sent by the European Commission as well as on certain 
documents stemming from the Council, that is agendas and draft Council initiatives (art. 
169 RoP 2012, art. 168 RoP 2010-1).  Before the Barroso-initiative installed a direct flow 
of documents from the European Commission to the NP, the Chamber rather sporadically 
obtained documents from government, even after 2003, when the Article 156(1) RoP 
(2003, art. 168 RoP 2007) introduced an information policy “in due time” (compare with 
section 6.1.1).  
 
The evaluation of EU documents, today delivered by the European Commission, the EP 
or the Council (art. 2 Protocol 1 TEU), results in a weekly classification of A (do not 
have to be followed up) and B (have to be followed up) EU policy documents, depending 
on whether Luxembourgish interests are at stake. Although the nomination is similar to 
the one in the Council of the EU (where the matters at stake are divided into 
uncontroversial A- and dividing B-points), the Chamber establishes its own ranking of 
importance. Thus, when we subsequently mention A- or B-documents within this study, 




Apart from this classification, the Europe unit also proposes a relevant sectoral 
committee217 to take care of the follow-up of B-documents. The European affairs 
committee (EAC) works as a formal coordinator of European matters in the Chamber. 
It checks the selection of important B-documents provided by the Europe unit, re-
evaluates and eventually modifies this list. On this basis, the Speaker of the House 
attributes the important B-documents, which need to be followed up, to the respective 
sectoral committees (art. 169(4) RoP 2012, art. 168(4) RoP 2010-11). Formerly, the 
Conference of Presidents held responsible for the dissemination of EU documents to 
committees (art. 156(1) RoP 2003, art. 168(1) RoP 2007, art. 168(2) RoP 2009).  
 
This attribution of documents may again be re-evaluated by the sectoral committees in 
case they find that a document would be better dealt with in another committee. Every 
sectoral committee may decide by simple majority and within four weeks after the 
reception of the document, whether it initiates a reasoned opinion which concludes a 
breach of the principle of subsidiarity. Similarly, each political faction (as well as 
technical group) within parliament may draft a reasoned opinion and invite a respective 
committee to take it over (art. 169(5) RoP 2012, art. 168(5) RoP 2010-1).  
 
Reasoned opinions as well as contributions to the political dialogue are issued in form of 
a resolution which addresses the European Commission (instead of the Chamber, like 
ordinary resolutions). Committees do not have the right to give binding resolutions on EU 
                                                          
217 Sectoral committees are responsible for a particular policy area. This wording has established in the 
literature on EU scrutiny in order to cover different committee functions for comparative reasons. In 
Luxembourg, the legislative permanent committees are mainly concerned, but also their sub- and special 
committees (compare with section 3.1). 
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issues in the name of the whole parliament. Instead, a resolution has to pass vote in 
plenary, although it is not necessarily debated (the Conference of Presidents may decide 
otherwise). If a breach of the subsidiarity principle was concluded, the draft resolution is 
then put on the agenda of a public session. Parliament adopts a resolution within the eight 
weeks-time limit given by art. 6 of Protocol 2,218 with a simple majority of its members 
and usually without debate in plenary, unless other is decided. In case no plenary session 
is foreseen, resolutions are adopted by the Conference of Presidents (art. 169(5) RoP 
2012, art. 168(5) RoP 2010-1) (Figure 77). 
 
If a resolution stating a breach of the subsidiarity principle is not considered appropriately 
by the European Commission, the Chamber may go before the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). To this end it adopts a respective motion in plenary session by a simple 
majority of MPs. If no plenary session is foreseen, the Conference of Presidents takes the 
decision (art. 169(6) RoP 2012, art. 168(6) RoP 2010-1).   
 
                                                          
218 Art. 6, Protocol (No 2) states that “Any national Parliament or any chamber of a national Parliament 
may, within eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, in the official languages of 
the Union, send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission a reasoned 








The Chamber regards NPs being the major source of legitimacy in the EU219 and 
consequently sees itself as “intermediary between the European Union and its 
citizens”.220  An involvement in the EU policy-making process was thus welcomed as a 
“good thing, not least in times of crisis when many rights shift to the hands of 
governments”.221 European integration does however not go far enough for many of the 
Luxembourgish MPs and some of them fear that the implication of NPs in European 
                                                          
219 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
220 “La Chambre et l’Union européenne… Un intermédiaire entre l’UE et ses citoyen(ne)s.”, www.chd.lu, 
“La Chambre et l’UE”, last access: 30 December 2013. 
221 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
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decision-making may block EU initiatives. Rather than the destructive role they gained 
with the EWM, some of the MPs would have preferred a right for NPs to issue EU 
legislative initiatives.222  
 
Nonetheless, the architecture of EU scrutiny in the Chamber is a creation of senior 
majority MPs rather than the opposition MPs. Some key personalities within parliament, 
none less than the Speaker and the chair of the EAC, were very active in promoting 
European integration on the agenda of the Chamber. Opposition MPs just as most of the 
majority MPs were less interested to get involved in the decision-making process of the 
procedure.223 Not surprisingly thus, the new possibilities provided by the EWM and the 
political dialogue are majority dependent. Single MPs or a small group of them are not 
able to question EU policy proposals. Resolutions on subsidiarity or proportionality 
grounds, as well as resolutions issued in the framework of the political dialogue require a 
majority vote. 
 
The procedures were designed by decision-makers who were well aware of the 
organisational structure of EU affairs in other NPs, particularly in the famous Finnish and 
Danish assemblies.224 However, no specific model was followed in practice and 
procedures were adapted to the Luxembourgish situation. Alternatively, it was discussed 
if a separate new committee would be created for “Europe work” more generally and the 
treatment of EU documents more particularly. Such a European affairs committee could 
hold larger powers, for instance, when it comes to instruct and attest enforceable 
                                                          
222 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 December 2012. 
223 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 3 May 2013. 
224 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 3 May 2013. 
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mandates to government for EU level negotiations. A mandating of government was 
however not aspired (compare with section 6.1.1). The Chamber was considered too 
small for such centralised structure in terms of the number of MPs and its administrative 
capacity. Instead, all MPs should be involved in EU matters, not least, because there are 
only few. In the centralised model of a separate committee, much additional staff would 
have been needed which were experts in specific policy fields.225 
 
Hence, all committees evaluate documents sent to them, not least, because they are 
experts in their field. At the same time, no formal obligation may be derived for the 
sectoral committees. The RoP were extended to increase their possibilities while their 
duties remain self-chosen. 
 
6.1.3. Summary and conclusions: Formal rules on EU scrutiny 
The RoP underwent major reforms with regard to EU matters in the period under 
investigation, that is between 1999 and 2011. Most importantly, the Chamber introduced 
extensive information obligation for its agent, the government. Since 2009, the 
government is requested to present two reports per year related to European matters, one 
on the transposition of European directives and one on European politics. Also, 
government has to inform the Chamber in case of an envisaged enlargement or Treaty 
revision.  
 
                                                          
225 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012, Member of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face 




The formal rules were furthermore extended regarding the new provisions foreseen in the 
Constitutional Treaty and later introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, which established a 
direct link between the Chamber and EU policy-making. Hence, government is obliged to 
assist parliament in the establishment of a reasoned opinion or political opinion in the 
framework of Protocol (No 2) of the Lisbon Treaty. The Chamber on the other hand 
informs government about its position in subsidiarity and proportionality matters. 
 
The RoP were extended to enshrine rules on the Early Warning Mechanism in 2010. 
Those changes must be seen as major reforms institutionalising European matters in 
the Luxembourgish parliament in the run-up to the Lisbon Treaty and beyond. Much 
effort and some resources have been attributed to this endeavour to succeed. This proves 
the reactivity of parliament with regard to changes introduced at European level. The 
flow of EU documents was adapted to the Chamber’s specific situation, which is most 
importantly defined by its limited size. The informal procedures have been taken up, as 
they were decided within the Chamber’s Europe strategy. Thus, we may speak of a 
continuation and follow-up of a once-taken decision. Rather than incremental, this 
proceeding may be described as informal testing and upon success formalisation of new 
rules.  
 
The Luxembourgish EU scrutiny model remains based on the screening of EU documents 
(document-based); no formal mandating of government has been introduced, not least, 
because of the refusal of government to accept a limitation of its discretion. The first 
attempt to formalise European matters in the Chamber was already made in 2003, when a 
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Chapter 10 on European affairs entered the RoP. The Chamber wanted to oblige 
government to keep it better informed by sending EU documents to parliament. 
Government however largely ignored this request. Only in 2009, the Chamber enforced 
its political will and fixed an agreement with government on European affairs. By then, 
the Barroso-initiative of 2005 guaranteed the direct transmission of EU documents to 
NPs. Government and parliament decided to better cooperate in EU matters and inform 
each other on their initiatives and positions.  
 
Senior majority MPs were the driving force behind the new procedures in the Chamber. 
They aimed at involving all MPs in EU matters. Thus, while the Chamber’s European 
affairs committee (EAC) coordinates the distribution of EU documents, it remains within 
the discretion of the sectoral committees – and most importantly their chairs – to decide 
whether and to what extent they consider EU matters in their work.  
 
Summing up, the Lisbon Treaty did not introduce legal obligations on NPs. Instead, it 
offers a new range of new opportunities for NPs at EU level. 
 
6.2. EU scrutiny in practice: The output side 
The formal rules have been adapted to exhaust all possibilities which opened up at 
European level. The question remains to be answered whether this new offer of activities 
was taken up by Luxembourgish MPs more generally and the committees more 
particularly, as they are the main locus of parliamentary control of government. This 
section aims at an evaluation of both, the practice of EU scrutiny of government and the 
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European institutions. The presence of government representative in sectoral committees 
serves as one indicator to estimate the control of government in EU matters. This data is 
however difficult to access and we thus are only able to examine the presence of 
government and its administration in the EAC. We draw on interviews with MPs and 
clerks of the Chamber to complete the picture.  
 
Regarding the control of European institutions, we investigate qualitative and quantitative 
indicators based on three sources: Firstly, two types of annual reports from the European 
Commission are examined. The reports “on subsidiarity and proportionality”, as well as 
the reports “on relations between the European Commission and national parliaments” 
give a good overview of parliamentary activity related to the Early Warning Mechanism 
(EWM) as well as the political dialogue. Secondly, parliament-internal reports “on the 
protocol about the application of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles by the 
Chamber of Deputies”226, which were issued for the 2010/1 and 2011/2 sessions, give a 
good insight in the challenges the Chamber faces with those new procedures. Thirdly, 
interviews with staff and MPs feed in additional detail. 
 
6.2.1. Control of the government in EU level negotiations 
Members of government and their staff seem to generally fulfil their duty and they 
regularly appear in committees and the plenary, if the Chamber requests it.227 The 
government informs the Chamber about important policy initiatives at European level. 
                                                          
226 ”Rapport sur l’application des dispositions relatives aux protocoles 1 et 2 du Traité de Lisbonne par la 
Chambre des Députés” 
227 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013, and Member of the Chamber of 
Deputies, face-to-face interview, 2 October 2013. 
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Interviewees note that there is a readiness to report before or after Council meetings, 
when the Chamber or its committees demand so. On such occasions, ministers give 
general evaluations of the situation and the standing of the Luxembourgish position. 
Often, they provide the agendas of the Council meetings. However, committees do not 
always take up the offer and the time to discuss Council negotiations with the minister. 
No systematic report about meetings of working groups or the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) is foreseen, but a minister updates about developments 
when invited to the Chamber. The person taking part in the meetings at European level 
usually accompanies the responsible minister.228  
 
Notwithstanding, government informs the Chamber if an intergovernmental conference 
is scheduled intending to negotiate Treaty revision or the accession of a country to the 
EU. It transmits its position although it is difficult to say whether this was at the earliest 
possible date and furthermore informs and consults the Chamber during the negotiations.  
 
No specific formal rules are foreseen concerning the so-called “passerelle clause”. This 
provision allows the European Council to decide that decisions in specific policy areas 
would require a qualified majority rather than a unanimous vote in the Council of the EU. 
Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, a passerelle clause may also enable a switch 
from a special legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure. This means that 
the European Parliament (EP) gains the right to be co-legislator and stand on equal 
footing with the Council. Thus, the application of a passerelle clause means a shift to 
supranational decision-making in areas where intergovernmental decision-making was 
                                                          
228 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 12 December 2012. 
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made the rule. Individual member states in the Council and/or the Council as a whole lose 
weight in decision-making in this case. Answering a PQ introduced by an opposition 
party, the government stated that the application of article 42 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) would be subject to the approval by the Chamber.229 And the Chamber was 
consulted at the occasion of “A Citizens’ Agenda – Delivering Results for Europe” 
(COM(2006)211 fin).230 
 
One indicator to better evaluate in how far information obligations were taken up by the 
government is the presence of ministers in committees. Such quantitative evaluation of 
the presence of government in parliament is however difficult because the Chamber’s 
committee meetings are non-public. Minutes on those meetings have been published in 
recent years only. Upon special request we gained access to the summaries of meetings of 
the EAC. To this end, the committee chair had to approve as well as the General 
Secretary, and a clerk of the Chamber had to find all relevant documents in the archive. 
Seen the time and effort to gain access, we therefore decided to concentrate on a few 
years only. Thus, all meetings of the EU held in the years 2001, 2006 and 2011 were 
investigated. From chapter three (section 3.3.1), it is already known that the number of 
committee meetings increases over the years and above all, the number of EAC meetings. 
In 2001, 19 meetings were convened by the EAC, in 2006 there were 50 and in 2011, we 
found 65 minutes of meetings.  
 
                                                          
229 Réponse à la question parlementaire N° 1326 du 5 octobre 2006 de Monsieur le Député Jacques-Yves 
Henckes. 
230 Cf. Annexe to the 6th Bi-annual report of COSAC: National Parliaments’ replies to the questionnaire, 
November 2006, p. 131. 
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Interestingly, the presence of ministers in terms of the attended share of total meetings 
was the highest in 2001. In 14 out of 19 EAC meetings, a minister was present. In 13 out 
of the 19, ministerial staff attended the meeting. In total, only two out of the 19 meetings 
were non-attendant by government representatives. In 2006, ministers covered 23 out of 
50 meetings of the EAC. Ministerial staff came to 30 of those meetings and in total, the 
EAC held thus 17 meetings “alone”, without the presence of ministers or their staff. In 
2011, ministers attended 33 and their staff 29 out of the 58 committee meetings. 
Altogether, the EAC held 16 meetings without government representative. The share of 
EAC meetings in government presence has fallen to a lower level over the years from 
almost 90% to around 70% of meetings (Table 26). 
 
















share of  
executive  
presence  
2001 19 14 73,7% 13 17 89.5% 
2006 50 23 46,0% 30 33 66.0% 
2011 58 33 56,9% 29 42 72.4% 
 
Data source: Parliamentary proceedings 
 
This result is certainly not to be generalised over other committees. The EAC has 
impressively increased the frequency of its meetings between 1999 and 2011 (compare 
with section 3.3.1). Ministers and their staff have still other occupation than to attend 
committee meetings. The sheer amount of sittings provides certainly one explanation for 
this diminishing share of executive presence. In absolute numbers, ministers and their 
321 
 
staff are more present in the EAC in 2011 than in the beginning of the period under 
investigation.  
 
Governmental presence in committees is however not determined by the frequency of 
meetings alone. Interviews reveal that the chairs of the committees and their 
relationship to ministers are a major factor for ministerial (and executive) presence. 
Generally speaking, many ministers seem to be very ready to take part in those 
meetings.231 However, at occasions, and even when ministers and committee chairs 
belong to the same party, personal aversions may prevent from a close relationship 
between the two. In this case, a minister would not attend committee meetings, nor would 
he/she be requested to do so. Some chairs are less keen on ministers taking part in “their” 
committee meetings. Although the minister was willing and requested to attend 
committee meetings, his/her demand may be rejected by the chair of the committee.232 On 
the other hand, some ministers have other priorities, and never join committee 
deliberations. They argue that parliamentary committees do not dispose over enough 
expertise to profoundly discuss matters at stake233 and find it a waste of time to invest 
into a “pedagogical” exercise.234 This may appear as neglect to the committee and 
parliament as a whole, and is not well perceived.235  
 
There is evidence that ministerial ignorance of parliament decreased over the years. 
But the matter at stake is pivotal for the ministerial attendance of committee meetings. A 
                                                          
231 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 June 2013, and Member of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. Both are former ministers.  
232 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 20 June 2013. 
233 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
234 Former Minister, face-to-face interview, 29 October 2013. 
235 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 12 December 2012. 
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minister also comes less often to a committee, if his/her or her policy area is mostly 
regulated by government decree instead of laws (compare with section 3.3.1 concerning 
the legislative burden of committees). Such is the case for instance for the Agriculture 
committee. Most regulation in this area comes from the European level and in form of 
regulations, which do not require transposition. Laws are the exception.236 Hence, it is a 
question of diplomacy and working routine to find the right amount of presence of 
government representatives in committees. The discretion of committee chairs is thus 
large to exert control in EU matters or not.   
 
In any case, government presence in committees is a double-edged sword. It is certainly 
so that ministers are held accountable in committee meetings. They are questioned by 
MPs about how meetings went at EU level. The privacy of committee meetings allows 
for a rather outspoken atmosphere. However, ministers may at the same time try to take 
influence in the committee’s internal bargaining and pose a threat to the independence of 
decision-making. Being expert, it may be possible for them to steer discussions in their 
preferred directions. 
 
The relationship to government is intended to be re-assessed in the next parliamentary 
term. Attempts to introduce stronger elements of a mandating system were not set into 
practice so far. The cooperation with government as a provider for expertise could be 
improved. Some ministers remain reluctant to give information – knowledge is power and 
parliament depends on their expertise.237 Another reason for their hesitation may be that 
                                                          
236 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
237 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
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giving a detailed account of their negotiation positions in EU level talks in parliament 
comes close to publish strategic information on their room to negotiate.238 Also, their 
“notes d’impact” on EU documents remain non-accessible for the Chamber. Those notes 
of impact are established by ministerial officials who take part in EU level negotiations. 
The Foreign ministry collects them from the other ministries. Their quality and 
substantiality differs, not least because of the rather small administrative capacity of the 
country. Direct personal contact between MPs and ministries may partly substitute for 
this intransparency.239 However, an opening up of the archives of impact notes could give 
the Chamber the necessary insight in EU level activities of the individual ministers and 
their staff. 
 
6.2.2. Output and evaluation of the screening of EU documents 
The Chamber is quite active when it comes to applying the new provisions of the Early 
Warning Mechanism (EWM) and the political dialogue with the European Commission. 
In 2005 still, the Luxembourgish parliament reported to not yet scrutinize EU legislation 
for its compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (COSAC 
Secretariat, 2006a, p. 16). The subsidiarity and proportionality checks organised by the 
COSAC in 2005 and 2006 served as testing field to live up to the deadlines and rules of 
the forthcoming provisions known from the EU Constitutional Treaty. Notably, the first 
subsidiarity check was initiated during the Luxembourgish Council of the EU Presidency 
                                                          
238 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013, and former Minister, face-to-
face interview, 29 October 2013. 
239 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
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in the first half of 2005 (COSAC Secretariat, 2006b). Until 2011, the Chamber 
participated in seven out of the eight pre-Lisbon subsidiarity checks.240 
 
In 2011, the Commission reports that “...the two Polish Chambers (Sejm and Senate) and 
the Luxembourg Parliament continue to be particularly active in terms of issuing 
reasoned opinions with regard to compliance with the subsidiarity principle” (European 
Commission, 2011, p. 3). During the 2010/1 parliamentary year, the Chamber has 
delivered five reasoned opinions and initiated nine political dialogues with the European 
Commission.  In 2011-2, eight reasoned opinions and eleven opinions falling under the 
political dialogue were sent to the Commission.241 Until the end of the 2011/2 
parliamentary year, it has submitted a total of 27 resolutions in the framework of the 
political dialogue and 21 reasoned opinions based on Protocol 2 of the Lisbon Treaty for 
the attention of the Commission.  
 
The Conference of committee chairs242 watches over the new procedures.  It has no 
formal anchor in the RoP but serves as an informal go-together of permanent committee 
chairs and the Speaker of parliament. This forum discusses the work of parliament in 
European matters but meets only on rare occasions. The purpose is to increase the 
expertise of all MPs in European matters. Committee chairs are urged to put “Europe 
work” on their committee’s agenda, most importantly the screening of EU documents in 
subsidiarity and proportionality matters. However, the work of the individual committees 
                                                          
240 The Chamber did not take part in the last pre-Lisbon subsidiarity check on the Commission proposal for 
a Council Framework Decision on the right to interpretation and to translation in criminal proceedings 
(COM(2009) 338). 
241 Cf. website of the Chamber, La Chambre et l’UE: www.chd.lu, last access: 10 September 2012. 
242 “Conférence des Présidents des Commissions permanentes“. 
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is generally not judged by others.243 The overload of some committees with lawmaking 
makes it difficult for some of them, most importantly the Justice committee (JURI) and 
the Finance and Budget committee (FIBU).  
 
Also the EAC has been concerned with the functioning of the new screening procedures, 
on one or two occasions. However, no profound changes have been introduced. Instead, 
comments were taken note of, and details were adapted.244 A general evaluation of the 
procedures was envisaged by the end of the 2009-14 term but was prevented by the early 
elections in October 2013 and thus shifted to the beginning of a new legislature. Judged 
by its output, the Europe strategy of the Chamber and its newly introduced system of EU 
document screening has been very effective.245 However, the inclusion of all MPs in the 
scrutiny process has improved246 but not been entirely successful. No matter which party 
they are affiliated to, some of the MPs are prioritising EU matters, while for others local 
issues prevail.247  
 
Furthermore, internal parliamentary reports are regularly created giving the state of 
affairs concerning subsidiarity and proportionality checks and the evaluation of EU 
documents. The administrator concerned with the examination of EU documents therein 
identified modified proposals and delegated acts posing problems for the Chamber’s EU 
scrutiny. Modified acts are introduced by the Commission, in order to escape a stalemate 
among the Council and the EP, co-legislators at EU level. It is not clear, whether those 
                                                          
243 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 
244 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 3 May 2013. 
245 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
246 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
247 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
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modified acts fall under the provisions of Protocol 2 on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality of the Lisbon Treaty. The Commission seems to 
decide from case to case if it transmits those modified acts to NP. The Chamber service 
notes that this practice is questionable with regard to judicial security and not least 
because modified acts generally diverge largely from the initial proposal, they claim.  
 
Delegated acts on the other side clearly do not fall in the area of legislative acts and may 
therefore not directly be issued to subsidiarity and proportionality checks. If such 
delegation is found to violate subsidiarity or proportionality before respective delegated 
acts are created, the possibility of NP to prevent from their introduction by means of 
Protocol 2 exists, as pointed out by the Chamber service.  
 
From the administrative point of view, the procedure works now in satisfying 
manner.248 EU affairs are part of the Chamber’s International relations and Protocol 
department. This department differs from other services, as it is concerned with a special 
mission on the one hand and the backup of a committee on the other hand. Thus it 
supports all parliament external affairs that are relations with international bodies, 
delegations, ingoing and outgoing visits and the necessary protocol service, as well as EU 
affairs. The latter includes the distribution of information on European dossiers and, what 
is more, the support of the Committee for foreign and European affairs, defence, 
cooperation and immigration of the Chamber, which is the Chamber’s EAC. Contrary to 
other committees, which are supported by the “Committees Service” department of the 
                                                          
248 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012, Member of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013, Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face 
interview, 3 May 2013, and Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
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Chamber, the EAC is larger in scope and may draw on extended staff. Formally, two 
administrators plus one assistant are attributed to the EAC. Other committees count one 
administrator plus one assistant at the most. Half of the committee administrators are 
assisted by one person and responsible for two committees. 
 
In 2004, the International relations and Protocol department consisted of 4.5 posts. At 
that time, one position was vacant. In 2009, 3 posts were vacant, at a staff of 7 and in 
2010 those vacancies were mostly filled with 2.75 employments. Thus, since 2004, the 
International affairs and Protocol department has more than doubled. The head of the 
department is one of two Deputy Secretary Generals of the Chamber and secretary of the 
COSAC delegation. In addition, three administrators and one assistant are working on EU 
affairs within this department, among them the EAC secretary and her assistant, the 
correspondent for the platform for EU Interparliamentary Exchange (IPEX) and one 
administrator charged with the evaluation of EU documents. Also attached to the 
International relations department is the permanent representative of the Chamber in 
Brussels. The post was created in 2006, right after the Luxembourgish Council and 
COSAC presidency. The permanent representative does not have any support in Brussels, 
but relies on the resources of the International relations department of the Chamber.  
 
The installation of the Europe unit in the Chamber and thus the increase of personnel 
were intended by its Europe strategy249 of 2005 (compare with section 6.1.2).250 
Parliamentary clerks should in a first period take over the classification of EU documents 
                                                          
249 “La stratégie européenne de la Chambre des Députés“, Chambre des Députés, 2006. 
250 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
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into A and B and create lists for the use in the sectoral committees. The B-documents are 
accompanied by a note including references, a proposal for its evaluation and possibly a 
summary of its content. The Europe strategy foresaw in a second phase to attribute a 
larger role to the civil service in this process. Clerks should conduct profound research 
and draft the political opinion or motivated opinion respectively.251 The role of staff was 
however not extended as the workload does not allow going into detail with every B-
document, seen that they comprise around 50% of all EU documents sent to the Chamber. 
The administrative burden is enormous.252 Thus, the Europe unit plays a crucial role in 
the selection of documents determined to be examined in committees. However, it does 
not have the last word.253  
 
The EAC reassesses this selection and sometimes adjusts it.254 The changes in the 
selection always concerned A-documents (documents judged of no major interest for 
Luxembourg) to be shifted to the B-category (documents of interest for Luxembourg). 
Such shifts, which are rather rare, were always initiated by individual MPs of the EAC 
who had a special interest in a particular issue. If for instance a MP engages for the 
protection of rare species, he/she would demand a document on deep sea fishing to fall 
into group B. The administration would primarily not assess any document related to 
maritime affairs as of major interest to midland Luxembourg.  
 
                                                          
251 La stratégie européenne de la Chambre des Députés (2005), point IV. 
252 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 
253 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 3 May 2013. 
254 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013.  
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The selection of important documents seems to be straightforward, and in case, sectoral 
committees may still shift documents among them.255 The priorities have not changed 
since 2006. The Chamber’s Europe unit and the EAC estimate that no informal 
coordination among NPs would be needed to take up a respective Commission document 
for scrutiny.256 Instead, when the composition of the EAC changes after elections, the 
priorities of the new MPs may shift and result in a revaluation of B-documents. If the 
EAC holds no meetings, during the summer break for instance, the list remains unseen 
and is established by the administration alone.257  
 
The representative of parliament at the European institutions eventually helps to 
point at important issues. His/her task is to collect information not available in 
Luxembourg, and as early as possible, on European dossiers which are of interest for the 
country. More specifically, he/she attends committee meetings and plenary sessions of 
the EP, meetings with functionaries of the EP and other European institutions, keeps up 
contact with the Luxembourgish MEPs and their assistants, the COSAC secretariat and 
the other interparliamentary secretariats, the EP department in charge of the relations with 
NPs, the permanent representatives of the other NPs etc. The permanent representative 
sends information notes to the staff of the International relations department. He/She 
guides delegations of the Chamber at the EP and follows any order given by the Bureau 
or General Secretary of the Chamber.258 He/She may alert the Chamber at an early stage 
                                                          
255 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 
256 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 30 November 2012. 
257 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 22 April 2013.  
258 La stratégie européenne de la Chambre des Députés (2005), point II (D). 
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about important EU legislative proposals to come and inform about the activities in other 
NPs. 
 
Not least, however, government helps focusing on issues of national interest. Ministries 
keep observing whether EU draft legal acts respect the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles. The choice of EU legislation subjected to a subsidiarity and proportionality 
checks requires some expertise and has not always been as freely chosen by the Chamber 
as one would think. The new possibilities offered to influence a draft act at early stage are 
well-known by the ministries. For instance, it turned out in interviews that the first 
subsidiarity test check in the framework of the COSAC regarding the 3rd railway package 
originated in an initiative of the Transport ministry.259  
 
While this incident may be the exception, the instrument is regarded as means to 
strengthen the position of a minister in Council negotiations since the entering into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty at the latest.260 Thus parliament became to some extent a means to 
an end for government to early push an EU draft legislative act into its direction. In the 
case of the 3rd railway package, the initial resistance of the parliamentary administration 
was overcome and the majority factions in the Chamber supported the initiative fully.  
 
The more the Chamber is able to establish its expertise, not least with regards to 
subsidiarity and proportionality control, the more independent it will be able to act vis-à-
vis government. Such development is estimated probable in future. At the moment, this 
                                                          
259 Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 10 October 2013.  
260 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. This contradicts what 
we have stated before, on the disadvantages of a formal mandating system mentioned by interviewees. 
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expertise may be found in the ministries mainly. Hence, parliament also requests their 
cooperation, in case it selects a document for closer inspection. However, even ministry 
officials judge the instrument as important, not least because the position of the Chamber 
not necessarily corresponds to the position of government. Still, their main argument 
remains the facilitation of negotiations at EU level as a minister may refer to 




6.2.3. Summary and conclusions: EU scrutiny in practice  
The Chamber’s EU scrutiny in the narrow sense is based upon the control of government 
on the one hand, and the European institutions on the other hand. Government in practice 
seems to meet its obligations regarding the information duty it has vis-à-vis parliament. 
Particularly the non-public committee meetings provide large occasion for an exchange 
on secret Council bargaining and important policy initiatives at European level. Generally 
speaking, ministers were ready to present themselves in parliament and discuss with MPs. 
The exception proves the rule. But then it also depends on the committee chair and 
his/her willingness to invite and welcome a minister. Committee chairs are the crucial 
driving force for the scrutiny of government more generally and in EU matters more 
particularly. The flipside of executive presence in committee is executive dominance. By 
the nature of the principal agent relationship, parliament to some extent depends on the 
government’s expertise. Thus, committee chairs should guard the good ratio of presence 
                                                          
261 Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 10 October 2013, and Member of the Chamber of Deputies, 
face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013. 
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and absence of ministers and their staff, which gives MPs a maximum of information 
from government and keep their independence at the same time.  
 
While the formal rules do not foresee the possibility to mandate ministers, the presence of 
government representatives in committee meetings may help MPs to still transmit their 
perspectives. The increase of committee meetings, most notably in the European affairs 
committee (EAC), increases the number of occasions to do so. On the other hand, it 
makes it more difficult for ministers to always be present and “take control” of the 
committee. An investigation on a sample of years shows that the share of meetings 
covered by government representatives has decreased in the period of investigation. This 
result for the EAC has to be taken with caution and may not be generalized over all 
committees. Seen the special function of the EAC as coordinator in EU subsidiarity and 
proportionality control (it checks the list of important EU documents established by the 
Chamber’s Europe unit), this decrease in governmental presence may be taken as an 
indicator of an increased independence of the Chamber in EU matters.  
 
With regard to the control of the compliance of European institutions with the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality, the Chamber is among the more active ones in the 
EU. Already, it not only took part but actively enabled the pre-Lisbon tests organised by 
the COSAC. For the purpose of screening EU documents amongst others, the staff of the 
Europe unit was increased. Thus, the Chamber has given itself the means to effectively 
scrutinise the European institutions’ policy output. Between 2006 and 2011/2, around 
50% of all EU documents were classified important B-documents. While the procedures 
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introduced for this purpose are satisfying from the administrative point of view, the 
Europe unit has identified delegated acts and modified proposals as EU documents, 
which partly escape the attention of NPs. What is more, the goal to involve all MPs into 
EU matters has not been successful. Thus, the chapter is not closed yet and procedures 
might be adapted within the coming years. 
 
6.3. The EU document control burden: The input side 
In this final section of our chapter six on EU scrutiny, we shed a light on yet another 
aspect of the document-based system of EU scrutiny. More particularly, the input side of 
subsidiarity and proportionality control is investigated within this section. In the first 
place, the general amount of EU documents entering parliament is thus evaluated. In the 
second section, the European affairs committee of the Chamber (EAC) is introduced and 
the burden EU documents represent for the sectoral committees investigated. Again, like 
in section 6.2., the data used are based upon the reports of the European Commission, the 
Chamber as well as interviews. 
 
6.3.1. A quantification of the flow of EU documents 
The Chamber’s evaluation reports indicate that around 4,150 EU policy-making 
documents entered the Chamber between 2006, when the European Commission started 
sending EU documents directly to NPs, and the 2011/2 parliamentary session. That is, 
around 700 documents per year. Unfortunately, no statistics exist on the first half of 2009, 
when the documentation changed from a yearly capture to a count by session. For the full 
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years contained in the statistics, the number of documents received decreased from 766 in 
2006 to 672 in 2011/2, with a peak of 809 in 2008. Overall, the amount of EU policy-
making documents received by the Chamber sank at lower level as of the 2009/10 
session, but increased again in 2011/2.  
 
An important change may be observed in the last two sessions. Up until 2009/10, the 
absolute number of A-documents always ranged above the number of B-documents. In 
2010/1, their numbers almost equalled with 277 A- and 282 B-documents. In 2011/2, B-
documents for the first time outnumber A-documents by 120. Thus, a larger share of the 
incoming documents is considered important and consequently should be treated by the 
sectoral committees. Although the total number of EU documents sent to the Chamber 
decreased over the years, the screening burden did not decrease and is supposed to 
continue its upward trend (Figure 78).262   
   
                                                          
262 Where not otherwise indicated, the data of this section are encoded and calculated by the author who 
retrieved all required information from parliamentary proceedings, that is the website of the Chamber at 
www.chd.lu, printed minutes of public sessions and activity reports. 
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Figure 78: A- and B-documents per year and session, absolute numbers, 2006-2011/2 
 
 
The total amount of documents entered in the Chamber is echoed by a somewhat similar 
trend in the EU legislative output (compare with Figure 8 in section 2.1.1). However, 
while the total EU legislative output consists of adopted acts, it is draft acts and 
preparatory documents which enter the Chamber at an early stage. Not all of those see the 
day of light in form of a legislative act. Still, the total amount of EU policy-making 
output exceeds the documents entering the Chamber many times over. Not all legislative 
initiatives are thus sent to the Chamber. The difference may partly be explained by 
modified acts (compare with point 6.2.2.), documents which were criticised by the 
Europe unit to bypass NPs. 
 
Around half of the documents which entered the Chamber were evaluated to be important 
over the whole period, as the more or less parallel development of the total amount of 
received EU documents and B-documents suggests. Indeed, after those documents went 
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through a first evaluation on the average 47% of them were considered important B-
documents. Their share increased over the years, however receded in the 2009/10 session. 
In the last two sessions 2010/1 and 2011/2, the amount of B-documents has increased 
again (Figure 79).   
 
Figure 79: A- and B-documents, percentages, 2006-2011/2 
 
 
Among the B-documents the Chamber administration divides between legislative and 
non-legislative acts in order to determine whether the EWM or the political dialogue 
applies. Only legislative documents fall under the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles. In absolute numbers, non-legislative documents outnumber legislative acts by 
two. While 622 legislative documents (that is decisions, directives and regulations) were 
classified “B”, 1,184 non-legislative acts (that is communications, reports, green and 
white papers, and other) were so. Per year, on average 104 legislative documents and 228 
non-legislative documents were considered important enough to be distributed to the 
sectoral committees. Since 2006, the share of legislative acts among the important B-
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documents has been stable until the 2010/1 session. In 2011/2, this share increased 
(Figure 80).  
 




Almost half of all the legislative B-documents were regulations. This total percentage is 
due to an increase in B-regulations within the 2011/2 session. Up until 2009/10, the three 
types of legislative acts were at almost equal amounts represented in B-documents 




Figure 81: Types of legislative B-documents, absolute numbers, 2006-2011/2 
 
 
Among the non-legislative acts, communications make the big share of all documents, 
although their number decreased until 2010/1. Second range reports and third other forms 
of non-legislative acts. White and Green papers, as well as recommendations are among 
the less frequent incoming documents. However, quantity in this case certainly does not 




Figure 82: Types of non-legislative B-documents, absolute numbers, 2006-2011/2 
 
 
When it comes to the political dialogue, data are available since 2008/2009. In absolute 
figures, 1,409 documents fell under the political dialogue. Among them, 620 were 
considered important B-documents. While A-documents outnumbered B-documents in 
2009/10, the inverse is true in the 2011/2 session (Figure 83).  
 
 





Those figures impressively demonstrate the burden that EU documents pose to a 
parliament, which used to adopt around 90 laws per parliamentary session (compare with 
section 2.2.1). The number of incoming EU documents is many times higher than the 
number of law initiatives. As we have seen, around 104 B-documents fall under the 
subsidiarity and proportionality check, 228 under the political dialogue per year. An 
improved selection of important documents could help reducing this burden, which varies 
however depending on the policy area. The next section disentangles the picture and 
evaluates the consequences of the document-based EU scrutiny for committees. 
 
6.3.2. The burden of EU scrutiny for the committee  
Above all, the Chamber’s European affairs committee (EAC) is challenged by the inflow 
of EU documents. It functions as a formal coordinator within the ex-ante document-based 
model of EU scrutiny employed by the Chamber. EU documents are checked at earliest 
possible stage after their transmission by the EU institutions (compare with section 6.1.2). 
The EAC is responsible for the review of the selection of important EU policy documents 
made by the Europe unit of the Chamber. On this basis, the Conference of Presidents 
attributes the important B-documents, which need to be followed up, to the respective 
sectoral committees.  
 
Apart from the increase of the EAC’s function as a coordinator in the screening of EU 
documents, it is a sectoral committee at the same time. The predecessor of today’s 
Luxembourgish Committee on foreign and European affairs, defence, cooperation 
and immigration was created in 1989, as Committee on foreign and Community affairs. 
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We have already mentioned its increase of jurisdiction: In 2000, defence added to the 
portfolio and in 2004, its scope was once more extended to cooperation and immigration 
(compare with section 3.1.1). Hence, it works as a sectoral committee on foreign affairs, 
defence, development, cooperation and immigration.  
 
Legislative sectoral committees are concerned to a varying extent by European matters 
and motivated to a different degree to contribute to the screening of EU documents. One 
expression of their degree of Europeanisation is the amount of EU policy documents they 
receive for review. By far the most B-documents enter the Committee for Foreign and 
European affairs, immigration, defence and cooperation (EAC), followed by the 
Economy committee (ECON) and the Finances and Budget committee (FIBU). The 
committees least dealing with EU acts are the Housing committee (LOG), the Committee 
for institutions and constitutional revision (INST) and the Committee for the control of 
budgetary execution (CODEXBU). The three committees most concerned by B-
documents receive almost half of them. Six further committees receive further 30-40%. 
Six committees again receive a decreasing 10-20% and the committees the least 
concerned receive less than 10% of all B-documents.  
 
Committees have large discretion when it comes to the examination of EU documents. 
The EAC as a sectoral committee treats each EU document in its jurisdiction. 
Rapporteurs are determined who briefly present the items on the list, their relevance and 
possible problems. Reports are only written on those documents which seem of particular 
interest. Most of the documents it receives are however cases for the political dialogue 
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rather than subsidiarity and proportionality control.  Thus, documents of general interest 
are often presented, such as European Commission reports, which could be followed up 
by directives eventually. Subsidiarity issues rarely fall into the EAC’s competences.  
 
Having the same functions like every other legislative committee, the EAC is concerned 
with the creation of reports on bill projects, their discussion and amendment. Although 
the EAC’s jurisdictions have been increased, EU matters take most of its time. On the 
EAC’s agenda, they remain among the most frequent items. In almost three fourth of all 
meetings of the years 2001, 2006 and 2011, the EU matters were scheduled and this stays 
quite so over time. 
 
With this extensive dealing of EU documents the EAC is located on the extreme end of a 
spectrum of committees. In other sectoral committees, practices differ, but generally EU 
issues are taken seriously. The decision of how to proceed in the concerned committees is 
largely up to the respective committee chair.263 Europe is more present in committees 
than it was before the introduction of the EWM.264  
 
In terms of the burden for permanent committees, we may distinguish between three 
groups: Firstly, the largest bulk of committees is only mildly concerned by EU 
documents (receiving less than 150 B-documents since 2006) and which are not very 
much involved in lawmaking either. A second group of committees is comprised by the 
busy lawmaking committees, which receive a medium amount of EU documents. Those 
                                                          
263 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 
264 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012, and Clerk of the Chamber 
of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013. 
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are the FIBU, the JURI and the ENVI/DEVDUR. Finally, a group of two committees is 
comparatively more affected by EU documents than by laws, that is the EAC and the 
ECON (Figure 84).265  
 




Compare with the committee key in Annex 0 on page 173 
 
Plotting EU B-document sending and transposition obligations, we again find a group of 
most committees not concerned by both. A group of JURI, ENVI/DEVDUR and ECON 
is concerned by both to a moderate extent. Apart from them, three outliers may be found. 
The Work and Employment committee (TRAVEMP) is only weakly concerned by EU 
                                                          
265 Where not otherwise indicated, the data of this section are encoded and calculated by the author who 
retrieved all required information from parliamentary proceedings, that is the website of the Chamber at 
www.chd.lu, printed minutes of public sessions and activity reports. 
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documents, while it deals with a medium number of transposition laws. And the FIBU is 
on the opposite extreme end than the EAC. Both receive a rather large amount of EU 
documents, however, the FIBU in addition is concerned with many transpositions, while 
the EAC is not (Figure 85).  
 





Compare with the committee key in Annex 0 on page 173 
 
Some commentators note that the EAC and other committees much concerned with EU 
affairs enhanced their status.266 Thus, committee chairs may use the new tools of the 
EWM and the political dialogue to create and provide expertise in EU matters, not 
least in order to control government. Some potential for EU scrutiny still seems to lie 
                                                          
266 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012. 
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idle. For instance, those committees, which are less challenged by lawmaking, could get 
more involved in EU scrutiny (compare with Table 10 on page 170).  
 
Committees do however not provide over larger resources in order to deal with the 
increased workload. A broad selection of EU documents is provided and committees then 
left alone with the burden. This situation poses multiple risks. Firstly, the new tasks in 
EU matters may go at the expense of the other activities of committees, that is lawmaking 
more particularly, and scrutiny of government in other matters. Secondly, and inversely, 
EU scrutiny may be neglected. Thirdly, none of the tasks a committee should accomplish 
is done in a profound and proper way. Therefore, if a committee fails to establish 
expertise and control government, a minister may dictate policy at will. In the worst case, 
parliament may represent a pure means in the hands of government. This situation is 
already at place in some policy fields, following the opinion of some interviewees.267  
 
The committees which received the most B-documents, that are the EAC, the ECON 
(ECONSP, ECCESS), the FIBU, the JURI and the ENVI/DEVDUR, have all augmented 
the frequency of their meetings. Comparing the years 2006 and 2011, we notice that the 
number of B-documents those five committees should deal with per meeting jumped up 
for the FIBU and the JURI, whereas the EAC could diminish its burden by the major 
increase of meetings it holds. The amount of B-documents the ECON should deal with 
per meeting remained the same, also due to the higher frequency of its meetings (Table 
27).  
                                                          
267 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 2 October 2013, and Ministry official, face 
to face interview, 10 October 2013. 
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Table 27: B-documents by committee meeting, absolute numbers, 2006 and 2011 
committee meetings B‐docs ratio committee meetings B‐docs ratio meetings B‐docs ratio
1 AEEDCI (EAC) 51 93 1.8 AEEDCI (EAC) 72 69 1.0 123 162 1.3
2 FIBU  54 32 0.6 FIBU  47 38 0.8 101 70 0.7
3 ECONSP 21 25 1.2 ECCEES 32 38 1.2 53 63 1.2
4 JURI 36 24 0.7 JURI 48 38 0.8 84 62 0.7
5 ENVI 25 24 1.0 DEVDUR 56 33 0.6 81 57 0.7
6 AGRI 19 14 0.7 AGRI 22 28 1.3 41 42 1.0
7 ENSSUP1 14 15 1.1 ENSSUP2 37 24 0.6 51 39 0.8
8 SANT 18 16 0.9 SANT 29 17 0.6 47 33 0.7
9 TRANS 14 29 2.1 x 14 29 2.1
10 FONCPUB2 12 18 1.5 FONCPUB3 7 1 0.1 19 19 1.0
11 TRAVEMP 29 11 0.4 TRAVEMP 10 7 0.7 39 18 0.5
12 FAM, EGAL 19 7 0.4 FAM, EGAL 25 8 0.3 44 15 0.3
13 EDU 13 5 0.4 EDUSP 37 6 0.2 50 11 0.2
14 INT2 17 3 0.2 INT3 31 6 0.2 48 9 0.2
15 CMTOUR, LOG 5 1 0.2 CMTOUR 17 3 0.2 22 4 0.2
16 CODEXBU 25 0 0.0 CODEXBU 32 3 0.1 57 3 0.1
17 INST 20 0 0.0 INST 12 1 0.1 32 1 0.0
18 x CULT 7 1 0.1 7 1 0.1
19 x LOG 10 1 0.1 10 1 0.1
20 TRAVPUB 10 0 0.0 x 10 0 0.0





6.3.3. Summary and conclusions: The EU document control burden 
This section addressed the input-side of the document-based EU scrutiny system of the 
Chamber. The subsidiarity and proportionality control of EU draft legislation requires a 
significant investment of time and resources in the separation of important and negligible 
documents. The Chamber provides some statistics on those documents which enter 
parliament. The total burden of EU documents has decreased since 2006, however, the 
amount of legislative documents increased in recent years (compare with section 2.2.1). 
The political dialogue remains more important in terms of the share of documents it 
applies to. Among the legislative and non-legislative documents, the number of B-
documents (classified as important) has outnumbered the less important A-documents. 
Thus, in total, although the general amount of EU documents has decreased, parliament is 
not relieved, but treats ever more EU documents further as they are considered important. 
The resources provided to the individual committees have however not been increased. 
 
The different sectoral committees face a varying burden of EU documents. Among the 
most challenged committees are the EAC, the Economics committee (ECON) and the 
Finances and Budget committee (FIBU). The actual scrutiny of EU documents depends 
on the available time and the motivation of committees, especially their chairs, to devote 
time to European issues. A third, important factor determining the level of activity in EU 
scrutiny is the quality of the preselection of documents.  
 
Thus, some potential lies still idle when it comes to the EWM and the political dialogue 
with the European institutions. A formal obligation of committee chairs to deal with EU 
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matters, an increase in resources provided to them for this purpose and a review of the 
selection procedure to limit the number of chosen documents could considerably improve 
the situation. 
 
6.4. Summary and conclusions: EU scrutiny 
The aim of chapter six was to contribute to a better understanding of how EU scrutiny 
works in the Chamber. With EU scrutiny in the narrow sense, it thus adds a third 
dimension of parliamentary control to legislative scrutiny as outlined in chapter four and 
parliamentary control tools in chapter five. This chapter developed in three sections: 
Firstly, the formal rules of EU scrutiny were outlined and their development investigated. 
This included both, the examination of rules on the control of government and of 
European institutions. Secondly, parliamentary practice of EU scrutiny was examined 
from an output perspective. Again, the control of government was separated from the 
control of European institutions. Thirdly, the practice of subsidiarity and proportionality 
control underwent a closer examination.  
 
The investigation of the formal rules concerning EU scrutiny at domestic level discovered 
that the Rules of Procedures of the Chamber (RoP) underwent major reforms regarding 
EU scrutiny in the period under investigation, that is between 1999 and 2011. New 
provisions were introduced as of 2003 when a first attempt was made to formalise 
European matters in the Chamber and a Chapter 10 on European affairs entered the RoP. 
Parliament aimed to improve the information policy of government and to oblige it to 
forward EU documents. While government ignored this request, the Barroso-initiative of 
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2005 provided NPs with the necessary documents. In 2009, the Chamber formalised an 
agreement with government on European affairs. A better cooperation in EU matters was 
decided and the obligation to inform each other on their initiatives and positions 
introduced. In 2010, the Chamber adapted to the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Hence, the RoP were extended to enshrine rules on the EWM. Altogether, those changes 
institutionalised European matters in the Luxembourgish parliament in the run-up to the 
Lisbon Treaty and beyond.  
 
Apart from the sending of EU documents, the government largely met its obligations with 
regard to the information duty it has vis-à-vis parliament. Ministers are often present in 
the Chamber and most importantly in the non-public committee meetings. This is where 
they report on Council bargaining and important policy initiatives at European level.  The 
Chamber’s EU scrutiny model remained document-based; no formal mandating of 
government was foreseen. However, the minister is not the only party responsible for the 
Chamber’s control of government in EU matters. It also depends on the committee chairs 
and MPs more generally to demand ministers to report. The presence of government in 
committees helps MPs to still transmit their perspective to government, despite the 
document-based EU scrutiny system. Beyond that, there may be a drawback of ministers 
taking part in committee meetings, notably when ministers dominate committees with 
their presence. This depends on the ministers, the chairs and MPs in committees. The 
skills of committee chairs to handle ministers and request reporting are thus the crucial 




The control of European institutions’ policy-making proposals has been taken up by the 
Chamber on a large scale. The control of the compliance of European institutions with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is taken seriously and requires a major 
administrative effort and time investment from the side of the European affairs committee 
(EAC) and the sectoral committees. The Chamber actively enabled and took part in the 
pre-Lisbon tests organised by the COSAC. Moreover, it has remained one of the more 
active assemblies in subsidiarity and proportionality control.  
 
The Europe unit of the Chamber screens the incoming EU documents and in the past 
years has selected around 50% of them for closer review in sectoral committees. While 
the procedures introduced for this purpose are satisfying from the administrative point of 
view, the Europe unit has identified delegated acts and modified proposals as EU 
documents, which partly escape the attention of NPs. Seen the already large quantity of 
EU documents, the added value of such additional sending may however be questioned. 
What is more, delegated acts are supposed to be technical of nature and of minor interest 
to NPs. A more focused sending of documents could lower the burden of incoming EU 
acts. At last, the goal to involve all MPs into EU matters has not been entirely successful. 
The procedures might be adapted within the coming years. 
 
Finally, from an input-perspective, it revealed that the total number of EU documents 
entering the Chamber per year has decreased since the beginning of sending in 2006. The 
evaluation of important B-documents however has shifted an increasing number of those 
incoming documents to an investigation in sectoral committees. Altogether, the political 
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dialogue is more often drawn upon than subsidiarity and proportionality control. Apart 
from the administration, the EAC takes much of the selection burden as it verifies the list 
established by the Europe unit of the Chamber. It is an outstanding committee, seen its 
large jurisdiction and role as coordinator of the screening of EU documents. The different 
sectoral committees face varying burdens of this selection. Among the most concerned 
are the EAC, the Economics committee (ECON) and the Finances and Budget committee 
(FIBU). More frequent meetings in the EAC have helped to cope with the increased 
burden of incoming B-documents. 
 
Limits in time and motivation prevent a closer investigation of most of those documents. 
No formal obligation exists for instance for committees to actually examine the sent EU 
documents. At the same time, committees do not dispose over better resources in order to 
deal with an increased workload. The preselection still leaves some of them with a rather 
large amount of EU documents.  
 
Summing up, EU scrutiny in the Luxembourgish parliament successfully targets the 
European institutions rather than the own government. It is the committees which carry 
the burden of the new opportunities offered at EU level, although at unequal levels.  
352 
 
Chapter 7. Analysis and relevant literature on the effect of 
European integration on parliamentary control of government 
This chapter serves two purposes: Firstly, it brings together the multiple findings of this 
study in order to evaluate the four hypotheses established in section 1.2. To this end, we 
create indices for each of the dependent (DV) and independent variables (IV) in order to 
take our findings to an aggregate level, without neglecting the details of our empirical 
analysis. Secondly, it puts this research and the Luxembourgish parliament into 
perspective by relating the results and the more detailed findings to previous 
research. It thus gives an account of what has been found in the course of the empirical 
chapters two to six and then frames the results in comparative perspective.  
 
Surveying the relevant literature, we refer to three types of analyses concerned with the 
Europeanisation of national legislatures and their relationship to executives: Firstly, some 
scholars more particularly deal with the Europeanisation of legislation and lawmaking. 
They focus on the impact of European regulation on domestic law and legislative 
scrutiny. Secondly, research on specific control instruments, that is mainly 
parliamentary questions (PQs) adds important insights on how EU matters are tackled in 
NPs. Scholars in this area have contributed valuable and detailed analyses on the use, 
function and Europeanisation of PQs. Thirdly there is a growing body of literature 
addressing EU scrutiny in a more narrow sense. Authors of this strand address 
institutional adaptations regarding subsidiarity and proportionality control and the 
mandating of ministers to EU level negotiations. Each of the three literature strands is 
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treated in a separate section within this chapter. The findings of this study are then put 
into the context of this previous research.  
 
Thus, we devote the first part of this chapter to an outline of the IV and DVs and 
thereafter attempt to evaluate our four hypotheses. The second section of this chapter 
deals with the previous literature on aspects related to this study and affords an evaluation 
of the contribution of the present thesis. 
 
7.1. Analysis: Effects of European integration on parliamentary control 
of government 
This thesis aimed at testing four hypotheses: Hypothesis H0 took account of the question 
whether governmental discretion actually has changed at EU level. Based on this 
precursory evaluation, three more hypotheses were under consideration regarding the 
parliamentary control of government: Abdication/deparliamentarisation Hypothesis H1 
suggested that NPs lose hold over governments due to European integration. Adaptation 
Hypothesis H2 assumed that parliament would adjust its control depending on 
governmental discretion and the risk for agency loss. Domestic complicity Hypothesis 
H3 finally proposed adaptation in support of government in order to work together for the 
national interest. In this section we outline the responses of this study’s findings 
concerning those four hypotheses under investigation. 
 
We account for the evaluation of Hypothesis H0 in the next section, and then outline our 
findings regarding the three hypotheses on executive-legislative relations in section 7.1.2. 
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Beforehand, we bring together the indicators of this study and establish four indices 
covering our IV and DVs. The IV on governmental discretion and the risk for delegation 
is set out in the next section. Then, the DVs covering the three pillars of parliamentary 
control of government follow. Finally, this enables us to give a response to the 
hypotheses guiding this thesis which closes the analysis. 
 
7.1.1. The IV: Governmental discretion and the risk for delegation 
This study investigated the development of governmental discretion at EU level as one 
part of our IV.  The discretion index (DI) established in chapter two (compare with 
section 2.1.3 on page 74) consists of two components. On the one hand, it includes the 
size of policy output of the Council. On the other hand, it takes into account the ability of 
government to influence this policy output by using the voting weight of government in 
the Council of the EU.  
 
Based on the DI, we could show that the enlargement to 25 member states in 2004 had a 
major impact on the voting power of Luxembourgish ministers in the Council of the EU. 
Indeed, even though the amount of Council acts slightly increased, the accession of new 
Eastern and Southern member states has considerably limited the influence of 
Luxembourg on Council decisions. Thus, the DI dropped importantly during Legislature 
2 (CSV/LSAP I), that is in 2005, to slightly increase again thereafter but never fully 
recover again. Rather than strengthened, we had to conclude that governmental discretion 
has decreased during our period of investigation. Hence, the main assumption of many 
studies on NPs in the EU does not hold to be true for the Luxembourgish case, and most 
355 
 
probably for other NPs too.  This is the first conclusion we must draw based on an 
evaluation of the DI.  
 
In order to ensure the accurate causal relationship, we afforded to control for changes in 
governmental discretion at domestic level.  The main aim was to check if - instead of 
our DI - developments not related to EU matters gave reason to parliament to adjust its 
scrutiny over government. Based on an analysis of the domestic context, and more 
particularly an investigation of the rules and practices guiding policy initiation and the 
legislative process, we could verify that governmental discretion in domestic matters did 
not change between 1999 and 2011. Government remained the main initiator of bills and 
was mainly constrained by the EU legislative output, because most of it is implemented 
by executive decree into the domestic legal order. The Chamber’s inclusion in 
transpositions slightly increased but remained modest (compare with section 2.2). Hence, 
parliament had no reason to adjust scrutiny as government’s discretion has not changed in 
domestic matters. 
 
What has varied over time, however, is the risk of delegation. In a next step, we 
investigated the electoral programmes of parties in parliament and government in order to 
arrive at a measure for differences in policy positions. Those served as approximation for 
the parliament’s risk of delegation. Interestingly, the minority factions in parliament as 
well as the coalition partner had to face the highest delegation risk in the most recent 
parliamentary year, that is in Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II) installed in 2009. More 
particularly, the party political differences between the coalition partners have jumped up 
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compared to Legislatures 1 and 2 (CSV/DP and CSV/LSAP I) (compare with section 
2.3.2). 
 
Following the findings on the development of ministerial discretion at EU level and the 
domestic preference constellation which consists of the ministerial discretion at 
domestic level, as well as the risk for delegation (as set out in chapter two), we may 
offer an outline of an IV which takes into account those three aspects. The first aspect is 
the discretion of ministers in the Council of the EU which revealed to decrease. The 
second aspect was governmental discretion at domestic level which has not varied in our 
period under investigation. Therefore, we may exclude that it has caused changes in 
parliamentary control of government and disregard it in our IV. However, we have to 
take into account the third aspect, that is the changing risk for delegation to the three 
governments in office between 1999 and 2011. It was the highest in the most recent 
Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II) and the lowest in Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I). Thus, our 
IV consists of two components: Ministerial discretion at EU level, as expressed by our 
DI, and the risk for agency loss. The higher either one of the two components, the more 
prone is parliament to adjust its control over government (Equation 4).  
 
Equation 4: Index of ministerial discretion including the risk for delegation (IV)  
 
IV = DI * R 
 
IV: Independent variable 
DI: Governmental discretion at EU level 




During the period of investigation, we have to deal with a U-shaped development of our 
IV. As a consequence of enlargement, ministerial discretion at EU level falls at a lower 
level during Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I). In 2009, our IV rises again because of the 
increased risk for agency loss, as the programmes of the political parties introduced more 
differences between political parties. Accordingly, we would assume parliament not to 
introduce major changes regarding the control of government in Legislature 2 
(CSV/LSAP I). Legislature 1 (CSV/DP) and Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II) are more 
prone to provoke adjustments in scrutiny (Figure 86).  
 





7.1.2. Effects of European integration on of parliamentary control of government: 
Three DVs 
The present study is based on the expectation that parliament reacted on changes of the 
IV and with regard to three dimensions of parliamentary control: Legislative scrutiny, 
control instruments and EU scrutiny. The three pillars of parliamentary control represent 
the dependent variables (DVs) in this thesis.  
 
Legislative scrutiny, the first DV, was measured using three indicators, that is the 
amount of amended laws, the share of non-unanimous decisions and the length of the 
legislative procedure. The higher each of these indicators, the stronger we have assumed 
legislative scrutiny to be. In order to arrive at a general evaluation of the strength of 
legislative scrutiny, we merge the three indicators into one measure. To this end, we 
multiply the average length of the legislative process per year with the share of non-
unanimous laws (plus one)268 and the share of amended laws (plus one) (Equation 5).   
 




LSI: Legislative scrutiny index 
D: Average length of the legislative process per year (duration) 
~U: Share of non-unanimous laws 
A: Share of amended laws 
 
                                                          
268 Adding one to the shares included in this equation makes them increasing the LSI, whereas the share 
itself would decrease the LSI. For instance, if D=100, ~U=0.1 and A=0.1, LSI=1. Thus, failing to add one 
to the shares diminishes our LSI. The correct calculation adding one goes LSI=100*(1+0.1) *(1+0.1)=121 
and thus indicates that ~U and A contribute to legislative scrutiny. 
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Although the share of amendments increased over the period under investigation 
(compare with Figure 42 on page 37), the so-calculated Legislative scrutiny index (LSI) 
decreased. The share of non-unanimous votes (compare with Figure 51 on page 213) and 
the length of the legislative process (compare with Figure 60 on page 234) accounted for 
this development. The LSI points out that the work in the Chamber, and most importantly 
in its committees, had an effect on the content of domestic draft laws, however, a critical 
evaluation of bills by MPs was not always fully guaranteed. In chapter four, this paradox 
was explained by the influence of other actors on bills, that is the State Council as well as 
government, and the quality of the law initiative. Parliament as such represented a forum 
for legislative work and besides its own input, drew on changes proposed by external 
instances (Figure 87).   
 





Our second DV consists in specific parliamentary control instruments. This included 
an evaluation of the parliamentary questions (PQs), budgetary control and other, rarer 
forms of parliamentary control tools (motions and enquiry committees). In this final 
analysis, we use PQs only as cover and approximation for this second dimension of 
parliamentary control. They represent the most flexible and unrestrained instrument as 
they were used by individual MPs and brought up (almost) any topic. What is more, data 
on PQs is quantifiable and available for the whole period. Trends in budgetary control 
and with regards to enquiry committees did not go counter the trend of PQs. Indeed, they 
followed a similar trend of strengthened control. Thus, PQs deliver an adequate measure 
for the increased control of government by specific control instruments (Figure 88).  
 





The third DV captures EU scrutiny in the narrow sense, and two dimensions account for 
it: The control of government and the scrutiny of EU documents. Chapter six pointed out 
that the Luxembourgish model of EU scrutiny was a document-based system. Thus, the 
control of government was not obligatory and only vaguely regulated in the formal rules 
leaving ministers and committee chairs large discretion. The pure presence of 
government in committees was no guarantee of scrutiny, in any case. On the contrary, it 
could point to ministerial dominance in a committee (compare with section 3.1).  
 
In our final evaluation of EU scrutiny, we thus concentrate on the screening of EU 
documents. Our third DV is thus measured by the share of B-documents which represents 
around 50% of all received documents. Although this overall percentage does not 
guarantee a review by the responsible sectoral committee, it is the best indicator we have 
available at this moment. Until 2005, no EU documents were reviewed yet. The screening 
started in 2006 and has increased since. At about the same time, the Chamber became 
generally more active in EU matters. It took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU 
and held a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. In its Europe strategy, it 
committed to engage more actively in EU matters. Since, it became one of the most 
active parliaments in subsidiarity and proportionality control and the political dialogue 
with the European Commission. Thus, despite its limitations, the screening of B-
documents may be regarded as an accurate measure for the effective EU scrutiny in the 




Figure 89: EU scrutiny (Dependent variable 3), 1999-2011 
 
 
This concludes our presentation of the DVs. In how far this development of the IV results 
in changes of parliamentary control of government is examined in the next section where 
hypotheses H0 to H3 are evaluated. 
 
7.1.3. An evaluation of four hypotheses on the effects of European integration on 
parliamentary control of government: Abdication, adaptation or complicity? 
This section examines whether our three DVs covering three pillars of parliamentary 
control of government were adapted according to our IV, that is the level of governmental 
discretion at EU level taking into account the risk for delegation. Although the detailed 
findings in the empirical chapters two to six suggested that parliament indeed is a reactive 
institution with regard to EU matters, we attempt in this section to put the analysis to an 
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aggregate level and provide sound evidence for each of our hypotheses, using the IV and 
DVs established in sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. 
 
Hypothesis H0 regarded the discretion of government at EU level and set the starting 
point of this investigation. Chapter two addressed the question of discretion at EU and 
domestic level and taking into account the risk for agency loss as intervening variable. 
The objective was to evaluate whether the governmental discretion at EU level has 
changed and consequently afforded the Chamber to adjust its overview strategy (Figure 
90).  
 




Our Discretion index (DI) based upon the voting power of member states and the 
quantity of Council acts affords us to reject Hypothesis H0 which assumed that 
ministerial discretion at EU level did not vary over the period of investigation (compare 
with section 2.1). In order to subsequently evaluate hypotheses H1 to H3, we draw on our 
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IV, which includes the risk for delegation. Chapters three to six investigated different 
aspects of parliamentary control. The aim was to give a complete picture of the whole 
range of means in the hands of parliament to outbalance changes in discretion and risks of 
agency loss. Two arguments were drawn upon.   
 
The famous deparliamentarisation/abdication Hypothesis H1 proposes that parliament is 
weakened because of European integration (Figure 91). Basically, it says that the 
leverage government has gained through European integration puts major constraints on 
parliament’s capacity to control its agent.  
 
Figure 91: Relationship between hypotheses - Hypothesis H1 
 
 
However, as we have seen with our investigation of governmental discretion at EU level 
and our DI, its basic assumption of an ever increasing advantage of government at EU 
level proved to be wrong. Drawing in addition on the results of the empirical chapters, we 
may reject the abdication/deparliamentarisation Hypothesis H1. On the contrary, 
there are indications that the Chamber of Deputies could make steps towards 
emancipation from government over the period of investigation. Its institutional self-
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understanding has developed and led to an increased self-confidence of MPs in the 
Chamber.  
 
This evaluation is supported by qualitative as well as quantitative indicators: Most 
importantly, the evaluation given by the interviewees pointed into this direction. But also 
the use of specific control instruments showed that the Chamber took more distance to 
government. Chapter five outlined that budgetary control has strengthened, that ministers 
are increasingly held accountable by the means of PQs.  
 
Based on the assumption that parliaments are reactive institutions, we have established an 
additional adaptation Hypothesis H2 (Figure 92). It assumes that parliament adapts with 
the discretion of government in EU matters. For an accurate evaluation of Hypothesis H2, 
the risk for agency loss (that is the differences in policy positions) has to be taken into 
account and thus our IV. We assumed a positive relationship between our IV and 
parliamentary control. The more discretion ministers enjoy in the Council and controlling 
for domestic discretion and delegation risk, the more the parliament should be inclined to 
reinforce its control.  
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Figure 92: Relationship between hypotheses - Hypothesis H2 
 
 
Our index of legislative scrutiny was high in Legislature 1 (CSV/DP), decreased with 
Legislature 2 (CSV/LSAP I) and further decreased with Legislature 3 (CSV/LSAP II). 
Thus, it parallels the U-shaped trend of our IV only to some minor extent. According to 
our expectations, we still find a positive relationship between IV and LSI. This 
relationship between ministerial discretion at EU level and legislative scrutiny has 
however to be qualified. In chapter four it reveals that Europeanised laws generally 
attract the same attention as other laws during the lawmaking process. Although 
transposition laws are more likely to be amended than other laws, we must conclude that 
MPs treat them the same way as other government initiatives. The increased amendment 
rate is due to the fact that the bills may lack quality and still require adaptation to the 
domestic setting. Legislative scrutiny is unspecific and mainly dependent on the work of 
the parliamentary committees and their chairs. The low correlation coefficient of R²=0.09 
shows that the discretion of ministers at EU level only accounts for a minor part of the 
variation of legislative scrutiny (Figure 93). Apart from governmental discretion at EU 
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level and the risk for delegation, other additional factors influence the strength of 
legislative scrutiny.  
 
Figure 93: Correlation between the IV and LSI, 1999-2011 (N=13)  
 
 
Similarly, we look for a positive relationship between our IV and the use of parliamentary 
questions (PQs) MPs have introduced. We do not find support for this assumed 
connection. On the contrary, there is a small negative effect of IV on the use of PQs. The 
more discretion ministers enjoy at EU level, taking into account the risk of agency loss, 
the less PQs were introduced (Figure 94).  This result is even more pronounced when we 




Figure 94: Correlation between the IV and the use of PQs, 1999-2011 (N=13) 
 





Given this outline of trends on the IV and legislative scrutiny, adaptation Hypothesis H2 
may be confirmed with some caution. Parliament is somewhat reactive to the level of 
discretion in the Council and the risk for agency loss.  However, parliamentary control 
instruments do not systematically serve parliamentary control of government in EU 
matters. In domestic matters, parliament has improved its control of government, not least 
owing to the varying risk of agency loss resulting from the increase of differences 
between the policy positions of parties in electoral programmes.  
 
More convincing, however, is the fact that parliament has adjusted its EU scrutiny in the 
narrow sense. Some scholars brought up the argument that for different reasons, the 
reaction of parliament on European integration consist in lining up with government 
(Börzel and Sprungk, 2007; Norton, 1996a). The domestic complicity Hypothesis H3 
thus suggested that in case of an external threat, parliament lines up with government and 
the two become accomplices. With regard to European integration, the aim is to defend 
the national interest. Parliamentary control in this case targets the European institutions 
rather than government (Figure 96).  
 





EU related PQs were more often used when governmental discretion is low at EU level. 
This points to complicity between parliament and government in EU matters. Parliament 
did not exhaust its power over government regarding the specific control instruments. 
Their use for EU scrutiny remained limited and MPs did not systematically control 
governments with regard to EU matters. This illustrates that EU issues remained an 
“also-ran” on MPs agendas; they ranked low on their priority lists and were not regarded 
helpful to increase electoral gains.  
 
Furthermore, an examination of EU scrutiny in the narrow sense in chapter six revealed 
that government successfully prevented parliament from stricter overview in EU matters. 
No mandating of government was established. Instead, major investments in subsidiarity 
and proportionality control have been made which showed effect as of 2006. It adds that 
government contributed and some ministerial departments made strategic use of the 
newly established parliamentary structures. In terms of the connection between IV, that is 
ministerial discretion including the risk of agency loss, and our third DV EU scrutiny, the 
correlation proves to be relatively strong (R²=0.36) (Figure 97). Altogether, we must 
conclude that Hypothesis H3 is confirmed. Parliament and government were accomplices 




Figure 97: Correlation between the IV and EU scrutiny, 2006-11 (N=6)  
 
 
The question of causality is necessarily a question of timing. The IV needs to precede its 
effect in appearance. Thus, one could argue that the IV shows effect only one or two 
years afterwards (König and Mäder, 2012a). In our case, we may argue that the risk of 
delegation is well known by parliament, as electoral programmes are published 
beforehand. Also, enlargement and its effects were predictable. Less conceivable is 
however the amount of acts the Council issues per year. Indeed, our correlation 
coefficients increase when we include a delay of two years in our calculation (IV – LSI: 
R²=0.13, IV – PQs: R²=0.11, IV – B-documents: R²=0.39), except the one between our 
IV and PQs issued on EU matters which decreases slightly (IV – PQs EU: R²=0.42). All 
relationships between IV and DVs keep their initiation direction which is positive for the 




Summing up, we may confirm two out of our four hypotheses, conclude that ministerial 
discretion at EU level varied and parliament adapted. It supported government in EU 
matters (Figure 98).  
 
 
Figure 98: Evaluation of tested hypotheses  
 
 
After this outline of the main results of this study, the following sections put the more 
detailed findings in the context of the previous research on the Europeanisation of NPs. 
Hence, we review research and recent findings on the effects of European integration on 
parliamentary control of government and its three pillars: Legislative scrutiny, special 
control instruments and EU scrutiny. Each of the three sections shows how the analysis 




7.2. Research on the Europeanisation of legislation and lawmaking 
A first research area regards the influence of European integration on domestic legislation 
and lawmaking. Scholars in this domain touch upon the question of “Who governs?” and 
analyse the extent to which domestic law is dominated by EU policy-making. Three 
research strands have to be mentioned in this context. Firstly, implementation research 
gives a first insight on how NPs may help a minister in negotiations at supranational 
level. Martin (2000) has made a major contribution in this respect. Secondly, scholars 
investigating the Europeanisation of legislation more closely examine the sources of laws 
using different indicators to measure the EU impact in laws (Brouard et al., 2012c). 
Thirdly, the more classical literature on legislative behaviour and lawmaking is essential 
for this thesis (Martin and Vanberg, 2011, 2004; Norton, 1998, 1996a, 1996b, 1993; 
Strøm, 1990). How the EU impacts the legislative procedures and actors has so far not 
received enough attention.  
 
In this literature review, we first outline the findings of scholars examining the 
Europeanisation of legislation and lawmaking. Then, a brief evaluation of this literature is 
given. In the final part of this section, we present the qualities of this study in the context 
of those findings.  
 
7.2.1. Research and recent findings on the Europeanisation of legislation and 
lawmaking 
NPs transpose the policies agreed upon at European level with the adoption of respective 
law initiatives. Few of the studies on the Europeanisation of NPs touch upon the issue of 
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what is actually lost for NPs to the EU in terms of policy formation. Whereas European 
integration impacts parliamentary oversight in a more indirect manner, it exerts a direct 
influence on domestic legislation. Three strands of literature touch upon the question of 
EU lawmaking and its consequences at national level: Policy analysis, implementation 
research and, most recently, legislative studies.  
 
Policy analysis typically comes in form of case studies and is concerned with uploading 
and downloading preferences between EU and domestic actors. Prominent in 
Europeanisation research, some policy areas are well investigated, such as environment 
(Börzel, 2009; Demmke and Unfried, 2001; Jordan, 2004; Knill and Liefferink, 2007), 
transport (Héritier et al., 2001; Kassim and Stevens, 2010; Knoflacher, 1996; Stevens, 
2004), or social policy (Falkner, 2007; Randall, 2001; Saari and Kvist, 2007).  
 
Closely connected to policy analysis is the second strand of literature which deals 
specifically with the transposition of EU law (Falkner and Holzleithner, 2008; Falkner 
et al., 2004; Siedentopf, 1989; Siedentopf and Ziller, 1989; Sverdrup, 2007). Its findings 
point to factors which influence compliance rates. Depending on the administrative 
capacity and the actual willingness of the actors concerned, track records of member 
states vary. Most concepts within Europeanisation research stem out of such studies, may 
it be the idea of a “goodness of fit” of national policies to EU goals, or the type of change 




However, some scholars rightly point to differences between policy sectors at the 
moment of implementation.  
“Significant cross-sector variation casts doubts on the generalizability of studies, 
which focus on transposition in one specific policy area […] No single sector can 
be considered representative for transposition of EU directives in general.” 
(Haverland et al., 2011, p. 286f).  
Furthermore, while such works are particularly rich and detailed when it comes to 
specific policies and their contents, most of these studies, and this is of particular interest 
for the present thesis, adds little information on the development of domestic executive-
legislative relations and parliamentary government (Brouard et al., 2012d, p. 7).  
 
A valuable exception is the research done by Martin (Martin, 2000, p. 147ff) (2000, 
147ff), who addresses the question of executive-legislative relations and their 
consequences for international agreements. She challenges the consensus of weakened 
NPs and links the question of successful implementation with the involvement of 
concerned actors in decision-making. Her findings point to the fact that parliamentary 
involvement in EU decision-making speeds up and facilitates transposition. Democracy 
and efficiency are thus not mutually exclusive.  
 
The case of Denmark serves her as an example: Although reined by minority 
governments and controlled by a tight parliamentary oversight, Danish ministers are able 
to negotiate with a tough stance at EU level and later face few troubles at the 
implementation stage.  Martin explains the lethargy of NPs up to the 1990s with a broad 
domestic consensus and few conflicts of interests regarding EU matters. NPs still exerted 
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a “latent influence” (Martin, 2000, p. 156). Only when governments stepped over the 
boundaries of delegation and failed to anticipate parliamentary preferences, NPs started 
to act.  
 
Martin’s research is contrasted and refined by more recent studies on transposition and 
compliance. Findings concerning the implication of parliamentary involvement in 
transposition show that delay is caused by other factors rather, than the parliamentary 
proceedings. While there are arguments that the involvement of fewer players should 
speed up transposition (Haverland, 2000; Tsebelis, 2002), the amount of actors involved 
is not a sufficient condition for fast transposition (Haverland et al., 2011). In short, 
transposition involving NPs so far proved not to prolong implementation. 
 
Finally and most importantly, a third strand of literature sheds light on the consequences 
of EU legislative activity for domestic legislation. Legislative studies deal with the 
“backbones of national policies” (Töller, 2010, p. 434): National legislation and 
lawmaking. Measuring the size and scope of the European impact on legislative bodies 
across countries and policy fields is of utmost importance in order to get to grips with the 
question of who governs. Since Delors’ prophecy269 that by 1998 80% of national 
legislation would be influenced by the EU, this amount was taken for granted by 
practitioners as well as scholars of the EU, but it was never proven by research. Recent 
findings suggest that the amount of EU-linked legislation is much smaller than forecast 
and expected (Brouard et al., 2012d).  
                                                          
269 "In ten years 80% of the legislation related to economics, maybe also to taxes and social affairs, will be 
of Community origin." Jacques Delors on 15 June 1988, in a plenary debate in the European Parliament, 




Depending on the policy field and the country under investigation, percentages of 
Europeanised national legislation come up to more than 80%. However, on average, the 
Europeanisation of legislation across policy fields is much lower: For the UK, this 
amount adds up to 16% (Page, 1998), for Germany different sources point to 
Europeanisation rates between 16.8% and 38.6% (König and Mäder, 2008; Töller, 2010, 
2008). In Austria, Europeanised laws account for around 26% (Jenny and Müller, 2012), 
and in Denmark they amount to around 20% of the legislative body (Christensen, 2010). 
13% to 19%  of laws in France contain EU references (Brouard et al., 2012a, 2012b). 
And similarly, 12% to 13% of the Dutch (Bovens and Yesilkagit, 2010; Breeman and 
Timmermans, 2012, p. 159), Finnish (Wiberg and Raunio, 2012), and Swiss federal laws 
(Gava and Varone, 2012, p. 213) show European links. Luxembourgish Europeanised 
laws total to around 29% in the period between 1986 and 2006 (Dumont and Spreitzer, 
2012). 
 
Going into the details with the Europeanisation of lawmaking, some contributions in the 
edited book of Brouard et al. (2012c) discover that Europeanised laws are more often 
amended than other laws. This is the case for Spain, Italy, Germany and France for 
instance (Borghetto et al., 2012; Brouard et al., 2012a; König and Mäder, 2012b; Palau 
and Chaqués, 2012). Also in Luxembourg, such pattern was observed (Dumont and 
Spreitzer, 2012) and the authors attribute this finding to the fact that government uses its 
discretion at transposition stage and proposes texts which are close to its preferences. 
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Parliament in reaction scrutinizes those texts more intensively in order to shift the text 
towards the preferences of parliament.  
 
In the same volume of Brouard et al., König and Mäder (2012a) investigate the causes for 
the Europeanisation of domestic legislation over all the nine countries. The development 
of EU policy-making as well as domestic factors prove to be important in determining the 
percentage of Europeanised domestic laws by area and in the period between 1987 to 
2005. They draw on Martin and Vanberg (2004) when they suggest that the difference 
between policy positions of the coalition partners determines the risk of ministerial drift. 
Also, they include the cost of the legislative review in their explanatory model of 
Europeanised legislation based on the transaction cost approach and parliamentary 
involvement serves as indicator for the cost of legislative review. They find that the size 
of the coalition conflict together with the cost for legislative review explain the 
Europeanisation of domestic legislation, however, differences between policy fields 
remain considerable. 
 
This significant body of literature on the Europeanisation of domestic legislation 
proposes that the EU has an influence on legislation on domestic level in terms of its 
sources. Research on lawmaking, that is legislative behaviour at domestic level 
complements this observation. The impact of parliaments on laws is disputed by many 
authors, seen that most bill initiatives are introduced by government and nearly the 
totality of those again are adopted by legislatures (Rasch and Tsebelis, 2011, p. 270ff). 
However, some scholars suggest that parliaments reveal to be “of greater significance to 
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policy outcomes than scholars have generally appreciated” (Martin and Vanberg, 2011, 
p. 5).  
 
The legislative process may serve to control the coalition partner for agency drift, as 
Martin and Vanberg (2011) argue. Parliaments, amongst other, serve parties in 
government to control their ministers, most importantly through lawmaking. This 
legislative scrutiny is necessary because the discretion a minister enjoys due to his/her 
more general information advantage. Depending on the likelihood of scrutiny, and its 
costs for the minister (drawing on his/her reputation and the possible impact on the 
relationship to the coalition partners), a minister will introduce bills according to his/her 
preferences, thus increasing the importance of preference divergence between coalition 
partners. Scrutiny and amendment of bills will therefore depend on the respective 
preference divergence between coalition partners (ibid. 2011, p. 23f).  
 
The conclusion that legislatures serve to resolve cabinet tension is certainly extending the 
view on the functions of parliaments. Similar to other authors (Mattson and Strøm, 2004; 
Strøm, 1990), Martin and Vanberg point to the importance of committees in retrieving 
information, creating expertise and modify bill initiatives. The Luxembourgish 
parliament ranks third out of 16 parliaments on Martin and Vanberg’s “Policy Strength 
Score”, which is based on eight variables on committee strength and authority to modify 
government bills.270 This implies that they consider the Chamber as strong legislature 
                                                          
270 Those variables are: The number of legislative committees, the correspondence to ministerial 
jurisdictions, the size of committees, binding plenary debate before committee stage, the right to compel 
witnesses and documents, rewriting authority, the urgency procedure, and the Guillotine procedure.  
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well equipped to allow the governing parties to monitor the coalition partners’ ministers 
(Martin and Vanberg, 2011, p. 42ff).  
 
Subsequently, they assume that bills dividing the coalition partners attract more attention 
in the legislative process than other bills. Attention in this case means scrutiny and is 
measured by the length of the legislative process. Martin and Vanberg discover that 
strong legislatures spend more time on bills: In strong parliaments a bill initiative takes 
longer to go through the legislative process than in weak parliaments (average lifespan of 
105 to 75 days respectively). In order to account for the content of the scrutiny, Martin 
and Vanberg examine the amendment of bill initiatives. They find that on average 30% of 
sub-articles are changed in strong as well as in weak legislatures. The more time bills 
spend in parliament the greater the divisiveness of the policy.  
 
7.2.2. Evaluating research on the Europeanisation of legislation and lawmaking 
After the presentation of findings of previous research in the field, we shall point to two 
major problems of research on the Europeanisation of legislation and lawmaking. The 
first shortcoming regards measurement questions in comparative research on the sources 
of domestic law. The second point concerns rather what has not been done yet instead of 
what has been done in legislative studies. 
 
A closer look at the figures mentioned concerning the Europeanisation of domestic 
legislation unearths measurement problems: There is no general agreement on how to 
operationalise the Europeanisation of legislation (Göler, 2009; König and Mäder, 2009; 
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Raunio and Wiberg, 2010, p. 77f; Töller, 2010, 2008). Whereas this is less crucial for 
single case studies, it is especially important for comparative research to utilise tools 
applicable and meaningful in more than one national setting. Discrepancies are hardly 
avoidable given financial and temporal limits (Müller et al., 2010).  
 
The choice of the research design heavily influences results. The figures scholars of the 
Europeanisation of national legislation came up with so far are not comparable for three 
reasons: Firstly, the units of analysis differ. While some scholars take into account 
secondary legislation, others account for primary legislation too. Different EU 
instruments imply different impacts. Hard law, such as regulations and directives leave 
their footprint in the national legislation. Directives especially occupy NPs with 
transposition and implementation. Policy areas of positive integration are built to correct 
markets and distinguish from negative integration areas, which establish markets. This is 
important because member states differ in their practices of implementation. If we aim at 
evaluating who governs, we need to take into account all different forms of legal acts.  
 
Some authors suggest summing up national legislation and directly applicable EU law, 
such as regulations, to calculate the Europeanisation of domestic regulation (Hoppe, 
2009, p. 168). The same could be stated about decisions of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), which are directly binding for all member states. Even more, as Töller (2010, p. 
430) points out, non-decisions could also be caused by the European integration. 
However, the EU preventing the drafting of national legislation and a resulting non-
decision increases the relative share of Europeanised decisions. It does not lead to an 
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underestimation of the effect of European integration. Quite the contrary and we argue 
that taking into account non-decisions is therefore irrelevant for the purpose of measuring 
the European impact on national legislation. 
 
Secondly, definitions of what comprises an Europeanised legislative act are not the same 
in these empirical studies. For the UK, only legal acts transposing a directive were taken 
into account, whereas for Germany, government reasoning in the explanatory note 
defines an Europeanised law. Brouard and colleagues (2012d) count indirect influences 
within the text bodies of laws as European impulse defining a Europeanised legal act. In 
the first case, Europeanisation of legislation equals the amount of implementing 
legislation. In the last case, also indirect effects are taken into account in order to defend 
against criticism of underestimating the impact.  
 
Thirdly, policy fields are not independent from each other. Most policy areas have some 
impact on the national budget and as such, eventually emanate a European impact on 
other fields not directly concerned by European integration (for examples see Töller 
(2010, p. 431)).  
 
Apart from questions concerning the comparability of findings, some authors argue for 
introducing qualitative indicators on the importance of the respective legislative acts. It 
might be that most of the EU impact concerns technical regulations rather than policy-
making essential to domestic politics. For example, content and monetary implications 
account for the importance of a law. Again, findings are policy specific and Europeanised 
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important laws amount to one fourth to one third of laws causing costs in Germany, 
whereas Europeanised laws only represent around 15% among all the identified “key 
laws” (König and Mäder, 2008, p. 450ff). 
 
Apart from measurement issues concerning the question “Who governs?” in the EU 
member states, legislative studies so far did not give a satisfying overview of the impact 
of European integration on domestic lawmaking. We know little about if and how 
domestic legislative procedures changed regarding EU matters in the last twenty years. 
This is probably due to the fact that it is difficult to isolate the cause of institutional and 
procedural developments at domestic level. The contributions in Brouard and colleagues 
(2012c) make a first attempt to get a closer insight. The finding that Europeanised laws 
are more often amended in some legislatures for instance is not a final result and requires 
further investigation.  
 
Another valuable exception is the contribution of Spreitzer and Timmermans (2014) on 
the link between consensus politics within the parliaments of the Benelux-countries and 
European integration. Their study shows that differences between domestic settings do 
not allow drawing general conclusions on the question so far.  For Luxembourg, the trend 
towards more unanimity and the inclusion of the opposition in the committee chair 
allocation shows that consensus has increased. European integration may help such 




In the next section the response of this thesis on those drawbacks of research on the 
Europeanisation of domestic legislation and lawmaking is highlighted. It takes stock of 
the specific added value of this thesis to the research area. 
 
7.2.3. Originality and contribution of this thesis to research on the Europeanisation 
of domestic legislation and lawmaking 
The contribution of this thesis lies in its holistic approach. It combines indicators for the 
Europeanisation of legislation as well as lawmaking and affords an in-depth view on 
legislative scrutiny.  Within this study, the problem of biasedness in single-sector policy 
analysis is avoided through an investigation of the whole population of laws adopted 
between 1999 and 2011. We offer a full account of the Europeanisation of legislation and 
lawmaking in the period of investigation. In the analysis of the sources of laws, we 
refrained however from introducing yet another measure for the Europeanisation of 
legislation. Instead, this study clearly aims at improving the possibilities for comparative 
research by focussing on the most basic concept, that is laws transposing directives as 
opposed to laws of other origin.  
 
We not only included quantitative indicators for the evaluation of the Europeanisation of 
lawmaking, but a qualitative analysis too. What is more, this contribution attempts an 
investigation of the most pertinent fora and actors within parliament, be it the 
parliamentary committees, or public sessions. At the same time, we take into account 
party political factors when we evaluate the risk for agency loss by the differences of 




Five important insights could be added regarding the Europeanisation of legislation and 
lawmaking. Firstly, the basic assumption of an ever growing influence of EU policy-
making on domestic legislation was qualified by the diminishing number of EU 
legislative acts. Secondly, we must remain conscious that enlargement has had a major 
impact on the say of single ministers at EU level. This study showed that such a decrease 
in discretion in the Council of the EU provokes collaboration between parliament and 
government at domestic level for the defence of a national interest. Ministers make use of 
new opportunities offered to NPs at domestic level. Although not restricted by a mandate, 
they may still use the parliament in order to push towards their position in EU level 
negotiations. The possibility of doing so is not restricted by the legislature. The control of 
government was not increased whereas the European institutions now are subject to 
increased overview. This finding fits to what Martin (2000) brought up: Strong 
legislatures may help government negotiating at supranational level. 
 
Thirdly, while laws transposing directives again proved to be more often amended than 
other laws, this thesis shed light on the causes of this result. Not the scrutiny of 
government accounted for more amendments in this case, but the differences in the 
quality of law proposals. Laws transposing directives were often poorly drafted, be it 
because of the complexity of the matter at stake, be it because of the low priority 




Fourthly, confirming Haverland et al. (2011), the inclusion of parliament in transposition 
was not the reason for delay. Rather, the argument of speed serves as reason drawn upon 
by government mainly to further exclude MPs from transposition. Instead, the late 
introduction of law initiatives for transposition by government accounted for the 
transposition deficit. Sometimes the deadline has already passed when parliament only 
received the bill. What is more, the involvement of the State Council extends the length 
of the legislative procedure. Laws transposing a directive and other laws generally spend 
the same amount of time in parliament.   
 
Fifth and finally, this finding has consequences on the use of the length of the legislative 
procedure as an indicator for scrutiny strength. Parliament is not the only actor 
influencing the duration of the process. Conclusions drawn on the basis of such indicator 
alone, as Martin and Vanberg (2011) for instance do, have to be taken with caution. This 
study thus proposed a Legislative scrutiny index (LSI), based on the share of amendments 
and not unanimously adopted bills adding to the length of the legislative process. This 
indicator for legislative scrutiny established in the previous section 7.1.2 could be 
investigated in comparative research in order to see whether the findings on the Chamber 
are echoed in other assemblies too.  
 
7.3. Research on parliamentary control instruments and EU matters 
The second literature strand to which this thesis contributes is research on parliamentary 
control instruments and their value for the parliamentary control of EU matters. More 
particularly, different research fields deal with parliamentary questions (PQs) as 
387 
 
instruments of parliamentary control, the budgetary procedure, motions of censure and 
enquiry committees. As we have done in the review of research on the Europeanisation of 
legislation and lawmaking (compare with section 7.2), we firstly outline the findings of 
scholars in the different areas and secondly give a critical evaluation of this research. In 
the final part, we outline the contribution of the present thesis to the findings of previous 
research. 
 
7.3.1. Research and recent findings on parliamentary control instruments and EU 
matters 
Members of parliament may ask ministers to respond to specific investigations by means 
of PQs. “All democratic parliaments have some procedures to allow representatives to 
put questions to ministers.” (Russo and Wiberg, 2010, p. 215), and so does the 
Luxembourgish Chamber of Deputies where every MP has the right to pose PQs to the 
government. Russo and Wiberg (2010) identify 14 different functions questions may 
exercise, starting with “to request information” and ending with “to create elements of 
excitement and drama” (ibid. 2010, p. 217f). In their detailed account of the use of PQs, 
Rozenberg and Martin (2011, pp. 394–404) divide those multiple functions into two 
categories: Based on case studies,271 they summarize that PQs serve to study legislators 
as well as legislatures, thus distinguishing between the meaning of PQs at micro- and a 
macro-level.  
 
                                                          
271 The case studies treat the national parliaments (Lower Chambers) of Belgium (Dandoy, 2011), Canada 
(Blidook and Kerby, 2011), Italy (Russo, 2011), Norway (Rasch, 2011), Switzerland (Bailer, 2011) and UK 
(Saalfeld, 2011). Compare with in the special issue of the Journal of Legislative Studies (Vol.17, No.3, 
September 2011).  
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At micro-level, PQs offer a measure for the behaviour and preferences of individual MPs, 
relatively unbiased from party discipline. Research on PQs gives an insight on the 
motivation of MPs, be it office-, vote- or policy-seeking. PQs enable opposition parties to 
put points on the agenda, which majority wanted to avoid or which are less in their 
interest. As such, they may serve MPs and political factions in parliament to profile 
themselves and citizens as well as media may follow those controversies at the 
parliamentary stage (Norton, 1993; Rozenberg and Martin, 2011). 
 
On the macro-level, PQs give an indication of the role of parliament in the political 
system. PQs serve to hold government accountable. It fits to the finding of Russo and 
Wiberg (2010, p. 215), that PQs become less significant if government holds a broad 
majority in parliament, when Rozenberg and Martin (2011, p. 400) conclude that PQs 
become less attractive as an instrument in legislatures of high policy-making influence. In 
a principal agent perspective, PQs serve to counterbalance information asymmetry and 
agency loss. Compared to 16 European countries, the Luxembourgish parliament is well 
equipped with questioning tools. Similar to PQs in the Belgian federal assemblies, their 
potential to obtain information is however considered rather low, not least because of the 
rather long time span of one month the minister may take to respond to written PQs. 
Instead, PQs may be better apt to push a topic on the agenda and provoke debate 
(Dumont and De Winter, 2003, p. 487f; Russo and Wiberg, 2010, p. 223).  
 
Most studies on PQs are based on a content analysis and the investigation of PQs with 
regard to their EU-relatedness is not new. Most importantly, Bergman and Damgaard 
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(2000) have introduced PQs as one indicator for parliamentary control in EU matters in 
their edited volume on delegation and accountability in European integration. Their case 
studies treat three Nordic EU member states: Denmark, Finland and Sweden, and 
evaluate the use of PQs, interpellations, plenary debates, specialised committees etc. in 
EU matters. Damgaard and Nørgaard demonstrate in their contribution to the volume how 
the EU committee of the Folketinget increased questioning ministers between 1972/73 
and 1997/98 (Damgaard and Nørgaard, 2000, p. 45). For Finland, we learn that an EU-
link exists in around 10% of the PQs asked between 1991 and 1998 in the Eduskunta 
(Raunio and Wiberg, 2000a, p. 71f). Raunio and Wiberg measure this EU link by 
searching for the keyword “EU-“ in the text bodies of PQs. For the Swedish Riksdag, 
Hegeland and Mattson (2000, p. 91) find that 10 to 13% of the PQs dealt with EU matters 
in four subsequent parliamentary years between 1994/5 and 1997/8. It is not mentioned 
how exactly the authors measure “EU-relatedness” in the Swedish case.  
 
Ten years later, Raunio and Wiberg (2010) still propose that research on EU scrutiny 
"…must extend beyond European Affairs Committees". They assume the share of PQs on 
EU matters to be low for the Finnish case, as information on EU matters may be retrieved 
from other sources more easily and the interest of citizens in European integration is 
rather low and thus not important for re-election (Raunio and Wiberg, 2010, p. 82). Their 
hypotheses can be confirmed with 3% of written PQs and 8% of oral PQs issued between 
1995 and 2007 dealing with EU matters (Raunio and Wiberg, 2010, p. 88). Those 
percentages are below the 10% of PQs on EU matters found between 1991 and 1998. 
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After EU accession in 1995, the interest of MPs in EU matters seems to have decreased in 
Finland.  
 
Apart from PQs, the budgetary procedure is in the focus of attention of scholars of NPs. 
Research in this area of legislative budgeting is rather scarce when it comes to the 
parliaments of the EU member states individually or in comparative perspective. The 
field is however expected to grow, seen the most recent developments at European level 
with regards to the EU economic governance (compare with the last section in this thesis 
on the outlook on future research).  
 
Some scholars already made a welcome exception to this rule. Leston-Bandeira (1999) 
shows for the Portuguese parliament that the budgetary procedure is of major importance 
for the scrutiny of government. Budgetary control has been rationalised and 
parliamentary influence strengthened.  In comparative perspective, Wehner’s (2010) 
contribution on “Legislatures and the budget process” establishes an index of legislative 
budget institutions. The index is based upon two sub-indexes on powers and organisation. 
In total, six variables are considered for their calculation: Amendment powers, 
reversionary budgets and executive flexibility comprise the formal legislative authority 
(powers sub-index). Time, committees and research capacity constitute the organisational 
capacity of a legislature (organisation sub-index).  
 
Based on this index, Wehner finds the parliaments of EU member states and among them 
the Chamber in the middle-field of the ranking. Luxembourg obtains a score of 50 on 
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this index, which ranges between 0 and 100. It is judged especially weak when it comes 
to its research capacities and the flexibility of executive during implementation (Wehner, 
2010, p. 54). Wehner clearly states that assumptions on the strength and weakness of 
legislatures are misplaced if budgetary procedures are not taken into account (ibid., p. 
58). The variation among parliaments suggests that budgetary control is a question of 
resources as well as institutional independence from government. If parliaments have an 
impact on spending, they may push towards spending rather than austerity. Wehner 
concludes that institutional features may have large effect on the establishment of a 
legislature that is “both powerful as well as fiscally responsible” (ibid., p. 141). 
 
Apart from PQs and budgetary control, we have dealt with other rare instruments of 
parliamentary control in our empirical chapter five. Those instruments were motions of 
censure and other motions, as well as enquiry committees. Regarding motions of 
censure, some scholars investigate government formation and resignation and 
parliamentary involvement. De Winter (1995) puts Luxembourg in the context of 
Western European political systems. He rightly claims that Luxembourg has no formal 
investiture vote on a new government, but an informal practice to confirm government 
after the outline of the government programme (see also Reimen and Krecké (1999, p. 
47ff)). Luxembourg thus ranges among the deviant cases when it comes to the type of 
government installed and the formal rules on investiture votes (Martin et al., 2012). With 
regard to government resignation, Luxembourg represents a case where government 
would resign after the defeat on a major bill but rarely did so, although a simple majority 




Finally, Enquiry committees may be installed in almost all parliaments (Pelizzo and 
Stapenhurst, 2004, p. 11). Little research has been done on the reasons for their 
establishment and the consequences of their work. One valuable exception is provided by 
Syrier (2013), who has examined the European Parliament’s investigative function to 
outbalance “accountability deficits” by enquiry committees amongst others. Their use 
remains however limited in the EP and it may thus be concluded that their potential is not 
fully exhausted.  
 
7.3.2. Evaluating research on parliamentary control instruments and EU matters  
With some exceptions, research on parliamentary control instruments which are of less 
common use is scarce.  Most research has been done on parliamentary questions (PQs), 
not least regarding their use in EU matters. Similar to the research on the Europeanisation 
of legislation, measurement problems exist with regard to the Europeanisation of PQs. 
For instance, most studies do not outline the method of their investigation in clear terms. 
The comparability of findings is thus not guaranteed. In terms of case selection, again 
most research has been done on the Nordic parliaments, especially so regarding the 
question of their use in EU matters.  
 
The investigation of budgetary procedures would benefit from in-depth investigations 
of single cases in order to increase our knowledge in how far the EU impacts on 
parliamentary financial oversight at domestic level. Subsequently, comparative research 
should shed light on the patterns across the EU. Similarly, enquiry committees and the 
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influence of parliament on government formation and resignation should be 
investigated further, not least with regard to the question whether the EU plays a role in 
this area of control instruments, as a subject matter or in formal terms. 
 
7.3.3. Originality and contribution of this thesis to research on parliamentary 
control instruments and EU matters 
The findings of this present study fit well into the general tenor of research on PQs in 
qualitative as well as quantitative terms. PQs prove not to be the favourite instrument of 
MPs when it comes to European matters. Or put the other way round: European matters 
are no preferred topic of MPs. What is more, PQs serve a plenitude of functions, and 
signalling activity to the electorate is one of the more common ones. This thesis is 
innovative when it comes to propose different measures for the investigation of PQs and 
their EU link, giving a varying degree of insight in the content and breath in terms of 
period covered.  
 
Furthermore, this study has investigated the Luxembourgish budget procedure regarding 
EU influence and the control of government in EU matters. To the knowledge of the 
author, no such enterprise has been attempted before. Similar may be stated about the 




7.4. Research on the parliamentary control of EU matters 
A third branch of literature is concerned with EU scrutiny in a more narrow sense. 
Scholars in this area may well be described as the pioneers of research concerned with 
NPs in the EU. Their activity guided the first institutional adaptations of NPs with regard 
to EU matters. As of the 1990s, political scientists were thus challenged to investigate 
and explain the variation of EU control mechanisms established in NPs. Most recently, 
authors of EU scrutiny are concerned with the consequences of the Lisbon Treaty for NPs 
in the EU. The next pages outline the development and findings of the field. Thereafter, 
the results are critically examined in order to evaluate the originality and added value of 
the present thesis. 
 
7.4.1. Research and recent findings on the parliamentary control of EU matters 
The large body of literature concerned with the scrutiny of EU affairs has developed in 
three waves. In a first period, scholars discovered the institutional adaptation processes 
within NPs (Adamcová, 2004; Maurer and Wessels, 2001a, 2001b; Office of the 
Hungarian National Assembly, 2004; Posch, 2004; Szalay, 2005; Vehar, 2004; Záluszký, 
2004). The findings point to the fact that although some formal givens of EACs might be 
similar, their functioning and nature varies between member states (Kiiver, 2006, p. 43ff).  
 
Scrutiny differs between legislatures in terms of working style, nature and timing. 
Regarding the working style, in some parliaments it is EACs which deal with European 
affairs only (Jacobs et al., 2007, p. 332). Other NPs engage specialized committees or the 
plenary with scrutiny. The nature of scrutiny, regarding the relationship between 
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parliament and government, might be supportive or instructive and controlling. Finally, 
scrutiny might be applied ex-ante, before the bargain has taken place in the Council, or 
ex-post, when ministers reached an agreement.  
 
The main achievement of these studies lies in the evaluation of the strength of the 
respective EU scrutiny settings, with mostly the Danish, Austrian, Swedish and Finnish 
parliaments ranging among the most powerful parliaments (Bergman, 2000b; Maurer and 
Wessels, 2001a). The Luxembourgish Chamber of Deputies, we learn from this literature, 
maintains a rather “low profile” when it comes to the scrutiny of EU affairs: The 
respective procedures, after the entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, rest 
informal and ineffective, as some scholars claim (Bossaert, 2001, p. 311). Not least its 
size, but also owing to the specific Luxembourgish political culture make the parliament 
a “slow adapter” (Maurer and Wessels, 2001b, p. 462f).  
 
Research on the actual use of scrutiny settings have challenged the power rankings 
based on institutional givens. A second strand of literature focuses on behavioural 
aspects. The formal organisation of scrutiny does not inform about the actual scrutiny 
practice. Formal scrutiny powers are only the necessary condition for legislative 
oversight. Scholars realised that some of the strongest legislatures in terms of EU scrutiny 
did not live up to their granted powers. Instead, those legislatures chose not to bind 




Two reasons were found for this strategy: Firstly, legislatures are confronted with the so-
called “scrutiny dilemma” (Auel and Benz, 2006; Auel, 2005; Benz, 2004). Especially 
when it comes to ex-ante instruction of ministers for negotiating at EU level, NPs are 
reluctant to impose too strict instructions. A tight mandating might block decisions in the 
Council of the EU and/or lead to suboptimal negotiation results. Or as Bergman puts it: 
“Even the most rigid mandate must be open for reconsideration.” (1997, p. 379). 
Parliaments are confronted with a trade-off between control/suboptimal negotiation 
results and discretion/agency loss. This is why some of the mandating parliaments, such 
as the Austrian Nationalrat or the Danish Folketinget, do not exploit their full potential of 
EU scrutiny.  
 
Secondly, party politics determine the way how legislatures control governments in EU 
affairs (Norton, 1996a, p. 192ff). When the majority within a parliament does not 
challenge government, the two institutions stop acting autonomously. This so-called 
“Monism”, a more general phenomenon in parliamentary government, appears when 
parties are the dividing line, instead of institutions (Holzhacker, 2007a, p. 145). European 
integration was found to further increase the fusion of executive and legislatures, as 
cooperation with the government was necessary in order to carry out effective scrutiny in 
EU matters. Information asymmetries required parliament to draw on government if it 
wished to more closely follow EU level actualities (Börzel and Sprungk, 2007). 
 
In a third wave, research on EU scrutiny systems started comparing the embeddedness 
within the national context and how variations of these structures could be explained. 
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Based on studies of comparative politics, some scholars drew on the ambitious aim of 
going beyond rankings and classifications. Instead of investigating their consequences, 
EU scrutiny settings became the DV in the analysis. They frame the strength of EU 
scrutiny path-dependent and bound to parliaments’ traditions and contexts.  
 
Bergman (2000b, 1997) was among the first to search for the causes for the specific form 
of parliamentary oversight structures in EU matters. His model was based upon three 
strands of theoretical literature: Cultural theory, Institutionalism and Rational Choice 
theory. Political culture, the party system, public opinion, the type of government, 
Federalism and accession timing were found to matter (Bergman, 1997). Apart from 
Bergman, Pahre (1997) approached the explanation of EU scrutiny as a two-level game 
based on party politics. A couple of years later, Rozenberg (2002) discovered that 
satisfaction with democracy plays a role in determining EU scrutiny strength. 
Furthermore, Saalfeld (2005) pointed to the importance of the type of government.  
 
Raunio (Raunio and Wiberg, 2000b; Raunio, 2005b) framed the strength of EU scrutiny 
in the 15 old EU member states within four explanatory variables: The political culture, 
the party system, the general relationship between executive and legislature, and the 
public opinion towards European integration. Especially the latter two variables were 
considered most important in explaining the strength of a legislature in EU scrutiny. His 
findings were threefold: Firstly, the introduction of EACs did not represent a fundamental 
system change within NPs. The main power relations within legislatures, represented by 




Secondly, attitudes of citizens concerning European integration add to determine the EU 
scrutiny arrangement: The more Euro-sceptic the population, the stronger parliamentary 
control in EU affairs (Raunio, 2005b, p. 34). Thirdly, findings concerning the relevance 
of political culture, operationalised as the share of non-Catholics/non-Orthodox 
population, for determining scrutiny models turned out to be mixed. The relevance of 
political culture, operationalised as the share of non-catholic/orthodox population, 
remained inconclusive for determining scrutiny models.  
 
Finally, and not least, a general political culture variable is certainly less insightful for the 
subject matter than the party system, generally acknowledged among comparative 
scholars as the most important factor influencing the relationship between government 
and parliament. Majority rules and minority rights are essential principles within 
democracies. As Holzhacker explains,  
“one of the reasons that national parliamentary scrutiny is so important for 
increasing the legitimacy and participation in the process of European decision-
making is that it is the primary institutional source for receiving input from 
opposition parties” (Holzhacker, 2007a, p. 144).  
EACs offer opportunity for criticising the governmental line in EU affairs, for both, 
opposition and governmental backbenchers (Ladrech, 2010, p. 86f).  
 
More recently, further attempts were made to explain EU scrutiny settings in the narrow 
sense. Hamerly (2007) added the timing of accession as important variable in the 
explanatory model for 25 member states. And indeed, Spreitzer and Pigeonnier (2012) 
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find that accession timing and political culture to explain EU scrutiny strength of all EU 
member states.  
 
Finally, Karlas (2011) tried to explain why the parliamentary control of EU affairs varies 
across the ten Central and Eastern European EU member states despite the same timing 
of their EU accession. He considered four explanatory factors: Public Euro-scepticism, 
party Euro-scepticism, the general power of the parliament, and the frequency of minority 
governments. His analysis revealed that the variation of EU scrutiny can be explained by 
the varying power of parliaments, while the timing of EU accession might explain a 
basic similarity of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) control systems.  
 
In his follow-up article, Karlas (2012) entered parliament internal and party system 
features into the analysis on the EU-27 member states. His explanatory model of EU 
scrutiny strength was based on seven explanatory factors: Party system fragmentation, 
party Euro-scepticism, public Euro-scepticism, the government type (minority, coalition 
government), the strength of the committee system and the year of accession. Committee 
strength and party system fragmentation reveal to best explain EU scrutiny strength. 
Karlas’ main contribution lies in a complex operationalisation of EU scrutiny strength, 
based on behavioural and structural indicators.  
 
Those different attempts for explanation result in different rankings and attributions of 
EU scrutiny strength. The Luxembourgish Chamber of Deputies thoroughly holds places 
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at the bottom end of all of these rankings. Its EU scrutiny strength is evaluated to be very 
low compared to the other NPs in the EU (Table 28). 
 
Table 28: The Luxembourgish parliament in the ranking of explanatory models of scrutiny strength 
Author Ranking  
Bergman (2000b) 12 (lowest scrutiny strength: 15) 
Raunio (2005b) 0.17 (highest scrutiny strength: 0.83) 
Hamerly (2007) 1 (highest scrutiny strength: 4) 
Karlas (2012) 20 (lowest scrutiny strength: 22) 
 
Most recently, scholars of NPs in the EU are intrigued to investigate the consequences of 
the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions on subsidiarity and proportionality control 
(Buzogány and Stuchlik, 2011; Jančić, 2012; Kiiver, 2012; Raunio, 2011). They conclude 
that the provisions so far have had rather modest effect on the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU. Not least, its practical application has been very critically judged as 
“bureaucratisation” rather than “democratisation” of the EU (Christiansen et al., 2013). 
Christiansen and colleagues rightly state that the EWM requires a “vertical” coordination 
between NPs, if the desired outcome is having an impact on EU policy-making. 
Similarly, an increase in administrative resources was required, given the quantity of EU 
documents to screen.  
 
Christiansen and colleagues develop three propositions regarding which NPs will wish to 
use the EWM: Firstly, parliaments with strong mandating powers are less likely to focus 
on the EWM, whereas “weak” second chambers are assumed to use the EWM as an 
opportunity to increase their role. Secondly, resources are important for parliamentary 
reform and smaller as well as poorer countries are less likely to act. Finally, the 
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executive-legislative relationship might hinder adaptation, if majority government and 
strong party discipline are in place (Christiansen et al., 2013, p. 8). NPs staff is supposed 
to preselect important EU documents and coordinate increasingly among each other. 
Thus, Christiansen and his colleagues expect an increase in the number of NPs’ staff 
concerned with the EWM (Christiansen et al., 2013, p. 14). Bureaucratisation is due to 
the fact that the administration preselects EU documents of importance to subsidiarity 
and proportionality control. Depending on the traditional role of parliamentary 
administration, staff concerned with EU matters may be servicing the political decision-
maker only, or steer the process.  
 
Summing up, researches have been very actively following the possibilities and activities 
of NPs in the EU. The following section will critically review the development and 
findings of research on EU scrutiny.  
 
7.4.2. Evaluating research on EU scrutiny  
Altogether, research on parliamentary oversight of EU affairs so far has brought us 
valuable insights on executive-legislative relations and has revealed possible reasons for 
institutionalisation. Three points of criticism must be added though: Firstly, and related to 
Raunio and Wiberg (2010), many authors frame EU scrutiny in diverging and narrow 
sense. When we consider EU scrutiny as the control of government in EU related matters, 
why should conventional scrutiny instruments we know from comparative politics not 
apply? Scrutiny is not only a question of NPs mandating government in international 




In comparative politics, parliamentary control may be exerted via questions, 
interpellations, enquiry committees, budgetary decisions and the committee work more 
generally. Strøm (1990, p. 70ff) for instance measures parliamentary control based on 
committee features. He argues that the higher the number of committees, fixed areas of 
specialisation, permanence, their correspondence to ministerial departments and the 
proportional distribution of committee chairs increase opposition influence and 
parliamentary control. Multiple committee membership of MPs on the contrary decreases 
their specialisation and makes members less apt to influence a legislative proposal.  
 
A second point of criticism, which is related to the narrow concept of EU scrutiny applied 
in many studies, concerns the conclusions drawn after the investigation of EU scrutiny. 
Evaluations of the strength of parliaments vis-à-vis their governments are premature, 
when only looking at EU scrutiny systems. Policy-making does not only consist in 
decision-making. Whilst parliamentary control on EU matters concerns policy formation 
and adoption, which is taken at supranational level and without the direct participation of 
NPs, we argue that the concentration of the focus on decision-making leads to an 
overestimation of executive power.  
 
On the one hand, and contrary to what happens at the national level, single governments 
alone are not master of the agenda at Council meetings specifically and at European level 
more generally. While agenda setting is an important instrument of executive power at 
national level, at EU level it is done by the 28 member states together with a major say of 
403 
 
the country holding the presidency at the time (Laver and Shepsle, 1994, p. 294). We thus 
propose taking into account both dimensions of parliament-government relations: 
Scrutiny as well as lawmaking. It is certainly useful to know what factors determine 
scrutiny strength at domestic level, knowledge about parliamentary oversight in EU 
matters tells us little about the general strength of NPs vis-à-vis their governments.  
 
Research has, until now, only partly assessed executive-legislative relations when looking 
at EU scrutiny mechanisms. In order to evaluate the strength of a legislature, in addition 
to decision-making, one further step in the policy cycle has to be taken into account: The 
transposition of EU legislation into domestic law. While NPs are excluded from 
negotiations in the Council of the EU, the implementation stage is where they step in the 
game again. 
 
Apart from the Council, it is the European Commission which proposes legislative acts 
and the EP which acts as co-legislator (at least since the Lisbon Treaty). The more actors 
involved at EU level, the less leverage a government has. Apart from being co-legislator, 
the EP as well as the Commission proved being allies to domestic legislators and willing 
to foster transparency and the opening of the decision-making process to NPs and the 
broader public. On the other hand, and not less important, governments’ negotiation 
power does depend on how credible they are able to threaten the use of a veto as well as 
to give commitments. The early inclusion of NPs in the formulation of the national 
position and a strong mandating system can be a “democratic asset” (Martin, 2000, p. 
190). It improves the credibility of government being able to implement to what it 
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commits to and with implementation, NPs enter the game again (Laursen, 2005; Martin, 
2000).  
 
The third point of criticism on research done so far on EU scrutiny is a methodological 
one. Most studies do not link findings on EU induced change in executive-legislative 
relations to their actual cause: EU decision-making. Depending on the policy field, the 
competence-mix between EU and domestic institutions differ and as such are domestic 
policy sectors unequally concerned by an EU impulse. Whereas for example 58% of 
Luxembourgish laws in the area of Banking and Finance and 52% in the area of Civil 
rights refer to EU policy-making, sectors such as Public lands/Water management 
(2.7%), Immigration (4.2%) or Housing (7.7%) are least concerned by European 
integration (Dumont and Spreitzer, 2012). Actors concerned with different policy fields 
are not exposed in the same way to European integration procedures. 
 
More importantly, NPs are not unitary actors. Scholars looking on the impact of the EU 
on NPs mostly deal with EU committees. Other actors within the parliament largely 
escaped scholarly attention up to now. Depending on the internal procedures within 
parliament, they might however be concerned by the growing legislative activity at EU 
level. Referring to the findings of Europeanisation of legislation by policy sector some 
committees, such as the Economic committee for instance, face a large amount of policy 
initiatives stemming from the EU, while other committees, such as the Defence 
committee, are much less concerned by European integration. Findings concerned with 
the impact of EU policy-making on national legislation have to be taken into account by 
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scholars of domestic legislatures and further conclusions have to be drawn on how the 
different fora within NPs adapt to such impact. What is more, we know little about the 
kind of EU legislative initiatives with regard to domestic legislative activities. Does 
European lawmaking substitute or complement national lawmaking? Do parliaments just 
continue law production in other fields, and hence succeed in “better regulation”?  
 
According to the abdication thesis, areas of exclusive EU competence are the ones where 
governments enjoy the highest agency drift, whereas areas of shared competence only 
partly escape from national parliaments’ attention. Consequently, in areas where the EU 
is not competent, national legislatures maintain the hitherto existing relationship with the 
government. But which kind of relationship have parliaments and governments 
traditionally maintained? Europeanisation research would benefit from including findings 
of comparative politics and legislative studies into its considerations. While empirical 
studies show that the EU impact on national legislation and lawmaking is rather modest, 
scholars of legislative studies attribute to legislatures in lawmaking a rather modest 
impact (Norton, 1996a, p. 14). Legislative power again is about constraining government. 
Parliaments do not produce laws on their own. Rather, they take part in a joint venture, 
where first and foremost the government, but also other actors, such as interest groups, 
are committed.  
 
For different reasons, such as resources and expertise at their disposal, it is mostly 
governments that propose laws. This leads to the question in how far NPs are capable of 
influencing the outcome of the legislative process even at national level. The so-called 
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“Mezey-question” was extensively dealt with in literature (Arter, 2006a, 2006b). Findings 
concluded with the application of the 90%-rule: Government proposes 90% of bills and 
gets them through in 90% of the cases. But even when a change in the domestic power 
balance of government-parliament relations is observed, it has to be proven that European 
integration was the actual cause of this change (Haverland, 2007). Developments at 
domestic or international level do not pass unseen. The danger of Europeanisation 
research lies in tautological arguments, such as explaining Europeanisation by the EU. 
Establishing a strong causal link mostly depends on the research design. As in most areas 
of political science, randomisation is impossible. We are not able to randomly assign EU 
influence and see effects on national parliaments’ actors or fora. 
 
The fourth and final point of criticism concerns the question of who is targeted by EU 
scrutiny. The screening of EU documents at proposal stage (in so-called document-based 
systems) and the mandating of government in EU negotiations (in so-called mandating 
systems) are actions of NPs which concern the European institutions on the one hand and 
governments on the other hand. The intentions guiding those activities differ to a large 
extent. While the European institutions are the target of control in the first case, it is 
government in the second case. Targeting the European institutions is led by the aim of 
defending a national interest, if necessary together with government. It may not be 
subsumed under parliamentary control of government as the outcome of decision-making 
at EU level is highly uncertain. Thus, in the analysis, mandating systems and document-
based systems are not the extreme points of a single EU scrutiny dimension, but instead 




7.4.3. Originality and contribution of this thesis to research on EU scrutiny 
This study responds to all above-mentioned points of criticism which were raised 
regarding previous literature on EU scrutiny. The originality of this study lies firstly in 
the framing of EU scrutiny in a broader sense. Not only subsidiarity and proportionality 
matters or mandates to government in EU level negotiations are investigated, but 
legislative scrutiny and other control instruments as well. The internal structure of 
parliament is taken into account in order to estimate the potential for EU scrutiny.  
Secondly, this thesis aims at avoiding an overestimation of executive power. It not only 
focusses on decision-making as well as lawmaking (and transposition) but explicitly takes 
into account the question of EU policy-making and discretion of ministers in the Council 
of the EU.  Thirdly, we take into account EU influences on different fora within 
parliament as all plenary and committee proceedings concerning lawmaking and 
parliamentary control are investigated. 
 
More particularly, we may qualify the findings concerning a fusion between the 
executive and the legislative as outlined by Börzel and Sprungk (2007) in the German 
case. Since 2007, when this book contribution was published, important developments 
have led to an overload of information rather than its scarcity. The direct sending of EU 
documents to NPs as initiated by the Barroso-initiative in 2005 (compare with section 
6.1.2) and the increase of parliamentary staff and resources regarding EU scrutiny in the 
narrow sense have improved the information of NPs. The complicity of parliaments and 
governments in EU matters stems from the fact that member states have lost in voting 
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power in the Council of the EU rather than from the necessity to retrieve information 
from government. In domestic matters, and although we have found an increase of 
sectoral thinking in committees, we witness an increased self-consciousness of parliament 
vis-à-vis government rather. Most importantly, this is expressed by a stricter budgetary 
control. 
 
7.5. Summary and conclusions: Analysis and relevant literature 
This chapter was concerned with a twofold enterprise. Firstly, we proposed a detailed 
analysis of the findings including an outline of the IV and the DVs. The purpose was to 
give a final evaluation of the four hypotheses this thesis aimed to investigate. Secondly, 
we set our findings in the context of the relevant literature on parliamentary control of 
government.  
 
Following the outline of hypotheses which we announced to test within the empirical 
chapters of this thesis, we have come to conclude that deparliamentarisation or 
abdication is not the case for the Chamber of Deputies. Rather, government has lost 
degrees of freedom in EU level negotiations due to the accession of new member states. 
At domestic level, ministers remain to a great extent free from constraints set by 
parliament although the Chamber has increased its expertise in policy matters. Its trust in 
government prevents it from using its rather large arsenal of control instruments. Finally, 
if government lost discretion at EU level, it is not the case when it comes to domestic 
matters where it remained stable. Therefore, no reason was given to the Chamber to 




However, the Luxembourgish parliament was seen to be a reactive institution. 
Adaptation has been made with regard to new opportunities at European level. At an 
early stage, it has informally tested to actively contribute to subsidiarity and 
proportionality checks. Later, those procedures have been formalised and today they 
make the Chamber one of the most active NPs in this formal dialogue with the European 
institutions.  
 
As such, its control activity in European matters mainly targets the European institutions 
rather than the Luxembourgish government. Seen that the latter has lost in discretion and 
as incidences of ministerial initiatives in the context of the EWM suggest, parliament has 
lined up to stand by its government in the defence of national interests at EU level. We 
may therefore speak of executive-legislative complicity in EU matters.  
 
In comparative perspective, the results of this study are surprising because of two 
reasons: Many scholars of NPs in the EU tend to assume a linear increase of 
governmental discretion in EU matters. This has been shown not to be the case and 
research has to acknowledge that unproved assumptions are not a stable basis for 
conclusions to be made. Apart from this basic assumption which has proved untrue, most 
knowledge about NPs in the EU stem from research treating legislatures which limit the 
degrees of freedom of their government in EU negotiations importantly. That a 





The review of relevant literature highlights the added value of this study which firstly 
brings major insight in the functioning of the Luxembourgish parliament and its 
relationship to government. Secondly, it treats all fora of parliament and all major links it 
maintains to government, be it lawmaking or scrutiny. Thirdly, the findings of this thesis 
are based on an examination of formal as well as informal rules and behaviour. It thus 
gives a complete picture of the developments in the period under investigation, that is 




Summary, general conclusions and outlook on future research 
For both, decision-makers and future research, it is of utmost importance to improve our 
understanding of how Europe “hits” national parliaments (NPs) in the EU and how the 
quality of democracy is concerned. This thesis aimed at contributing to explain the 
evolution of parliamentary democracy in the EU. More generally, the link between EU 
policy-making and changes in lawmaking and scrutiny has attracted our attention in this 
study. The starting point was the often proclaimed assumption of a weakening of NPs by 
European integration.  
 
The research literature so far gave valuable insights into the consequences of European 
integration for domestic legislatures. Scholars of NPs in the EU shed light on different 
aspects of the on-going developments. Given the limitations of existing research on the 
Europeanisation of NPs, and although interest in this kind of question is still growing 
after the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, it appears that there is room for 
improvement to our understanding of how NPs and the domestic executive-legislative 
relationship is shaped by European integration. A better comprehension is needed of how 
opportunities offered by the supranational level, and the constraints it sets, influence the 
institutional balance as well as the cross-institutional divisions.  
 
Contrary to single-aspect studies, this thesis attempted to give a larger account of the 
extent of how NPs are concerned by European integration. The venture of evaluating the 
effect of European integration on the Luxembourgish parliament more particularly, and 
its relationship to government, afforded us to take into account parliamentary 
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organisation including all actors and fora, as well as three dimensions of parliamentary 
control. 
 
The first main argument of this thesis is that parliaments have varying capacities to 
control government, depending on their committee structure. It is their internal 
organisation which enables them to establish expertise. The more decentralised a 
legislature is organised the more expertise is facilitated. In this setting, size matters and 
larger parliaments are advantaged when it comes to human resources. Thus, the more 
MPs and the larger the administrative personnel, the more specialisation is possible. The 
small number of MPs hinders the creation of expertise. Over the period of investigation, 
the Structural scrutiny potential (SSP), that is the possibility of an individual MP to 
establish expertise, remained rather stable and at low levels compared to other countries.  
 
Still, the argument of size is to be taken with parsimony. Some possibilities exist to 
facilitate specialisation. The number of committee meetings has increased for instance. 
We covered the use of the potential in a second index, that is the Structural scrutiny 
intensity index (SSI). It takes into account the frequency of committee meetings which 
are of major importance for the establishment of expertise among MPs. The SSI turned 
out to vary during our period of investigation, without showing a general trend towards 
more or less scrutiny intensity (compare with Figure 40 on page 177).  
 
This leads us to conclude that Luxembourgish MPs are generalists rather than specialists, 
but also that their expertise may increase due to the intensified work in parliamentary 
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committees. Chapter three gives an evaluation of the highly decentralized Luxembourgish 
committee system and its opportunities for the establishment of expertise for an effective 
parliamentary control of government. 
 
The second main argument we employed within this study is that parliamentary control 
in EU matters may draw upon a plenitude of instruments at hands of MPs. It is 
multidimensional and based upon three pillars. Their investigation and the conditions of 
their employment allowed us to approach an overall evaluation of the Europeanisation of 
NPs.  The first pillar is based on lawmaking and legislative scrutiny. The second one, 
specific control instruments such as parliamentary questions and the budgetary procedure 
are important tools in the hands of MPs to effectively scrutinise government. Finally, as 
third pillar, we examined EU scrutiny in the narrow sense, that is the overview of 
government regarding EU level negotiations and the control of the European institutions 
on the subsidiarity and proportionality principles.  
 
The timing of those three control dimensions with respect to the adoption of EU 
regulation varies. They may concern EU draft legislation, the negotiation process at EU 
level as well as the adopted EU acts. Legislative scrutiny is related to the adopted act of 
EU policy-making. Specific control instruments may target both, drafts, negotiations as 
well as adopted texts. EU scrutiny in the narrow sense concerns the control of EU draft 
law and negotiations at EU level.  Those three pillars of parliamentary control were 





Three research questions were investigated. The first one concerned the influence of 
European integration on the Luxembourgish parliament and more particularly, in how far 
the different actors and fora within parliament were affected. The second research 
question was related to the consequences of European integration on the institutional 
balance between parliament and government. The third research question targeted the 
changes for parliament resulting from the handling of European matters (compare with 
the outline of research questions in the first part of this study on page 22). The domestic 
context of three different governments as well as the European setting of Treaty revisions 
and enlargement was taken into account, as well as the scrutiny potential of the Chamber.  
 
Subsequently, we established four hypotheses related to the three research questions and 
based on the principal agent approach (compare with section 1.2). Those hypotheses 
concerned the question whether governmental discretion at EU level afforded a change in 
parliamentary control at domestic level. Based on the findings of chapters two to six, 
chapter seven brought the results of the empirical chapters together. 
 
How Europeanised is the Luxembourgish Chamber of Deputies as a principal and which 
consequences does this have for its relationship to government? A plenitude of indicators 
was investigated in this study (compare with Table 2 on page 51) and six different 
concepts were drawn upon: Ministerial discretion, risk for agency loss, scrutiny potential, 
legislative scrutiny, specific parliamentary control instruments, and EU scrutiny. Each 
concept was measured by one or more variables stemming from different data sources. 
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Those pieces put together led to support conclusions concerning the research questions 
and hypotheses outlined in the beginning of this study (Figure 99). 
 
The first section within this final chapter is devoted to an overall evaluation of the 
different trends. It outlines the main results of the investigation of those three control 
dimensions and concludes with an answer to the three research questions. After the 
presentation of the main findings, we point to the theoretical implications of this thesis, as 
well as the strengths of the approach and research. In the final section, we identify the 









Main findings: The responsibility of the Chamber 
Ministers are responsible, as the Luxembourgish Constitution (art. 78 C) states. They 
account for their own actions as well as for the actions of their ministerial administration. 
However, parliament is responsible too. It is not supposed to govern but should watch its 
duty to overview government in order to guarantee democratic governance.  
 
Our first main finding responds to our second research question regarding the effect of 
European integration on executive-legislative relations. To be sure, parliament has not 
lost its authority over government because of European integration, quite the contrary. 
This being said, we should also add that parliamentary control was at low levels in the 
end of the 1990s. While the deparliamentarisation/abdication thesis must be rejected and 
having confirmed that the Chamber has undergone major reform, we must conclude that 
complicity determines the relationship between parliament and government in EU 
matters. Complicity has been reinforced by the diminishing discretion of government in 
EU level negotiations. This thesis has demonstrated that a fundamental assumption of 
many studies proves to be incorrect. There is no linear, growing discretion of government 
in EU matters and consequently, no automatic loss of power for parliament. On the 
contrary, rather than parliament, government has suffered from the enlarged EU.  
 
The second main finding is that the Chamber is well equipped with control tools, be it in 
the area of legislative scrutiny, EU scrutiny or with regard to special control instruments. 
In terms of the formal procedures, major reforms were introduced during the 13 years 
under investigation. The speed of reform has increased in recent years and the Rules of 
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Procedures of the Chamber (RoP) have been subject to ever more frequent changes (a 
trend which is similar to what may be observed regarding constitutional reform). The 
changes concerned all three control dimensions but at varying degrees.  
 
We may speak of a major institutionalisation of parliamentary control more generally and 
European matters more particularly. The Chamber has formally clarified its proceedings 
in lawmaking, introduced new tools for questioning ministers, strengthened its budgetary 
overview, and set out the rules for enquiry committees. With regard to EU policy-
making, it could formalise an agreement with government and it took up possibilities 
offered at European level to deliver opinions on policy proposals. Hence, formally, the 
Chamber is quite an Europeanised institution. Taking up our third research question, 
concerning the consequences of handling EU matters for the Chamber as a principal, we 
may state that the strengthening of domestic scrutiny has partly been pushed forward by 
EU level developments. As best examples serve the creation of special, sub- and enquiry 
committees concerned with EU matters and the developments in budgetary control, 
which increase the expertise and resources of MPs. 
 
The third main finding is that the Chamber does not always live up to the given 
opportunities. Control is often not exerted in sufficient manner and not least regarding 
EU matters. Thus, despite its big potential to exert oversight, the Chamber seems to have 
willingly refrained from carrying out a more thorough scrutiny of government in EU 
matters over government.  This thesis has pointed out that government so far could avoid 
being given a mandate in EU level negotiations. Instead, parliament made major 
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investments in subsidiarity and proportionality control and draws on governmental 
resources in the control of European institutions.  
 
For instance, we have discovered that the level of legislative scrutiny decreased between 
1999 and 2011. Parliamentary questions (PQs) seem to serve mainly the electoral purpose 
and disregard EU matters. Budgetary control, although strengthened, could be exerted 
more publicly, provoking extensive discussions on how the public money is spent. 
Although MPs may draw on a large variety of special control instruments, they do not 
systematically use those to outbalance information asymmetries of ministers gained in 
EU level negotiations. Hence, those are no privileged instruments for the control of EU 
matters which still range low on the priority lists of most MPs. The control of ministers in 
EU level negotiations is mostly dependent on the goodwill of committee chairs and 
ministers. Our investigation points to the fact that ministers generally meet their duty to 
appear before parliament or one of its committees. However, the Chamber could take up 
its responsibility more often and overview government in EU matters. 
 
Thus, the effective Europeanisation of the Chamber remains limited. MPs may still 
choose to get active in policies related to the EU or not. The Europe strategy of the 
Chamber attempted to make all MPs deal with EU matters. However, this goal has not 
been yet totally achieved. In plenary session, European issues are more often discussed, 
not least with the introduction of obligatory reports of government concerning the 
transposition of directives and EU politics. However, below the line, and in response to 
our first research question, on which fora and actors are most concerned by European 
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integration, we must conclude that the burden of parliamentary control in general and in 
EU matters more particularly, is carried by some of the permanent committees, most 
importantly the EAC. Permanent committees deal with transpositions of European 
directives and screen EU documents.  
 
The most important hampering factor is a matter of size. Is the Chamber too small to 
take over its responsibilities in a satisfying manner? Its organisation of committees 
suggests a good division of labour. At the same time, one MP is sitting in around five 
committees; vice versa one ministerial portfolio is covered by two MPs. Thus, it is surely 
a difficult enterprise to keep track of all on-going matters. In EU matters more 
particularly, information asymmetries were outbalanced by the European Commission 
and its Barroso-initiative as of 2006. While parliament became more independent from 
the information provided by government, it still is reliant on its expertise. Rather than 
information scarcity, it is the overload of information which challenges the Chamber in 
recent years. 
 
An increase in parliamentary and party staff could outbalance the lack of expertise. Even 
though the Chamber as well as its factions have indeed restocked their departments, so 
far, it remains uncertain, whether this measure was sufficient. If parliamentary control of 
government does not come “naturally” in EU matters, obliging formal rules could serve 
motivating greater engagement of MPs as well as rendering committee work more 




With this regard, the increase of committee meetings serves as a good example of how 
parliament could improve its performance. MPs’ expertise has been promoted as 
committees have gained in importance over the years. The number of meetings jumped 
up and opposition MPs gained at least a small but fixed number of chairs. Thus, for 
individual MPs this means an increase in their independence of faction leaders. 
Consequently, cross-party decision-making has been enhanced. To go even further, 
there are tendencies towards increased sectoral trenches between experts of different 
committees. The consensual decision-making style of committees includes minister and 
ministerial staff. However, differences between committees remain, not least because of 
varying leadership styles of committee chairs.  
 
MPs should devote their entire attention to parliamentary work, improve their knowledge 
in policy areas and live up to the discussion with ministers. The chairs have to be obliged 
to keep balance between too large and too little government presence in their committee 
meetings. They have to take up the responsibility to serve as pedagogues, where 
necessary, and train their committee members to a better understanding of the issues at 
stake. The control of ministers in EU matters does not necessitate more formal rules or 
the introduction of a mandating system. A better follow-up by MPs with sufficient 
expertise in the matters at stake could considerably improve the situation.  
 
Thus, we may conclude that the Chamber’s internal organisation and its RoP allow for 
Europeanisation. However, its effectiveness depends on the motivation of MPs and 
committee chairs. Indeed, they have all cards in their hands to improve their expertise and 
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to become the actors of an efficient and highly Europeanised Chamber which is able to 
cope with any development at EU level. 
 
Theoretical implications: Europeanisation and delegation 
While the main empirical findings of this study do not allow drawing conclusions on 
developments in other legislatures, they may help to improve our theoretical 
understanding of NPs and executive-legislative relations with regard to EU matters more 
generally. The combination of the Europeanisation framework with a New Institutionalist 
approach and the principal agent theory more particularly proved to be a fruitful way to 
approach the question of the double democratic deficit and deparliamentarisation. Some 
of our results should thus consequently feed back on the use of theory in future studies of 
parliamentary control of government in the EU and on Europeanisation research and 
delegation theory more particularly.  
 
Top-down Europeanisation has to be reconsidered as well as its meaning for NPs which 
deal with European matters to a lesser extent than one would expect. The main business 
of parliament remains domestic politics rather than European matters. This is where they 
may, want and do make a difference. Thus, we have to be cautious to automatically 
assume a profound influence of European integration on NPs and the long-standing, 
traditional balance of power between executive and legislative at domestic level.  
 
Instead, the reluctance of legislatures to fully exert the scrutiny of government has to be 
taken into account, not only in EU but also in domestic matters, as Norton among others 
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suggested (1996a, p. 192ff) and explained by party bonds. Based on the findings of this 
thesis, we can add that committee bonds may breed a strong identification of all those 
involved in the solution of a certain legal problem. Decentralisation may thus provoke the 
independence of MPs from the party leadership and prevent effective control of 
government. Although on the face of it counterintuitive, ministerial presence in 
committees may not only serve scrutiny but may risk executive dominance in case the 
minister remains the only expert, or sectoral thinking, when committee members 
including the respective minister develop a common committee identity based on 
expertise. For instance, MPs of an Environment committee and a Minister of environment 
are prone to mutually support each other and a common agenda against for instance 
economic interests represented in a respective parliamentary committee.  
 
Besides, the differentiation between informal and formal Europeanisation of NPs 
should be useful in future studies. European integration effects may cause informal or 
formal change in NPs. Our investigation has pointed out that informal change, for 
instance the introduction of new administrative procedures by the parliamentary steering 
bodies, tend to precede formal change expressed in the RoP. However, formal change 
may immediately be decided, without an informal testing taking place. Such jump in at 
the deep end is arguably less effective than the concession of an exploration period. Also, 





The Europeanisation of NPs does not necessarily result in a reinforcement of 
parliamentary control of government. Rather, NPs react on the opportunities offered by 
the European institutions. The Europeanisation of NPs yields thus their empowerment in 
EU level politics. This represents a profoundly intergovernmental approach to European 
integration. Again, some NPs actively take up this opportunity, and we have shown that 
the Luxembourgish parliament does so for instance, while others are unwilling to invest 
in new activities, as in the Finnish case for instance. By its nature, the main aim of such 
intergovernmental trend must be recognised to consist in the support of national 
governments and national interest as opposed to supranational decision-making. As a 
matter of fact, government may be at the origin of parliamentary control of European 
institutions, which again underlines the intergovernmental nature of the procedures 
formally introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Besides, this study affords a reassessment and adaptation of the basic assumptions of 
delegation theory. Not least, European integration as an external force touches upon 
domestic institutions in a non-uniform way. Parliament as a principal is less concerned by 
Europeanisation pressures than its agent the government. That much of the regulatory 
activity does not include parliament in EU and domestic matters is no new situation. This 
study reveals that parliament may not be keen on being charged with more legislative 
activity. Instead, MPs prefer concentrating on politically controversial issues which 
promise public attention and electoral reward, as well as policies which they may 
influence and that are domestic issues.  
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This is why European matters are delegated to a large extent and belong to the core 
business of the domestic executive. In case governments face difficulties in influencing 
the game at EU level, parliaments stand by their side. Government may count on 
parliament, when it risks the loss of influence. The ministerial discretion at EU level has 
suffered a major loss after the enlargement round of 2004. Rather than increasing the 
control of government in EU matters, the Chamber has since adapted its procedures and 
better scrutinises the European institutions.  
 
While the principal agent relationship is mainly seen as determined by preoccupations 
over the prevention of agency loss, this concern is less visible in the Luxembourgish case 
and this may hold for other parliaments too. Rather, executive-legislative relations are 
based on a solid ground of trust between parliament and government, and even more so 
with regard to EU matters. This is owed to strong party organisation which make 
“delegation and accountability work” (Müller, 2000) and the agency problem may thus 
be considered to a large extent taken over by the political parties. Parliament in this 
respect offers instruments for cross-party control rather which are supplemented by the 
within-party monitoring mechanisms.  
 
Trust is furthermore fostered by country specific characteristics. Firstly, Luxembourg 
provides a case of a founding member of the EU. From its beginnings, it has contributed 
to shape the form and function of European institutions. The adaptation of domestic 
institutions has to be seen in this light. Secondly, no major barriers in terms of public or 
party Euro-scepticism hindered or advanced necessary adaptations of political 
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institutions (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008, 2004). Thirdly, the size of the country and its 
political institutions facilitates a more personal acquaintance of the decision-makers 
(Dumont and Varone, 2006).  
 
Hence, we are inclined to suggest that some of the developments we have examined in 
Luxembourg may be found in other political systems too. A comparative study 
combining parliaments of non-founding members of the EU, holding larger resources and 
facing Euro-scepticism in the population as well as at party level would be appropriate. 
Different strategies concerning EU scrutiny in the narrow sense (as expressed by the 
classification between document-based and mandating systems) are filtered by those 
contextual features of parliamentary systems.  
 
Strength of the approach and the research 
How has European integration influenced the Chamber and its relationship to 
government? In order to answer this question, we have made some deliberate choices 
which have directed our focus of attention. Firstly, we have taken over the definition of 
Ladrech, that Europeanisation means institutionalisation at national level. Thus, this 
thesis was designed to investigate top-down Europeanisation, that is the impact of 
European integration on domestic institutions.  
 
Secondly, we have added the perspective of the principal agent approach. The emphasis 
of this investigation was on parliament as principal of government, and its means to 
prevent from agency loss. The relationship between voters, the ultimate principals, and 
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the legislature as their agent is a separate question which had to be excluded from the 
analysis. Through those choices, Europeanisation became a question of adaptation and 
institutionalisation of parliamentary control.  
 
Thirdly, one would think that all means are allowed in the parliamentary control of 
government in EU matters, the objective being the maintenance of high democratic 
standards. Hence, we aimed to provide a holistic picture of how the Chamber as a 
principal is concerned by European integration and thus incorporated a maximum of 
information concerning scrutiny and lawmaking in this study. Parliamentary control was 
therefore investigated in an extensive way, including three analytical dimensions: 
Legislative scrutiny, specific control instruments and EU scrutiny.  
 
Fourthly, this study was limited to a period of thirteen years. Our observation was 
constrained to the developments between 1999 and 2011. Besides, we chose to compare 
the development of one assembly and executive-legislative relations between three 
legislative periods. This choice guaranteed the undistortedness of our conclusions. The 
possibility to draw causal inferences was guaranteed by the control of contextual and 
intervening variables.  
 
On the one hand, we have taken into account the risk of delegation as an intervening 
variable and in order to estimate the need for overview. Depending on how far the policy 
preferences of government differed from the preferences of parliament, this risk was 
evaluated larger or smaller. On the other hand, the discretion of government in 
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domestic matters as contextual factor was controlled for. The aim was to be able to 
unambiguously trace back adaptations of parliamentary control to changes in ministerial 
discretion at EU level.  
 
The discretion of ministers at EU level, together with the risk for agency loss established 
our independent variable (IV). Discretion of government at EU level, that is our 
Discretion index (DI), was operationalised by taking into account two indicators. Firstly, 
the number of regulatory acts the Council of the EU has issued served as an 
approximation to the development of the amount of discretion. Secondly, the voting 
power of the Luxembourgish ministers in the Council in terms of the Normalized 
Banzhaf index has qualified the given discretion. Together, the risk and the DI generate 
our IV. 
 
The three dependent variables (DVs) consisted in three control dimensions: Legislative 
scrutiny, special control instruments and EU scrutiny. They underwent a thorough 
investigation in terms of the formal rules they are based on and the use of those rules in 
terms of parliamentary behaviour. To this end, we have drawn upon quantitative as well 
as qualitative indicators in order to provide a complete and nuanced picture of 
parliamentary control. Methodological triangulation has revealed to be of major 
importance given that many of the quantitative developments disguised the actual 
importance of a trend. For instance, when looking at amendments and the length of the 
legislative procedure, interviews and participatory observations brought practices to light 




Summing up, the use of theory as well as the course of action in data collection and 
analysis may be recommended to similar enterprises. Our results rest upon a secure 
theoretical as well as empirical basis.  
 
Limitations of the study and avenues for future research 
While this thesis was designed to gain a most inclusive picture on the Europeanisation of 
the Chamber of Deputies and its relationship to government, limitations and 
shortcomings remain. Firstly, the subject covered within this thesis could be investigated 
in more detail. For instance, developments in different policy fields should be compared 
among each other with more depth. While this was planned at a first stage of this 
research, it has been dropped subsequently, not least because it had gone beyond the 
scope of this study. Such enterprise would make a thesis on its own.  
 
Secondly, more accurate and dynamic measures for the policy positions of parties could 
be introduced by promoting the establishment of comparative data, for instance the 
agenda setting data. As these data do not exist so far for Luxembourg, we had to content 
ourselves with a calculated risk of agency loss which remains stable between two 
elections, that is during one legislature. This does not entirely cope with reality, as 
actualities for instance may shift government programme and parties policy positions. 




Also, we have not dealt with the question of whether delegation is a favourable thing 
to do for the Chamber as a principal. However, within the context of executive-legislative 
relations, the division of labour has been rather fixed. Government governs while 
parliament ensures adequate monitoring of its agent. We would thus not expect major 
discoveries to be made on this point.  
 
Between 2011 and 2014, the end of the period of investigation and the defence of this 
thesis a couple of important developments have occurred, which we could not take into 
account in this analysis. Regarding EU scrutiny in the narrow sense, the Chamber was 
one of the twelve NPs or assemblies (summing up to 19 votes) which have contributed to 
the first yellow card which was issued on 22 May 2012 on subsidiarity grounds.272 The 
crux of the European Commission’s “Monti II” proposal laid in the attempt of the 
Commission to introduce fundamental rights in the internal market, among them the right 
to strike. NPs deemed such to violate national competences.  
 
The European Commission was forced to review and finally withdrew its proposal. 
Opposition from 12 member states’ parliaments certainly would make it difficult to find 
unanimity in the Council (IPEX, CHD). Very obviously to the Chamber’s Europe unit 
and the EAC, the right to strike was not of European competence and the first yellow card 
on the Monti II proposal evident. They estimated that no informal coordination among 
NPs had been needed to take up the respective Commission document for scrutiny.273 
 
                                                          
272 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context 
of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (COM(2012) 373). 
273 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 30 November 2012. 
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The domestic agenda dominates however the engagement in subsidiarity and 
proportionality control. The ongoing electoral campaign for the anticipatory legislative 
elections on 20 October 2013 prevented the Chamber even evaluating the proposal of the 
European Commission to establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office.274  Fourteen 
other assemblies have issued reasoned opinions and thus attained the threshold for the 
second yellow card. As a result, the European Commission justified its decision and did 
not withdraw its proposal.  
 
A more profound evaluation of the procedures concerning the screening of EU 
documents was envisaged by the end of the 2009-14 term but prevented by the early 
elections and thus shifted to the beginning of a new legislature. The inclusion of all MPs 
in the scrutiny process has not been entirely successful. No matter which party they are 
affiliated to, some of the MPs are prioritising EU matters, while for others local issues 
prevail. From the administrative point of view, however, the procedure works in 
satisfying manner.275 
 
The challenges to come for Luxembourgish politics more generally, and the 
Luxembourgish parliament more particularly, also concern recent developments at 
European level which aim at escaping and preventing economic and financial crisis. The 
provisions on the EU’s financial stability276 as well as economic and budgetary 
                                                          
274 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office 
(COM (2013) 534).  
275 Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012, and Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013. 
276 The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) led to the creation of a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) on 8 October 2012.  
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coordination risk undermining the budgetary authority of NPs and create a new 
democratic deficit as some scholars suggest (Fasone, 2013).  
 
The adopted measures include a strengthened financial and macroeconomic surveillance 
of member states by the European Commission. To this end, the Stability and Growth 
Pact was reinforced by the so-called “Six-Pack” 277 in December 2011. Most importantly, 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the European Monetary 
Union (TSCG), the so-called “Fiscal Compact”, entered into force on 1 January 2013. 
The signing Heads of States declared implementing a balanced (constitutional) budget 
rule and introduce automatic mechanisms in case of deviations from the medium-term 
objectives by the end of 2013.278 Besides, it was agreed to inform each other and the 
European institutions in case they plan to take up new debt and to meet regularly and 
more often in the framework of the so-called “Euro Summit meetings”.279  Thus, the 
Convergence criteria, set out by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and as modified by the 
Fiscal Compact, need to be taken seriously if financial sanctions are to be avoided.  
 
                                                          
277 The so-called six-pack contains the following five regulations and one directive: Council Regulation 
(EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November, Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Regulation 
(EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and 
the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro 
area, Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the 
Member States. 
278 COM/2012/0342 final 
279 Information retrieved at the website of the European Commission: http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/euro-
area/topics/treaty-on-stability,-coordination-and-governance-%28tscg%29/ last access: 7 December 2013. 
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Not only past expenditures are set to be overviewed by the European Commission, but 
future spending too. National governments agreed to coordinate budgetary drafts more 
extensively based on the provisions of the Six-Pack, the TSCG, and extended by the so-
called Two-Pack280 measures in 2013. The European Semester, more particularly, 
guides the domestic budgetary procedure. It is complemented by the “national semester” 
taking place during the second half of each calendar year.  
 
Hence, the Luxembourgish government is now required to submit so-called “reform 
plans” relatively early in the year to the European Commission. The question of timing is 
thus a major concern of those involved in the budgetary procedures. Deliberately, the 
Luxembourgish state budget was scheduled late in the year in order to preview next 
year’s developments as precise as possible. Fears regarding the European Semester 
concern the insecurity of figures entering an early draft budget. What is more, the 
Chamber, as well as the professional chambers and the trade unions, have to be given a 
possibility to comment and discuss the preliminary budget before precise figures are sent 
to the Commission. Hence, the budgetary procedure is prone to be changed and set up 
earlier in the year.281  
 
Apart from the domestic adaptation required by the new economic and budgetary policy 
instruments, a new Interparliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial 
                                                          
280 The Two-Pack contains two regulations: Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans 
and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area and Regulation (EU) 
No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of 
economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with 
serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability. 
281 Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 2 October 2013. 
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Governance of the European Union (Interparliamentary Conference on EFG) has been 
created. The Chamber of Deputies was among the parliaments supporting its creation.282 
Bringing together members of NPs and the EP, the purpose of this forum is to establish a 
dialogue with the heads of European institutions and the European Commission more 
particularly, on the economic and financial governance in the EU. Most importantly, the 
European Commission’s assessments based on the submitted national reform plans 
should be discussed. The first Interparliamentary Conference on EFG was held on 16 
October 2013. In its conclusions, the need for more effective democratic legitimacy and 
accountability was emphasised, not least, with regard to the scrutiny of reform plans 
submitted by governments in the framework of the European semester.283 
 
Apart from those developments at European level, a major constitutional reform is 
upcoming in Luxembourg. This reform is prone to set the stage for future executive-
legislative relations. The draft proposition so far advantages the Chamber to the detriment 
of the Grand Duke. It may well be that the recent events leading to the early elections 
provoke further adaptations not least regarding the powers of the Chamber to vote 
government out of power. The confusion of political decision-makers and commentators 
in this rather extraordinary situation for the Luxembourgish context showed the need for 
clear rules in case of motions of censure of any kind.  
 
                                                          
282 Working paper of the meeting of the Speakers of Parliament of the Founding Member States of the 
European Union and the European Parliament  in Luxembourg on January 11th, 2013. 
283 Presidency Conclusions. Interparliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial Governance of the 
European Union, 16-17 October 2013, Vilnius. 
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Indeed, the early elections were provoked by a newly installed enquiry committee on the 
Luxembourgish Secret Service (SREL) which concluded a failure of Prime Minister Jean-
Claude Juncker to overview the activities of the Secret Service. After the reform of RoP 
regarding the separation of legislative and judicial powers, the SREL-committee could be 
a signal that enquiry committees will be a more frequent phenomenon in the years to 
come. 
 
Each of those recent developments, be it at domestic or EU level, would justify the 
starting point of a new research project. Many scholars see European integration as a 
danger for the democratic quality at domestic level. As we have seen, NPs may draw on a 
multitude of instruments to thoroughly scrutinise their government’s actions. In how far 
they take over this responsibility is up to them. Perhaps it is time to change implicit 
assumptions and start from a more objective and open point of view. The effect of 
European integration on parliamentary control of government and NPs must be seen 
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(2) La priorité 
est réservée 













(5) A défaut du 
président et des 
vice-
présidents, le 
député le plus 




Art. 20.- (1) 




fixé par la 
commission, 
ou, à son 
défaut, par son 
président ou 
par le Président 
de la Chambre. 
 
(2) La priorité 
est réservée 






















Art. 20.- (1) 




est fixé par la 
commission, 
ou, à son 
défaut, par son 
président ou 
par le Président 
de la Chambre. 
 
(2) La priorité 
est réservée 






















Art. 20.- (1) 




est fixé par la 
commission, 
ou, à son 
défaut, par son 
président ou 
par le Président 
de la Chambre. 
 
(2) La priorité 
est réservée 
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et motions que 




indiqué par la 
Chambre. Elles 














ainsi que des 




rentrant dans le 




Président de la 
Chambre, du 




et motions que 




indiqué par la 
Chambre. Elles 














ainsi que des 




rentrant dans le 




Président de la 
Chambre, du 




et motions que 




indiqué par la 
Chambre. Elles 














ainsi que des 




rentrant dans le 




Président de la 
Chambre, du 




et motions que 




indiqué par la 
Chambre. Elles 














ainsi que des 




rentrant dans le 




Président de la 
Chambre, du 




et motions que 




indiqué par la 
Chambre. Elles 














ainsi que des 




rentrant dans le 




Président de la 
Chambre, du 




et motions que 




indiqué par la 
Chambre. Elles 














ainsi que des 




rentrant dans le 




Président de la 
Chambre, du 




et motions que 




indiqué par la 
Chambre. Elles 














ainsi que des 




rentrant dans le 




Président de la 
Chambre, du 




et motions que 




indiqué par la 
Chambre. Elles 














ainsi que des 




rentrant dans le 




Président de la 
Chambre, du 




et motions que 




indiqué par la 
Chambre. Elles 














ainsi que des 




rentrant dans le 




Président de la 
Chambre, du 
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les principes  
en la matière.  

















avis à la 
commission 
compétente de 
la Chambre. La 
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 
un délai dans 
lequel la 
commission 
doit avoir émis 
son avis; à 
défaut d'avis 





accord avec le 
les principes  
en la matière. 

















avis à la 
commission 
compétente de 
la Chambre. La 
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 
un délai dans 
lequel la 
commission 
doit avoir émis 
son avis; à 
défaut d’avis 





accord avec le 
les principes  
en la matière. 

















avis à la 
commission 
compétente de 
la Chambre. La 
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 
un délai dans 
lequel la 
commission 
doit avoir émis 
son avis; à 
défaut d’avis 





accord avec le 
les principes  
en la matière. 

















avis à la 
commission 
compétente de 
la Chambre. La 
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 
un délai dans 
lequel la 
commission 
doit avoir émis 
son avis; à 
défaut d'avis 





accord avec le 
les principes  
en la matière. 

















avis à la 
commission 
compétente de 
la Chambre. La 
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 
un délai dans 
lequel la 
commission 
doit avoir émis 
son avis; à 
défaut d’avis 





accord avec le 
les principes  
en la matière.  

















avis à la 
commission 
compétente de 
la Chambre. La 
conférence des 
Présidents fixe 
un délai dans 
lequel la 
commission 
doit avoir émis 
son avis; à 
défaut d’avis 





accord avec le 
les principes  
en la matière.  

















avis à la 
commission 
compétente de 
la Chambre. La 
conférence des 
Présidents fixe 
un délai dans 
lequel la 
commission 
doit avoir émis 
son avis; à 
défaut d’avis 





accord avec le 
les principes  
en la matière. 

















avis à la 
commission 
compétente de 
la Chambre. La 
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 
un délai dans 
lequel la 
commission 
doit avoir émis 
son avis; à 
défaut d'avis 





accord avec le 
les principes en 
la matière. 








de Travail est  







de Travail pour 
avis à la 
commission 
compétente de 
la Chambre. La 
Commission 
de Travail fixe 
un délai dans 
lequel la 
commission 
doit avoir émis 
son avis; à 
défaut d'avis 





accord avec le 


























nomment, à la 
majorité 
absolue, un de 
leurs membres, 
en qualité de 
rapporteur, 
pour faire 
rapport à la 
Chambre. Si 




























nomment, à la 
majorité 
absolue, un de 
leurs membres, 
en qualité de 
rapporteur, 
pour faire 
rapport à la 
Chambre. Si 




























nomment, à la 
majorité 
absolue, un de 
leurs membres, 
en qualité de 
rapporteur, 
pour faire 
rapport à la 
Chambre. Si 




























nomment, à la 
majorité 
absolue, un de 
leurs membres, 
en qualité de 
rapporteur, 
pour faire 
rapport à la 
Chambre. Si 




























nomment, à la 
majorité 
absolue, un de 
leurs membres, 
en qualité de 
rapporteur, 
pour faire 
rapport à la 
Chambre. Si 




























nomment, à la 
majorité 
absolue, un de 
leurs membres, 
en qualité de 
rapporteur, 
pour faire 
rapport à la 
Chambre. Si 




























nomment, à la 
majorité 
absolue, un de 
leurs membres, 
en qualité de 
rapporteur, 
pour faire 
rapport à la 
Chambre. Si 




























nomment, à la 
majorité 
absolue, un de 
leurs membres, 
en qualité de 
rapporteur, 
pour faire 
rapport à la 
Chambre. Si 




























nomment, à la 
majorité 
absolue, un de 
leurs membres, 
en qualité de 
rapporteur, 
pour faire 
rapport à la 
Chambre. Si 




































jours avant les 




































jours avant les 




































jours avant les 




































jours avant les 




































jours avant les 




































jours avant les 




































jours avant les 




































jours avant les 




































jours avant les 




























































































































































































































































































































































décider que les 
travaux d’une 
réunion sont à 
transmettre en 
direct par la 
chaîne 
télévisée de la 
Chambre.  
 
(8) De chaque 
réunion il est 
dressé un 
procès-verbal 
























décider que les 
travaux d’une 
réunion sont à 
transmettre en 
direct par la 
chaîne 
télévisée de la 
Chambre. 
 
(8) De chaque 
réunion il est 
dressé un 
procès-verbal 
























décider que les 
travaux d’une 
réunion sont à 
transmettre en 
direct par la 
chaîne 
télévisée de la 
Chambre. 
 
(8) De chaque 
réunion il est 
dressé un 
procès-verbal 

































(8) De chaque 
réunion il est 
dressé un 
procès-verbal 
qui doit être 
approuvé au 
début de la 
prochaine 





























(8) De chaque 
réunion il est 
dressé un 
procès-verbal 
qui doit être 
approuvé au 
début de la 
prochaine 





























(8) De chaque 
réunion il est 
dressé un 
procès-verbal 
qui doit être 
approuvé au 
début de la 
prochaine 





























(8) De chaque 
réunion il est 
dressé un 
procès-verbal 
qui doit être 
approuvé au 
début de la 
prochaine 





























(8) De chaque 
réunion il est 
dressé un 
procès-verbal 
qui doit être 
approuvé au 
début de la 
prochaine 





























(8) De chaque 
réunion il est 
dressé un 
procès-verbal 
qui doit être 
approuvé au 
début de la 
prochaine 























verbal par la 
commission, 
celui-ci est 
signé par le 




et publié sur le 




Bureau, de la 
Conférence des 
Présidents et 
ceux ayant trait 




















verbal par la 
commission, 
celui-ci est 
signé par le 




et publié sur le 




Bureau, de la 
Conférence des 
Présidents et 
ceux ayant trait 




















verbal par la 
commission, 
celui-ci est 
signé par le 




et publié sur le 




Bureau, de la 
Conférence des 
Présidents et 
ceux ayant trait 




















sur les  
travaux de la 
commission 









arrêtées par le 
Bureau  
et sous la 
responsabilité 







(9) Sur la 
demande d’un 












sur les  
travaux de la 
commission 




















(9) Sur la 
demande d’un 












sur les  
travaux de la 
commission 




















(9) Sur la 
demande d’un 












sur les  
travaux de la 
commission 




















(9) Sur la 
demande d’un 











orale ou écrite 
sur les 
travaux de la 
commission 
peut être faite  
à condition que 
la commission 
soit d'accord et 
















(9) Sur la 
demande d'un 











orale ou écrite 
sur les 
travaux de la 
commission 
peut être faite  
à condition que 
la commission 
soit d'accord et 
















(9) Sur la 
demande d'un 













peut décider de 






















Art. 23.- (1) A 
l'heure fixée 





de la liste de 






peut décider de 






















Art. 23. (1) A 
l’heure fixée 





de la liste de 






peut décider de 
garder le secret 
des 
délibérations. 
Dans ce cas la 
commission 
peut également 
décider de ne 
pas dresser 
procès-verbal 
de la réunion.  





garder le secret 
des 
délibérations 
peut se faire à 
la majorité des 
voix. 
 
Art. 23. (1) A 
l’heure fixée 





de la liste de 






peut décider de 
garder le secret 
des 
délibérations. 
Dans ce cas la 
commission 
peut également 
décider de ne 
pas dresser 
procès-verbal 
de la réunion.  





garder le secret 
des 
délibérations 
peut se faire à 
la majorité des 
voix. 
 
Art. 23.- (1) A 
l'heure fixée 





de la liste de 






peut décider de 
garder le secret 
des 
délibérations. 
Dans ce cas la 
commission 
peut également 
décider de ne 
pas dresser 
procès-verbal 
de la réunion. 





garder le secret 
des 
délibérations 
peut se faire à 
la majorité des 
voix. 
 
Art. 23. (1) A 
l’heure fixée 





de la liste de 






peut décider de 
garder le secret 
des 
délibérations. 
Dans ce cas la 
commission 
peut également 
décider de ne 
pas dresser 
procès-verbal 
de la réunion.  





garder le secret 
des 
délibérations 
peut se faire à 
la majorité des 
voix. 
 
Art. 22.- (1) A 
l’heure fixée 





de la liste de 






peut décider de 
garder le secret 
des 
délibérations. 
Dans ce cas la 
commission 
peut également 
décider de ne 
pas dresser 
procès-verbal 
de la réunion.  





garder le secret 
des 
délibérations 
peut se faire à 
la majorité des 
voix. 
 
Art. 22.- (1) A 
l’heure fixée 





de la liste de 






peut décider de 
garder le secret 
des 
délibérations. 
Dans ce cas la 
commission 
peut également 
décider de ne 
pas dresser 
procès-verbal 
de la réunion. 





garder le secret 
des 
délibérations 
peut se faire à 
la majorité des 
voix. 
 
Art. 22.- (1) A 
l'heure fixée 





de la liste de 






peut décider de 
garder le secret 
des 
délibérations. 
Dans ce cas la 
commission 
peut également 
décider de ne 
pas dresser 
procès-verbal 
de la réunion. 





garder le secret 
des 
délibérations 
peut se faire à 
la majorité des 
voix. 
 
Art. 22.- (1) A 
l'heure fixée 





de la liste de 
présence; il a 
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la faculté soit 
d'ouvrir 
immédiatement 
la séance, soit 




(2) Dans toute 
commission, la 
présence de la 
majorité des 
membres est 








pour les votes, 
ceux-ci sont 
valables, quel 






président de la 
commission 





la faculté soit 
d’ouvrir 
immédiatement 
la séance, soit 




(2) Dans toute 
commission, la 
présence de la 
majorité des 
membres est 








pour les votes, 
ceux-ci sont 
valables, quel 






président de la 
commission 





la faculté soit 
d’ouvrir 
immédiatement 
la séance, soit 




(2) Dans toute 
commission, la 
présence de la 
majorité des 
membres est 








pour les votes, 
ceux-ci sont 
valables, quel 






président de la 
commission 





la faculté soit 
d'ouvrir 
immédiatement 
la séance, soit 




(2) Dans toute 
commission, la 
présence de la 
majorité des 
membres est 








pour les votes, 
ceux-ci sont 
valables, quel 






président de la 
commission 





la faculté soit 
d’ouvrir 
immédiatement 
la séance, soit 




(2) Dans toute 
commission, la 
présence de la 
majorité des 
membres est 








pour les votes, 
ceux-ci sont 
valables, quel 






président de la 
commission 





la faculté soit 
d’ouvrir 
immédiatement 
la séance, soit 




(2) Dans toute 
commission, la 
présence de la 
majorité des 
membres est 








pour les votes, 
ceux-ci sont 
valables, quel 






président de la 
commission 





la faculté soit 
d’ouvrir 
immédiatement 
la séance, soit 




(2) Dans toute 
commission, la 
présence de la 
majorité des 
membres est 








pour les votes, 
ceux-ci sont 
valables, quel 






président de la 
commission 





la faculté soit 
d'ouvrir 
immédiatement 





(2) Dans toute 
commission, la 
présence de la 
majorité des 
membres est 








pour les votes, 
ceux-ci sont 
valables, quel 






président de la 
commission 





la faculté soit 
d'ouvrir 
immédiatement 





(2) Dans toute 
commission, la 
présence de la 
majorité des 
membres est 








pour les votes, 
ceux-ci sont 
valables, quel 






président de la 
commission 
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avec mention 
des excuses qui 
auraient été 
portées à sa 
connaissance.  
 
Art. 24.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre, sur 








lequel il y a 
lieu de déposer 
les rapports sur 
les objets dont 
elles sont 
saisies.  
Dans le cas où 
le délai n'est 
pas observé et 
que cette 
carence est due 
au rapporteur, 
le Président de 
la Chambre 
peut proposer à 
la commission 





des excuses qui 
auraient été 
portées à sa 
connaissance. 
 
Art. 24. Le 
Président de la 
Chambre, sur 








lequel il y a 
lieu de déposer 
les rapports sur 
les objets dont 
elles sont 
saisies. 
Dans le cas où 
le délai n’est 
pas observé et 
que cette 
carence est due 
au rapporteur, 
le Président de 
la Chambre 
peut proposer à 
la commission 





des excuses qui 
auraient été 
portées à sa 
connaissance. 
 
Art. 24. Le 
Président de la 
Chambre, sur 








lequel il y a 
lieu de déposer 
les rapports sur 
les objets dont 
elles sont 
saisies. 
Dans le cas où 
le délai n’est 
pas observé et 
que cette 
carence est due 
au rapporteur, 
le Président de 
la Chambre 
peut proposer à 
la commission 





des excuses qui 
auraient été 
portées à sa 
connaissance. 
 
Art. 24.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre, sur 








lequel il y a 
lieu de déposer 
les rapports sur 
les objets dont 
elles sont 
saisies. 
Dans le cas où 
le délai n'est 
pas observé et 
que cette 
carence est due 
au rapporteur, 
le Président de 
la Chambre 
peut proposer à 
la commission 





des excuses qui 
auraient été 
portées à sa 
connaissance. 
 
Art. 24. Le 
Président de la 
Chambre, sur 








lequel il y a 
lieu de déposer 
les rapports sur 
les objets dont 
elles sont 
saisies. 
Dans le cas où 
le délai n’est 
pas observé et 
que cette 
carence est due 
au rapporteur, 
le Président de 
la Chambre 
peut proposer à 
la commission 





des excuses qui 
auraient été 
portées à sa 
connaissance. 
 
Art. 23.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre, sur 








lequel il y a 
lieu de déposer 
les rapports sur 
les objets dont 
elles sont 
saisies.  
Dans le cas où 
le délai n’est 
pas observé et 
que cette 
carence est due 
au rapporteur, 
le Président de 
la Chambre 
peut proposer à 
la commission 





des excuses qui 
auraient été 
portées à sa 
connaissance. 
 
Art. 23.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre, sur 








lequel il y a 
lieu de déposer 
les rapports sur 
les objets dont 
elles sont 
saisies.  
Dans le cas où 
le délai n’est 
pas observé et 
que cette 
carence est due 
au rapporteur, 
le Président de 
la Chambre 
peut proposer à 
la commission 





des excuses qui 
auraient été 
portées à sa 
connaissance. 
 
Art. 23.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre, sur 








lequel il y a 
lieu de déposer 
les rapports sur 
les objets dont 
elles sont 
saisies. 
Dans le cas où 
le délai n'est 
pas observé et 
que cette 
carence est due 
au rapporteur, 
le Président de 
la Chambre 
peut proposer à 
la commission 





des excuses qui 
auraient été 
portées à sa 
connaissance. 
 
Art. 23.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre, sur 








lequel il y a 
lieu de déposer 
les rapports sur 
les objets dont 
elles sont 
saisies. 
Dans le cas où 
le délai n'est 
pas observé et 
que cette 
carence est due 
au rapporteur, 
le Président de 
la Chambre 
peut proposer à 
la commission 
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peut aussi 
procéder de sa 
propre 





Art. 25.- (1) 
L'auteur 
principal d'une 














le droit d'être 






membre de la 
Chambre a le 
droit de faire 
parvenir à une 
commission 
peut aussi 
procéder de sa 
propre 





Art. 25. (1) 
L’auteur 
principal d’une 














le droit d’être 






membre de la 
Chambre a le 
droit de faire 
parvenir à une 
commission 
peut aussi 
procéder de sa 
propre 





Art. 25. (1) 
L’auteur 
principal d’une 














le droit d’être 






membre de la 
Chambre a le 
droit de faire 
parvenir à une 
commission 
peut aussi 
procéder de sa 
propre 





Art. 25.- (1) 
L'auteur 
principal d'une 














le droit d'être 






membre de la 
Chambre a le 
droit de faire 
parvenir à une 
commission 
peut aussi 
procéder de sa 
propre 





Art. 25. (1) 
L’auteur 
principal d’une 





aux séances de 








le droit d’être 






membre de la 
Chambre a le 
droit de faire 
parvenir à une 
commission 
peut aussi 
procéder de sa 
propre 





Art. 24.- (1) 
L’auteur 
principal d’une 














le droit d’être 






membre de la 
Chambre a le 
droit de faire 
parvenir à une 
commission 
peut aussi 
procéder de sa 
propre 





Art. 24.- (1) 
L’auteur 
principal d’une 














le droit d’être 






membre de la 
Chambre a le 
droit de faire 
parvenir à une 
commission 
peut aussi 
procéder de sa 
propre 





Art. 24.- (1) 
L'auteur 
principal d'une 














le droit d'être 






membre de la 
Chambre a le 
droit de faire 
parvenir à une 
commission 
peut aussi 
procéder de sa 
propre 





Art. 24.- (1) 
L'auteur 
principal d'une 














le droit d'être 






membre de la 
Chambre a le 
droit de faire 
parvenir à une 
commission 




écrites sur les 
projets ou 
propositions 
dont elle est 
saisie.  
 
Art. 26.- (1) A 
l'occasion de 
l'examen d'un  








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 

















écrites sur les 
projets ou 
propositions 
dont elle est 
saisie. 
 
Art. 26. (1) A 
l’occasion de 
l’examen d’un 








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 

















écrites sur les 
projets ou 
propositions 
dont elle est 
saisie. 
 
Art. 26. (1) A 
l’occasion de 
l’examen d’un 








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 

















écrites sur les 
projets ou 
propositions 
dont elle est 
saisie. 
 
Art. 26.- (1) A 
l'occasion de 
l'examen d'un  








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 

















écrites sur les 
projets ou 
propositions 
dont elle est 
saisie. 
 
Art. 26. (1) A 
l’occasion de 
l’examen d’un 








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 

















écrites sur les 
projets ou 
propositions 
dont elle est 
saisie.  
 
Art. 25.- (1) A 
l’occasion de 
l’examen d’un 








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 

















écrites sur les 
projets ou 
propositions 
dont elle est 
saisie.  
 
Art. 25.- (1) A 
l’occasion de 
l’examen d’un 








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 

















écrites sur les 
projets ou 
propositions 
dont elle est 
saisie. 
 
Art. 25.- (1) A 
l'occasion de 
l'examen d'un  










il est  

















écrites sur les 
projets ou 
propositions 
dont elle est 
saisie. 
 
Art. 25.- (1) A 
l'occasion de 
l'examen d'un  










il est  
























l'espèce doit se 
rapporter à 
l'objet dont la 
commission est 




Elle ne peut 
être autorisée 




votée à la 
majorité 
absolue de ses 
membres, 
estime qu'elle 
serait de nature 
à éclairer ses 
délibérations.  
 
(3) Si une 
commission 












l’espèce doit se 
rapporter à 
l’objet dont la 
commission est 




Elle ne peut 
être autorisée 




votée à la 
majorité 
absolue de ses 
membres, 
estime qu’elle 
serait de nature 
à éclairer ses 
délibérations. 
 
(3) Si une 
commission 












l’espèce doit se 
rapporter à 
l’objet dont la 
commission est 




Elle ne peut 
être autorisée 




votée à la 
majorité 
absolue de ses 
membres, 
estime qu’elle 
serait de nature 
à éclairer ses 
délibérations. 
 
(3) Si une 
commission 












l'espèce doit se 
rapporter à 
l'objet dont la 
commission est 




Elle ne peut 
être autorisée 




votée à la 
majorité 
absolue de ses 
membres, 
estime qu'elle 
serait de nature 
à éclairer ses 
délibérations. 
 
(3) Si une 
commission 












l’espèce doit se 
rapporter à 
l’objet dont la 
commission est 




Elle ne peut 
être autorisée 




votée à la 
majorité 
absolue de ses 
membres, 
estime qu’elle 
serait de nature 
à éclairer ses 
délibérations. 
 
(3) Si une 
commission 












l’espèce doit se 
rapporter à 
l’objet dont la 
commission est 




Elle ne peut 
être autorisée 




votée à la 
majorité 
absolue de ses 
membres, 
estime qu’elle 
serait de nature 
à éclairer ses 
délibérations. 
 
(3) Si une 
commission 












l’espèce doit se 
rapporter à 
l’objet dont la 
commission est 




Elle ne peut 
être autorisée 




votée à la 
majorité 
absolue de ses 
membres, 
estime qu’elle 
serait de nature 
à éclairer ses 
délibérations. 
 
(3) Si une 
commission 












l'espèce doit se 
rapporter à 
l'objet dont la 
commission est 




Elle ne peut 
être autorisée 




votée à la 
majorité 
absolue de ses 
membres, 
estime qu'elle 
serait de nature 
à éclairer ses 
délibérations. 
 
(3) Si une 
commission 












l'espèce doit se 
rapporter à 
l'objet dont la 
commission est 




Elle ne peut 
être autorisée 




votée à la 
majorité 
absolue de ses 
membres, 
estime qu'elle 
serait de nature 
à éclairer ses 
délibérations. 
 
(3) Si une 
commission 
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commission, 
elle en informe 
le Président de 
la Chambre.  
 
(4) Dans les 
hypothèses 
prévues aux 
alinéas (1) et 
(3) du présent 
article, 
l'autorisation 
du Président de 








(5) Si une 
commission 
souhaite 
émettre un avis 
au sujet d'un 
projet ou d'une 
proposition de 
loi dont une 
autre 
commission est 
saisie, elle en 
informe le 





elle en informe 
le Président 
de la Chambre. 
 
(4) Dans les 
hypothèses 
prévues aux 
alinéas (1) et 
(3) du présent 
article, 
l’autorisation 









(5) Si une 
commission 
souhaite 
émettre un avis 
au sujet d’un 
projet ou d’une 
proposition de 
loi dont une 
autre 
commission est 
saisie, elle en 
informe le 





elle en informe 
le Président 
de la Chambre. 
 
(4) Dans les 
hypothèses 
prévues aux 
alinéas (1) et 
(3) du présent 
article, 
l’autorisation 









(5) Si une 
commission 
souhaite 
émettre un avis 
au sujet d’un 
projet ou d’une 
proposition de 
loi dont une 
autre 
commission est 
saisie, elle en 
informe le 





elle en informe 
le Président de 
la Chambre. 
 
(4) Dans les 
hypothèses 
prévues aux 
alinéas (1) et 
(3) du présent 
article, 
l'autorisation 









(5) Si une 
commission 
souhaite 
émettre un avis 
au sujet d'un 
projet ou d'une 
proposition 
de loi dont une 
autre 
commission est 
saisie, elle en 
informe le 





elle en informe 
le Président 
de la Chambre. 
 
(4) Dans les 
hypothèses 
prévues aux 
alinéas (1) et 
(3) du présent 
article, 
l’autorisation 









(5) Si une 
commission 
souhaite 
émettre un avis 
au sujet d’un 
projet ou d’une 
proposition de 
loi dont une 
autre 
commission est 
saisie, elle en 
informe le 





elle en informe 
le Président de 
la Chambre.  
 
(4) Dans les 
hypothèses 
prévues aux 
alinéas (1) et 
(3) du présent 
article, 
l’autorisation 
du Président de 








(5) Si une 
commission 
souhaite 
émettre un avis 
au sujet d’un 
projet ou d’une 
proposition de 
loi dont une 
autre 
commission est 
saisie, elle en 
informe le 





elle en informe 
le Président de 
la Chambre.  
 
(4) Dans les 
hypothèses 
prévues aux 
alinéas (1) et 
(3) du présent 
article, 
l’autorisation 
du Président de 








(5) Si une 
commission 
souhaite 
émettre un avis 
au sujet d’un 
projet ou d’une 
proposition de 
loi dont une 
autre 
commission est 
saisie, elle en 
informe le 





elle en informe 
le Président de 
la Chambre. 
 
(4) Dans les 
hypothèses 
prévues aux 
alinéas (1) et 
(3) du présent 
article, 
l'autorisation 
du Président de 








(5) Si une 
commission 
souhaite 
émettre un avis 
au sujet d'un 
projet ou d'une 
proposition de 
loi dont une 
autre 
commission est 
saisie, elle en 
informe le 





elle en informe 
le Président de 
la Chambre. 
 
(4) Dans les 
hypothèses 
prévues aux 
alinéas (2) et 
(3) du présent 
article, 
l'autorisation 
du Président de 








(5) Si une 
commission 
souhaite 
émettre un avis 
au sujet d'un 
projet ou d'une 
proposition de 
loi dont une 
autre 
commission est 
saisie, elle en 
informe le 
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être remis par 
l'intermédiaire 
du Président de 






Art. 27.- Les 
règles de 
fonctionne-








l’annexe 1 du 
présent 
Règlement. 
être remis par 
l’intermédiaire 
du Président de 






Art. 27. Les 
règles de 
fonctionne-








l’annexe 1 du 
présent 
Règlement. 
être remis par 
l’intermédiaire 
du Président de 






Art. 27. Les 
règles de 
fonctionne-








l’annexe 1 du 
présent 
Règlement. 
être remis par 
l'intermédiaire 
du Président de 
la Chambre et 
sera 




Art. 27.- Les 
règles de 
fonctionne-








l’annexe 1 du 
présent 
Règlement. 
être remis par 
l’intermédiaire 
du Président de 






Art. 27. Les 
règles de 
fonctionne-








l’annexe 1 du 
présent 
Règlement. 
être remis par 
l’intermédiaire 
du Président de 







être remis par 
l’intermédiaire 
du Président de 







être remis par 
l'intermédiaire 
du Président de 








être remis par 
l'intermédiaire 
du Président de 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
Annexe 1 :  
Règlement d’ordre 













Art. 1er. Des missions  
 
Selon les dispositions 





l’Etat les activités du 
Service de 
renseignement sont 
soumises au contrôle 




ladite loi les 
attributions de la 
Annexe 1: 
Règlement d’ordre 













Art. 1er. Des missions 
 
Selon les dispositions 





l’Etat les activités 
du Service de 
renseignement sont 
soumises au contrôle 




D’après ladite loi les 
attributions de la 
Annexe 1: 
Règlement d’ordre 













Art. 1er. Des missions 
 
Selon les dispositions 





l’Etat les activités 
du Service de 
renseignement sont 
soumises au contrôle 




D’après ladite loi les 
attributions de la 
Annexe 1 : 
Règlement d’ordre 













Art. 1er. Des missions 
 
Selon les dispositions 
de la loi du 15 juin 
2004 portant 
organisant du  
Service de 
Renseignement de 








D’après ladite loi les 
attributions de la 
Annexe 1: 
Règlement d’ordre 













Art. 1er. Des missions 
 
Selon les dispositions 
de la loi du 15 juin 
2004 portant 
organisant du  
Service de 
Renseignement de 
l’Etat les activités 
du Service de 
renseignement sont 
soumises au contrôle 




D’après ladite loi les 
attributions de la 
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• être informée par le 
Directeur du Service 
de Renseignement sur 
les activités générales 
du Service, y compris 
les relations avec les 
services de 
renseignement et de 
sécurité étrangers. 
  
• procéder à des 
contrôles portant sur 
des dossiers 
spécifiques. A cette 
fin, la Commission est 
autorisée à prendre 
connaissance de toutes 
les informations et 
pièces qu’elle juge 
pertinentes pour 
l’exercice de sa 
mission, à l’exception 
d’informations ou de 
pièces susceptibles de 
révéler l’identité d’une 
source du Service ou 
pouvant porter atteinte 
aux droits de la 
personne d’un tiers. La 
Commission peut 
entendre les agents du 
Service de 
Renseignement en 




• être informée par le 
Directeur du Service 
de Renseignement sur 
les activités générales 
du Service, y compris 
les relations avec les 
services de 
renseignement et de 
sécurité étrangers. 
 
• procéder à des 
contrôles portant sur 
des dossiers 
spécifiques. A cette 
fin, la Commission est 
autorisée à prendre 
connaissance de toutes 
les informations et 
pièces qu’elle juge 
pertinentes pour 
l’exercice de sa 
mission, à l’exception 
d’informations ou de 
pièces susceptibles de 
révéler l’identité d’une 
source du Service ou 
pouvant porter atteinte 
aux droits de la 
personne d’un tiers. La 
Commission peut 
entendre les agents du 
Service de 
Renseignement en 




• être informée par le 
Directeur du Service 
de Renseignement sur 
les activités générales 
du Service, y compris 
les relations avec les 
services de 
renseignement et de 
sécurité étrangers. 
 
• procéder à des 
contrôles portant sur 
des dossiers 
spécifiques. A cette 
fin, la Commission est 
autorisée à prendre 
connaissance de toutes 
les informations et 
pièces qu’elle juge 
pertinentes pour 
l’exercice de sa 
mission, à l’exception 
d’informations ou de 
pièces susceptibles de 
révéler l’identité d’une 
source du Service ou 
pouvant porter atteinte 
aux droits de la 
personne d’un tiers. La 
Commission peut 
entendre les agents du 
Service de 
Renseignement en 




• être informée par le 
Directeur du Service 
de Renseignement sur 
les activités générales 
du Service, y compris 
les relations avec les 
services de 
renseignement et de 
sécurités étrangères. 
 
• procéder à des 
contrôles portant sur 
des dossiers 
spécifiques. A cette 
fin, la Commission est 
autorisée à prendre 
connaissance de toutes 
les informations et 
pièces qu’elle juge 
pertinentes pour 
l’exercice de sa 
mission, à l’exception 
d’informations ou de 
pièces susceptibles de 
révéler l’identité d’une 
source du Service ou 
pouvant porter atteinte 
aux droits de la 
personne d’un tiers. La 
Commission peut 
entendre les agents du 
Service de 
Renseignement en 




• être informée par le 
Directeur du Service 
de Renseignement sur 
les activités générales 
du Service, y compris 
les relations avec les 
services de 
renseignement et de 
sécurité étrangers. 
 
• procéder à des 
contrôles portant sur 
des dossiers 
spécifiques. A cette 
fin, la Commission est 
autorisée à prendre 
connaissance de toutes 
les informations et 
pièces qu’elle juge 
pertinentes pour 
l’exercice de sa 
mission, à l’exception 
d’informations ou de 
pièces susceptibles de 
révéler l’identité d’une 
source du Service ou 
pouvant porter atteinte 
aux droits de la 
personne d’un tiers. La 
Commission peut 
entendre les agents du 
Service de 
Renseignement en 
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charge du dossier sur 
lequel porte le 
contrôle.  
 
• se faire assister par 
un expert lorsque le 
contrôle porte sur un 
domaine qui requiert 
des connaissances 
spéciales. La 
Commission peut en 
décider ainsi à la 
majorité des deux tiers 
des voix et après avoir 
consulté le Directeur 
du Service de 
Renseignement.  
 
• dresser à l’issue de 
chaque contrôle un 
rapport final à 
caractère confidentiel 




formulées par ses 




spécifiques définis au 
paragraphe (2) ci- 
avant. Ce rapport est 
adressé au Premier 
Ministre, Ministre 
d’Etat, au Directeur du 
charge du dossier sur 
lequel porte le 
contrôle. 
 
• se faire assister par 
un expert lorsque le 
contrôle porte sur un 
domaine qui requiert 
des connaissances 
spéciales. La 
Commission peut en 
décider ainsi à la 
majorité des deux tiers 
des voix et après avoir 
consulté le Directeur 
du Service de 
Renseignement. 
 
• dresser à l’issue de 
chaque contrôle un 
rapport final à 
caractère confidentiel 




formulées par ses 




spécifiques définis au 
paragraphe (2) ci-
avant. Ce rapport est 
adressé au Premier 
Ministre, Ministre 
d’Etat, au Directeur du 
charge du dossier sur 
lequel porte le 
contrôle. 
 
• se faire assister par 
un expert lorsque le 
contrôle porte sur un 
domaine qui requiert 
des connaissances 
spéciales. La 
Commission peut en 
décider ainsi à la 
majorité des deux tiers 
des voix et après avoir 
consulté le Directeur 
du Service de 
Renseignement. 
 
• dresser à l’issue de 
chaque contrôle un 
rapport final à 
caractère confidentiel 




formulées par ses 




spécifiques définis au 
paragraphe (2) ci- 
avant. Ce rapport est 
adressé au Premier 
Ministre, Ministre 
d’Etat, au Directeur du 
charge du dossier sur 
lequel porte le 
contrôle. 
 
• se faire assister par 
un expert lorsque le 
contrôle porte sur un 
domaine qui requiert 
des connaissances 
spéciales. La 
Commission peut en 
décider ainsi à la 
majorité des deux tiers 
des voix et après avoir 
consulté le Directeur 
du Service de 
Renseignement.  
 
• dresser à l’issue de 
chaque contrôle un 
rapport final à 
caractère confidentiel 




formulées par ses 




spécifiques définis au 
paragraphe (2) ci- 
avant. Ce rapport est 
adressé au Premier 
Ministre, 
Ministre d’Etat, au 
charge du dossier sur 
lequel porte le 
contrôle. 
 
• se faire assister par 
un expert lorsque le 
contrôle porte sur un 
domaine qui requiert 
des connaissances 
spéciales. La 
Commission peut en 
décider ainsi à la 
majorité des deux tiers 
des voix et après avoir 
consulté le Directeur 
du Service de 
Renseignement. 
 
• dresser à l’issue de 
chaque contrôle un 
rapport final à 
caractère confidentiel 




formulées par ses 




spécifiques définis au 
paragraphe (2) ci-
avant. Ce rapport est 
adressé au Premier 
Ministre, Ministre 
d’Etat, au Directeur du 
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Service de 
Renseignement et aux 
députés qui sont 





• élaborer des avis 
concernant des 
questions liées au 
fonctionnement et aux 
activités du service de 
Renseignement soit 
sur demande du 
Premier Ministre, 
Ministre d’Etat, soit de 
sa propre initiative.  
 
• prendre connaissance 




ordonnées par le 
Premier Ministre à la 
demande du Service 
de Renseignement.  
 
• prendre connaissance 
avant le début de 
l’exercice budgétaire, 
des explications du 
Premier Ministre, 
Ministre d’Etat sur le 
détail des crédits mis à 
la disposition du 
Service de 
Renseignement et aux 
députés qui sont 





• élaborer des avis 
concernant des 
questions liées au 
fonctionnement et aux 
activités du service de 
Renseignement soit 
sur demande du 
Premier Ministre, 
Ministre d’Etat, soit de 
sa propre initiative. 
 
• prendre connaissance 




ordonnées par le 
Premier Ministre à la 
demande du Service 
de Renseignement. 
 
• prendre connaissance 
avant le début de 
l’exercice budgétaire, 
des explications du 
Premier Ministre, 
Ministre d’Etat sur le 
détail des crédits mis à 
la disposition du 
Service de 
Renseignement et aux 
députés qui sont 





• élaborer des avis 
concernant des 
questions liées au 
fonctionnement et aux 
activités du service de 
Renseignement soit 
sur demande du 
Premier Ministre, 
Ministre d’Etat, soit de 
sa propre initiative. 
 
• prendre connaissance 




ordonnées par le 
Premier Ministre à la 
demande du Service 
de Renseignement. 
 
• prendre connaissance 
avant le début de 
l’exercice budgétaire, 
des explications du 
Premier Ministre, 
Ministre d’Etat sur le 
détail des crédits mis à 
la disposition du 
Directeur du Service 
de Renseignement et 
aux députés qui 





• élaborer des avis 
concernant des 
questions liées au 
fonctionnement et aux 
activités du service de 
Renseignement soit 
sur demande du 
Premier Ministre, 
Ministre d’Etat, soit de 
sa propre initiative. 
 
• prendre connaissance 




ordonnées par le 
Premier Ministre à la 
demande du Service 
de Renseignement. 
 
• prendre connaissance 
avant le début de 
l’exercice budgétaire, 
des explications du 
Premier Ministre, 
Ministre d’Etat sur le 
détail des crédits mis à 
la disposition du 
Service de 
Renseignement et aux 
députés qui sont 





• élaborer des avis 
concernant des 
questions liées au 
fonctionnement et aux 
activités du service de 
Renseignement soit 
sur demande du 
Premier Ministre, 
Ministre d’Etat, soit de 
sa propre initiative. 
 
• prendre connaissance 




ordonnées par le 
Premier Ministre à la 
demande du Service 
de Renseignement. 
 
• prendre connaissance 
avant le début de 
l’exercice budgétaire, 
des explications du 
Premier Ministre, 
Ministre d’Etat sur le 
détail des crédits mis à 
la disposition du 





• soumettre chaque 
année un rapport 
d’activités à la 
Chambre des Députés.  
 




l’article 14 de la loi du 









composée des seuls 
présidents des groupes 
politiques représentés 
à la Chambre des 
Députés.  Chaque 
membre y dispose 
d’un nombre de voix 
égal au nombre des 
membres du groupe 
qu’il représente. Le 
membre empêché 
d’assister à une 
réunion de la 
Commission ne peut 




• soumettre chaque 
année un rapport 
d’activités à la 
Chambre des Députés. 
 




l’article 14 de la loi du 









composée des seuls 
présidents des groupes 
politiques représentés 
à la Chambre des 
Députés. Chaque 
membre y dispose 
d’un nombre de voix 
égal au nombre des 
membres du groupe 
qu’il représente. Le 
membre empêché 
d’assister à une 
réunion de la 
Commission ne peut 




• soumettre chaque 
année un rapport 
d’activités à la 
Chambre des Députés. 
 




l’article 14 de la loi du 









composée des seuls 
présidents des groupes 
politiques représentés 
à la Chambre des 
Députés. Chaque 
membre y dispose 
d’un nombre de voix 
égal au nombre des 
membres du groupe 
qu’il représente. Le 
membre empêché 
d’assister à une 
réunion de la 
Commission ne peut 




• soumettre chaque 
année un rapport 
d’activités à la 
Chambre des Députés. 
 




l’article 14 de la loi du 









composée des seuls 
présidents des groupes 
politiques représentés 
à la Chambre des 
Députés. Chaque 
membre y dispose 
d’un nombre de voix 
égal au nombre des 
membres du groupe 
qu’il représente. Le 
membre empêché 
d’assister à une 
réunion de la 
Commission ne peut 




• soumettre chaque 
année un rapport 
d’activités à la 
Chambre des Députés. 
 




l’article 14 de la loi du 









composée des seuls 
présidents des groupes 
politiques représentés 
à la Chambre des 
Députés. Chaque 
membre y dispose 
d’un nombre de voix 
égal au nombre des 
membres du groupe 
qu’il représente. Le 
membre empêché 
d’assister à une 
réunion de la 
Commission ne peut 
pas se faire remplacer 
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par un autre membre 
de son groupe 
politique.  
 
Art. 3.- Du Président  
 
La Commission 
nomme en son sein, à 
la majorité absolue des 
voix et pour la durée 
de la session un 
président. A défaut du 
président, le député le 
plus ancien en rang 
préside la commission. 
Il revient au président 
de diriger les débats de 
la Commission et à 
veiller à l’expédition 
la plus prompte des 
affaires attribuées à la 
commission. 
 
Art. 4.- Du secrétariat  
 
Le secrétariat est 
assuré par un membre 
du personnel du 
Service de 
Renseignement ou par 
une autre personne 
désignée à cet effet par 
les membres de la 
Commission. Le 
secrétaire surveille 
l’entrée et le suivi des 
affaires dont est saisie 
par un autre membre 
de son groupe 
politique. 
 
Art. 3. Du Président 
 
La Commission 
nomme en son sein, à 
la majorité absolue des 
voix et pour la durée 
de la session un 
président. A défaut du 
président, le député le 
plus ancien en rang 
préside la commission. 
Il revient au président 
de diriger les débats de 
la Commission et à 
veiller à l’expédition 
la plus prompte des 
affaires attribuées à la 
commission. 
 
Art. 4. Du secrétariat 
 
Le secrétariat est 
assuré par un membre 
du personnel du 
Service de 
Renseignement ou par 
une autre personne 
désignée à cet effet par 
les membres de la 
Commission. Le 
secrétaire surveille 
l’entrée et le suivi des 
affaires dont est saisie 
par un autre membre 
de son groupe 
politique. 
 
Art. 3. Du Président 
 
La Commission 
nomme en son sein, à 
la majorité absolue des 
voix et pour la durée 
de la session un 
président. A défaut du 
président, le député le 
plus ancien en rang 
préside la commission. 
Il revient au président 
de diriger les débats de 
la Commission et à 
veiller à l’expédition 
la plus prompte des 
affaires attribuées à la 
commission. 
 
Art. 4. Du secrétariat 
 
Le secrétariat est 
assuré par un membre 
du personnel du 
Service de 
Renseignement ou par 
une autre personne 
désignée à cet effet par 
les membres de la 
Commission. Le 
secrétaire surveille 
l’entrée et le suivi des 
affaires dont est saisie 
par un autre membre 
de son groupe 
politique. 
 
Art. 3.- Du Président 
 
La Commission 
nomme en son sein, à 
la majorité absolue des 
voix et pour la durée 
de la session un 
président. A défaut du 
président, le député le 
plus ancien en rang 
préside la commission. 
Il revient au président 
de diriger les débats de 
la Commission et à 
veiller à l’expédition 
la plus prompte des 
affaires attribuées à la 
commission. 
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la commission. Il 
rédige les procès-
verbaux des réunions 
de cette dernière et 
s’occupe de 
l’expédition des 
convocations et ordres 
du jour des réunions, 
des projets d’avis et 
des délibérations y 
afférentes, voire de la 
correspondance. Il a la 
garde des archives qui 
seront tenus auprès  









Art. 5.- De la tenue 
des réunions 
  
La Commission se 
réunit toutes les fois 
que les affaires 
comprises dans ses 
attributions l’exigent 
et au moins une fois 
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convocation se fait par 
écrit et est adressée 
aux membres au 
moins trois jours avant 
la date fixée pour la 
réunion. La 
Commission se réunit 
obligatoirement à la 
demande d’au moins 
deux de ses membres. 
La convocation 
mentionne le lieu, le 
jour et l’heure de la 
réunion et contient 
l’ordre du jour. Les 
réunions de la 
Commission se 
tiennent à huis clos. 
Les membres de la 
Commission sont 
tenus au strict respect 
de la confidentialité 
des affaires traitées au 
sein de la Commission 
et ceci au-delà du 
temps où ils font partie 
de ladite Commission.  
 
Art. 6.- De l’ordre du 
jour  
 
L’ordre du jour des 
réunions de la 
Commission est fixé 
par celle-ci, ou, à son 
défaut, par son 
président. Les 
convocation se fait par 
écrit et est adressée 
aux membres au 
moins trois jours avant 
la date fixée pour la 
réunion. La 
Commission se réunit 
obligatoirement à la 
demande d’au moins 
deux de ses membres. 
La convocation 
mentionne le lieu, le 
jour et l’heure de la 
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l’ordre du jour. Les 
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défaut, par son 
président. Les 
Annex - 34 
 
membres se voient 
communiquer par le 
président la 
convocation ensemble 
avec l’ordre du jour 
ainsi que le cas 
échéant les pièces et 
documents nécessaires 




l’ordre du jour par les 
membres peut être 
faite séance tenante. 
Avant d’en délibérer, 
il est statué sur 
l’urgence.  
 
Art. 7.- Des 
délibérations  
 
La commission ne 
délibère valablement 
que si au moins la 
majorité des voix est 
représentée. Les 
décisions sont prises à 
la majorité des voix. 
Elles sont prises par 
vote à main levée. 
Cependant sur 
proposition d’un de 
ses membres, la 
Commission peut 
procéder par vote 
secret.  
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avec l’ordre du jour 
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communiquer par le 
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membres peut être 
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Commission peut 
procéder par vote 
secret. 
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Art. 8.- Du procès-
verbal  
 
Il est établi pour 
chaque réunion un 
procès-verbal qui est 
signé par le président 
et le secrétaire de la 
Commission. Le 
procès-verbal a pour 
objet d’acter la 
présence des membres 
ainsi que les 
conclusions des 
discussions et les 
décisions de la 
Commission. Le projet 
de procès-verbal est 
établi par le secrétaire 
ou le cas échéant par 
une personne désignée 
à cet effet par les 
membres de la 
Commission. Le projet 
de procès-verbal est 
soumis pour 
approbation aux 
membres au plus tard 
au début de la 
prochaine réunion de 
la commission. Les 
membres munissent 
chaque page du 
procès-verbal dûment 
approuvé de leur 
paraphe. Seuls les 
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Annex - 36 
 
membres qui ont 
assisté à la réunion 
dont rend compte le 
projet de procès-verbal 
soumis à approbation 
peuvent en exiger une 
modification. Les 
procès-verbaux ont un 
caractère strictement 
confidentiel. Sauf 
décision contraire de 
la commission les 
procès-verbaux et 
leurs annexes ne sont 
pas distribués. Ils sont 
conservés dans les 
locaux du Service de 
Renseignement où ils 
peuvent être consultés 




Art. 9.- Du contrôle 
portant sur des 
dossiers spécifiques  
 
Le membre qui désire 
procéder à un contrôle 
portant sur un dossier 
spécifique en saisira le 
Président qui en 
informera la 
Commission qui à son 
tour transmettra la 
requête au Service de 
Renseignement. Les 
membres qui ont 
assisté à la réunion 
dont rend compte le 
projet de procès-verbal 
soumis à approbation 
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informations fournies 




transmises à tous les 








Art. 10.- Modification 
du règlement  
 
Toute modification du 
règlement intérieur de 
la Commission doit 
être adoptée par la 
Commission à la 
majorité des voix. Le 
règlement modifié doit 
être soumis pour 
approbation à la 
Chambre des Députés 
siégeant en séance 
plénière.  
 
Art. 11.- Entrée en 
vigueur  
 
Le présent règlement 
intérieur entre en 
vigueur après 
approbation par la 
informations fournies 
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Chambre des Députés 
ayant siégé en séance 
plénière. 
Chambre des Députés 
ayant siégé en séance 
plénière. 
Chambre des Députés 
ayant siégé en séance 
plénière. 
Chambre des Députés 
ayant siégé en séance 
plénière. 
Chambre des Députés 
ayant siégé en séance 
plénière. 
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1.2. The legislative process  




Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
Art. 55.- (1) 
Les projets de 
loi présentés au 
nom du Grand-
Duc sont 










pour  y être 
discutés 
suivant la 
forme établie à 











Art. 55. (1) Les 














pour y être 
discutés 
suivant la 
forme établie à 











Art. 55. (1) Les 














pour y être 
discutés 
suivant la 
forme établie à 











Art. 55.- (1) 
Les projets de 
loi présentés au 
nom du Grand-
Duc sont 










pour y être 
discutés 
suivant la 
forme établie à 











Art. 55. (1) Les 














pour y être 
discutés 
suivant la 
forme établie à 











Art. 53.- (1) 
Les projets de 
loi présentés au 
nom du Grand-
Duc sont 










pour y être 
discutés 
suivant la 
forme établie à 











Art. 53.- (1) 
Les projets de 
loi présentés au 
nom du Grand-
Duc sont 










pour y être 
discutés 
suivant la 
forme établie à 











Art. 53.- (1) 
Les projets de 
loi présentés au 
nom du Grand-
Duc sont 










pour y être 
discutés 
suivant la 
forme établie à 








renvoi. Il peut 
toutefois 
consulter 
Art. 53.- (1) 
Les projets de 
loi présentés au 
nom du Grand- 
Duc sont 










pour y être 
discutés 
suivant la 
forme établie à 








renvoi. Il peut 
toutefois 
consulter 















donnent lieu ni 
à débat ni à 
vote par appel 
nominal.  
 
(4) Les projets 









sont renvoyés:  




qui fera rapport 
















donnent lieu ni 
à débat ni à 
vote par appel 
nominal. 
 
(4) Les projets 














qui fera rapport 
















donnent lieu ni 
à débat ni à 
vote par appel 
nominal. 
 
(4) Les projets 














qui fera rapport 
















donnent lieu ni 
à débat ni à 
vote par appel 
nominal. 
 
(4) Les projets 














qui fera rapport 
















donnent lieu ni 
à débat ni à 
vote par appel 
nominal. 
 
(4) Les projets 














qui fera rapport 
















donnent lieu ni 
à débat ni à 
vote par appel 
nominal.  
 
(4) Les projets 









sont renvoyés :  




qui fera rapport 
















donnent lieu ni 
à débat ni à 
vote par appel 
nominal.  
 
(4) Les projets 









sont renvoyés : 




qui fera rapport 
à la Chambre, 
les autres 
commissions 
la Chambre au 
sujet du renvoi. 
Cette 
consultation 









donnent lieu ni 
à débat ni à 
vote par appel 
nominal. 
 
(4) Les projets 














qui fera rapport 
à la Chambre, 
les autres 
commissions 
la Chambre au 
sujet du renvoi. 
Cette 
consultation 









donnent lieu ni 
à débat ni à 
vote par appel 
nominal. 
 
(4) Les projets 














qui fera rapport 
à la Chambre, 
les autres 
commissions 





pour avis;  




à l'article 18;  




















l'article 19. Il 
en est de même 
en cas de 













à l’article 18; 




















l’article 19. Il 
en est de même 
en cas de 













à l’article 18; 




















l’article 19. Il 
en est de même 
en cas de 













à l'article 18; 




















l'article 19. Il 
en est de même 
en cas de 













à l’article 18; 




















l’article 19. Il 
en est de même 
en cas de 








pour avis ; 




à l’article 17 ; 




















l’article 18. Il 
en est de même 
en cas de 








pour avis ; 




à l’article 17 ; 




















l’article 18. Il 
en est de même 
en cas de 













à l'article 17; 




















l'article 18. Il 
en est de même 
en cas de 













à l'article 17; 




















l'article 18. Il 
en est de même 
en cas de 






















































































































Art. 54.- (1) 
Dans le cas où 
la Chambre est 
saisie d'un 
projet de loi 
qui n'aura pas 












le Président en 
ordonne le 

















Art. 54.- (1) 
Dans le cas où 
la Chambre est 
saisie d'un 
projet de loi 
qui n'aura pas 












le Président en 
ordonne le 
renvoi, soit à 
une  
commission 
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permanente, 




(2) Dans les 
cas prévus par 
le présent 
article et par le 
précédent, la 
Chambre fixe 




le rapport de la 
commission, 
qui sera fait 
dans 
le plus court 
délai possible. 
 
(3) Il y aura au 






la discussion, à 









(2) Dans les 
cas prévus par 
le présent 
article et par le 
précédent, la 
Chambre fixe 




le rapport de la 
commission, 
qui sera fait 
dans 
le plus court 
délai possible. 
 
(3) Il y aura au 






la discussion, à 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
Art. 56.- 
Chaque député 










loi la signe et 
la dépose sur le 


























Art. 57. Le  
député qui  
veut faire  
une 
proposition de 
loi la signe et 
la dépose sur le 



















Art. 56.  
Chaque député 





Art. 57. Le  
député qui  
veut faire  
une 
proposition de 
loi la signe et 
la dépose sur le 


























Art. 57.- Le  
député qui  
veut faire  
une 
proposition de 
loi la signe et 
la dépose sur le 




Art. 58.- (1) 
Une  
proposition de 
loi est toujours 
recevable, sauf 
si elle est 
contraire à 
l’ordre public 
ou aux bonnes 
mœurs. La 
Chambre 











Art. 57. Le  
député qui  
veut faire  
une 
proposition de 
loi la signe et 
la dépose sur le 




Art. 58. (1) 
Une 
proposition de 
loi est toujours 
recevable, sauf 
si elle est 
contraire à 
l’ordre public 
ou aux bonnes 
mœurs. La 
Chambre 




Art. 55. – 
Chaque député 





Art. 56. Le  
député qui  
veut faire  
une 
proposition de 
loi la signe et 
la dépose sur le 




Art. 57. (1)  
Une 
proposition de 
loi est toujours 
recevable, sauf 
si elle est 
contraire à 
l’ordre public 
ou aux bonnes 
mœurs. La 
Chambre 




Art. 55. – 
Chaque député 





Art. 56. Le  
député qui  
veut faire  
une 
proposition de 
loi la signe et 
la dépose sur le 




Art. 57. (1)  
Une 
proposition de 
loi est toujours 
recevable, sauf 
si elle est 
contraire à 
l’ordre public 
ou aux bonnes 
mœurs. La 
Chambre 











Art. 56.- Le  
député qui  
veut faire  
une 
proposition de 
loi la signe et 
la dépose sur le 




Art. 57.- (1) 
Une 
proposition de 
loi est toujours 
recevable, sauf 
si elle est 
contraire à 
l'ordre public 
ou aux bonnes 
mœurs. La 
Chambre 





Chaque député  





Art. 56.- Le  
député qui  
veut faire  
une 
proposition de 
loi la signe et 
la dépose sur 




Art. 57.- (1) 
Une  
proposition de 
loi est toujours 
recevable, sauf 
si elle est 
contraire à 
l'ordre public 
ou aux bonnes 
mœurs. La 
Chambre 












Art. 59.- Si la 
proposition de 
loi est déclarée 
recevable, elle 

































(2) Si la 
proposition de 
loi est déclarée 
recevable, elle 

































(2) Si la 
proposition de 
loi est déclarée 
recevable, elle 

































(2) Si la 
proposition de 





elle est  
imprimée et 
distribuée. et 










des alinéas 2 et 
4 de l’article 
55. 
 













(2) Si la 
proposition de 





elle est  
imprimée, 
distribuée et 










des alinéas 2 et 
















(2) Si la 
proposition de 





elle est  
imprimée, 
distribuée et 










des alinéas 2 et 
4 de l’article 
53. 
 













(2) Si la 
proposition de 





et elle est 
imprimée, 
distribuée et 










des alinéas 2 et 
4 de l’article 
53. 
 













(2) Si la 
proposition de 






















Art. 58.-  
Après que le 
Conseil d'Etat 










(2) Si la 
proposition de 






















Art. 58.-  
Après que le 
Conseil d'Etat 






































et, par ce 
dernier, pour 
avis au Conseil 


































qui peut rendre 




































qui peut rendre 































de 3 mois, pour 
prendre 
position au 
sujet de la 
proposition. 
qui peut rendre 































de 3 mois, pour 
prendre 
position au 


































de 3 mois, pour 
prendre 
position au 







renvoyée à une 
commission 
qui la discute 
et en fait 








des alinéas 2 et 














de 3 mois, pour 
prendre 
position au 







renvoyée à une 
commission 
qui la discute 
et en fait 








des alinéas 2 et 
























renvoyée à une 
commission 
qui la discute 
et en fait 








des alinéas 2 et 
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professionnelle































 La proposition 
de loi est 
renvoyée pour 






Art. 60. La 
proposition de 
loi figure à 






un délai de 6 

















Art. 61. (1) 
 La proposition 








Art. 60. La 
proposition de 
loi figure à 






un délai de 6 

















Art. 61. (1)  
La proposition 








Art. 60.- La 
proposition de 
loi figure à 






un délai de 6 

















Art. 61.- (1)  
La proposition 








Art. 60. Après 
s’être vu 
communiquer 






à l’article 59 si 
le 
Gouvernement 





de loi pour en 









Art. 61. (1)  
La proposition 








Art. 59. – 
Après s’être vu 
communiquer 





délai prévu à 
l’article 58 si 
le 
Gouvernement 





de loi pour en 









Art. 60. – (1) 
La proposition 








Art. 59. – 
Après s’être vu 
communiquer 





délai prévu à 
l’article 58 si 
le 
Gouvernement 





de loi pour en 









Art. 60. – (1) 
La proposition 













et le renvoi de 
la proposition 






loi à l'ordre 
du jour d'une 
séance en vue 
d'exposer 
l'objet de sa 
proposition 
de loi, sans que 
la Chambre ne 
soit cependant 




















et le renvoi de 
la proposition 






loi à l'ordre 
du jour d'une 
séance en vue 
d'exposer 
l'objet de sa 
proposition 
de loi, sans que 
la Chambre ne 
soit cependant 



















des alinéas 2 et 























politique et de 








à la poursuite 



























politique et de 








à la poursuite 



























politique et de 








à la poursuite 












parole est, sans 
préjudice de 
l’article 80 de 
la Constitution, 








ainsi que pour 
chaque groupe 
politique et de 






















parole est, sans 
préjudice de 
l’article 80 de 
la Constitution, 








ainsi que pour 
chaque groupe 
politique et de 






















parole est, sans 
préjudice de 
l’article 80 de 
la Constitution, 








ainsi que pour 
chaque groupe 
politique et de 

















(2) Si la 
Chambre fait 
droit à la 
demande, Le 
temps de 
parole est, sans 
préjudice de 
l’article 80 de 
la Constitution, 








ainsi que pour 
chaque groupe 
politique et de 










savoir si elle 
fait 





(3) Si la 
Chambre fait 
droit à la 
demande, le 
temps de 
parole est, sans 
préjudice de 
l'article 80 de 
la Constitution, 








ainsi que pour 
chaque groupe 
politique et de 










savoir si elle 
fait 





(3) Si la 
Chambre fait 
droit à la 
demande, le 
temps de 
parole est, sans 
préjudice de 
l'article 80 de 
la Constitution, 






















Art. 62. A 




par un vote sur 































Art. 62. A 




par un vote sur 































Art. 62. A 




par un vote sur 































Art. 62.- A 




par un vote sur 





















Art. 63. (1) 
Lorsque l’avis 
du Conseil 







(3) A  






politique de la 
proposition de 
loi et sur le 
caractère 
















Art. 63. (1) 
Lorsque l’avis 
du Conseil 







(3) A  






politique de la 
proposition de 
loi et sur le 
caractère 
















Art. 60.-2.- (1) 
Lorsque l’avis 
du Conseil 







(3) A  






politique de la 
proposition de 
loi et sur le 
caractère 
















Art. 60.-2.- (1) 
Lorsque l’avis 
du Conseil 
























décidé qu'il y a 








l'Art. 27 de la 



























décidé qu'il y a 








l'Art. 27 de la 





renvoi à une 
commission 
sera 









Art. 63. (1) Si 
la Chambre se 
prononce en 
faveur de la 














des alinéas 2 et 


















Art. 63. (1) Si 
la Chambre se 
prononce en 
faveur de la 














des alinéas 2 et 


















Art. 63. (1) Si 
la Chambre se 
prononce en 
faveur de la 














des alinéas 2 et 


















Art. 63.- (1) Si 
la Chambre se 
prononce en 
faveur de la 














des alinéas 2 et 


















(2) Si elle se 
prononce en 






renvoyée à la 
commission 
saisie pour en 
faire rapport à 





chapitre 3 du 
présent titre. 
 
(3) Si elle se 
prononce 















(2) Si elle se 
prononce en 






renvoyée à la 
commission 
saisie pour en 
faire rapport à 





chapitre 3 du 
présent titre. 
 
(3) Si elle se 
prononce 















(2) Si elle se 
prononce en 






renvoyée à la 
commission 
saisie pour en 
faire rapport à 





chapitre 3 du 
présent titre. 
 
(3) Si elle se 
prononce 
















avant le vote 




































avant le vote 
































(2) Si la 
Chambre se 
prononce en 
défaveur de la 




de loi, celle-ci 
est classée sans 
suites. 
 
Art. 62.- Ne 
peuvent être 
réintroduites 








qu’elle n'a pas 
adoptées.  
 
Art. 63.- Tout 
rapport qui 






et tendant à 
pour avis. 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre se 
prononce en 
défaveur de la 




de loi, celle-ci 
est classée sans 
suites. 
 
Art. 64. Ne 
peuvent être 
réintroduites 








qu’elle n’a pas 
adoptées. 
 
Art. 65. Tout 
rapport qui 






et tendant à 
pour avis. 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre se 
prononce en 
défaveur de la 




de loi, celle-ci 
est classée sans 
suites. 
 
Art. 64. Ne 
peuvent être 
réintroduites 








qu’elle n’a pas 
adoptées. 
 
Art. 65. Tout 
rapport qui 






et tendant à 
pour avis. 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre se 
prononce en 
défaveur de la 




de loi, celle-ci 
est classée sans 
suites. 
 
Art. 64.- Ne 
peuvent être 
réintroduites 








qu'elle n'a pas 
adoptées. 
 
Art. 65.- Tout 
rapport qui 





















Art. 64. Ne 
peuvent être 
réintroduites 






pas prises en 
considération 
ou qu’elle n’a 
pas adoptées. 
 
Art. 65. Tout 
rapport qui 





















Art. 61.- Ne 
peuvent être 
réintroduites 






pas prises en 
considération 
ou qu’elle n’a 
pas adoptées.  
 
Art. 62.- Tout 
rapport qui 





















Art. 61.- Ne 
peuvent être 
réintroduites 






pas prises en 
considération 
ou qu’elle n’a 
pas adoptées.  
 
Art. 62.- Tout 
rapport qui 





















Art. 61.- Ne 
peuvent être 
réintroduites 






pas prises en 
considération 
ou qu'elle n'a 
pas adoptées. 
 
Art. 62.- Tout 
rapport qui 





















Art. 61.- Ne 
peuvent être 
réintroduites 






pas prises en 
considération 
ou qu'elle n'a 
pas adoptées. 
 
Art. 62.- Tout 
rapport qui 






et tendant à 































Art. 64.- (1) 
Chaque député 
a le droit de 
retirer une 
proposition de 
loi dont il est 
l’auteur. avant 






























Art. 66. (1) 
Chaque député 
a le droit de 
retirer une 
proposition de 
loi dont il est 
l’auteur avant 






























Art. 66. (1) 
Chaque député 
a le droit de 
retirer une 
proposition de 
loi dont il est 
l’auteur avant 






























Art. 66.- (1) 
Chaque député 
a le droit de 
retirer une 
proposition de 
loi dont il est 
l’auteur 






























Art. 66. (1) 
Chaque député 
a le droit de 
retirer une 
proposition de 
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poursuite de la 
procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 62.  
La Chambre 
est informée du 
retrait. 
 





politique a le 




avant le vote 
sur la poursuite 
de la procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 62, si 
l’auteur n’est 
plus membre 
de la Chambre, 
à condition que 
l’auteur ait été 
membre de ce 
groupe 





poursuite de la 
procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 62.  
La Chambre 
est informée du 
retrait. 
 





politique a le 




avant le vote 
sur la poursuite 
de la procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 62, si 
l’auteur n’est 
plus membre 
de la Chambre, 
à condition que 
l’auteur ait été 
membre de ce 
groupe 





poursuite de la 
procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 62.  
La Chambre 
est informée du 
retrait. 
 





politique a le 




avant le vote 
sur la poursuite 
de la procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 62, si 
l’auteur n’est 
plus membre 
de la Chambre, 
à condition que 
l’auteur ait été 
membre de ce 
groupe 





sur la poursuite 
de la procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 62.  
La Chambre 
est informée du 
retrait. 
 





politique a le 
droit de retirer 
une 
proposition de 
loi avant le 
vote sur la 
poursuite de la 
procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 62, si 
l’auteur n’est 
plus membre 
de la Chambre, 
à condition que 
l’auteur ait été 
membre de ce 
groupe 











est informée du 
retrait. 
 





politique a le 












de la Chambre, 
à condition que 
l’auteur ait été 
membre de ce 
groupe 
















Art. 65.- Si 
l’auteur de la 
proposition de 
loi n’est plus 
membre de la 
Chambre et si 
le groupe 
politique, 






dépôt de la 
proposition de 
loi n’existe 
plus, le retrait 
d’une 
proposition de 
loi est décidé 






(4) Le retrait 
politique au 
moment du 







(3) Si  
l’auteur de la 
proposition de 
loi n’est plus 
membre de la 
Chambre et si 
le groupe  
politique, 






dépôt de la 
proposition de 
loi n’existe 
plus, le retrait 
d’une 
proposition de 
loi est décidé 






(4) Le retrait 
politique au 
moment du 







(3) Si  
l’auteur de la 
proposition de 
loi n’est plus 
membre de la 
Chambre et si 
le groupe  
politique, 






dépôt de la 
proposition de 
loi n’existe 
plus, le retrait 
d’une 
proposition de 
loi est décidé 






(4) Le retrait 
politique au 
moment du 







(3) Si  
l’auteur de la 
proposition de 
loi n’est plus 
membre de la 
Chambre et si 
le groupe  
politique, 






dépôt de la 
proposition de 
loi n’existe 
plus, le retrait 
d’une 
proposition de 
loi est décidé 






(4) Le retrait 
politique au 
moment du 







(3) Si  
l’auteur de la 
proposition de 
loi n’est plus 
membre de la 
Chambre et si 
le groupe  
politique, 






dépôt de la 
proposition de 
loi n’existe 
plus, le retrait 
d’une 
proposition de 
loi est décidé 











loi après le 
vote sur la 
poursuite de la 
procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 
62 est décidé 






Art. 66.- (1) 
Une 
proposition de 
loi ne peut être 









loi à son nom. 
d’une 
proposition de 
loi après le 
vote sur la 
poursuite de la 
procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 
62 est décidé 









loi ne peut être 









loi à son nom. 
d’une 
proposition de 
loi après le 
vote sur la 
poursuite de la 
procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 
62 est décidé 









loi ne peut être 









loi à son nom. 
d’une 
proposition de 
loi après le 
vote sur la 
poursuite de la 
procédure 
législative tel 
que prévu à 
l’article 62 est 










loi ne peut être 





























loi ne peut être 









loi à son nom. 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP)
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
Art. 67.- (1) Le 
rapporteur 
présente le 
rapport de la 
commission à 
laquelle le 
projet ou la 
proposition  












rapport sur un 












Art. 67. (1)  
Le rapporteur 
présente le 
rapport de la 
commission à 
laquelle le 
projet ou la 
proposition  












rapport sur un 




une discussion  







Art. 67. (1) 
Le rapporteur 
présente le 
rapport de la 
commission à 
laquelle le 
projet ou la 
proposition  












rapport sur un 




une discussion  







Art. 67.- (1) Le 
rapporteur 
présente le 
rapport de la 
commission à 
laquelle le 
projet ou la 
proposition  












rapport sur un 




une discussion  







Art. 67. (1)  
Le rapporteur 
présente le 
rapport de la 
commission à 
laquelle le 
projet ou la 
proposition  












rapport sur un 




une discussion  







Art. 63. (1)  
Le rapporteur 
présente le 
rapport de la 
commission, à 
laquelle le 
projet ou la 
proposition  












rapport sur un 




une discussion  







Art. 63. (1)  
Le rapporteur 
présente le 
rapport de la 
commission, à 
laquelle le 
projet ou la 
proposition  












rapport sur un 




une discussion  







Art. 63.- (1) Le 
rapporteur 
présente le 





de loi a été  











rapport sur un 




une discussion  
























Art. 63.- (1) La 
discussion qui 
suivra le 
rapport sur un 
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sur le principe 
et sur 
l'ensemble du 




(4) Outre la 
discussion 















contraire de la 
Chambre, le 
texte adopté ou 
éventuellement 
amendé par la 
commission 
sert de base à 
la discussion 





sur le principe 
et sur 
l’ensemble du 




(4) Outre la 
discussion  















contraire de la 
Chambre, le 
texte adopté ou 
éventuellement 
amendé par la 
commission 







sur le principe 
et sur 
l’ensemble du 




(4) Outre la 
discussion  















contraire de la 
Chambre, le 
texte adopté ou 
éventuellement 
amendé par la 
commission 







sur le principe 
et sur 
l'ensemble du 




(4) Outre la 
discussion  







de chacune des 
divisions d'un 






contraire de la 
Chambre, le 











sur le principe 
et sur 
l’ensemble du 




(4) Outre la 
discussion  















contraire de la 
Chambre, le 
texte adopté ou 
éventuellement 
amendé par la 
commission 







sur le principe 
et sur 
l’ensemble du 




(4) Outre la 
discussion  















contraire de la 
Chambre, le 
texte adopté ou 
éventuellement 
amendé par la 
commission 







sur le principe 
et sur 
l’ensemble du 




(4) Outre la 
discussion  















contraire de la 
Chambre, le 
texte adopté ou 
éventuellement 
amendé par la 
commission 







sur le principe 
et sur 
l'ensemble du 




(4) Outre la 
discussion  















contraire de la 
Chambre, le 
texte adopté ou 
éventuellement 
amendé par la 
commission 







sur le principe 
et sur 
l'ensemble 
du projet de loi 
ou de la 
proposition. 
 
(3) Outre la 
discussion  







de chacune des 
divisions d'un 






contraire de la 
Chambre, le 
texte adopté ou 
éventuellement 
amendé par la 
commission 





















ouverte sur une 
proposition, 
celui qui l'a 
faite peut la 

































ouverte sur une 
proposition, 
celui qui l’a 
faite peut la 

































ouverte sur une 
proposition, 
celui qui l’a 
faite peut la 

































ouverte sur une 
proposition, 
celui qui l'a 
faite peut la 

































ouverte sur une 
proposition, 
celui qui l’a 
faite peut la 

































ouverte sur une 
proposition, 
celui qui l’a 
faite peut la 

































ouverte sur une 
proposition, 
celui qui l’a 
faite peut la 

































ouverte sur une 
proposition, 
celui qui l'a 
faite peut la 
retirer; mais si 
un autre 
membre 






























ouverte sur une 
proposition, 
celui qui l'a 
faite peut la 
retirer; mais si 
un autre 
membre 

















de leur rapport, 








Art. 70.- (1) 
Lorsque, dans 
les cas prévus 
par l'Art. 2 de  




Conseil d’Etat,  
une 
proposition ou 
un projet de loi 
aura été discuté 
























Art. 70. (1) 
Lorsque, dans 
les cas prévus 
par l’Art. 2 de 







un projet de loi 
aura été discuté 
sans que l’avis 
du  
Conseil d’Etat 





















Art. 70. (1) 
Lorsque, dans 
les cas prévus 
par l’Art. 2 de 







un projet de loi 
aura été discuté 
sans que l’avis 
du  
Conseil d’Etat 





















Art. 70.- (1) 
Lorsque, dans 
les cas prévus 
par l'Art. 2 de  







un projet de loi 
aura été discuté 
























Art. 70. (1) 
Lorsque, dans 
les cas prévus 
par l’Art. 2 de 







un projet de loi 
aura été discuté 
sans que l’avis 
du  
Conseil d’Etat 





















Art. 66. (1) 
Lorsque, dans 
les cas prévus 
par l’Art. 2 de 







un projet de loi 
aura été discuté 
sans que l’avis 
du  
Conseil d’Etat 





















Art. 66. (1) 
Lorsque, dans 
les cas prévus 
par l’Art. 2 de 
la loi du 12 
juillet 1996 
portant 




un projet de loi 
aura été discuté 
sans que l’avis 
du  
Conseil d’Etat 





















Art. 66.- (1) 
Lorsque, dans 
les cas prévus 
par l'Art. 2 de  
la loi du 12 






un projet de loi 
aura été discuté 





projet de loi 
aura subi, par 
l'adoption 
d'amendements 















Art. 66.- (1) 
Lorsque, dans 
les cas prévus 
par l'Art. 27 de 
la loi du 8 






un projet de loi 
aura été discuté 
sans que l'avis 
préalable du 
Conseil d'Etat 
ait été pris, ou 
lorsqu'un 
projet de loi 
aura subi, par 
l'adoption 
d'amendements 
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du projet de 




vote article par 
article 
conformément 






la loi du fait 
qu'une 
proposition ou 
un projet de loi 
aura subi, par 
l'adoption 
d'amendements 
















du projet de  
loi. Si la 
Chambre des 
Députés a 








au vote sur 
l’ensemble de 
la loi du fait 
qu’une 
proposition ou 
un projet de loi 
aura subi, par 
l’adoption 
d’amendements 
















du projet de  
loi. Si la 
Chambre des 
Députés a 








au vote sur 
l’ensemble de 
la loi du fait 
qu’une 
proposition ou 
un projet de loi 
aura subi, par 
l’adoption 
d’amendements 
















du projet de 




vote article par 
article 
conformément 






la loi du fait 
qu'une 
proposition ou 
un projet de loi 
aura subi, par 
l'adoption 
d'amendements 
















du projet de  
loi. Si la 
Chambre des 
Députés a 








au vote sur 
l’ensemble de 
la loi du fait 
qu’une 
proposition ou 
un projet de loi 
aura subi, par 
l’adoption 
d’amendements 
















du projet de  
loi. Si la 
Chambre des 
Députés a 










la loi du fait 
qu’une 
proposition ou 
un projet de loi 
aura subi, par 
l’adoption 
d’amendements 
















du projet de  
loi. Si la 
Chambre des 
Députés a 










la loi du fait 
qu’une 
proposition ou 
un projet de loi 
aura subi, par 
l’adoption 
d’amendements 
















du projet de 




vote article par 
article 
conformément 






la loi du fait 
qu’une 
proposition ou 
un projet de loi 
aura subi, par 
l'adoption 
d'amendements 












avant le vote 
sur l'ensemble  
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entendu, celui-
ci rend son 
avis sur les 
dispositions 
votées par la 
Chambre dans 
un délai de 
trois mois au 
plus tard à 
partir de la 






dans ce délai, 
la Chambre 
peut passer au 
vote sur 
l'ensemble du 









loi a lieu par 
appel nominal 
et à haute voix. 
entendu, celui-
ci rend son  
avis sur les 
dispositions 
votées par la 
Chambre dans 
un délai de 
trois mois au 
plus tard à 







dans ce délai, 
la Chambre 
peut passer au 
vote sur 
l’ensemble du 









loi a lieu par 
appel nominal 
et à haute voix. 
entendu, celui-
ci rend son  
avis sur les 
dispositions 
votées par la 
Chambre dans 
un délai de 
trois mois au 
plus tard à 







dans ce délai, 
la Chambre 
peut passer au 
vote sur 
l’ensemble du 









loi a lieu par 
appel nominal 
et à haute voix. 
entendu, celui-
ci rend son 
avis sur les 
dispositions 
votées par la 
Chambre dans 
un délai de 
trois mois au 
plus tard à 
partir de la 






dans ce délai, 
la Chambre 
peut passer au 
vote sur 
l'ensemble du 









loi a lieu par 
appel nominal 
et à haute voix. 
entendu, celui-
ci rend son  
avis sur les 
dispositions 
votées par la 
Chambre dans 
un délai de 
trois mois au 
plus tard à 







dans ce délai, 
la Chambre 
peut passer au 
vote sur 
l’ensemble du 









loi a lieu par 
appel nominal 
et à haute voix. 
entendu, celui-
ci rend son  
avis sur les 
dispositions 
votées par la 
Chambre dans 
un délai de 
trois mois au 
plus tard à 







dans ce délai, 
la Chambre 
peut passer au 
vote sur 
l’ensemble du 









loi a lieu par 
appel nominal 
et à haute voix.  
entendu, celui-
ci rend son  
avis sur les 
dispositions 
votées par la 
Chambre dans 
un délai de 
trois mois au 
plus tard à 







dans ce délai, 
la Chambre 
peut passer au 
vote sur 
l’ensemble du 









loi a lieu par 
appel nominal 
et à haute voix.  
entendu, celui-
ci rend son 
avis sur les 
dispositions 
votées par la 
Chambre dans 
un délai de 
trois mois au 
plus tard à 
partir de la 






dans ce délai, 
la Chambre 
peut passer au 
vote sur 
l'ensemble du 









loi a lieu par 
appel nominal 































loi a lieu par 
appel nominal 
et à haute voix. 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
a) Des 
amendements 
en commission  
 
Art. 71.- (1) 
Chaque 










ou à l'article du 
projet ou de la 
proposition 


















Art. 71. (1) 
Chaque 










ou à l’article 
du projet ou de 
la proposition 


















Art. 71. (1) 
Chaque 










ou à l’article 
du projet ou de 
la proposition 


















Art. 71.- (1) 
Chaque 










ou à l'article du 
projet ou de la 
proposition 


















Art. 71. (1) 
Chaque 










ou à l’article 
du projet ou de 
la proposition 


















Art. 67. (1) 
Chaque 










ou à l’article 
du projet ou de 
la proposition 


















Art. 67. (1) 
Chaque 










ou à l’article 
du projet ou de 
la proposition 






par écrit et 
remis au 
Président. Ils 
doivent être  








Art. 67.- (1) 
Chaque 










ou à l'article du 
projet ou de la 
proposition 






par écrit et 
remis au 
Président. Ils 
doivent être  








Art. 67.- (1) 
Chaque 










ou à l'article du 
projet ou de la 
proposition 






par écrit et 
remis au 
Président. Ils 
ne peuvent être 

















son rapport la 
suite qu'elle a 
donnée aux 
amendements 






le droit d'être 


























son rapport la 
suite qu’elle a 
donnée aux 
amendements 






le droit d’être 


























son rapport la 
suite qu’elle a 
donnée aux 
amendements 






le droit d’être 


























son rapport la 
suite qu'elle a 
donnée aux 
amendements 






le droit d'être 


























son rapport la 
suite qu’elle a 
donnée aux 
amendements 






le droit d’être 


























son rapport la 
suite qu’elle a 
donnée aux 
amendements 






le droit d’être 


























son rapport la 
suite qu’elle a 
donnée aux 
amendements 






le droit d’être 


























son rapport la 
suite qu'elle a 
donnée aux 
amendements 






le droit d'être 

















membres de la 
Chambre et 







son rapport la 
suite qu'elle a 
donnée aux 
amendements 






le droit d'être 




















au moins. Les 
amendements 
sont rédigés 





de la Chambre. 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 













au moins. Les 
amendements 
sont rédigés 





de la Chambre. 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 













au moins. Les 
amendements 
sont rédigés 





de la Chambre. 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 













au moins. Les 
amendements 
sont rédigés 





de la Chambre. 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 













au moins. Les 
amendements 
sont rédigés 





de la Chambre. 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 













au moins. Les 
amendements 
sont rédigés 





de la Chambre. 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 













au moins. Les 
amendements 
sont rédigés 





de la Chambre. 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 























(2) Si la 
Chambre 











(3) Le vote des 
amendements 
produits au 
cours de la 
discussion peut 
avoir lieu sur 
un texte 
unique. 
Si la discussion 















(2) Si la 
Chambre 











(3) Le vote des 
amendements 
produits au 
cours de la 
discussion peut 
avoir lieu sur 
un texte 
unique. 
Si la discussion 
est renvoyée à 
une autre 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 




un projet de loi 
ou une 
proposition a 
été adopté sans 
modification et 
lorsqu'il n'a été 
fait aucune 
observation 
importante, il  
n'est pas 
déposé de 
rapport sur ce 
projet ou cette 
proposition.  
 
(2) L'intitulé et 
le numéro des 
projets de loi et 
propositions,  




portés sur une 
liste qui sera 
distribuée au 
moins trois 
jours avant la 
séance  




un projet de loi 
ou une 
proposition a 
été adopté sans 
modification et 
lorsqu’il n’a 





rapport sur ce 
projet ou cette 
proposition. 
 
(2) L’intitulé et 
le numéro des 
projets de loi et 
propositions,  




portés sur une 
liste qui sera 
distribuée au 
moins trois 
jours avant la 
séance  




un projet de loi 
ou une 
proposition a 
été adopté sans 
modification et 
lorsqu’il n’a 





rapport sur ce 
projet ou cette 
proposition. 
 
(2) L’intitulé et 
le numéro des 
projets de loi et 
propositions,  




portés sur une 
liste qui sera 
distribuée au 
moins trois 
jours avant la 
séance  




un projet de loi 
ou une 
proposition a 
été adopté sans 
modification et 
lorsqu'il n'a été 
fait aucune 
observation 
importante, il  
n'est pas 
déposé de 
rapport sur ce 
projet ou cette 
proposition. 
 
(2) L'intitulé et 
le numéro des 
projets de loi et 
propositions, 




portés sur une 
liste qui sera 
distribuée au 
moins trois 
jours avant la 
séance  




un projet de loi 
ou une 
proposition a 
été adopté sans 
modification et 
lorsqu’il n’a 





rapport sur ce 
projet ou cette 
proposition. 
 
(2) L’intitulé et 
le numéro des 
projets de loi et 
propositions,  




portés sur une 
liste qui sera 
distribuée au 
moins trois 
jours avant la 
séance  




un projet de loi 
ou une 
proposition a 
été adopté sans 
modification et 
lorsqu’il n’a 





rapport sur ce 
projet ou cette 
proposition.  
 
(2) L’intitulé et 
le numéro des 
projets de loi et 
propositions,  




portés sur une 
liste qui sera 
distribuée au 
moins trois 
jours avant la 
séance  




un projet de loi 
ou une 
proposition a 
été adopté sans 
modification et 
lorsqu’il n’a 





rapport sur ce 
projet ou cette 
proposition.  
 
(2) L’intitulé et 
le numéro des 
projets de loi et 
propositions,  




portés sur une 
liste qui sera 
distribuée au 
moins trois 
jours avant la 
séance  




un projet de loi 
ou une 
proposition a 
été adopté sans 
modification et 
lorsqu'il n'a été 
fait aucune 
observation 
importante, il  
n'est pas 
déposé de 
rapport sur ce 
projet ou cette 
proposition. 
 
(2) L'intitulé et 
le numéro des 
projets de loi et 
propositions, 




portés sur une 
liste qui sera 
distribuée au 
moins trois 
jours avant la 
séance  




un projet de loi 
ou une 
proposition a 
été adopté sans 
modification et 
lorsqu'il n'a été 
fait aucune 
observation 
importante, il  
n'est pas 
déposé de 
rapport sur ce 
projet ou cette 
proposition. 
 
(2) L'intitulé et 
le numéro des 
projets de loi et 
propositions, 




portés sur une 
liste qui sera 
distribuée au 
moins trois 
jours avant la 
séance  
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au cours de 
laquelle ils 
seront mis en 
délibération.  
Il y est fait 
mention pour 
chacun d'eux 






inscrit à l'ordre 
du jour d'une 
séance les 
objets figurant 







peut proposer à 
la Conférence 
des Présidents 
de la Chambre 
de porter à 
l'ordre du jour 
une affaire ne 
demandant 
qu'un vote  
sans qu'il n'y 
ait lieu de 
prévoir des 
débats.  
au cours de 
laquelle ils 
seront mis en 
délibération. 
Il y est fait 
mention pour 
chacun d’eux 






inscrit à l’ordre 
du jour d’une 
séance les 
objets figurant 







peut proposer à 
la Conférence 
des Présidents 
de la Chambre 
de porter à 
l’ordre du jour 
une affaire ne 
demandant 
qu’un vote 
sans qu’il n’y 
ait lieu de 
prévoir des 
débats. 
au cours de 
laquelle ils 
seront mis en 
délibération. 
Il y est fait 
mention pour 
chacun d’eux 






inscrit à l’ordre 
du jour d’une 
séance les 
objets figurant 







peut proposer à 
la Conférence 
des Présidents 
de la Chambre 
de porter à 
l’ordre du jour 
une affaire ne 
demandant 
qu’un vote 
sans qu’il n’y 
ait lieu de 
prévoir des 
débats. 
au cours de 
laquelle ils 
seront mis en 
délibération. 
Il y est fait 
mention pour 
chacun d'eux 






inscrit à l'ordre 
du jour d'une 
séance les 
objets figurant 







peut proposer à 
la Conférence 
des Présidents 
de la Chambre 
de porter à 
l'ordre du jour 
une affaire ne 
demandant 
qu'un vote  
sans qu'il n'y 
ait lieu de 
prévoir des 
débats. 
au cours de 
laquelle ils 
seront mis en 
délibération. 
Il y est fait 
mention pour 
chacun d’eux 






inscrit à l’ordre 
du jour d’une 
séance les 
objets figurant 







peut proposer à 
la Conférence 
des Présidents 
de la Chambre 
de porter à 
l’ordre du jour 
une affaire ne 
demandant 
qu’un vote 
sans qu’il n’y 
ait lieu de 
prévoir des 
débats. 
au cours de 
laquelle ils 
seront mis en 
délibération.  
Il y est fait 
mention pour 
chacun d’eux 






inscrit à l’ordre 
du jour d’une 
séance les 
objets figurant 







peut proposer à 
la Conférence 
des Présidents 
de la Chambre 
de porter à 
l’ordre du jour 
une affaire ne 
demandant 
qu’un vote 
sans qu’il n’y 
ait lieu de 
prévoir des 
débats.  
au cours de 
laquelle ils 
seront mis en 
délibération.  
Il y est fait 
mention pour 
chacun d’eux 






inscrit à l’ordre 
du jour d’une 
séance les 
objets figurant 







peut proposer à 
la Conférence 
des Présidents 
de la Chambre 
de porter à 
l’ordre du jour 
une affaire ne 
demandant 
qu’un vote 
sans qu’il n’y 
ait lieu de 
prévoir des 
débats.  
au cours de 
laquelle ils 
seront mis en 
délibération. 
Il y est fait 
mention pour 
chacun d'eux 






inscrit à l'ordre 
du jour d'une 
séance les 
objets figurant 







peut proposer à 
la Conférence 
des Présidents 
de la Chambre 
de porter à 
l'ordre du jour 
une affaire ne 
demandant 
qu'un vote  
sans qu'il n'y 
ait lieu de 
prévoir des 
débats. 
au cours de 
laquelle ils 
seront mis en 
délibération. 
Il y est fait 
mention pour 
chacun d'eux 






inscrit à l'ordre 
du jour d'une 
séance les 
objets figurant 







peut proposer à 
la Commission 
de Travail  
de la Chambre 
de porter à 
l'ordre du jour 
une affaire ne 
demandant 
qu'un vote  
sans qu'il n'y 
ait lieu de 
prévoir des 
débats. 
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portée à l'ordre 




(6) Si, avant le 









Président de la 
Chambre, il 
sera fait droit à 
la demande de 
la commission.  
 





du jour de la 
 









portée à l’ordre 




(6) Si, avant le 









Président de la 
Chambre, il 
sera fait droit à 
la demande de 
la commission. 
 





du jour de la 
 









portée à l’ordre 




(6) Si, avant le 









Président de la 
Chambre, il 
sera fait droit à 
la demande de 
la commission. 
 





du jour de la 
 









portée à l'ordre 




(6) Si, avant le 









Président de la 
Chambre, il 
sera fait droit à 
la demande de 
la commission. 
 





du jour de la 
 









portée à l’ordre 




(6) Si, avant le 









Président de la 
Chambre, il 
sera fait droit à 
la demande de 
la commission. 
 





du jour de la 
 









portée à l’ordre 




(6) Si, avant le 









Président de la 
Chambre, il 
sera fait droit à 
la demande de 
la commission. 
  





du jour de la 
 









portée à l’ordre 




(6) Si, avant le 









Président de la 
Chambre, il 
sera fait droit à 
la demande de 
la commission. 
  





du jour de la 
 









portée à l'ordre 




(6) Si, avant le 









Président de la 
Chambre, il 
sera fait droit à 
la demande de 
la commission. 
 





ordre du jour 
 









portée à l'ordre 




(6) Si, avant le 









Président de la 
Chambre, il 
sera fait droit à 
la demande de 
la commission. 
 





du jour de la 
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Chambre où 


































de la Chambre 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 




Art. 74.- (1) 
Seront soumis, 
avant le vote 
sur l'ensemble, 
à une nouvelle 

















4. les articles 
modifiés de 
quelque 
manière que ce 
soit;  
5. toutes les 
dispositions 




Art. 74. (1) 
Seront soumis, 
avant le vote 
sur l’ensemble, 
à une nouvelle 

















4. les articles 
modifiés de 
quelque 
manière que ce 
soit;  
5. toutes les 
dispositions 




Art. 74. (1) 
Seront soumis, 
avant le vote 
sur l’ensemble, 
à une nouvelle 

















4. les articles 
modifiés de 
quelque 
manière que ce 
soit;  
5. toutes les 
dispositions 




Art. 74.- (1) 
Seront soumis, 
avant le vote 
sur l'ensemble, 
à une nouvelle 

















4. les articles 
modifiés de 
quelque 
manière que ce 
soit;  
5. toutes les 
dispositions 




Art. 74. (1) 
Seront soumis, 
avant le vote 
sur l’ensemble, 
à une nouvelle 

















4. les articles 
modifiés de 
quelque 
manière que ce 
soit; 
5. toutes les 
dispositions 




Art. 70. (1) 
Seront soumis, 
avant le vote 
sur l’ensemble, 
à une nouvelle 
discussion et à 
un vote 





projet dans le 
cours des 











manière que ce 
soit;  
5. toutes les 
dispositions 




Art. 70. (1) 
Seront soumis, 
avant le vote 
sur l’ensemble, 
à une nouvelle 
discussion et à 
un vote 





projet dans le 
cours des 











manière que ce 
soit;  
5. toutes les 
dispositions 




Art. 70.- (1) 
Seront soumis, 
avant le vote 
sur l'ensemble, 
à une nouvelle 

















4. les articles 
modifiés de 
quelque 
manière que ce 
soit; 
5. toutes les 
dispositions 




Art. 70.- (1) 
Seront soumis, 
avant le vote 
sur l'ensemble, 
à une nouvelle 

















4. les articles 
modifiés de 
quelque 
manière que ce 
soit; 
5. toutes les 
dispositions 
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qui auront été 
admises avant 
que le Conseil 











étrangers à ce 
second vote 




moins un jour 
franc entre la 
séance du 




articles de la 
proposition 
auront été 
votés, à moins 
que la 
Chambre, à la 
majorité des 
deux tiers des 
membres 
présents, 
qui auront été 
admises avant 
que le Conseil 

















moins un jour 
franc entre la 
séance du 




articles de la 
proposition 
auront été 
votés, à moins 
que la 
Chambre, à la 
majorité des 
deux tiers des 
membres 
présents,  
qui auront été 
admises avant 
que le Conseil 

















moins un jour 
franc entre la 
séance du 




articles de la 
proposition 
auront été 
votés, à moins 
que la 
Chambre, à la 
majorité des 
deux tiers des 
membres 
présents,  
qui auront été 
admises avant 
que le Conseil 















(3) Il  
s'écoulera au 
moins un jour 
franc entre la 
séance du 




articles de la 
proposition 
auront été 
votés, à moins 
que la 
Chambre, à la 
majorité des 
deux tiers des 
membres 
présents,  
qui auront été 
admises avant 
que le Conseil 

















moins un jour 
franc entre la 
séance du 




articles de la 
proposition 
auront été 
votés, à moins 
que la 
Chambre, à la 
majorité des 
deux tiers des 
membres 
présents,  
qui auront été 
admises avant 
que le Conseil 











étrangers à ce 
second vote 




moins un jour 
franc entre la 
séance du 




articles de la 
proposition 
auront été 
votés, à moins 
que la 
Chambre, à la 
majorité des 
deux tiers des 
membres 
présents, 
qui auront été 
admises avant 
que le Conseil 











étrangers à ce 
second vote 




moins un jour 
franc entre la 
séance du 




articles de la 
proposition 
auront été 
votés, à moins 
que la 
Chambre, à la 
majorité des 
deux tiers des 
membres 
présents, 
qui auront été  
admises avant 
que le Conseil 












ce second vote 
sont interdits. 
 
(3) Il  
s'écoulera au 
moins un jour 
franc entre la 
séance du 




articles de la 
proposition 
auront été 
votés, à moins 
que la 
Chambre, à la 
majorité des 
deux tiers des 
membres 
présents, et 





mais avant que 
le Conseil 








ce second vote 
sont interdits.  
 
(3) Il  
s'écoulera au 
moins un jour 
franc entre la 
séance du 




articles de la 
proposition 
auront été 
votés, à moins 
que la 
Chambre, à la 
majorité des 
deux tiers des 
membres 
présents et 













second vote, au 
vote sur 
l'ensemble du 
















Art. 75. Toutes 
les lois sont 
soumises à un 
second vote, à 














second vote, au 
vote sur 
l’ensemble du 
















Art. 75. Toutes 
les lois sont 
soumises à un 
second vote, à 














second vote, au 
vote sur 
l’ensemble du 
















Art. 75. Toutes  
les lois sont 
soumises à un 
second vote, à 














second vote, au 
vote sur 
l'ensemble du 
















Art. 75. Toutes 
les lois sont 
soumises à un 
second vote, à 














second vote, au 
vote sur 
l’ensemble du 
















Art. 75. Toutes 
les lois sont 
soumises à un 
second vote, à 














second vote, au 
vote sur 
l’ensemble du 
















Art. 71. Toutes 
les lois sont 
soumises à un 
second vote, à 














second vote, au 
vote sur 
l’ensemble du 
















Art. 71. Toutes 
les lois sont 
soumises à un 
second vote, à 














second vote, au 
vote sur 
l'ensemble du 
















Art. 71. Toutes 
les lois sont 
soumises à un 
second vote, 














second vote, au 
vote sur 
l'ensemble du 
















Art. 71. Toutes 
les lois sont 
soumises à un 
second vote, 
à moins que la 
Chambre,  
d'accord avec 









Art. 76.- (1) 
Après le vote 
sur l'ensemble 




Chambre sur la 
question de 
savoir „s'il y a 
lieu ou s'il n'y 
a pas lieu à 
second vote“.  
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 
décide qu'il  
n'y a pas lieu à 
second vote, le 
projet de loi est 
renvoyé au 
Conseil d'Etat, 
et dans le cas 
où le Conseil 
d'Etat se rallie 
à la décision de 
la Chambre, le 










Art. 76. (1) 
Après le vote 
sur l’ensemble 




Chambre sur la 
question de 
savoir «s’il y a 
lieu ou s’il n’y 
a pas lieu à 
second vote». 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 
décide qu’il 
n’y a pas lieu à 
second vote, le 
projet de loi est 
renvoyé au 
Conseil d’Etat, 
et dans le cas 
où le Conseil 
d’Etat se rallie 
à la décision de 
la Chambre, le 










Art. 76. (1) 
Après le vote 
sur l’ensemble 




Chambre sur la 
question de 
savoir «s’il y a 
lieu ou s’il n’y 
a pas lieu à 
second vote». 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 
décide qu’il 
n’y a pas lieu à 
second vote, le 
projet de loi est 
renvoyé au 
Conseil d’Etat, 
et dans le cas 
où le Conseil 
d’Etat se rallie 
à la décision de 
la Chambre, le 










Art. 76.- (1) 
Après le vote 
sur l'ensemble 




Chambre sur la 
question de 
savoir „s'il y a 
lieu ou s'il n'y 
a pas lieu à 
second vote“. 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 
décide qu'il  
n'y a pas lieu à 
second vote, le 
projet de loi est 
renvoyé au 
Conseil d'Etat, 
et dans le cas 
où le Conseil 
d'Etat se rallie 
à la décision de 
la Chambre, le 










Art. 76. (1) 
Après le vote 
sur l’ensemble 




Chambre sur la 
question de 
savoir «s’il y a 
lieu ou s’il n’y 
a pas lieu à 
second vote». 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 
décide qu’il 
n’y a pas lieu à 
second vote, le 
projet de loi est 
renvoyé au 
Conseil d’Etat, 
et dans le cas 
où le Conseil 
d’Etat se rallie 
à la décision de 
la Chambre, le 










Art. 72. (1) 
Après le vote 
sur l’ensemble 




Chambre sur la 
question de 
savoir «s’il y a 
lieu ou s’il n’y 
a pas lieu à 
second vote». 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 
décide qu’il 
n’y a pas lieu à 
second vote, le 
projet de loi est 
renvoyé au 
Conseil d’Etat, 
et dans le cas 
où le Conseil 
d’Etat se rallie 
à la décision de 
la Chambre, le 










Art. 72. (1) 
Après le vote 
sur l’ensemble 




Chambre sur la 
question de 
savoir «s’il y a 
lieu ou s’il n’y 
a pas lieu à 
second vote». 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 
décide qu’il 
n’y a pas lieu à 
second vote, le 
projet de loi est 
renvoyé au 
Conseil d’Etat, 
et dans le cas 
où le Conseil 
d’Etat se rallie 
à la décision de 
la Chambre, le 










Art. 72.- (1) 
Après le vote 
sur l'ensemble 




Chambre sur la 
question de 
savoir "s'il y a 
lieu ou s'il n'y 
a pas lieu à 
second vote".  
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 
décide qu'il  
n'y a pas lieu à 
second vote, le 
projet de loi est 
renvoyé au 
Conseil d'Etat, 
et dans le cas 
où le Conseil 
d'Etat se rallie 
à la décision de 
la Chambre, le 










Art. 72.- (1) 
Après le vote 
sur l'ensemble 




Chambre sur la 
question de 
savoir "s'il y a 
lieu ou s'il n'y 
a pas lieu à 
second vote". 
 
(2) Si la 
Chambre 
décide qu'il  
n'y a pas lieu à 
second vote, le 
projet de loi est 
renvoyé au 
Conseil d'Etat, 
et dans le cas 
où le Conseil 
d'Etat se rallie 
à la décision de 
la Chambre, le 
projet de loi est 
définitivement 
dispensé du 
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second vote.  
 
Art. 77.- (1) 
Lorsque la 
Chambre ou le 
Conseil d'Etat  
aura décidé 
qu'il y a lieu à 




mois après le 







projets de loi 
présentés à la 
Chambre 
seront 
observées à  
cette occasion.  
 
Art. 78.- Dans 
tous les cas où 
la Chambre se 
sera prononcée 
en faveur de la 
dispense du 






Art. 77. (1) 
Lorsque la 
Chambre ou le 
Conseil d’Etat 
aura décidé 
qu’il y a lieu à 












projets de loi 






Art. 78. Dans 
tous les cas où 
la Chambre se 
sera prononcée 
en faveur de la 
dispense du 






Art. 77. (1) 
Lorsque la 
Chambre ou le 
Conseil d’Etat 
aura décidé 
qu’il y a lieu à 












projets de loi 






Art. 78. Dans 
tous les cas où 
la Chambre se 
sera prononcée 
en faveur de la 
dispense du 






Art. 77.- (1) 
Lorsque la 
Chambre ou le 
Conseil d'Etat  
aura décidé 
qu'il y a lieu à 
second 
vote, il n'y sera 
procédé qu'au 
moins trois 








projets de loi 
présentés à la 
Chambre 
seront 
observées à  
cette occasion. 
 
Art. 78.- Dans 
tous les cas où 
la Chambre se 
sera prononcée 
en faveur de la 
dispense du 






Art. 77. (1) 
Lorsque la 
Chambre ou le 
Conseil d’Etat 
aura décidé 
qu’il y a lieu à 












projets de loi 






Art. 78. Dans 
tous les cas où 
la Chambre se 
sera prononcée 
en faveur de la 
dispense du 




second vote.  
 
Art. 73. (1) 
Lorsque la 
Chambre ou le 
Conseil d’Etat 
aura décidé 
qu’il y a lieu à 




mois après le 







projets de loi 
présentés à la 
Chambre 
seront 
observées à  
cette occasion.  
 
Art. 74.- Dans 
tous les cas où 
la Chambre se 
sera prononcée 
en faveur de la 
dispense du 




second vote.  
 
Art. 73. (1) 
Lorsque la 
Chambre ou le 
Conseil d’Etat 
aura décidé 
qu’il y a lieu à 




mois après le 







projets de loi 
présentés à la 
Chambre 
seront 
observées à  
cette occasion.  
 
Art. 74.- Dans 
tous les cas où 
la Chambre se 
sera prononcée 
en faveur de la 
dispense du 






Art. 73.- (1) 
Lorsque la 
Chambre ou le 
Conseil d'Etat  
aura décidé 
qu'il y a lieu à 












projets de loi 




cette occasion.  
 
Art. 74.- Dans 
tous les cas où 
la Chambre se 
sera prononcée 
en faveur de la 
dispense du 






Art. 73.- (1) 
Lorsque la 
Chambre ou le 
Conseil d'Etat  
aura décidé 
qu'il y a lieu à 












projets de loi 






Art. 74.- Dans 
tous les cas où 
la Chambre se 
sera prononcée 
en faveur de la 
dispense du 


















































à la Chambre. 
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1.3. Questions, interpellations and motions 




Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 






et des débats  
 





Art. 79.-  
(1) Chaque 
député a le 



























Art. 79.  
(1) Chaque 
député a le 



























Art. 79.  
(1) Chaque 
député a le 



























Art. 79.-  
(1) Chaque 
député a le 



























Art. 79.  
(1) Chaque 
député a le 



























Art. 75.-  
(1) Chaque 
député a le 



























Art. 75.-  
(1) Chaque 
député a le 



























Art. 75.-  
(1) Chaque 
député a le 



























Art. 75.-  
(1) Chaque 
député a le 
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commentaires 












leur objet.  
 
(4) Le 
Président de la 
Chambre est 















donne pas lieu 
à recours 
devant un autre 
organe 
commentaires 















Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions. 












donne pas lieu 
à recours 
devant un autre 
organe 
commentaires 















Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions. 












donne pas lieu 
à recours 
devant un autre 
organe 
commentaires 















Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions. 












donne pas lieu 
à recours 
devant un autre 
organe 
commentaires 















Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions. 












donne pas lieu 
à recours 
devant un autre 
organe 
commentaires 















Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions. 












donne pas lieu 
à recours 
devant un autre 
organe 
commentaires 















Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions. 












donne pas lieu 
à recours 
devant un autre 
organe 
commentaires 















Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions. 












donne pas lieu 
à recours 
devant un autre 
organe 
commentaires 















Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions. 












donne pas lieu 
à recours 
devant un autre 
organe 
















cours de la 
même session.  
 
b) Questions et 
réponses 
écrites 






en remet le 
texte écrit au 






en informe la 
Chambre lors 















cours de la 
même session. 
 
b) Questions et 
réponses 
écrites 






en remet le 
texte écrit au 






Il en informe la 
Chambre lors 















cours de la 
même session. 
 
b) Questions et 
réponses 
écrites 






en remet le 
texte écrit au 






Il en informe la 
Chambre lors 















cours de la 
même session. 
 
b) Questions et 
réponses 
écrites 






en remet le 
texte écrit au 






Il en informe la 
Chambre lors 















cours de la 
même session. 
 
b) Questions et 
réponses 
écrites 






en remet le 
texte écrit au 






Il en informe la 
Chambre lors 















au cours de la 
même session. 
 
b) Questions et 
réponses 
écrites 






en remet le 
texte écrit au 






Il en informe la 
Chambre lors 















au cours de la 
même session. 
 
b) Questions et 
réponses 
écrites 






en remet le 
texte écrit au 






Il en informe la 
Chambre lors 















au cours de la 
même session. 
 
b) Questions et 
réponses 
écrites 






en remet le 
texte écrit au 






Il en informe la 
Chambre lors 















au cours de la 
même session. 
 
b) Questions et 
réponses 
écrites 






en remet le 
texte écrit au 






Il en informe la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 




dépôt de la 
question.  
 





Président de la 
Chambre au 
plus tard dans 




l'auteur de la 
question. Il en 
informe la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique 
suivant la 
réception de la 
réponse.  
 
(3) Si le 
Ministre 
compétent  
n'est pas en 
mesure de 
fournir sa 
réponse dans le 
délai prescrit, il 
en informe le 
Président de la 
publique 
suivant le 
dépôt de la 
question. 
 





Président de la 
Chambre au 
plus tard dans 




l’auteur de la 
question. Il en 
informe la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique 
suivant la 
réception de la 
réponse. 
 
(3) Si le 
Ministre 
compétent 
n’est pas en 
mesure de 
fournir sa 
réponse dans le 
délai prescrit, 
il en informe le 
Président de la 
publique 
suivant le 
dépôt de la 
question. 
 





Président de la 
Chambre au 
plus tard dans 




l’auteur de la 
question. Il en 
informe la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique 
suivant la 
réception de la 
réponse. 
 
(3) Si le 
Ministre 
compétent 
n’est pas en 
mesure de 
fournir sa 
réponse dans le 
délai prescrit, 
il en informe le 
Président de la 
publique 
suivant le 
dépôt de la 
question. 
 





Président de la 
Chambre au 
plus tard dans 
un délai d'un 
mois. 
Le Président la 
communique à 
l'auteur de la 
question. 
Il en informe la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique 
suivant la 
réception de la 
réponse. 
 
(3) Si le 
Ministre 
compétent  
n'est pas en 
mesure de 
fournir sa 
réponse dans le 
délai prescrit, 
il en informe le 
Président de la 
publique 
suivant le 
dépôt de la 
question. 
 





Président de la 
Chambre au 
plus tard dans 




l’auteur de la 
question. Il en 
informe la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique 
suivant la 
réception de la 
réponse. 
 
(3) Si le 
Ministre 
compétent 
n’est pas en 
mesure de 
fournir sa 
réponse dans le 
délai prescrit, 
il en informe le 
Président de la 
publique 
suivant le 
dépôt de la 
question. 
 





Président de la 
Chambre au 
plus tard dans 




l’auteur de la 
question. Il en 
informe la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique 
suivant la 
réception de la 
réponse.  
 
(3) Si le 
Ministre 
compétent 
n’est pas en 
mesure de 
fournir sa 
réponse dans le 
délai prescrit, 
il en informe le 
Président de la 
publique 
suivant le 
dépôt de la 
question. 
 





Président de la 
Chambre au 
plus tard dans 




l’auteur de la 
question. Il en 
informe la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique 
suivant la 
réception de la 
réponse.  
 
(3) Si le 
Ministre 
compétent 
n’est pas en 
mesure de 
fournir sa 
réponse dans le 
délai prescrit, 
il en informe le 
Président de la 
publique 
suivant le 
dépôt de la 
question. 
 





Président de la 
Chambre au 
plus tard dans 




l'auteur de la 
question. Il en 
informe la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique 
suivant 
la réception de 
la réponse. 
 
(3) Si le 
Ministre 
compétent  
n'est pas en 
mesure de 
fournir sa 
réponse dans le 
délai prescrit, 
il en informe le 
Président de la 
publique 
suivant le 
dépôt de la 
question. 
 





Président de la 
Chambre au 
plus tard dans 




l'auteur de la 
question. 
Il en informe la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique 
suivant la 
réception de la 
réponse. 
 
 (3) Si le 
Ministre 
compétent 
n'est pas en 
mesure de 
fournir sa 
réponse dans le 
délai prescrit, 
il en informe le 
Président de la 
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Chambre tout 
en indiquant et 
les raisons 
d'empêche-
ment et la date 
probable de la 
réponse. Le 






(4) La question 





rendu de la 
Chambre.  
 
(5) A défaut de 
réponse du 
Ministre à une 
question dans 






de la première 
séance 




en indiquant et 
les raisons 
d’empêche-
ment et la date 
probable de la 
réponse. 






(4) La question 





rendu de la 
Chambre. 
 
(5) A défaut de 
réponse du 
Ministre à une 
question dans 






de la première 
séance 




en indiquant et 
les raisons 
d’empêche-
ment et la date 
probable de la 
réponse. 






(4) La question 





rendu de la 
Chambre. 
 
(5) A défaut de 
réponse du 
Ministre à une 
question dans 






de la première 
séance 




en indiquant et 
les raisons 
d'empêche-
ment et la date 
probable de la 
réponse. 






(4) La question 





rendu de la 
Chambre. 
 
(5) A défaut de 
réponse du 
Ministre à une 
question dans 






de la première 
séance 




en indiquant et 
les raisons 
d’empêche-
ment et la date 
probable de la 
réponse. 






(4) La question 





rendu de la 
Chambre. 
 
(5) A défaut de 
réponse du 
Ministre à une 
question dans 






de la première 
séance 




en indiquant et 
les raisons 
d’empêche-
ment et la date 
probable de la 
réponse.  






(4) La question 





rendu de la 
Chambre. 
 
(5) A défaut de 
réponse du 
Ministre à une 
question dans 






de la première 
séance 




en indiquant et 
les raisons 
d’empêche-
ment et la date 
probable de la 
réponse.  






(4) La question 





rendu de la 
Chambre. 
 
(5) A défaut de 
réponse du 
Ministre à une 
question dans 






de la première 
séance 




en indiquant et 
les raisons 
d'empêche-
ment et la date 








(4) La question 





rendu de la 
Chambre. 
 
(5) A défaut de 
réponse du 
Ministre à une 
question dans 







autant pour le 
quota du 
groupe ou de la 
sensibilité 
Chambre tout 
en indiquant et 
les raisons 
d'empêche-
ment et la date 








(4) La question 





rendu de la 
Chambre. 
 
(5) A défaut de 
réponse du 
Ministre à une 
question dans 







autant pour le 
quota du 
groupe ou de la 
sensibilité 







par le Président 










question à un 
Ministre, il doit 
la 
communiquer 
par écrit au 
Président qui 
juge de sa 
recevabilité. 
 
(2) Si la 
question est 
jugée recevable 
par le Président 
et si son 
caractère 
urgent est 
accepté par lui, 
 








par le Président 














par écrit au 
Président qui 
juge de sa 
recevabilité. 
 




le Président et 
si son caractère 
urgent est 
accepté par lui,  
 








par le Président 














par écrit au 
Président qui 
juge de sa 
recevabilité. 
 




le Président et 
si son caractère 
urgent est 
accepté par lui, 
 








par le Président 














par écrit au 
Président qui 
juge de sa 
recevabilité. 
 




le Président et 
si son caractère 
urgent est 
accepté par lui, 
 








par le Président 














par écrit au 
Président qui 
juge de sa 
recevabilité. 
 




le Président et 
si son caractère 
urgent est 
accepté par lui, 
 








par le Président 














par écrit au 
Président qui 
juge de sa 
recevabilité. 
 




le Président et 
si son caractère 
urgent est 
accepté par lui, 
 








par le Président 














par écrit au 
Président qui 
juge de sa 
recevabilité. 
 




le Président et 
si son caractère 
urgent est 
accepté par lui, 
 























par écrit au 
Président qui 
juge de sa 
recevabilité. 
 




le Président et 
si son caractère 
urgent est 
accepté par lui, 
 























par écrit au 
Président qui 
juge de sa 
recevabilité. 
 




le Président et 
si son caractère 
urgent est 




du Ministre,  
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de l'auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes.  
 
3) Au cas où il 
n'y a pas de 





dans un délai 










elle siège, une 
partie de 
séance 
publique à des 
questions  
avec débat.  






de l’auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes. 
 
(3) Au cas où il 
n’y a pas de 
















elle siège, une 
partie de 
séance 
publique à des 
questions 
avec débat. 






de l’auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes. 
 
(3) Au cas où il 
n’y a pas de 
















elle siège, une 
partie de 
séance 
publique à des 
questions 
avec débat. 






de l'auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes. 
 
3) Au cas où il 
n'y a pas de 
















elle siège, une 
partie de 
séance 
publique à des 
questions avec 
débat. 






de l’auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes. 
 
3) Au cas où il 
n’y a pas de 
















elle siège, une 
partie de 
séance 
publique à des 
questions 
avec débat. 






de l’auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes. 
 
3) Au cas où il 
n’y a pas de 
















elle siège, une 
partie de 
séance 
publique à des 
questions 
avec débat. 






de l’auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes. 
 
3) Au cas où il 
n’y a pas de 
















elle siège, une 
partie de 
séance 
publique à des 
questions 
avec débat. 






de l'auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes. 
 
3) Au cas où il 
n'y a pas de 
















elle siège, une 
partie de 
séance 
publique à des 
questions 
avec débat. 













(3) Au cas où 
il n'y a pas de 
















elle siège, une 
partie de 
séance 
publique à des 
questions 
avec débat. 
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traitée de cette 
façon doivent 
le signaler  
dans le libellé 
de la question, 
qui sera par 
ailleurs 
conforme à 
l'article 79.  
 
(3) Le nombre 
des questions 















débat au moins 









traitée de cette 
façon doivent 
le signaler  
dans le libellé 
de la question, 





(3) Le nombre 
des questions 















débat au moins 









traitée de cette 
façon doivent 
le signaler  
dans le libellé 
de la question, 





(3) Le nombre 
des questions 















débat au moins 









traitée de cette 
façon doivent 
le signaler  
dans le libellé 
de la question, 





(3) Le nombre 
des questions 















débat au moins 









traitée de cette 
façon doivent 
le signaler  
dans le libellé 
de la question, 





(3) Le nombre 
des questions 















débat au moins 









traitée de cette 
façon doivent 
le signaler  
dans le libellé 
de la question, 





(3) Le nombre 
des questions 















débat au moins 









traitée de cette 
façon doivent 
le signaler  
dans le libellé 
de la question, 





(3) Le nombre 
des questions 















débat au moins 









traitée de cette 
façon doivent 
le signaler  
dans le libellé 
de la question, 





(3) Le nombre 
des questions 















débat au moins 









traitée de cette 
façon doivent 
le signaler 
dans le libellé 
de la question, 





(3) Le nombre 
des questions 















débat au moins 
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y répond. Le 
















Le temps de 
parole global 
de l'auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes; 
ce temps de 
parole 
comprend la 
question et la 








y répond. Le 
















Le temps de 
parole global 
de l’auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes; 
ce temps de 
parole 
comprend la 
question et la 








y répond. Le 
















Le temps de 
parole global 
de l’auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes; 
ce temps de 
parole 
comprend la 
question et la 








y répond. Le 
















Le temps de 
parole global 
de l'auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes; 
ce temps de 
parole 
comprend la 
question et la 








y répond. Le 
















Le temps de 
parole global 
de l’auteur  de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes; 
ce temps de 
parole 
comprend la 
question et la 








y répond. Le 
















Le temps de 
parole global 
de l'auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes; 
ce temps de 
parole 
comprend la 
question et la 








y répond. Le 
















Le temps de 
parole global 
de l'auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes; 
ce temps de 
parole 
comprend la 
question et la 








y répond. Le 
















Le temps de 
parole global 
de l'auteur de 
la question est 
de 5 minutes et 
celui du 
Gouvernement 
de 10 minutes; 
ce temps de 
parole 
comprend la 
question et la 








y répond. Le 


































e) Heure de 
questions 
Art. 83.- (1) 
Sauf décision 




questions a lieu 
chaque mardi, 


















par les députés 








e) Heure de 
questions 
Art. 83. (1) 
Sauf décision 




questions a lieu 
chaque mardi, 


















par les députés 








e) Heure de 
questions 
Art. 83. (1) 
Sauf décision 




questions a lieu 
chaque mardi, 


















par les députés 








e) Heure de 
questions 
Art. 83.- (1) 
Sauf décision 




questions a lieu 
chaque mardi, 


















par les députés 








e) Heure de 
questions 
Art. 83. (1) 
Sauf décision 




questions a lieu 
chaque mardi, 


















par les députés 








e) Heure de 
questions 
Art. 78-1.- (1) 
Sauf décision 




questions a lieu 
chaque mardi, 



























e) Heure de 
questions 
Art. 78-1.- (1) 
Sauf décision 




questions a lieu 
chaque mardi, 



























e) Heure de 
questions 
Art. 78-1.- (1) 
Sauf décision 




questions a lieu 
chaque mardi, 



























e) Heure de 
questions 
Art. 78-1.- (1) 
La 
Commission 
de Travail fixe, 
par session, les 











lieu une fois 
par mois 
pendant les 







































posées par des 
membres de la 
majorité 
parlementaire 

































posées par des 
membres de la 
majorité 
parlementaire 

































posées par des 
membres de la 
majorité 
parlementaire 

































posées par des 
membres de la 
majorité 
parlementaire 

































posées par des 
membres de la 
majorité 
parlementaire 

































posées par des 
membres de la 
majorité 
parlementaire 

































posées par des 
membres de la 
majorité 
parlementaire 

































posées par des 
membres de la 
majorité 
parlementaire 
















l'état de la 
Nation ou dans 
la déclaration 














par heure de 
questions. 


































(5) Le temps 




























seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions 





(5) Le temps 




























seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions 





(5) Le temps 




























seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions 





(5) Le temps 




























seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions 





(5) Le temps 




























seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions 





(5) Le temps 




























seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions 





(5) Le temps 




























seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions 





(5) Le temps 




























seul juge de la 
recevabilité 
des questions 





(5) Le temps 
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parole à un 
député d’un 
groupe de la 






par manque de 
temps, 
n'auraient pu 
être posées lors 















 f) Heure 
d'actualité  
Art. 84.- (1)  
Sauf décision 
contraire de la 




parole à un 
député d’un 
groupe de la 






par manque de 
temps, 
n’auraient pu 
être posées lors 

















Art. 84. (1) 
Sauf décision 
contraire de la 




parole à un 
député d’un 
groupe de la 






par manque de 
temps, 
n’auraient pu 
être posées lors 

















Art. 84. (1) 
Sauf décision 
contraire de la 




parole à un 
député d’un 
groupe de la 






par manque de 
temps, 
n'auraient pu 
être posées lors 

















Art. 84.- (1) 
Sauf décision 
contraire de la 




parole à un 
député d’un 
groupe de la 






par manque de 
temps, 
n’auraient pu 
être posées lors 

















Art. 84. (1) 
Sauf décision 
contraire de la 




parole à un 
député d’un 
groupe de la 






par manque de 
temps, 
n'auraient pu 
être posées lors 

















Art. 78-2.- (1) 
Sauf décision 
contraire de la 




parole à un 
député d’un 
groupe de la 






par manque de 
temps, 
n'auraient pu 
être posées lors 

















Art. 78-2.- (1) 
Sauf décision 
contraire de la 




parole à un 
député d'un 
groupe de la 



























Art. 78-2.- (1) 
Sauf décision 
contraire de la 




parole à un 
député d'un 
groupe de la 
majorité et de 
l'opposition 
parlementaire. 






lieu le mardi, 
après l'heure de 
questions, 
pendant les 
semaines où la 
Chambre siège, 




au plus tard le 
jeudi précédent 
par un groupe 
politique.  
 
(2) Le temps 
de parole est de 
10 minutes 
pour le groupe 
politique qui 
est à l'origine 
de l'heure 
d'actualité, de 
5 minutes pour 
les autres 
groupes 















semaines où la 
Chambre siège, 




au plus tard le 
jeudi précédent 
par un groupe 
politique. 
 
(2) Le temps 
de parole est 
de 10 minutes 
pour le groupe 
politique qui 
est à l’origine 
de l’heure 
d’actualité, de 
5 minutes pour 
les autres 
groupes 















semaines où la 
Chambre siège, 




au plus tard le 
jeudi précédent 
par un groupe 
politique. 
 
(2) Le temps 
de parole est 
de 10 minutes 
pour le groupe 
politique qui 
est à l’origine 
de l’heure 
d’actualité, de 
5 minutes pour 
les autres 
groupes 











lieu le mardi, 
après l'heure de 
questions, 
pendant les 
semaines où la 
Chambre siège, 




au plus tard le 
jeudi précédent 
par un groupe 
politique.  
 
(2) Le temps 
de parole est 
de 10 minutes 
pour le groupe 
politique qui 
est à l'origine 
de l'heure 
d'actualité, de 
5 minutes pour 
les autres 
groupes 















semaines où la 
Chambre siège, 




au plus tard le 
jeudi précédent 
par un groupe 
politique. 
 
(2) Le temps 
de parole est 
de 10 minutes 
pour le groupe 
politique qui 
est à l’origine 
de l’heure 
d’actualité, de 
5 minutes pour 
les autres 
groupes 











lieu le mardi, 
après l'heure de 
questions, 
pendant les 
semaines où la 
Chambre siège, 




au plus tard le 
jeudi précédent 
par un groupe 
politique. 
 
(2) Le temps 
de parole est 
de 10 minutes 
pour le groupe 
politique qui 
est à l'origine 
de l'heure 
d'actualité, de 
5 minutes pour 
les autres 
groupes 











lieu le mardi, 
après l'heure de 
questions, 
pendant les 
semaines où la 
Chambre siège, 




au plus tard le 
jeudi précédent 
par un groupe 
politique. 
 
(2) Le temps 
de parole est 
de 10 minutes 
pour le groupe 
politique qui 
est à l'origine 
de l'heure 
d'actualité, de 
5 minutes pour 
les autres 
groupes 











lieu le mardi, 
après l'heure de 
questions, 
pendant les 
semaines où la 
Chambre siège, 




au plus tard le 
jeudi précédent 
par un groupe 
politique. 
 
(2) Le temps 
de parole est 
de 10 minutes 
pour le groupe 
politique qui 




pour les autres 
groupes 
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groupe, ainsi 
que de 15 





n'aurait pu être  
mise à l'ordre 
du jour de la 
Chambre au 







que de 15 





n’aurait pu être 
mise à l’ordre 
du jour de la 
Chambre au 








que de 15 





n’aurait pu être 
mise à l’ordre 
du jour de la 
Chambre au 







que de 15 





n'aurait pu être  
mise à l'ordre 
du jour de la 
Chambre au 







que de 15 





n’aurait pu être 
mise à l’ordre 
du jour de la 
Chambre au 








que de 15 





n'aurait pu être  
mise à l'ordre 
du jour de la 
Chambre au 







que de 15 





n'aurait pu être  
mise à l'ordre 
du jour de la 
Chambre au 







que de 15 
minutes pour le 
Gouvernement. 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
Chapitre 3  
Des 
interpellations 
Art. 88.- (1) 
Chaque député 




(2) Le membre 




















ne peut être 
introduite que 




Art. 88. (1)  
Chaque député 




(2) Le membre 




















ne peut être 
introduite que 




Art. 88. (1)  
Chaque député 




(2) Le membre 




















ne peut être 
introduite que 




Art. 88.- (1) 
Chaque député 




(2) Le membre 




















ne peut être 
introduite que 




Art. 88. (1)  
Chaque député 




(2) Le membre 




















ne peut être 
introduite que 




Art. 82.- (1) 
Chaque député 




(2) Le membre 




















ne peut être 
introduite que 




Art. 82.- (1) 
Chaque député 




(2) Le membre 




















ne peut être 
introduite que 




Art. 82.- (1) 
Chaque député 




(2) Le membre 




















ne peut être 
introduite que 




Art. 82.- (1) 
Chaque député 




(2) Le membre 




















ne peut être 
introduite que 
par un seul 









écrite et la  
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 










endéans les six 
mois de 
l’introduction 
de la demande, 





devra se  














écrite et la  
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 










endéans les six 
mois de 
l’introduction 
de la demande, 





devra se  














écrite et la  
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 










endéans les six 
mois de 
l’introduction 
de la demande, 





devra se  














écrite et la  
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 










endéans les six 
mois de 
l’introduction 
de la demande, 




















écrite et la  
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 










endéans les six 
mois de 
l’introduction 
de la demande, 





devra se  














écrite et la  
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 










endéans les six 
mois de 
l'introduction 
de la demande, 




















écrite et la  
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 










endéans les six 
mois de 
l'introduction 
de la demande, 




















écrite et la  
Conférence des 
Présidents fixe 










endéans les six 
mois de 
l'introduction 
de la demande, 




















écrite, et la 
date de 
l'interpellation 










endéans les six 
mois de 
l'introduction 
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sera épuisée 
dans la séance 
où elle a été 
développée, à 


















l'article 80 de 
la Constitution, 




dernier lieu.  
 








dans la séance 
où elle a été 
développée, à 


















l’article 80 de 
la Constitution, 














dans la séance 
où elle a été 
développée, à 


















l’article 80 de 
la Constitution, 














dans la séance 




















l'article 80 de 
la Constitution, 














dans la séance 
où elle a été 
développée, à 


















l’article 80 de 
la Constitution, 














dans la séance 
où elle a été 
développée, à 


















l'article 80 de 
la Constitution, 














dans la séance 
où elle a été 
développée, à 


















l'article 80 de 
la Constitution, 














dans la séance 
où elle a été 
développée, à 


















l'article 80 de 
la Constitution, 














dans la séance 
où elle a été 
développée, à 


























Art. 83.- La 
Commission 
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l'article 82 du 
présent 
règlement. 














l’article 82 du 
présent 
règlement. 














l’article 82 du 
présent 
règlement. 














l'article 82 du 
présent 
règlement. 














l’article 82 du 
présent 
règlement. 














l'article 78 du 
présent 
règlement. 














l'article 78 du 
présent 
règlement. 





















l'article 78 du 
présent 
règlement. 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010 2010 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
Chapitre 4 Du 
débat de 
consultation 














(2) Pour ce 
débat, le temps 
de parole 
global est fixé 
conformément 












Du débat de 
consultation 














(2) Pour ce 
débat, le temps 
de parole 
global est fixé 
conformément 












Du débat de 
consultation 














(2) Pour ce 
débat, le temps 
de parole 
global est fixé 
conformément 












Du débat de 
consultation 














(2) Pour ce 
débat, le temps 
de parole 
global est fixé 
conformément 












Du débat de 
consultation 














(2) Pour ce 
débat, le temps 
de parole 
global est fixé 
conformément 












Du débat de 
consultation 




consultation à  









(2) Pour ce 
débat, le temps 
de parole 
global est fixé 
conformément 












Du débat de 
consultation 




consultation à  









(2) Pour ce 
débat, le temps 
de parole 
global est fixé 
conformément 












Du débat de 
consultation 














(2) Pour ce 
débat, le temps 
de parole 
global est fixé 
conformément 































tenir un débat 
d'actualité 









faire tenir un 
débat 















































































































































































































































































































lui adressent à 
cet effet un 
questionnaire 





de Travail qui 
décide, sans 





sera traité sous 
forme de débat 
d'actualité ou 
sous forme de 
question 
conformément 
aux articles 76 


































Chapitre 5  
Du débat 
d’orientation 












































































































































































































































































sur un sujet 
d'intérêt 
général 


































sur un sujet 
d'intérêt 
général 
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déterminé. A 















l'objet du  
















à l'article 37.  
 
(3) Le groupe 
ayant demandé 
déterminé. A 
































à l’article 37. 
 
(3) Le groupe 
ayant demandé 
déterminé. A 
































à l’article 37. 
 
(3) Le groupe 
ayant demandé 
déterminé. A 















l'objet du  
















à l'article 37. 
 
(3) Le groupe 
ayant demandé 
déterminé. A 
































à l’article 37. 
 
(3) Le groupe 
ayant demandé 
déterminé. A 
































à l'article 35. 
 
(3) Le groupe 
ayant demandé 
déterminé. A 
































à l'article 35. 
 
(3) Le groupe 
ayant demandé 
déterminé. A 
































à l'article 35. 
 
(3) Le groupe 
ayant demandé 
déterminé. A 



























































































































Du débat sur la 
politique 
étrangère 




























Du débat sur la 
politique 
étrangère 




























Du débat sur la 
politique 
étrangère 















à l'article 35. 
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1.4. Budgetary procedures in the Rules of Procedures of the Chamber  




Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 















dans le cadre 
de la procédure 
budgétaire qui 
comprend:  





l'état de la 
nation  



















dans le cadre 
de la procédure 
budgétaire qui 
comprend:  





l’état de la 
nation 



















dans le cadre 
de la procédure 
budgétaire qui 
comprend:  





l’état de la 
nation 



















dans le cadre 
de la procédure 
budgétaire qui 
comprend: 





l'état de la 
nation 



















dans le cadre 
de la procédure 
budgétaire qui 
comprend: 





l’état de la 
nation 



















dans le cadre 
de la procédure 
budgétaire qui 
comprend: 





l'état de la 
nation 



















dans le cadre 
de la procédure 
budgétaire qui 
comprend: 





l'état de la 
nation 



















dans le cadre 
de la procédure 
budgétaire qui 
comprend: 





l'état de la 
nation 



















dans le cadre 
de la procédure 
budgétaire qui 
comprend: 





l'état de la 
nation 








projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l'Etat  
3) le débat à 
l'occasion de 
l'examen du 








projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l’Etat 
3) le débat à 
l’occasion de 
l’examen du 








projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l’Etat 
3) le débat à 
l’occasion de 
l’examen du 








projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l'Etat 
3) le débat à 
l'occasion de 
l'examen du 








projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l’Etat 
3) le débat à 
l’occasion de 
l’examen du 








projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l'Etat 
3) le débat à 
l'occasion de 
l'examen du 








projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l'Etat 
3) le débat à 
l'occasion de 
l'examen du 








projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l'Etat 
3) le débat à 
l'occasion de 
l'examen du 








projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l'Etat 
3) le débat à 
l'occasion de 
l'examen du 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
Chapitre 2 
Débat sur l’état 
de la nation  
Déclaration sur 















l'état de la 
nation.  
 
Débat général  











Débat sur l’état 
de la nation 
Déclaration sur 






























Débat sur l’état 
de la nation 
Déclaration sur 






























Débat sur l’état 
de la nation 
Déclaration sur 






























Débat sur l’état 
de la nation 
Déclaration sur 






























Débat sur l'état 
de la nation 
Déclaration sur 






























Débat sur l'état 
de la nation 
Déclaration sur 






























Débat sur l'état 
de la nation 
Déclaration sur 






























Débat sur l'état 
de la nation 
Déclaration sur 

































Art. 95.- Pour 
le débat 
général défini à 


































Art. 95. Pour le 
débat général 
défini à 


































Art. 95. Pour le 
débat général 
défini à 


































Art. 95.- Pour 
le débat 
général défini à 


































Art. 95. Pour le 
débat général 
défini à 


































Art. 90.- Pour 
le débat 
général défini à 


































Art. 90.- Pour 
le débat 
général défini à 


































Art. 90.- Pour 
le débat 
général défini à 


































Art. 90.- Pour 
le débat 
général défini 
à l'article 89, il 
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semble dans le 




































semble dans le 




































semble dans le 




































semble dans le 




































semble dans le 




































semble dans le 




































semble dans le 




































semble dans le 




































semble dans le 




Art. 92.- Pour 
la discussion 
des résolutions 
et motions, il 

















Art. 93.- A la 






être fixé à 
l'ordre du jour 
de la Chambre 
en cours 















































































































































































































































































































limité à un par 
an pour chaque 
Ministère. 
 





doit être mis 
obligatoiremen
t à l'ordre du 
jour de la 





toutefois que le 
Ministère en 
question n'ait 
pas déjà fait 
l'objet d'un tel 
débat 
d'actualité au 
cours de la 
même année. 
 
Art. 95.- Le 
temps de 
parole pour les 
débats 






des Finances et 
du Budget  
Art. 97.- Au 

















des Finances et 







Art. 98.- Les 
rapports écrits 
des Ministères 






des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 97. Au 

















des Finances et 







Art. 98. Les 
rapports écrits 
des Ministères 






des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 97. Au 

















des Finances et 







Art. 98. Les 
rapports écrits 
des Ministères 






des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 97.- Au 

















des Finances et 







Art. 98.- Les 
rapports écrits 
des Ministères 






des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 97. Au 

















des Finances et 







Art. 98. Les 
rapports écrits 
des Ministères 






des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 96. Au 

















des Finances et 







Art. 97. Les 
rapports écrits 
des Ministères 






des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 96. Au 

















des Finances et 







Art. 97. Les 
rapports écrits 
des Ministères 


































Art. 97.- Les 
rapports écrits 
des Ministères 


































Art. 97.- Les 
rapports écrits 
des Ministères 
sur l'activité de 
l'exercice 








mis à la 
disposition de 
la Chambre 
avant le 1er 








mis à la 
disposition de 
la Chambre 
avant le 1er 








mis à la 
disposition de 
la Chambre 
avant le 1er 
mars au plus 
tard. 
précédent  





mis à la 
disposition de 
la Chambre 
avant le 1er 








mis à la 
disposition de 
la Chambre 
avant le 1er 








mis à la 
disposition de 
la Chambre 
avant le 1er 








mis à la 
disposition de 
la Chambre 
avant le 1er 






Art. 98.- Les 
Ministres 




au plus tard 




















mis à la 
disposition de 
la Chambre 
avant le 1er 






Art. 98.- Les 
Ministres 

























mis à la 
disposition de 
la Chambre 
avant le 1er 






Art. 98.- Les 
Ministres 
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la trésorerie de 
l'Etat. 










la trésorerie de 
l'Etat. 










la trésorerie de 
l'Etat. 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
Chapitre 3  








Art. 99.- Le 
Gouvernement 
saisit le 30 juin 
au plus tard la 
Chambre des 
Députés d’une 
liste de projets 
prioritaires à 
construire par 
l’Etat au cours 
des exercices 
suivants et 
dont le coût 
dépasse le 
seuil prévu par 
l’article 99 de 
la Constitution. 
 




de l’examen de 
cette liste. Ces 
Chapitre 3 








Art. 99. Le 
Gouvernement 
saisit le 30 juin 
au plus tard la 
Chambre des 
Députés d’une 
liste de projets 
prioritaires à 
construire par 
l’Etat au cours 
des exercices 
suivants et 
dont le coût 
dépasse le seuil 
prévu par 
l’article 99 de 
la Constitution. 
 




de l’examen de 
cette liste. Ces 
Chapitre 3 








Art. 99. Le 
Gouvernement 
saisit le 30 juin 
au plus tard la 
Chambre des 
Députés d’une 
liste de projets 
prioritaires à 
construire par 
l’Etat au cours 
des exercices 
suivants et 
dont le coût 
dépasse le seuil 
prévu par 
l’article 99 de 
la Constitution. 
 




de l’examen de 
cette liste. Ces 
Chapitre 3 








Art. 99.- Le 
Gouvernement 
saisit le 30 juin 
au plus tard la 
Chambre des 
Députés d’une 
liste de projets 
prioritaires à 
construire par 
l’Etat au cours 
des exercices 
suivants et 
dont le coût 
dépasse le seuil 
prévu par 
l’article 99 de 
la Constitution. 
 




de l’examen de 
cette liste. Ces 
Chapitre 3 








Art. 99. Le 
Gouvernement 
saisit le 30 juin 
au plus tard la 
Chambre des 
Députés d’une 
liste de projets 
prioritaires à 
construire par 
l’Etat au cours 
des exercices 
suivants et 
dont le coût 
dépasse le seuil 
prévu par 
l’article 99 de 
la Constitution. 
 




de l’examen de 
cette liste. Ces 
Chapitre 3 












































































































































Art. 101.- Les 
rapports des 
commissions, 















plus tard.  
 

















Art. 101. Les 
rapports des 
commissions, 















plus tard.  
 

















Art. 101. Les 
rapports des 
commissions, 


































Art. 101.- Les 
rapports des 
commissions, 


































Art. 101. Les 
rapports des 
commissions, 


















































































































































































































projet de loi  
Art. 103.- Le 
Ministre ayant 
dans ses 

































projet de loi 
Art. 103. Le 
Ministre ayant 
dans ses 

































projet de loi 




































projet de loi 
Art. 103.- Le 
Ministre ayant 
dans ses 

































projet de loi 




































projet de loi  




































projet de loi  




































projet de loi  




































projet de loi 
Art. 99.- Le 
Ministre ayant 
dans ses 




















cours de la 3e 
semaine  
d'octobre au 














invités à rendre 
leurs avis le 15 
attributions le 
budget de 




et les  
chambres 
profession-


























invités à rendre 
leurs avis le 15 
attributions le 
budget de 




et les  
chambres 
profession-


























invités à rendre 
leurs avis le 15 
attributions le 





et les  
chambres 
profession-


























invités à rendre 
leurs avis le 15 
attributions le 
budget de 




et les  
chambres 
profession-









cours de la 3e 
semaine  
d’octobre au 














invités à rendre 
leurs avis le 15 
attributions le 





et les  
chambres 
profession-









cours de la 3e 
semaine  
d’octobre au 














invités à rendre 
leurs avis le 15 
attributions le 
budget de 




et les  
chambres 
profession-









cours de la 3e 
semaine de 
septembre au 














invités à rendre 
leurs avis 
attributions le 





et les  
chambres 
profession-









cours de la 3e 
semaine de 
septembre au 














invités à rendre 
leurs avis 
attributions le 

























Art. 100.- Les 
Chambres 
profession-
nelles et le 





invités à rendre 
leurs avis 
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novembre au 







Travaux de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget  
Art. 105.- La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
chargée de 
l'examen du 



























Travaux de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 105. La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
chargée de 
l’examen du 



























Travaux de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 105. La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
chargée de 
l’examen du 



























Travaux de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 105.- La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
chargée de 
l'examen du 



























Travaux de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 105. La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
chargée de 
l’examen du 



























Travaux de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 101.- La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
chargée de 
l'examen du 






















au plus tard 
après le dépôt 
du projet de 
loi.  
 
Travaux de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 101.- La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
chargée de 
l'examen du 






















au plus tard 
après le dépôt 
du projet de 
loi.  
 
Travaux de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 101.- La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
chargée de 
l'examen du 











l'état de la 
nation. 









au plus tard 
après le dépôt 
du projet de 
loi. 
 
Travaux de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget 
Art. 101.- La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
chargée de 
l'examen du 











l'état de la 
nation. 















































































































































































































































des Finances et 









projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l'Etat au plus 
tard huit jours 
après le dépôt 
du projet de 




au plus tard à 













des Finances et 









projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l'Etat au plus 
tard huit jours 
après le dépôt 
du projet de 




au plus tard à 













des Finances et 









projet de loi 
concernant le 
budget des 
recettes et des 
dépenses de 
l'Etat au plus 
tard huit jours 
après le dépôt 
du projet de 




au plus tard à 
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publique et au 
plus tard le 30 
novembre.  
 
Art. 106.- La 
commission 










à l'article 20 du 
Règlement de 
la Chambre.  
 
















Elles ont la 
publique et au 
plus tard le 30 
novembre. 
 
Art. 106. La 
commission 










à l’article 20 
du Règlement 
de la Chambre. 
 
















Elles ont la 
publique et au 
plus tard le 30 
novembre. 
 
Art. 106. La 
commission 










à l’article 20 
du Règlement 
de la Chambre. 
 
















Elles ont la 
publique et au 
plus tard le 30 
novembre. 
 
Art. 106.- La 
commission 










à l'article 20 du 
Règlement 
de la Chambre. 
 
















Elles ont la 
publique et au 
plus tard le 30 
novembre. 
 
Art. 106. La 
commission 










à l’article 20 
du Règlement 
de la Chambre. 
 
















Elles ont la 
publique et au 
plus tard le 30 
novembre. 
 
Art. 102.- La 
commission 



































Art. 102.- La 
commission 



































Art. 102.- La 
commission 



































Art. 102.- La 
commission 










à l'article 19 du 
Règlement de 
la Chambre.  
 
















Elles ont la 





de présenter un 
rapport à 
l'intention de la 
Commission 










D'autre part, la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget peut 
demander 
l'avis de telle 
ou telle 
commission 





























D’autre part, la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget peut 
demander 
l’avis de telle 
ou telle 
commission 





























D’autre part, la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget peut 
demander 
l’avis de telle 
ou telle 
commission 















de présenter un 
rapport 
à l'intention de 
la Commission 










D'autre part, la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget peut 
demander 
l'avis de telle 
ou telle 
commission 





























D’autre part, la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget peut 
demander 
l’avis de telle 
ou telle 
commission 















de présenter un 
rapport à 
l'intention de la 
Commission 










D'autre part, la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget peut 
demander 
l'avis de telle 
ou telle 
commission 















de présenter un 
rapport à 
l'intention de la 
Commission 










D'autre part, la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget peut 
demander 
l'avis de telle 
ou telle 
commission 















de présenter un 
rapport à 
l'intention de la 
Commission 










D'autre part, la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget peut 
demander 
l'avis de telle 
ou telle 
commission 















de présenter un 
rapport à 
l'intention de la 
Commission 










D'autre part, la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget peut 
demander 
l'avis de telle 
ou telle 
commission 









ainsi que les 
groupes 
politiques et 




le droit de faire 
parvenir à la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget des 
notes écrites, 




















doit porter sur 
l'objet du 
projet de loi. 
La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 




le droit de faire 
parvenir à la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget des 
notes écrites, 




















doit porter sur 
l’objet du 
projet de loi. 
La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 




le droit de faire 
parvenir à la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget des 
notes écrites, 




















doit porter sur 
l’objet du 
projet de loi. 
La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 




le droit de faire 
parvenir à la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget des 
notes écrites, 




















doit porter sur 
l'objet du 
projet de loi. 
La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 




le droit de faire 
parvenir à la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget des 
notes écrites, 




















doit porter sur 
l’objet du 
projet de loi. 
La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 




le droit de faire 
parvenir  à la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget des 
notes écrites, 




















doit porter sur 
l'objet du 
projet de loi. 
La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 




le droit de faire 
parvenir  à la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget des 
notes écrites, 




















doit porter sur 
l'objet du 
projet de loi. 
La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 




le droit de faire 
parvenir  à la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget des 
notes écrites, 




















doit porter sur 
l'objet du 
projet de loi. 
La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 




le droit de faire 
parvenir à la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget des 
notes écrites, 




















doit porter sur 
l'objet du 
projet de loi. 
La 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
seule juge de la 
recevabilité 






















Art. 109.- Le 
rapport de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
présenté à la 
Chambre lors 
















les dix jours 
qui suivent  
leur réception. 
Les questions 










Art. 109. Le 
rapport de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
présenté à la 
Chambre lors 
















les dix jours 
qui suivent  
leur réception. 
Les questions 










Art. 109. Le 
rapport de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
présenté à la 
Chambre lors 
















les dix jours 
qui suivent  
leur réception. 
Les questions 










Art. 109.- Le 
rapport de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
présenté à la 
Chambre lors 
















les dix jours 
qui suivent  
leur réception. 
Les questions 










Art. 109. Le 
rapport de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
présenté à la 
Chambre lors 
















les dix jours 
qui suivent  
leur réception. 
Les questions 










Art. 105.- Le 
rapport de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
présenté à la 
Chambre lors 
















les dix jours 
qui suivent  
leur réception. 
Les questions 










Art. 105.- Le 
rapport de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
présenté à la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique du 
premier mardi 
du mois de 












les dix jours 
qui suivent  
leur réception. 
Les questions 










Art. 105.- Le 
rapport de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
présenté à la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique du 
premier mardi 
du mois de 












les dix jours 
qui suivent  
leur réception. 
Les questions 










Art. 105.- Le 
rapport de la 
Commission 
des Finances et 
du Budget est 
présenté à la 
Chambre lors 
de la séance 
publique du 
premier mardi 
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présente le 
projet de loi à 
la Chambre 















Art. 110.- La 
discussion du 
projet de loi 
commence à la 
séance 
publique du 
mardi de la 
semaine 
suivante. Elle 
est limitée à 
une semaine et 
ne porte que 








projet de loi à 
la Chambre 















Art. 110. La 
discussion du 
projet de loi 
commence à la 
séance 
publique du 
mardi de la 
semaine 
suivante. 
Elle est limitée 
à une semaine 
et ne porte que 








projet de loi à 
la Chambre 















Art. 110. La 
discussion du 
projet de loi 
commence à la 
séance 
publique du 
mardi de la 
semaine 
suivante. 
Elle est limitée 
à une semaine 
et ne porte que 








projet de loi à 
la Chambre 















Art. 110.- La 
discussion du 
projet de loi 
commence à la 
séance 
publique du 
mardi de la 
semaine 
suivante. 
Elle est limitée 
à une semaine 
et ne porte que 








projet de loi à 
la Chambre 















Art. 110. La 
discussion du 
projet de loi 
commence à la 
séance 
publique du 
mardi de la 
semaine 
suivante. 
Elle est limitée 
à une semaine 
et ne porte que 








projet de loi à 
la Chambre 















Art. 106.- La 
discussion du 
projet de loi 
commence à la 
séance 
publique du 
mardi de la 
semaine 
suivante. 
Elle est limitée 
à une semaine 







Art. 107.- Si le 
présente le 
projet de loi à 
la Chambre 















Art. 106.- La 
discussion du 
projet de loi 
commence à la 
séance 
publique du 
mardi de la 
semaine 
suivante. 
Elle est limitée 
à une semaine 







Art. 107.- Si le 
présente le 
projet de loi à 
la Chambre 















Art. 106.- La 
discussion du 
projet de loi 
commence à la 
séance 
publique du 
mardi de la 
semaine 
suivante. 
Elle est limitée 
à une semaine 







Art. 107.- Si le 
présente le 
projet de loi à 
la Chambre 















Art. 106.- La 
discussion du 
projet de loi 
commence à la 
séance 
publique du 
mardi de la 
semaine 
suivante. 
Elle est limitée 
à une semaine 







Art. 107.- Si le 






























































































































































































au projet de 
loi, il est invité 
à les déposer à 
la Chambre au 
plus tard 2 
semaines avant 































au projet de 
loi, il est invité 
à les déposer à 
la Chambre au 
plus tard 2 
semaines avant 































au projet de 
loi, il est invité 
à les déposer à 
la Chambre au 
plus tard 2 
semaines avant 











de l'article 35, 
paragraphe (2). 


















au projet de 
loi, il est invité 
à les déposer à 
la Chambre au 
plus tard 2 
semaines avant 











de l'article 35, 
paragraphe (2). 












Art. 109.- Un 
député ne peut 
prendre la 





























































































































































































































































































































la parole à un 
membre de la 
majorité et à 
un membre de 
l'opposition. 
 
Art. 110.- Le 
Gouvernement 
prend position 
sur le débat 
après 
l'épuisement de 
la liste des 
orateurs 
inscrits. Un 
membre de la 
Chambre peut 
toujours 











































































































































































































































































































parole après un 
membre du 
Gouvernement. 
Dans ce cas, 
son temps de 
parole est 
imputé sur le 
temps global 
lui réservé ou 
réservé 





Art. 111.- Les 
amendements 
parlementaires 





Le temps de 
parole pour la 
motivation est 





réservé à son 














































































































































































































































































































Art. 112.- Les 
motions et les 
amendements 
sont évacués à 
la fin des 

















parole pour un 
temps limité à 
cinq minutes 











orateurs ou aux 



























Vote du projet 
de loi  
Art. 112.- Les 
différents votes 
sur le projet de 
loi, prévus par 
le Règlement 
de la Chambre, 
ont lieu au plus 
tard le jeudi de 
la 3e semaine 


























Vote du projet 
de loi 
Art. 112. Les 
différents votes 
sur le projet de 
loi, prévus par 
le Règlement 
de la Chambre, 
ont lieu au plus 
tard le jeudi de 
la 3e semaine 


























Vote du projet 
de loi 
Art. 112. Les 
différents votes 
sur le projet de 
loi, prévus par 
le Règlement 
de la Chambre, 
ont lieu au plus 
tard le jeudi de 
la 3e semaine 


























Vote du projet 
de loi 
Art. 112.- Les 
différents votes 
sur le projet de 
loi, prévus par 
le Règlement 
de la Chambre, 
ont lieu au plus 
tard le jeudi de 
la 3e semaine 


























Vote du projet 
de loi 
Art. 112. Les 
différents votes 
sur le projet de 
loi, prévus par 
le Règlement 
de la Chambre, 
ont lieu au plus 
tard le jeudi de 
la 3e semaine 


























Vote du projet 
de loi 
Art. 114.- Les 
différents votes 
sur le projet de 
loi, prévus par 
le Règlement 
de la Chambre, 
ont lieu au plus 
tard le jeudi de 
la 3e semaine 


























Vote du projet 
de loi 
Art. 114.- Les 
différents votes 
sur le projet de 
loi, prévus par 
le Règlement 
de la Chambre, 
ont lieu au plus 
tard le jeudi de 
la 3e semaine 


























Vote du projet 
de loi 
Art. 114.- Les 
différents votes 
sur le projet de 
loi, prévus par 
le Règlement 
de la Chambre, 
ont lieu au plus 
tard le jeudi de 
la 3e semaine 


























Vote du projet 
de loi 
Art. 114.- Les 
différents votes 
sur le projet de 
loi, prévus par 
le Règlement 
de la Chambre, 
ont lieu au plus 
tard le jeudi de 
la 3e semaine 
entière du mois 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 






Art. 113.-  
Pour le 31 mai 
au plus tard, le 







déposé à la 
Chambre des 
Députés par le 
Gouvernement. 
Pour le 30 
septembre 
suivant au plus 













Art. 113.  
Pour le 31 mai 
au plus tard, le 







déposé à la 
Chambre des 
Députés par le 
Gouvernement. 
Pour le 30 
septembre 
suivant au plus 













Art. 113.  
Pour le 31 mai 
au plus tard, le 







déposé à la 
Chambre des 
Députés par le 
Gouvernement. 
Pour le 30 
septembre 
suivant au plus 














 Pour le 31 mai 
au plus tard, le 







déposé à la 
Chambre des 
Députés par le 
Gouvernement. 
Pour le 30 
septembre 
suivant au plus 













Art. 113.  
Pour le 31 mai 
au plus tard, le 







déposé à la 
Chambre des 
Députés par le 
Gouvernement. 
Pour le 30 
septembre 
suivant au plus 













Art. 115.-  
Pour le 31 mai 
au plus tard, le 







déposé à la 
Chambre des 
Députés par le 
Gouvernement. 
Pour le 30 
septembre 
suivant au plus 













Art. 115.-  
Pour le 31 mai 
au plus tard, le 







déposé à la 
Chambre des 
Députés par le 
Gouvernement. 
Pour le 30 
septembre 
suivant au plus 













Art. 115.-  
Pour le 31 mai 
au plus tard, le 







déposé à la 
Chambre des 
Députés par le 
Gouvernement. 
Pour le 30 
septembre 
suivant au plus 













Art. 115.- Le 
Gouvernement 
est invité à 
déposer le 







l'année de la 









fixées pour un 
projet de loi. 
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1.5. Motions 




Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
Chapitre 2  
Des motions et 
des résolutions  
 
Art. 85.- (1)  
Chaque député 















par écrit et 
remises au 





au moins. Elles 
sont  
Chapitre 2 
Des motions et 
des résolutions 
 
Art. 85. (1)  
Chaque député 















par écrit et 
remises au 





au moins. Elles 
sont  
Chapitre 2 
Des motions et 
des résolutions 
 
Art. 85. (1)  
Chaque député 















par écrit et 
remises au 





au moins. Elles 
sont  
Chapitre 2 
Des motions et 
des résolutions 
 
Art. 85.- (1) 
Chaque député 















par écrit et 
remises au 





au moins. Elles 
sont  
Chapitre 2 
Des motions et 
des résolutions 
 
Art. 85. (1)  
Chaque député 















par écrit et 
remises au 





au moins. Elles 
sont  
Chapitre 2 
Des motions et 
des résolutions 
 
Art. 79.- (1) 
Chaque député 















par écrit et 
remises au 





au moins. Elles 
sont  
Chapitre 2 
Des motions et 
des résolutions 
 
Art. 79.- (1) 
Chaque député 















par écrit et 
remises au 





au moins. Elles 
sont  
Chapitre 2 
Des motions et 
des résolutions 
 
Art. 79.- (1) 
Chaque député 















par écrit et 
remises au 





au moins. Elles 
sont  
Chapitre 2 
Des motions et 
des résolutions 
 
Art. 79.- (1) 
Chaque député 















par écrit et 
remises au 





au moins. Elles 
sont 
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distribuées aux 


















un point de 
l’ordre du jour, 
le temps de 
parole est celui 
prévu à 











Si la motion ou 
la résolution 
distribuées aux 


















un point de 
l’ordre du jour, 
le temps de 
parole est celui 
prévu à 
































un point de 
l’ordre du jour, 
le temps de 
parole est celui 
prévu à 











Si la motion ou 
la résolution 
distribuées aux 


















un point de 
l'ordre du jour, 
le temps de 
parole est celui 
prévu à  











Si la motion ou 
la résolution 
distribuées aux 


















un point de 
l’ordre du jour, 
le temps de 
parole est celui 
prévu à 











Si la motion ou 
la résolution 
distribuées aux 


















un point de 
l'ordre du jour, 
le temps de 
parole est celui 
prévu à  











Si la motion ou 
la résolution 
distribuées aux 


















un point de 
l'ordre du jour, 
le temps de 
parole est celui 
prévu à  











Si la motion ou 
la résolution 
distribuées aux 


















un point de 
l'ordre du jour, 
le temps de 
parole est celui 
prévu à  











Si la motion ou 
la résolution 
distribuées aux 
membres de la 
Chambre. 
 















un point de 
l'ordre du jour, 
le temps de 
parole est de 
10 minutes 
pour l'auteur 










Si la motion ou 
la résolution 
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s’inscrit dans 
le cadre de la 
discussion d’un 
projet ou d’une 
proposition de 
loi ou d’un 













à l’article 37 
(2).  
 
Art. 86.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité en 










le cadre de la 
discussion d’un 
projet ou d’une 
proposition de 
loi ou d’un 













à l’article 37 
(2). 
 
Art. 86. Le 
Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité en 










motions soit à 
s’inscrit dans 
le cadre de la 
discussion d’un 
projet ou d’une 
proposition de 
loi ou d’un 













à l’article 37 
(2). 
 
Art. 86. Le 
Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité en 










s'inscrit dans  
le cadre de la 
discussion d'un 
projet ou d'une 
proposition de 
loi ou d'un 













à l'article 37 
(2). 
 
Art. 86.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité en 











le cadre de la 
discussion d’un 
projet ou d’une 
proposition de 
loi ou d’un 













à l’article 37 
(2). 
 
Art. 86. Le 
Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité en 










s'inscrit dans  
le cadre de la 
discussion d'un 
projet ou d'une 
proposition de 
loi ou d'un 













à l'article 35 
(2). 
 
Art. 80.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité en 










s'inscrit dans  
le cadre de la 
discussion d'un 
projet ou d'une 
proposition de 
loi ou d'un 













à l'article 35 
(2). 
 
Art. 80.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité en 










s'inscrit dans  
le cadre de la 
discussion d'un 
projet ou d'une 
proposition de 
loi ou d'un 













à l'article 35 
(2). 
 
Art. 80.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité en 










s'inscrit dans  
le cadre de la 
discussion d'un 
projet ou d'une 
proposition de 
loi,  
elle est  
discutée  
pendant le  










à l'article 35. 
 
 
Art. 80.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre est 
seul juge de la 
recevabilité en 







de Travail, qui  
décide du 
renvoi des 
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soit à une 
commission 
traitant du 
même sujet.  
 
Art. 87.- Si la 
Chambre est 







elle décide au 
préalable de la 
priorité à 
accorder à 












accorder à une 










Art. 87. Si la 
Chambre est 







elle décide au 















accorder à une 
des motions ou 
résolutions, 
celle-ci est 




soit à une 
commission 
traitant du 
même sujet.  
 
Art. 87. Si la 
Chambre est 







elle décide au 















accorder à une 
des motions ou 
résolutions, 




soit à une 
commission 
traitant du 
même sujet.  
 
Art. 87.- Si la 
Chambre est 







elle décide au 















accorder à une 
des motions ou 
résolutions, 









Art. 87. Si la 
Chambre est 







elle décide au 















accorder à une 
des motions ou 
résolutions, 









Art. 81.- Si la 
Chambre est 







elle décide au 















accorder à une 
des motions ou 
résolutions, 









Art. 81.- Si la 
Chambre est 







elle décide au 















accorder à une 
des motions ou 
résolutions, 









Art. 81.- Si la 
Chambre est 







elle décide au 















accorder à une 
des motions ou 
résolutions, 









Art. 81.- Si la 
Chambre est 







elle décide au 
préalable de la 
priorité à 
accorder à 












accorder à une 
des motions ou 
résolutions, 
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celle-ci est 
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1.6. Enquiry committees 




Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 












































l’Art. 64 de la 
Constitution 



























prévu par l’Art. 
64 de la 
Constitution 



























prévu par l'Art. 
64 de la 
Constitution 



























prévu par l’Art. 
64 de la 
Constitution 



























prévu par l'Art. 
64 de la 
Constitution 



























prévu par l'Art. 
64 de la 
Constitution 



























prévu par l'Art. 
64 de la 
Constitution 



























prévu par l'Art. 
64 de la 
Constitution 























faits à la base 
de l’enquête et 
définit la 
mission de la 
commission.  
 












de la Chambre 
des Députés.  
 
Art. 180.- Les 
députés non 
membres de la 
commission 
ont le droit 
d’assister à 
l’enquête de la 
commission à 














Art. 179. La 
Chambre 



































Art. 179. La 
Chambre 



































Art. 179.- La 
Chambre 



































Art. 179. La 
Chambre 



































Art. 168.- La 
Chambre 



































Art. 168.- La 
Chambre 



































Art. 168.- La 
Chambre 



































Art. 168.- La 
Chambre 



















de la Chambre. 
Les séances 
dans lesquelles 









peut à tout 
moment 
décider le huis 
clos. Les 
membres de la 
Chambre des 
Députés sont 
tenus au secret 






publiques de la 
commission. 
Toute violation 










secret sauf si 
elle s’est 
expressément 
les témoins ou 
les experts sont 
entendus, sont 
publiques à 
moins que la 
commission 
n’en ait décidé 
autrement. 
Dans tous les 
cas, chaque 



























les témoins ou 
les experts sont 
entendus, sont 
publiques à 
moins que la 
commission 
n’en ait décidé 
autrement. 
Dans tous les 
cas, chaque 
































moins que la 
commission 
n'en ait décidé 
autrement. 
Dans tous les 
cas, chaque 


























les témoins ou 
les experts sont 
entendus, sont 
publiques à 
moins que la 
commission 
n’en ait décidé 
autrement. 
Dans tous les 
cas, chaque 



























les témoins ou 
les experts sont 
entendus, sont 
publiques à 
moins que la 
commission 
n'en ait décidé 
autrement. 
Dans tous les 
cas, chaque 



























les témoins ou 
les experts sont 
entendus, sont 
publiques à 
moins que la 
commission 
n'en ait décidé 
autrement. 
Dans tous les 
cas, chaque 



























les témoins ou 
les experts sont 
entendus, sont 
publiques à 
moins que la 
commission 
n'en ait décidé 
autrement. 
Dans tous les 
cas, chaque 



























les témoins ou 
les experts sont 
entendus, sont 
publiques à 
moins que la 
commission 
n'en ait décidé 
autrement. 
Dans tous les 
cas, chaque 



























Annex - 135 
 











préjudice a le 
droit de 
demander à y 
être entendue 









fondé de cette 
demande. Les 
travaux de la 
commission se 
font dans le 
respect des 
droits de la 
défense.  
 
Art. 181.- La 
commission 



































Art. 181. Les 
pouvoirs 
attribués à la 


































Art. 181. Les 
pouvoirs 
attribués à la 


































Art. 181.- Les 
pouvoirs 
attribués à la 


































Art. 181. Les 
pouvoirs 
attribués à la 













le droit  
d'y  
être entendue 


















Art. 170.- Les 
pouvoirs 
attribués à la 













le droit  
d'y  
être entendue 


















Art. 170.- Les 
pouvoirs 
attribués à la 













le droit  
d'y  
être entendue 


















Art. 170.- Les 
pouvoirs 
attribués à la 













le droit  
d'y  
être entendue 


















Art. 170.- Les 
pouvoirs 
attribués à la 
Chambre ou à 
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autant que 
celui-ci y soit 
















sur des faits 
ayant donné 






sont en cours. 
Si une 
commission a 
déjà été créée, 
sa mission 

























le droit de la 
Chambre ou de 
la commission 










ne peut être 
confiée qu’à un 






















le droit de la 
Chambre ou de 
la commission 










ne peut être 
confiée qu’à un 






















le droit de la 
Chambre ou de 
la commission 










ne peut être 
confiée qu'à un 






















le droit de la 
Chambre ou de 
la commission 










ne peut être 
confiée qu’à un 






















le droit de la 
Chambre ou de 
la commission 










ne peut être 
confiée qu'à un 






















le droit de la 
Chambre ou de 
la commission 










ne peut être 
confiée qu'à un 






















le droit de la 
Chambre ou de 
la commission 










ne peut être 
confiée qu'à un 






















le droit de la 
Chambre ou de 
la commission 










ne peut être 
confiée qu'à un 
conseiller de la 
Cour 
supérieure de 














































procéder à des 
perquisitions 
ou à des visites 
domiciliaires, 
ou à des saisies 
de documents 
ou correspond-
ances, il y a 





























procéder à des 
perquisitions 
ou à des visites 
domiciliaires, 
ou à des saisies 
de documents 
ou correspond-
ances, il y a 





























procéder à des 
perquisitions 
ou à des visites 
domiciliaires, 
ou à des saisies 
de documents 
ou correspond-
ances, il y a 





























procéder à des 
perquisitions 
ou à des visites 
domiciliaires, 
ou à des saisies 
de documents 
ou correspond-
ances, il y a 





























procéder à des 
perquisitions 
ou à des visites 
domiciliaires, 
ou à des saisies 
de documents 
ou correspond-
ances, il y a 





























procéder à des 
perquisitions 
ou à des visites 
domiciliaires, 
ou à des saisies 
de documents 
ou correspond-
ances, il y a 





























procéder à des 
perquisitions 
ou à des visites 
domiciliaires, 
ou à des saisies 
de documents 
ou correspond-
ances, il y a 





























procéder à des 
perquisitions 
ou à des visites 
domiciliaires, 
ou à des saisies 
de documents 
ou correspond-
ances, il y a 
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établissements 






peut se faire si 
elle n’est pas 
de nature à 
compromettre 





Art. 182.- Les 
citations sont 
faites par le 
ministère 
d’huissier ou 
par tout autre 
moyen 
d’information 
équivalent, à la 
requête, selon 
le cas, du 
Président de la 
Chambre, du 




le délai sera de 
deux jours au 
moins, sauf en 

















Art. 182. Les 
citations sont 






à la  
requête, selon 
le cas, du 
Président de la 
Chambre, du 




délai sera de 
deux jours au 


















Art. 182. Les 
citations sont 






 à la  
requête, selon 
le cas, du 
Président de la 
Chambre, du 




délai sera de 
deux jours au 


















Art. 182.- Les 
citations sont 






à la  
requête, selon 
le cas, du 
Président de la 
Chambre, du 




délai sera de 
deux jours au 


















Art. 182. Les 
citations sont 






à la  
requête, selon 
le cas, du 
Président de la 
Chambre, du 




délai sera de 
deux jours au 


















Art. 171.- Les 
citations sont 






à la  
requête, selon 
le cas, du 
Président de la 
Chambre, du 




délai sera de 
deux jours au 


















Art. 171.- Les 
citations sont 






à la  
requête, selon 
le cas, du 
Président de la 
Chambre, du 




délai sera de 
deux jours au 


















Art. 171.- Les 
citations sont 






à la  
requête, selon 
le cas, du 
Président de la 
Chambre, du 




délai sera de 
deux jours au 


















Art. 171.- Les 
citations sont 






à la  
requête, selon 
le cas, du 
Président de la 
Chambre, du 




le délai sera de 
deux jours au 
moins, sauf en 
cas d'urgence. 
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Art. 183.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre ou le 
président de la 
commission 
aura la police 
des séances. Il 
l’exerce dans 




cours et des 
tribunaux.  
 
Art. 184.- Les 
outrages et les 
violences 
envers les 










chap. II, titre 
V. livre II du 
Code pénal, 
concernant les 




Art. 183. Le 
Président de la 
Chambre ou le 
président de la 
commission 
aura la police 
des séances. Il 
l’exerce dans 
les limites des 
pouvoirs 
attribués au  
président de la 
cour et des 
tribunaux. 
 
Art. 184. Les 
outrages et les 
violences 
envers les 










chap. I, titre V, 
livre II du  
code pénal, 
concernant les 




Art. 183. Le 
Président de la 
Chambre ou le 
président de la 
commission 
aura la police 
des séances. Il 
l’exerce dans 
les limites des 
pouvoirs 
attribués au 
président de la 
cour et des 
tribunaux. 
 
Art. 184. Les 
outrages et les 
violences 
envers les 










chap. I, titre V, 
livre II du  
code pénal, 
concernant les 




Art. 183.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre ou le 
président de la 
commission 
aura la police 
des séances. Il 
l'exerce dans 
les limites des 
pouvoirs 
attribués au 
président de la 
cour et des 
tribunaux. 
 
Art. 184.- Les 
outrages et les 
violences 
envers les 










chap. I, titre V, 
livre II du  
code pénal, 
concernant les 




Art. 183. Le 
Président de la 
Chambre ou le 
président de la 
commission 
aura la police 
des séances. Il 
l’exerce dans 
les limites des 
pouvoirs 
attribués au 
président de la 
cour et des 
tribunaux. 
 
Art. 184. Les 
outrages et les 
violences 
envers les 










chap. I, titre V, 
livre II du  
code pénal, 
concernant les 




Art. 172.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre ou le 
président de la 
commission 
aura la police 
des séances. Il 
l'exerce dans 
les limites des 
pouvoirs 
attribués au 
président de la 
cour et des 
tribunaux. 
 
Art. 173.- Les 
outrages et les 
violences 
envers les 










chap. 1, titre V, 
livre Il du  
code pénal, 
concernant les 




Art. 172.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre ou le 
président de la 
commission 
aura la police 
des séances. Il 
l'exerce dans 
les limites des 
pouvoirs 
attribués au 
président de la 
cour et des 
tribunaux. 
 
Art. 173.- Les 
outrages et les 
violences 
envers les 










chap. 1, titre V, 
livre Il du  
code pénal, 
concernant les 




Art. 172.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre ou le 
président de la 
commission 
aura la police 
des séances. Il 
l'exerce dans 
les limites des 
pouvoirs 
attribués au 
président de la 
cour et des 
tribunaux. 
 
Art. 173.- Les 
outrages et les 
violences 
envers les 










chap. 1, titre V, 
livre Il du  
code pénal, 
concernant les 




Art. 172.- Le 
Président de la 
Chambre ou le 
président de la 
commission 
aura la police 
des séances. Il 
l'exerce dans 
les limites des 
pouvoirs 
attribués au 
président de la 
cour et des 
tribunaux. 
 
Art. 173.- Les 
outrages et les 
violences 
envers les 










chap. Il, titre 
V, livre Il du 
code pénal, 
concernant les 
outrages et les 
violences 
envers les 
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ministres, les 
membres de la 
Chambre des 
Députés et les 
dépositaires de 




Art. 185.- Les 
témoins, les 
interprètes et 
les experts sont 
soumis, devant 







devant le juge 
d’instruction; 








par le Code 
pénal. Le 
serment sera 




membres de la 
Chambre des 
Députés et les 
dépositaires de 




Art. 185. Les 
témoins, les 
interprètes et 
les experts sont 
soumis, devant 







devant le juge 
d’instruction; 















membres de la 
Chambre des 
Députés et les 
dépositaires de 




Art. 185. Les 
témoins, les 
interprètes et 
les experts sont 
soumis, devant 







devant le juge 
d’instruction; 















membres de la 
Chambre des 
Députés et les 
dépositaires de 




Art. 185.- Les 
témoins, les 
interprètes et 
les experts sont 
soumis, devant 







devant le juge 
d'instruction; 















membres de la 
Chambre des 
Députés et les 
dépositaires de 




Art. 185. Les 
témoins, les 
interprètes et 
les experts sont 
soumis, devant 







devant le juge 
d’instruction; 















membres de la 
Chambre des 
Députés et 'les 
dépositaires de 




Art. 174.- Les 
témoins, les 
interprètes et 
les experts sont 
soumis, devant 







devant le juge 
d'instruction; 















membres de la 
Chambre des 
Députés et 'les 
dépositaires de 




Art. 174.- Les 
témoins, les 
interprètes et 
les experts sont 
soumis, devant 







devant le juge 
d'instruction; 















membres de la 
Chambre des 
Députés et 'les 
dépositaires de 




Art. 174.- Les 
témoins, les 
interprètes et 
les experts sont 
soumis, devant 







devant le juge 
d'instruction; 















membres de la 
Chambre des 
Députés et les 
dépositaires de 




Art. 174.- Les 
témoins, les 
interprètes et 
les experts sont 
soumis, devant 







devant le juge 
d'instruction; 











prêté d'après la 
formule usitée 
devant la cour 




témoin qui, en 
faisant une 
déclaration 
conforme à la 
vérité, pourrait 

















ne font pas 
l’objet de son 
inculpation.  
 









jure de dire 
toute la vérité, 



































jure de dire 
toute la vérité, 




































de dire toute la 



































jure de dire 
toute la vérité, 




































de dire toute la 
vérité, rien que 



































de dire toute la 
vérité, rien que 



































de dire toute la 
vérité, rien que 






















































































































ment de deux 
mois à trois 
ans et privés 




ans au moins et 












plus à une 
amende de 
123,95 à 
7.436,81 euro.  













ment de deux 
mois à trois  
ans et privés  




ans au moins et 





























ment de deux 
mois à trois 
ans et privés 




ans au moins et 












plus à une 
amende de 
123,95 à 
7.436,81 euro.  













ment de deux 
mois à trois  
ans et privés  




ans au moins et 












plus à une 
amende de 
123,95 à 
7.436,81 euro.  













ment de deux 
mois à trois  
ans et privés  




ans au moins et 












plus à une 
amende de 
5.000 à 
300.000 F.  













ment de deux 
mois à trois  
ans et privés  




ans au moins et 












plus à une 
amende de 
5.000 à 
300.000 F.  













ment de deux 
mois à trois 
ans et privés 




ans au moins et 












plus à une 
amende de 
5.000 à 
300.000 F.  













ment de deux 
mois à trois 
ans et privés 




ans au moins et 












plus à une 
amende de 
5.000 à 
300.000 F.  




















































persister. Si le 
témoin est 
appelé pour 






par la dernière 
déclaration du 
témoin qu’il 
persiste dans la 
déposition. 
 






général pour y 
être donné telle 
suite que de 
droit. Les 
dispositions du 
livre 1er du 
code pénal  
 








persister. Si le 
témoin est 
appelé pour 






par la dernière 
déclaration du 
témoin qu’il 
persiste dans la 
déposition. 
 






général pour y 
être donné telle 
suite que de 
droit. Les 
dispositions du 
livre 1er du 
code pénal  
 








persister. Si le 
témoin est 
appelé pour 






par la dernière 
déclaration du 
témoin qu'il  
persiste dans la 
déposition. 
 






général pour y 
être donné telle 
suite que de 
droit. Les 
dispositions du 
livre Ier du 
code pénal  
 








persister. Si le 
témoin est 
appelé pour 






par la dernière 
déclaration du 
témoin qu’il 
persiste dans la 
déposition. 
 






général pour y 
être donné telle 
suite que de 
droit. Les 
dispositions du 
livre Ier du 
code pénal  
 








persister. Si le 
témoin est 
appelé pour 






par la dernière 
déclaration du 
témoin qu'il  
persiste dans la 
déposition. 
 






général pour y 
être donné telle 














persister. Si le 
témoin est 
appelé pour 






par la dernière 
déclaration du 
témoin qu'il  
persiste dans la 
déposition. 
 






général pour y 
être donné telle 














persister. Si le 
témoin est 
appelé pour 






par la dernière 
déclaration du 
témoin qu'il  
persiste dans la 
déposition. 
 






général pour y 
être donné telle 





de même que 








persister. Si le 
témoin est 
appelé pour 






par la dernière 
déclaration du 
témoin qu'il  
persiste dans la 
déposition. 
 






général pour y 
être donné telle 





de même que 



































































































































































































































































Art. 177.- Les 
indemnités 



































Art. 177.- Les 
indemnités 



































Art. 177.- Les 
indemnités 




le concours a 




au tarif des 
frais en matière 
civile.  
 




imputées sur le 




Art. 189.- Les 
procès-verbaux 
constatant des 








pour y être 
donné telle 






le concours a 




au tarif des 
frais en matière 
civile. 
 




imputées sur le 























le concours a 




au tarif des 
frais en matière 
civile. 
 




imputées sur le 























le concours a 




au tarif des 
frais en matière 
civile. 
 




imputées sur le 























le concours a 




au tarif des 
frais en matière 
civile. 
 




imputées sur le 























le concours a 




au tarif des 
frais en matière 
civile. 
 




imputées sur le 























le concours a 




au tarif des 
frais en matière 
civile. 
 




imputées sur le 























le concours a 




au tarif des 
frais en matière 
civile. 
 




imputées sur le 























le concours a 




au tarif des 
frais en matière 
civile. 
 




imputées sur le 

























sur ses travaux. 
Elle y acte ses 
conclusions et 













Art. 190.- Les 
pouvoirs de la 
commission 
cessent en cas 
de dissolution 




la clôture de la 
session, à 
























Art. 190. Les 
pouvoirs de la 
commission 
cessent en cas 
de dissolution 
de la Chambre.  
 
Il sont  
suspendus par 
la clôture de la 
session, à 























Art. 190. Les 
pouvoirs de la 
commission 
cessent en cas 
de dissolution 
de la Chambre.  
 
Il sont  
suspendus par 
la clôture de la 
session, à 























Art. 190.- Les 
pouvoirs de la 
commission 
cessent en cas 
de dissolution 
de la Chambre. 
 
Ils sont  
suspendus par 
la clôture de la 
session, à 























Art. 190. Les 
pouvoirs de la 
commission 
cessent en cas 
de dissolution 
de la Chambre. 
 
Ils sont  
suspendus par 
la clôture de la 
session, à 























Art. 179.- Les 
pouvoirs de la 
commission 
cessent en cas 
de dissolution 
de la Chambre. 
 
Ils sont  
suspendus par 
la clôture de 
la session, à 























Art. 179.- Les 
pouvoirs de la 
commission 
cessent en cas 
de dissolution 
de la Chambre. 
 
Ils sont  
suspendus par 
la clôture de 
la session, à 























Art. 179.- Les 
pouvoirs de la 
commission 
cessent en cas 
de dissolution 
de la Chambre. 
 
Ils sont  
suspendus par 
la clôture de 
la session, à 























Art. 179.- Les 
pouvoirs de la 
commission 
cessent en cas 
de dissolution 
de la Chambre. 
 
Ils sont  
suspendus par 
la clôture de la 
session, à 
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1.7. European affairs 




Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010_7_15 2010_1_19 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
Art. 26.- (1) A 
l'occasion de 
l'examen d'un  








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 
















Art. 26. (1) A 
l’occasion de 
l’examen d’un 








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 
















Art. 26. (1) A 
l’occasion de 
l’examen d’un 








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 
loisible à une 
commission 
d’entendre 













Art. 26.- (1) A 
l'occasion de 
l'examen d'un  








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 
















Art. 26. (1) A 
l’occasion de 
l’examen d’un 








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 
















Art. 25.- (1) A 
l’occasion de 
l’examen d’un 








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 
















Art. 25.- (1) A 
l’occasion de 
l’examen d’un 








lors de la 
rédaction d’un 
rapport, il est 
















Art. 25.- (1) A 
l'occasion de 
l'examen d'un 










il est  
















Art. 25.- (1) A 
l’occasion de 
l’examen d’un 










il est  
loisible à une 
commission 
d’entendre 
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Legislature 3  
(CSV/LSAP II) 
Legislature 2  
(CSV/LSAP I) 
Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 










Députés et le 
Gouvernement 
en matière de 
politique 
européenne est 
régie par un 
aide-mémoire 
figurant à 


























Députés et le 
Gouvernement 
en matière de 
politique 
européenne est 
régie par un 
aide-mémoire 
figurant à 


























Députés et le 
Gouvernement 
en matière de 
politique 
européenne est 
régie par un 
aide-mémoire 
figurant à 


























Députés et le 
Gouvernement 
en matière de 
politique 
européenne est 
régie par un 
aide-mémoire 
figurant à 



























définies par le 
Conseil 
conformément 































définis par le 
Conseil 
conformément 































définis par le 
Conseil 
conformément 





















-  - 























































































































































à la Chambre 
en temps utile 
pour que celle-
ci puisse 
rendre un avis 
avant que le 
Gouvernement 






























à la Chambre 
en temps utile 
pour que celle-
ci puisse 
rendre un avis 
avant que le 
Gouvernement 






























à la Chambre 
en temps utile 
pour que celle-
ci puisse 
rendre un avis 
avant que le 
Gouvernement 
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à la majorité de 
ses membres, 
s’il y a lieu de 


































à la majorité de 
ses membres, 
s’il y a lieu de 


































à la majorité de 
ses membres, 
s’il y a lieu de 
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motivé tendant 




















délai de huit 
semaines et 
adopté sans 












le délai de huit 
motivé tendant 




















délai de huit 
semaines et 
adopté sans 












le délai de huit 
motivé tendant 




















délai de huit 
semaines et 
adopté sans 



















































































































































































informée de la 
décision de la 
Conférence des 
Présidents lors 
de la prochaine 
séance 
publique dans 








avis motivé sur 
le non-respect 
du principe de 
subsidiarité et 


















informée de la 
décision de la 
Conférence des 
Présidents lors 
de la prochaine 
séance 
publique dans 








avis motivé sur 
le non-respect 
du principe de 
subsidiarité et 


















informée de la 
décision de la 
Conférence des 
Présidents lors 
de la prochaine 
séance 
publique dans 








avis motivé sur 
le non-respect 
du principe de 
subsidiarité et 
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compte de cet 
















du recours doit 
être adoptée en 
séance 
publique à la 
majorité des 
Députés. Au 














compte de cet 
















du recours doit 
être adoptée en 
séance 
publique à la 
majorité des 
Députés. Au 














compte de cet 
















du recours doit 
être adoptée en 
séance 
publique à la 
majorité des 
Députés. Au 





















































































































































des Députés est 
informée de la 
décision de la 
Conférence des 
Présidents lors 
de la prochaine 
séance 
publique dans 










est applicable à 
la rédaction 
d’avis 
politiques et au 
droit 
d’opposition 













des Députés est 
informée de la 
décision de la 
Conférence des 
Présidents lors 
de la prochaine 
séance 
publique dans 










est applicable à 
la rédaction 
d’avis 
politiques et au 
droit 
d’opposition 













des Députés est 
informée de la 
décision de la 
Conférence des 
Présidents lors 
de la prochaine 
séance 
publique dans 










est applicable à 
la rédaction 
d’avis 
politiques et au 
droit 
d’opposition 
prévu par les 
traités en 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010 2010 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 
- - - - - - Chapitre 6 



















à l’article 35. 
Chapitre 6 



















à l’article 35. 
 
Chapitre 6 



















à l'article 35. 
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Legislature 1  
(CSV/DP) 
2011 2010 2010 2009 2007 2004 2003 2000 1999 




la Chambre des 








I. Information à 





la Chambre des 
Députés notent 
que cette dernière 
reçoit d’ores et 























I. Information à 





la Chambre des 
Députés notent 
que cette dernière 
reçoit d’ores et 























I. Information à 





la Chambre des 
Députés notent 
que cette dernière 
reçoit d’ores et 









et tout autre 













I. Information à 





la Chambre des 
Députés notent 
que cette dernière 
reçoit d’ores et 
déjà les projets 
d’actes législatifs 







et tout autre 
- - - - - 




législative ou de 
stratégie 
politique de la 
Commission, les 
ordres du jour et 





des sessions au 
cours desquelles 
le Conseil 
délibère sur des 
projets d’actes 
législatifs, ainsi 
que le rapport 
annuel de la Cour 




informe sur une 














législative ou de 
stratégie 
politique de la 
Commission, les 
ordres du jour et 





des sessions au 
cours desquelles 
le Conseil 
délibère sur des 
projets d’actes 
législatifs, ainsi 
que le rapport 





informe sur une 














législative ou de 
stratégie 
politique de la 
Commission, les 
ordres du jour et 





des sessions au 
cours desquelles 
le Conseil 
délibère sur des 
projets d’actes 
législatifs, ainsi 
que le rapport 





informe sur une 














législative ou de 
stratégie 
politique de la 
Commission, les 
ordres du jour et 





des sessions au 
cours desquelles 
le Conseil 
délibère sur des 
projets d’actes 
législatifs, ainsi 
que le rapport 





informe sur une 
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peut se faire sous 
forme orale ou 
écrite comme par 










Elle peut porter 
tant sur le fond 
que sur la 
procédure. Elle 
doit permettre à 
la Chambre des 
Députés de 
déterminer en 
temps utile sa 















peut se faire sous 
forme orale ou 
écrite comme par 










Elle peut porter 
tant sur le fond 
que sur la 
procédure. Elle 
doit permettre à 
la Chambre des 
Députés de 
déterminer en 
temps utile sa 















peut se faire sous 
forme orale ou 
écrite comme par 










Elle peut porter 
tant sur le fond 
que sur la 
procédure. Elle 
doit permettre à 
la Chambre des 
Députés de 
déterminer en 
temps utile sa 















peut se faire sous 
forme orale ou 
écrite comme par 










Elle peut porter 
tant sur le fond 
que sur la 
procédure. Elle 
doit permettre à 
la Chambre des  
Députés de  
déterminer en 
temps utile sa 





Dans ces cas, la 
Chambre des 
Députés doit être 
informée de 
façon continue de 
l’état 
d’avancement de 




la Chambre des 
Députés ayant à 
traiter de dossiers 
européens dans le 




faire appel à des 
membres du 
Gouvernement en 
charge de ces 
dossiers pour les 













Dans ces cas, la 
Chambre des 
Députés doit être 
informée de 







la Chambre des 
Députés ayant à 
traiter de dossiers 
européens dans le 




faire appel à des 
membres du 
Gouvernement en 
charge de ces 
dossiers pour les 













Dans ces cas, la 
Chambre des 
Députés doit être 
informée de 







la Chambre des 
Députés ayant à 
traiter de dossiers 
européens dans le 




faire appel à des 
membres du 
Gouvernement en 
charge de ces 
dossiers pour les 













Dans ces cas, la 
Chambre des 
Députés doit être 
informée de 







la Chambre des 
Députés ayant à  
traiter de dossiers 
européens dans 




faire appel à des 
membres du 
Gouvernement en 
charge de ces  
dossiers pour les 















5. La Chambre 










ou du Conseil de 
l’Union de venir 
exposer 
préalablement à 
la tenue de ces 
réunions l’état 
des dossiers en 
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s’engage à 





qu’elle reçoit de 







figurant à l’ordre 








documents à la 
Chambre des 
Députés, il le fait 
à la date la plus 
précoce possible 
et par la voie la 
plus directe. 
Lesdits courriers 
sont à adresser au 
service 
international de 
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Chambre des  
Députés dès  
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et du Conseil. 
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Gouvernement 
expédie les  
documents à la 
Chambre des  
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à la date la plus  
précoce possible 
et par la voie la 
plus directe. 
Lesdits courriers 
sont à adresser au 
service 
international de 
la Chambre des  
Députés par 
courrier ordinaire 
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contacts entre les 
institutions 
européennes et 
ses membres et 
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permettant, dans 
un délai de huit 
semaines à 




toutes les langues 
de l’Union, de 
communiquer un 
avis motivé aux 
institutions 
européennes. Cet 





considère que le 
texte en cause ne 
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participation à 
une initiative 
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un délai de huit 
semaines à 




toutes les langues 
de l’Union, de 
communiquer un  
avis motivé aux 
institutions 
européennes. Cet  
avis expose les  
motifs pour 
lesquels  
la Chambre des 
Députés 
considère 
que le texte en 
cause ne respecte 
pas le principe de 
subsidiarité. 
 
2. La Chambre 
informe le 
Gouvernement  
d’une initiative  
qu’elle aurait 
prise ou de sa 
participation à 
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3. A la demande 
de la Chambre 
des Députés, le 
Gouvernement 
peut assister cette 
dernière dans son 
travail de 
recherche en vue 
d’une prise de 




relativement à un 
projet d’acte 
législatif 
déterminé, en lui 
fournissant des 
éléments oraux 
ou écrits lui 
permettant 
d’apprécier 
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premier semestre 






de l’année.  
 
3. La Chambre 
des Députés 
décidera si et 
quand il y a lieu 
de débattre les 
deux rapports.  
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faisant l’objet des 
échanges entre le 
Gouvernement et 
la Chambre des 
Députés. 
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Annex 2: Committee key 
AEE Foreign and European affairs (affaires étrangères et européennes) 
AEEDCI Foreign and European affairs, defence, cooperation and immigration (affaires 
étrangères et européennes, de la défense, de la coopération et de l'immigration) 
AGRI Agriculture, viticulture, rural development (agriculture, viticulture, développement 
rural) 
CMTOUR SME, tourism (classes moyennes, tourisme) 
CODEXBU Budgetary control (contrôle de l'exécution budgétaire) 
CULT Culture (culture) 
DEVDUR Sustainable development (développement durable) 
EAC European affairs committee (that is the AEE and the AEEDCI) 
EACs European Union affairs committees of national parliaments 
ECCEES Economy, external commerce, solidary economy (économie, commerce extérieur, 
économie solidaire) 
ECON Economy committee 
ECON,SP Economy, energy, postal services, sports (économie, énergie, postes, sports) 
ECON, TRAN Economy, energy, postal services, transport (économie, énergie, postes, transports) 
EDU National education, vocational training (éducation nationale, formation 
professionnelle) 
EDUSP National education, vocational training, sports (éducation nationale, formation 
professionnelle, sports) 
EGAL Equal opportunities, women’s advancement (égalité des chances, promotion féminine) 
ENSSUP  Higher education committee  
ENSSUP1 Higher education, research, culture (enseignement supérieur, recherche, culture) 
ENSSUP2 Higher education, research, media, communications, space (enseignement supérieur, 
recherche, médias, communications, espace) 
ENVI Environment (environnement) 
FAM Family, social security, youth (famille, solidarité sociale, jeunesse) 
FIBU Finances, budget (finances, budget) 
FONCPUB Public service (fonction publique) 
FONCPUB2 Public service, administrative reform, media, communications (fonction publique, 
réforme administrative, médias, communications) 
FONCPUB3 Public service, administrative simplification (fonction publique, simplification 
administrative) 
INST Institutions, constitutional revision (institutions, révision constitutionnelle) 
INT1 Internal affairs (intérieur) 
INT2 Internal affairs, spatial planning (intérieur, aménagement du territoire) 
INT3 Internal affairs, the Greater Region, police (intérieur, Grande Région, police) 
JURI Justice (juridique) 
LOG Housing (logement) 
MEDIA Media, communications (médias, communications) 
SANT Health, social security (santé, sécurité sociale) 
TRANS Transport (transport) 
TRAVEMP Work, employment (travail, emploi) 
TRAVPUB Public works (travaux publics) 
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Annex 3: Key of interviews 
1. Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 30 November 2012 
2. Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 December 2012 
3. Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 12 December 2012 
4. Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 December 2012 
5. Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 January 2013 
6. Member of the European Parliament, telephone interview, 26 March 2013 
7. Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 25 May 2013 
8. Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 June 2013 
9. Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 10 June 2013 
10. Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 13 June 2013 
11. Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 14 June 2013 
12. Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013 
13. Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 18 June 2013 
14. Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 20 June 2013 
15. Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 24 July 2013 
16. Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 July 2013 
17. Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 18 September 2013 
18. Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 23 September 2013 
19. Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2013 
20. Member of the Chamber of Deputies, face-to-face interview, 2 October 2013 
21. Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 3 October 2013 
22. Official of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013 
23. Member of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 4 October 2013 
24. Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 10 October 2013 
25. Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 18 October 2013 
26. Ministry official, face-to-face interview, 28 October 2013 
27. Former Minister, face-to-face interview, 29 October 2013 
28. Member of the State Council, face-to-face interview, 7 November 2013 
29. Minister, face-to-face interview, 19 November 2013 
 




Speaker of the House 1 
Committee chair 6 
Committee secretary 3 
Clerk of the Chamber 9 
Minister 4 
Government official 8 
Ambassador to the EU 1 
MEP 2 
State Councillor 2 
Official of the State Council 2 
Member of the Audit Court 1 
Employee of a professional chamber 1 
 
